IPOJ Held, that the two services had no common origin, but were recruited on different bases on different rates of pay Kuni B•huila1 and runditions of service. Even among tbe members of the Ayat'wol two parallel services, there had been great disparities in rates Unim of !Mia •• of pay and condition of•ervice. The two ScrvicC9 had been unified within each group by separate order• passed in 1945 and 1946. As a rernlt of the changes brought about by these two orders in these two groups, a substantial amount of uniformity in the conditions of service of each group, comp- ared with the other, had also been achieved. An attempt had been made to bring into a common roll the member• of the two Services by the communication dated Augu•t 14, 1946, but that communication was cancelled on February 15, 1947, Before August 19, 1949, the Temporary Clerks held their employment a. against sanctioned p<>919. The Extra Temp· orary Clerks were ad hoc employees recruited on a temporary basis and not against any sanctioned post, whether permanent or temporary. On the date of the amalgamation when the services of the Extra Temporary Clerks were regularised and they were brought to a. common establishment, the position wa. that when:aJ the Temporary Clerks along with the per· manent establishment were members of the ISP or IPE, the Extra Temporary Clerk's did not fall within that category, and were made part 0£ it only from and after August 1, 1949, ol'nder the order dated August 19, 1949. While the Tempor· ary Clerks could claim to have been in the same •ervice from even before August 1, 1949, the Extra Temporary Clerk• cou Id claim to belong to that service only from and after August 1, 1949. There was no express provision providin~ for a common basis of seniority based on length of service of the personnel falling under two groups and there WaJ no intention of providing a common rule for determining the •eniority. The petitioner could not claim that any rights regarding seniority which he posse.•ed on the date when the Constitution came into force, were, in any way, restricted or denied to him by the order of April 20, 1955. The said order was really a concession in favour of the petitioner and not any detraction from the right posscased by him at the time of the commencement of the Constitution. There was no basis for the contention that any fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 14 or 16 ( 1) had been violatetl. Actually, the p<>!ition of the petitioner had improved and he was given a limited amount of seniority by the impugned order as compared to the rights he possessed on January 26, 1950. The impu~ned order really conferred upon him larger right. than he nreviou•ly possessed. The writ petition was dismissed.
