Learned counsel for the respondent however drew our attention to the Criminal Law (194:-1 Amendment) Amending Ordinance, No. 7 of 1946, by which s. 10. f)f the 1943-0rdinance was further amended. It is not disputed that the Ordinance of 1946 by which s. IO was further amended had no application to the trial of the respondent. This ,.-1 will clear from the judgment of the High Court in appeal filed by the respondent from hie conviction. In that appeal the High Court held that a. 10, as a.mended by the 1946-0rrlinance, could not apply to the case, which was pending before the tribunal on the date when the 1946-0rdinance became law. Therefore, the respondent cannot take advantage of the provisions of s. IO, 11~ amended by the 19460rdinance and his case must be governed by s. 10 as it was after the amendment of 1945. It is clear ;,... \ that though s. 10 of the 1943-ordinance, as amended in 1945, provided for a minimum fine, it still left it open to the criminal court to pass a.ny fine above the minimum. Further the fine as paSBed under a.IO, as it was in 1945, was one fine and not divided into two parts as was the case under the Ordinance of 1946. Again, as the High Court pointed out in the appeal of the respondent from bis conviction, --1 "the liability to fine in addition to a sentence of \ imprisonment for an offence of criminal breach of trust by a public servant, or for an offence of criminal conspiracy to commit an offence. under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code was thus not created for the first time by section 10 of the Ordinance. The liability was already there under the Indian Penal Code. But while under the Penal Code, it was discretionary for the court to pass a , sentence of fine, in addition to a term of imprison, ment, section 10 of the Ordinance (the 1943-0rdinapce) inade it coinpulliory for the court to Plll!ll a
