Allowed

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Another v. the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara

Supreme Court24 Sept 19621962 INSC 265 · [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 1721962 INSC 265

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Coal miners challenged demands for enhanced coal tax levied by the Janapada Sabha at 9 pies per ton. The court held constructive res judicata did not bar the new challenges for different years, but the enhanced levy was invalid absent prior government sanction under s. 51(2), and final assessments could not be reopened.

What did the court decide?

Respondent restrained from recovering tax above 3 pies per ton and from recovering additional tax for years already assessed; costs to appellants.

What the court decided

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and… — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | Supreme Court (1963)

¶1

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶2

1962

¶3

Gujarat University, 11hmedabad

¶4

v. Krishna Rangariath Mudholkar

¶5

Subba Rao, J.

¶6

under a statute, s. 38A of the Act which is a conse· quential provision would be valid.

¶7

For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the University was w~ll within its rights in prescribing, by statutes, the said two languages as media of instruc· tion to replace English by stages.

¶8

. In the result the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeals are allowed with costs of the appeliants here and in the High Court.

¶9

BY COURT: In accordance with the view of the majority, both the appeals stand dismissed in the manner indicated in the majority judgment, with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee.

Appeals dismissed.

1962

Septtmber 24.

THE AMALGAMATED COALFIELDS LTD. AND ANOTHER

¶14

¶15

THEJANAPADA SABHA, CHHINDWARA (And connected appeals)

¶16

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAB GUPTA AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)

¶17

Coal Tax-Levy-ValUJity-Writ Petition, if barred by rea ju&icata-Enhanced levy after first imposition-Absence of premous sanction by Local Government-Legality of such levy-Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (f), 32, 141, 226-Central Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920 (C. P. IV of 1920), 8. 51(2).

¶18

The 1st appellant in the first batch of appeals >ad filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the nouces. calhg upon him to pay the tax of 9 pies per ton on coal mcluding coal despatched outside the State of Madhya Pradesh on two grounds, namely, that the levy of the tax by. th~ J.ndepende~~ Mining Board was invalid at the date of its uutial mtposttion and,

¶19

173

¶20

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶21

1962

¶22

therefore, the respondent Sabha wl,ich was the successor of the Mining Board could not continue the levy an~ also that on a proper construction of s. 51 of the Act, the levy could not be made. Another point natnely, the increase in the rate of tax from the original 3 pies to the 9 pies per ton a.t <sup>1 .rhich the tax \Vas demanded \Vas illegal v • .-as sought to be canvassed but was not allowed to be argued hy the Court as it had not been raised in the pctitio11. The \.Tit petition \Vas rejected.

¶23

The Amalgamattd Coalfields Ltd. v.

¶24

The ]anapada Sabha Chhindu·ara

¶25

The appellant challenged the levy of the tax for the further periods by way of a writ petition before the High Court of J.Jadhya Pradt"'sh on grounds distinct and separate from those which had been rejected by this Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it.was barred by rrs,judicata by reason of the earlier judgment by this Court. In the case of the other appellants the High Court held that the matter '.Vas also concluded on the authority of the de:cision of this Court. The appellants in the first batch of appeals came by special leave and also filed writ petitions challenging the validity of the levy.

¶26

Held, that while the general principle of res-jud·icala app]ies to '\Tit petitions undrr Art. 32 and Art. 226 of the Constitution, in its application to ~i.rt. 32 of the Constitution, the doctrine only regulates the manner in which the fundanu'ntal rights could be f;HCcessfully asserted and does not in any \vay i1npair or affect the content of the fundamental rights.

¶27

Pandit M.8.M. Sha""'" v. Dr. 8hree Krishna Sinha, [1961] 1 8. C. R. 96, Raj 1,ak8hmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, [1953] S. C.R. 154 and Duryao v. 8tnte of U.P., [1962] l S.C.R. 574, referred to.

¶28

Constructive rc8-jiulicafa was a crcoture of statute and its application could not Le extended to other proceedings particularly those questioning tax liability for different years.

¶29

Hrld, further, that the law declared by the Supreme Court which is binding under Art. 141 of the Constitution of India is diat which has been expressly declared and any implied dcclarat1on though binding was subject to revision by this Court when the point was subsequently directly and expressly raised before this Court.

¶30

Held, further, that the procedure of assessment of tax authorised by the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules could not be said to be a capricious administrative or executive affair so'" to violate Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.

¶31

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶32

1962

¶33

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v.

¶34

1 he Janapada Sabha Chhir1dwara '

¶35

Kunnathat Thathunni Moapil Nair v. State of Kera/a, [1961) 3 S. C.R. 77, distinguished.

¶36

As the Rule which prescribed the maximum rate had itself been deleted it could not be said that there had been a levy in excess of the maximum prescri°hed.

¶37

As neither the Act nor the Rules prescribed a ceiling on the levy, the expression "first imposition" occurring in s. 51(2) would include every increase of the levy after its initial impnsition and the increased levy Would require the previous sanction of the Local Government and such sanction not being there, the levy at the rate of 9 pies per ton was illegal.

¶38

Considering the nature of the tax and the periods for which it was assessed and in the· absen~e of any provision, the assessment once made by r. l 0 was final and there could be no re-assessment.

¶39

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 469, 470, 506, 507 and 529 to 534 of 1962.

¶40

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 18, 1961, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. ·Petition Nos. 24, 2!l, 42, to 45, 58, 70, 95 and 213 of 1960.

¶41

WITH

¶42

Petitions Nos. 70 and 71 of 1962.

¶43

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.

¶44

Sachin Chaudhri, B. Sen, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. 0 .. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 469 and 470/62) and the Petitioners (in Petns. Nos. 70 and 71 of 62).

¶45

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnt:tn, for the respondent (in C. As. Nos. 469, 470, 506 and 507 of 62), Respondents Nos. l and 3 (in C. As. Nos. 529 to 534/62) and Respondent No. l (in. Petn. Nos. 70 and 71/62).

¶46

B. Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 506 and 507/62).

¶47

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 175

¶48

1962

¶49

N. C. Chatterjee, Y. S. Dharmadhikaree and Jf. S. Gnpta, for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 529 to 534 of 62).

¶50

I. N. Shroff, for the respondents Nos. 2 and 4 (in C. As. 529 to 534 of 62).

¶51

The Am.a/gamattt. Coalfieldr Ltd v. The Janapada SObh. Chhindwara

¶52

September 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

¶53

GAJRNDRAGADKAR, ].-These ten appeals and two writ petitions have been placed for hearing together in a group, because they raise common questions of law. The appellants in these matters are all colliers holding mining leases under the Government of Madhya Pradesh for the extraction of coal from collieries situated in the Chhindwara District. The respondent, Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara, has issued notices against them calling upon them to pay coal tax "for coal manufactured at the mines, sold for export by rail or sold otherwise than for export by rail within the jurisdiction of the original Independent Mining Board for the said area". It appears that the mining area in question was within the territorial limits of the Independent Mining Local Board which had the status and powers of a District Council under the Central Provinces Local-Self Government Act, 1920 (hereinafter called the Act). The respondent Sabha is the successor of the said Mining Board and, therefore, claims to be entitled to continue the levy and recover the tax in question.

¶54

Gajendragadlrar, J.

¶55

On March 12, 1935, the Mining Board exercising its powers under section 51 of the Act, resolved to levy coal tax, and accordingly, the first imposition made by it received the sanction of the local Government on December 16, 1935, as per Notification No. 8700-2253-D-VIII. This notification came into force from January 1, 1936. On December 16, 1935, the local Government notified the mies for the assessment and

¶56

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l963]SUPP.

¶57

1962

¶58

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. The Janapada Sabha, Chhintfwara

¶59

Gajendrag11dkar, J.

¶60

collection of the tax which it had framed in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 79 (l ), clauses (xv), (xix) and (xxx). Rule 2 of these Rules provided that the tax shall be payable by every person, firm or company holding a mining lease for coal within the limits of the Independent Mining Local Board's jurisdiction. Rule 3 provided that the tax shall be levied @ three pies per ton on coal, coal dust or coke manufactured at the mines, sold for export by rail or sold otherwise than for export by rail within the torritorial jurisdiction of the Independent Mining Local Board. In 1943, the words "coke manufactured at the mines" were deleted from Rule 3 and the tax was confined to coal and coal dust. The rate thus prescribed was increased from time to time. On December 22, 1943, the rate was made 4 pies per ton; on .July 29, 1946, it was made 7 pies, per ton; and on July 19, 194 7, it was made 9 pies. The Mining Board continued to recover the tax at the said rates until the Act was repealed in 1948 and in its place was enacted the Central Provinces and Berar Local Self-Government Act, 1948 (No. 38 of 1948). The respondent Sabha has now taken the place of the said Mining Board and has issued the notices against the several appellants, calling upon them to pay the coal tax for the different periods mentioned in the said notices.

¶61

The appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 469 and 4 70 of 1962 are : The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd., and The Pench Valley Coal Co. Ltd. They are companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and both have Shaw Wallace & Co., Ltd., as their Managing Agents. On August 23, 1958, notices. were served on the two appellants calling upon them to pay Rs. 21,898/ 64 np and Rs. 11,838/9 np respectively as tax assessed @ 9 pies per ton from January 1, 1958, to June 30, 1958. This tax was claimed in respect of coal which iucluded coal despatched by the appellants outside the State of

¶62

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 177

¶63

Madhya Pradesh. The validity of these notices was challenged by the appellants in this Court by their Writ Petition No. 31 of Hl59. On Februarv 10, 1961, the said writ petition was dismissed b)· this Court and it was held that the notices served on them were valid (Vide The A1ru1/gr1111fr.ied Cool;field8 Ltd. v. T0e Ja1uipn17'! Sabhn, Chhindmrr'.1.(').

¶64

1962

¶65

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. The J anaprzda Sabha Chhindu•ara

¶66

GaJendragadkar, J.

¶67

On September 13, I!)()() and March 2, 19fil, two notices of demand were served on the appellants calling upon them to pay Rs. 1,16,776/25 nP. and Rs. 65,21il/10 nP. respectively in regard to the tax assessed @nine pies per ton on all coal despat. ched by the appellants from their collieries for the half years ending June ;{O, Hlii8. December :H, 19,;s, June :lO, lDiill, December :11, 1959, June 30, !\WO and December :ll, rnno. The appellants challenged the validitv of these notices by a Writ Petition filed by them in the High Court of Madhva Pradesh on April 12, J!)()l (:'\o. 9G of l!lCil). \Vhilst the said writ petition was pending before the High Court, the appellants filed another writ Petition in the same High Court (No. 21 :l of 1961 ). By this writ petition, the appellants challenged the validity of notices issued against them on June !l, l !)59, by which coal tax was demanded from them for a period b,elwec11_ April 1, I [)51 to December 31, l!J;37. This tax was levied in respect of co'al despatched by the appellants outside the State of Madhva Pradesh. The amounts demanded ;vere Rs. l,!J:!,U4/66 nP. and Rs. ()8,319/36 nP. respectively.

¶68

These two petitions along with eight others were heard together by the High Court. So far as the appellants' petitions were concerned, the High Court has held that the appellants' claims were barred by res .i1tdicnff1 by reason of the earlier decision of this Court in the case of the Am11/ynrnated Coo/field,• Ltd. ('). The appellants then applied for and obtained special leave from (I) (1962] J, S. C. R. !.

¶69

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SL.'i'.

¶70

1962

¶71

The Amalgamated Coalfield, Ltd.

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v. The· J anapada Sabha~ Chhindwara

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Gajendn1gadkar, J.

¶74

this Court on April 23, 1962 and it is by special leave thus granted to them that they have come to this Court in Civil Appeals 4()9 & 4 70 of 1!1(i2.

¶75

The appellants have also filed two Writ Petitions Nos. 70 & 71 j HJ()2 under Art. :l2 of the Constitution. By these writ petitions, the two appdlants challenged the validitv of the not ices served .on them on June 9, Hl59 as well as on September l:l, 1960. The appellants' case is that these notices are illegal and without jurisdiction and so, they want them to be quashed by an appropriate writ or order issued against the respondent in that behalf. Thus, the two appellants, the Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd., and the Pcnch Valley Coal Co. Ltd., are concerned with the two appeals Nos 4G\l & 470/1!1()2 and \Vrit Petitions 70 & 71/1962.

¶76

The other appeals arise from the writ petitions filed in thC' High Court of :Madhya Pradesh by the respective appellants which were tried along with the writ petitions filed by the Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. In dealing with these writ petitions, High Court has held that the decision of this Court is the case ofAmal!7amatcd Crxil;ficlds Lld.(¹ ) concludes the points raised by them in challenging the validity of the notices, and so, following the said decision, the Hig·h Court has dismissed all the said petitions. The appellants applied for and obtainrd special leave to come to this Court against the said decisions ahd it is 'A>ith the special leave thus granted to them that these appellants have come before us.

¶77

Civil Appeal No. 500 arises from the decision of the Hirsh Court of Maclhya Pr~cicsh dismissing the writ petition filed bcfor·c it by the appellant, the Ctntral Provinces Svmlic3tc (P) Ltd. By its writ petition the appellant had cliallic>nged the validity of the notice served by the respondent calling upon it to pay arrears of the tax amounting to Rs. 20,776/88 nP. being arrears from April 1, !9iil to June 30, 1959. (1) [ 1%2] l S.C.R. !.

¶78

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 179

¶79

It appears that for the said period, the appellant had been taxed by the respondent, but the said tax was not imposed on coal which had been transported by the appellant outside the limits of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondent now sought to reopen the assessment levied against the appellant for that period by inclnding a claim for tax in respect of coal sold by the appellant outside the limits of the State. The High Court has rejected the Writ Petition and that decision has given rise to Civil Appeal No. 500 of 1902.

¶80

1962

¶81

1k Amafgamalld Coalfieldf Ltd. v. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara '

¶82

Gajendragadkar, /,

¶83

Civil Appeal No. 507 of 1962 arises from a writ petition filed by the appellants M/s. Kanhan Valley Coal Co. (Private) Ltd., in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in which the validity of the notice issued by the respondent calling upon the appellants to pay the coal tax amounting to Rs. IO, !liO/ · as arrears from April 1. 1051 to .June :lll, l\liifl has been challenged .. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition, and so, the appellants have n•mc tn this Court by their Appeal No. fi()i /l!lG:!.

¶84

Civil Appeals Nos. fi:W to 534 of l 962 similarly arise out of six writ petitions filed by the appellants M/s. Newton Chickli Collieries (P) Ltd. & five others in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the validity of the notices of demand served on them to recover by way of arrears coal tax for the periods mentioned in the notices in regard to coal sent by them outside the State of Madhya Pradesh for export. These writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court, and the appellants have,· therefore, come to this Court by appeals Nos. 5:W-ii:l4/190~. That, in brief, is the genesis of the ten appeals and two writ petitions which have bern grouped together for hearing in th is Court.

¶85

It will thus be seen that Civil Appeals Nos. 409 & 470/l!ltl:l and \Vrit Petitions Nos. 70 & 71/196:! raise a preliminarv question about the applicability

¶86

¶87

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶88

1962

¶89

Thr? Amalgamated Coa(fieldJ Ltd. v. The Janapada~ Sabha, Chhindwara

¶90

Gajrndragadkar. J.

¶91

of the doctrine of res judicata to writ petitions filed under Art. 226 or to petitions under Art. 32, whereas the said appeals and writ petitions as well as the other appeals raise an additional question about the validity of the notices issued against the respective appellants. We would, therefore, deal with civil appeals i\os. 4G9 and 470/1962 and Writ Petitions Nos. 70 and 71/19G2. Our decision in these matters will govern the other appeals in this group.

¶92

The first point which falls for our decision in these appeals is one of res judicatet. The High Court has held that the challenge made by the appellants against the validity of the demand notices issued against them by the respondent is barred by res jiidiwta by virtue of the decision of this Court in the earlier case brought by the appellants themselves before this Court. 'J'he Amalgamated Coal;(relds Ltd.(') Before dealing with this point it is necessary to refer to the said decision. In that case, the validity of the impugned notices was challenged on two grounds ; it was urged that the levy of the tax by the Independent Mining Board was invalid at the date of its initial imposition in 1935 and so, the respondent Sabha which was the successor of the said Mining Board could claim no authority to continue the said tax. This contention was based on the assumption that before the power conferred· bys. 51 of the Act could be exercised, the previous sanction of the Governor-General had to be obtained, or that there should be fresh legislation in that behalf. This Court held that the Act having received the assent of the Governor-General, its validity cannot be challenged in view of the saving clauses in the proviso to section 80A (3) and s. 84(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915. That being so, it was not open to any party to suggest that any subsequent amendments of the Government of India Act could affect the continued validity and operation of the Act. The scconcl con- . tention raised was one of construction. It was urged (!) [1962] I S.C.R. I.

¶93

¶94

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 181

¶95

1962

¶96

that on a fair construction of s. 51, the coal tax was excluded from the purview of the local authority. This argument was based on the opening clause of s. 51 which provided that its provisions would operate subject to the provision of any law or enactment for the time being in force. It was suggested that this clause took in the provisions of s. 80A(3) of the Government of India Act read with the Scheduled Taxes Rules framed under that section, but this argument was also rejected. It appears that at the hearing of the petition, the appellants also attempted to tak~ an additional point against the validity of the impugned notices on the ground that the rate of tax which had been increa>ed from :l pies to U pies per ton was invalid. The appellants' case was that this increase was effected· after the commencement of the Government of India :\ct, l !l:J.i, and so, it was invalid. This argument was not considered by the Court, because it was not even hinted in the petition filed by the appellants and the Court thought tltat it would not be proper lo permit the appellants to raise that point at that stage. That is how the appellants' challenge to the validity of the impugned notices served on them on August 23, l \J58 was repelled and the writ petition filed by them in that behalf was dismissed.

¶97

The Amalga111a ted Coalfields Ltd.

¶98

v. The Janapada ilabha, Clihindwara

¶99

Gajendragadkar, J.

¶100

It appears that the authority of the .J anapada Sabha to le,·y the impost under s.51 of the. :\ct was challenged on another ground in the case of .J/ /s. Rr11n Kri.shmi Ram Nath v. J11napad Sabhr6 ('). This time the attack against the competence of the J anapad Sabha proceeded on the ground that in repealing the Act of l!l:!O, the subscqncnt Act of 19!8 had not provided for the continuance of the said power in the J anapad Sabhas which were the successors of the Independent Mining Boards. Section 192(c) purported to provide that all rates, taxes and cesses due to the District Council, Local Board or Independent Local Board shall be deemed to be due to the Sabha to

¶101

(I) (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70.

¶102

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶103

The Amalgamated Caaljields Ltd.

¶104

¶105

The Jonrtpada Sabha, Chhiridwara

¶106

Gajendragadkar, J,

¶107

whose area they pertain. But it was obvious that this clause coulcl apply to, and save, only rates, taxes and cesses alreacly due; it did not authorise the imposition of fresh ccsscs, taxes or rates in future. Having realised that the relevant provision did not save future imposts, an amending Act was passed in 1949 by which the said saving was extended to include the right of the J anapad Sabhas to continue the levy of the impugned tax and this amendment was made retrospective from June 11, 1948, when the parent Act had come into force. In the case of Rurn Krishna (1) the validity and effectiveness of this amendment of 1949 was challenged. It was thus a basic challenge to the power of the Janapad Sabhas to levy any impost on the ground that the subsequent amendment was invalid. This Court repelled the said challenge and held that the retrospective operation of the amendment was valid. According to this decision, the Provincial Legislature was competent to legislate for the continuance of the tax, provided the relevant conditions of s.143(2) of the Government of India Act 1935 were satisfied. These conditions required that the tax should be one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the purposes of a local area at the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act; that the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to· be utilised and the purposes for which it is to be utilised continue to be the same, and that the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor is its incidence materially altered, so that, in substance, it continues to be the same tax. Since these tests were· satisfied by the impost levied by the Janapad Sabha, it was held that the impost was valid and that the retrospective amendment of s.192 was effective.

¶108

The present proceedings constitute a third challenge to the validity of the notices issued by the Janapad Sabha, and as we have already seen, the (IJ [1962] Supp. s s.c.R. 10.

¶109

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 183

¶110

challenge made by the appellants by their writ petitions before the High Court has been repelled on the preliminary ground that it is barred by res judicatf•. In that connection, the first question to consider is whether the general principle of res farliwta applies to writ petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

¶111

1962

¶112

The Ama/gamatdd Coa(field~ Ltd. v.

¶113

The Janopada Sabha, Chhindwara

¶114

Gajendragadlcar, J.

¶115

This question has been considered by a special Bench of this Court in the case of Pandit JJJ. 8. 31. Shamui v. Dr. Shrec J{rishna Sinha (1). Chief Justice Sinha, who ddivcrcd the unanimous opinion of the Court, has answered this question in the aflirmative. In that connection, the learned Chief Justice has referred to an earlier decision of this court in RuJ L11ksh111i Da.si v. Banmnali Sen, (') where it has been laid down that the principle underlying re.s jmli'.wta is applicable in respect of a question which has been raised and decided after full contest, even though the first Tribunal which decided the matter may have no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit and even though the subject-matter of the dispute was not exactly the same in the two proceedings. It ought to be added that the Tribunal which had tried the first dispute in that case was a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. Then the points raised on behalf of the petitioner Sharma were considered and it was noticed that, in substance, they were the same points which had been agitated before. this Court on an earlier occasion and had been rejected. "In our opinion", said the judgment, "the qucslions determined by the previous decision of this Court cannot be reopened in the present case and must govern the rights and obligations of the parties which as indicated above, are substantially the same." Thus, this decision shows that even petitions filed under Art. 32 are subject to the general principle of res jwlicata.

¶116

The question about. the applicability of the doctrine of res jwjicata to the petitions filed under (1) [1961] 1. S.C.R. 96. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 154.

¶117

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶118

1962

¶119

1962 Art. 32 came before this Court in another form in 1 he Amalgamatrd Daryao v. 1'he St,i,te of U. l'. ('), and in that case it Coalfirlds Ltd. v. has been held that whete the petition under Art. 226 The JanavaJa Sabha is considered on the merits as a contested matter and

¶120

Chhir;d,cara dismissed by the High Court, the decision pronounced Gajcndragadkar, J. is binding on the parties, unless modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings under the Constitution, and so, if the said decision was not challenged by an appropriate remedy provided by the Constitution, a writ petition filed in respect of the same matter would be deemed to be barred by res judicata.. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res jndicatri applies to writ petitions filed under Art. 32 or Art. 226. It is necessary 'to emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res judicatn to the petitions filed under Art. 32 ·does not in any way impair or affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It only seeks to regulate the manner in which the said rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in courts of law.

¶121

The question in the present appeals, however, is somewhat different. The notices which are challenged by the appellants in the present proceedings are in respect of the tax levied for a period different from the period covered by the notices issued ·on August 23, l!J;)8 which were the subject-matter of the earlier writ proc_eedings (The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. (')). Where the liability of a tax for a particular year is considered and decided, does the decision for that particular year operate as res judicata in respect of the liability for a subsequent year ? In a sense, the liability to pay tax from year to year is a separate and distinct liability; it is based on a different cause of action from year to year, and if any points of fact or law are considered in determining· the liability for a given year, they can generally be deemed to have been considered and decided in a collateral and incidental way. The (1) [1962) l S. C.R. 574. (2\ [1962) l S. C. R. I.

¶122

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 185

¶123

1962

¶124

trend of the recent English decisions on the whole appears to be, in the words of Lord Radcliffe, "that it is more in the public interest that tax and rate assessments should not be artificially encumbered with estoppels (I am not speaking, of course, of the effect of legal decisions establishing the law, which is quite a different matter), even though in the result, some exptctations may be frustrated and some time wasted." (vide Society of Jlediwl Officers oj flcrilth v. Hope l'alnation O.fficer (')). The basis for this view is that generally, questions of liability to pay ta/( are determined by Tribunals wilh limited jurisdiction and so, it would not be inappropriate to assume that if they decide any other questions incidental to the determination of the liability for the specific period, the decisions of those incidental questions need not create a bar of re8 judicata while similar questions of liability for subsequent years are being examined.

¶125

The Ama/gamat, Coalfields Ltd. v. The Janapada .Sab Chhindwara

¶126

Gajendragadkar 1 ,

¶127

In that connection, it would be interesting to refer to four English decisions. In the case of Brol:en Hill Proprietnry Co. Ltd. rmd Jlunicipal Cowncil of Broken Hill, (') the question which fell for decision was how the average annual value of a mine for rating purposes had to be determined, and it was held by the Privy Council that the said value was to be ascertained by dividing the value of the output during the three years by three, not by multiplying it by 205 Jnd dividing it by 305. One of the points which the Privy Council had to consider was whether a contrary decision reached by the High Court of Australia between the parties as to the valuation for a previous year, operated as res judicata. In reject. ing the plea that the principle of res judicata applied, Lord Carson observed that "the decision: of the High Court related to a valuation and a liability to a tax in a previous year, and no doubt as regards that year, the decision could not be disputed. The present case relates to a new question, viz., the valuation for a different year and the liability for that year. It is not (l) [1960] A. C. 551, 563. (2) (1926] A. a. 94;

¶128

lSG SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G3] SUPP.

¶129

1962

¶130

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.

¶131

v. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara

¶132

Gajendragadkar, J.

¶133

eadem questio, and therefore, the principle of res judicata cannot apply." (p. 100).

¶134

It, however, appears that in the same year, the Privv Council came to a somewhat contrarv decision in the case of Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation.(1) In that case, the question which arose for decision was about the deduction claimable under ther elevant provision of the Land Tax Assessment Act, 1\JlG (Aust.) Upon the assessment for 1919-20, the Commissiouer allowed only one deduction of 5,000 lbs. contending that the beneficiaries were not joint owners within the meaning of the Act. The case was then stated to the full Bench which upheld the Commissioner's view and rejected the argument that the Commissioner was estopped from coming to that conclusion in view of his decision in a previous year. When the matter went before the Privy Council, it reversed the decision of the Full Court, because it held that the Commissioner was estopped, even though in the previous litigation no express decision had been given whether the beneficiaries were joint owners, it being assumed and admitted that they were, and the Privy Council thought that the matter so admitted was fundamental to the decision then given. It would thus be seen that this decision applied the principle of res judicata even where there was no express decision on the point, but the point had been conceded in the earlier proceedings.

¶135

In 19GO, the House of Lords had occasion to consider this question in the case of Society of illedical Ojjicers of Health ('). \Ve have already quoted one statement of the law from the speech of Lord Radcliffe in that case. In that case, the main reason given for repelling the application of the principle of res judicatq, in rating cases, was that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which deals with those cases is limited, in that its function begins with and ends with deciding the assessment or liability of a person for a terminable period. Besides, it was (1) fl926] A. C. 155. (2j [1960] A. C. 551, 563.

¶136

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 187

¶137

held that the position of a valuation officer is that of a neutral official charged with the recurring duty of bringing into existence a valuation list, and he cannot properly be described as a party so as to make the proceedings a !is inter partes. In coming to the conclusion that the doctrine of res Judimtu would not apply in such cases, Lord Radcliffe was influenced by the consideration that if decisions in rating cases are to be treated as conclusive for all time that would be to impose a needlessly heavy burden upon the administration of rating (p . .';fi6). This decision purported to approve of the view taken in 1 he case of the Broken Hill Proprietnry Co. Ud.(') and to distinguish the view taken in the lloy8teiid mse.(')

¶138

1962

¶139

The Amal,~amated CotJlfitfdJ Ltd. v. The Janapada 'labl1a, Chhindwara

¶140

Gojendragadkar, J.

¶141

Lord Radcliffe had occasion to return to the same subject again in Oaffoor v. Incnme-ttix Commi"siuncr.(³ ) Speaking for the Privy Council, Lord Radcliffe considered the problem of the application of res J11rliml<• to taxation cases, examined it in detail and came to the conclusion that the said doctrine did not apply to tax cases in the sense that the decision for the levy of a tax for one year docs not operate as res J nd i1;nl11 in dealing with the question of a tax for the subsequent year. On this occasion, emphasis was not placed so much on the limited nature of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal that deals with tax cases, but it was held that even if the matter goes to a High Court on :1 statement of the case, the decision of the High Court would also not create a bar of res Jnrliwtu in dealing with the tax claim for a subsequent year. "The critical thing," said Lord Radcliffe, "is that the dispute which alone can be determined by any decision given in the course of these proceedings is limi tcd to one subject only, the amount of the assessable income for the year in which the assessment is challenged." He, no doubt, recognised that in the process of arriving at the necessary decision, it was likely that the consideration of questions of law turning upon the construction of the ordinance or of other statutes or (1) [1926] A.C. 94. (2) [1926) A.C. 155. (3) ll9Gl] 2 W.L.R. 794.

¶142

188 SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶143

19G2

¶144

The Amalgamated' C,,/ftelds Ltd. v. The Jana/Jada Sabha, Chhi11d11·ara

¶145

Gajendragadkar, J.

¶146

upon the general law, may he involved, but he thought that the decision of those questions should be treated as collateral or incidental to what is the only issue that is truly submitted to determination (pp. 800-801). This decision would, therefore, support the appellants' contention' that the High Court was in error in dismissing their writ petitions on the preliminary ground that they were barred by res jttdicaltb. '

¶147

In considering this question, it may be necessary to distinguish between decision on questions of law which directly and substantially arise in any dispute about the liability for a particular year, and questions of law which arise incidentally or in a collateral manner, as Lord Radcliffe himself has observed in the case of the Society of 1}Jedical Officers of llealtl!, (1) that the effect of legal decisions establishing the law would be a different matter. If, for instance, the validity of a taxing statute is impeached by an assessee who is called upon to pay a tax for a particular year and the matter is taken to the High Court or brought before this Court and it is held that the taxing statute is valid, it may not be easy to hold that the decision on this basic and material issue would not operate as res,iiuliwta against the assessee for a subsequent year. That, however, is a matter on which it is unnecessary 'for us . to pronounce a definite 9pinion in the present case. In this connection, it would be relevant to add that, even if a direct decision of this Court 011 a point bf law does not operate as res Jud·icata in a dispute for a subsequent year, such a decision would, under Art. 141, have a binding effect not only on the parties to it, but also on all courts in India as a precedent in which the law is declared by this Court. The question about the applicability of res ,iiidicata to such a decision would thus be a matter of merely academic significance.

¶148

In the present appeals, the question which arises directly for our decision is : does the principle (I) [196D] A.C. 551, 563.

¶149

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 189

¶150

of constructive res judicata apply to petitions under Art. 32 or Art. 226 where the dispute raised is in respect of a year different from the year involved in a prior dispute decided by this Court ? w· e have already noticed the points actually decided by this Court against the appellants on the earlier occasion (vide 'l.'he Amalgamated Coafields Ltd.(1)). One of the points sought to be raised was in regard to the validity of the increase in the rate of tax from 3 pies to 9 pies per ton; and since this point had not been taken in the petition and relevant material was not available on record, this Court refrained from expressing any opinion on it. The appellants contend that the order passed by this Court refusing permission to the appellants to raise this point on the earlier occasion docs not mean that this Court has decided the point on the merits against the appellants; it may mean that the appellants were given liberty to raise this point later: but even otherwise. the point has not been considered and should not be held to be barred bv constructive res fudiwta. It is significant that th attack against the validity of the notices in the present pi;oceedings is based on grounds different and distinct from the grounds raised on the earlier'occasion. It is not as if the same ground which was urged on the earlier occasion is placed before the Court in another form. The grounds now urged arc entirely distinct, and so, the decision of the High Court can be upheld only if the principle of constructive res jndicatci can be said to apply to writ petitions filed under Art. 32 or Art. 226. In our opinion, constructive resJnd·icnta which is a special and artificial form of res .fudicata, enacted by section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code should not generally be applied to writ petitions filed under Art. 32 or Art. 226. We would be reluctant t8 apply this principle ro the present appeals all the more because we arc dealing with cases where the impugned tax liability is for different years. In dismissing the appellants' petitions on the ground of res )uclicata, the High Court has no don bt referred to (!) (1962] 1. S. C.R. !.

¶151

1962

¶152

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v.

¶153

1 he Janaprula Sabha 1 Chhindwara

¶154

c . ijrndra_r;adkar, J.

¶155

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶156

1962

¶157

Tht Amalgamated CD"/jie/d; Ltd. v.

¶158

The J,znaj1ada Sabha, Ch!tindU"ara

¶159

Gajendragadkar, J,

¶160

Art. 141 under which the law declared by this Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. But when we are considering. the question as to whether any law has been declared by this Court bv implication, such implied declaration, though binding must be held to be subject to revision by this Court on a proper occasion where the point in question is directly and n:pressly raised by any party before this Court. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that the appellants cannot be precluded from raising the new contentions on which their challenge against the validity of the notices is based.

¶161

The first ground urged by the appellants on the merits is that the levy authorised to be imposed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens under Art. l!l (1) (f) of the Constitution, and in support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Kunootlu1t Thathunni 11loopil .N11ir v. The 8t11tc of Il.emla (1). In that case, the impugned Act was struck down because it suffered from several serious infirmities; it was confiscatory in character and its provisions in regard to the levy of the impost were so arbitrary and unreasonable that the Court took the view that the Legislature had completely ignored the legal position that the assessment of a tax on person or property was at least of a quasi-judicial character. This conclusion was based on the examination of the relevant statutory provisions. In the present case, we are not satisfied that this decision can assist the appellants at all, because the nature of the statutory provisions and the Rules framed under the Act in the present appeals is entirely different.

¶162

At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules. Section 51 of the Act (which, in substance, corresponds to section 90 of the Act of 1948) reads thus :-

¶163

(!) [1961]3 S.·C. R. 77.

¶164

i s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 191

¶165

1962

¶166

"51. (1) Subject to the provisions of any law or enactment for the time being in force, a District Council may, by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present at a special meeting convened for the purpose, impose any tax, toll or rate other than those specified in sections 2+, +8, +!l and 50.

¶167

7 h~ A1Pa!gamattd Car:lfields l.td. v.

¶168

Tht J nnafw-ln Sa Aha, Chhind<1·am

¶169

(:!) The first imposition of any tax, toll or rate under sub-section (l) shall be subject to the previous sanction of the Provincial Government.

¶170

x". x x x

¶171

Sub-section (3) and the proviso are uot relevant for our purpose.

¶172

Then we go to section /fl which confers power on the Provincial Government to make Rules. Section 79 (l)(xv) is relevant for our purpose. It provides that:

¶173

"The Provincial Government may make rules consistant with this Act and with reference, if necessary, to the varying circumstances of different local areas, as to the assessment and collection of the cases and rates specified in sectiom 48, 4fl & 50 and of any tax, toll or rate imposed under section 51, as to the maximum amounts or rates at which any of them may he imposed, as to the prevention of evasion of assessment or payment thereof, as to the agency by which they shall be assessed and collected, and as to the manner in which account thereof shall be rendered by District Councils."

¶174

In pursuance of the powers conferred on the local Government by s. 79, rules have been framed on December 16, 1935. Rules 3 to l 0 deal with the question of the impost of tax and provide how decisions made in that behalf by appropriate authorities

¶175

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶176

1962 become final. Rule 3 prescribed the rate at 3 pies The Afnalgcmattd per ton, Rule 4 provides that the figures reported by Coalfields Ltd. the concessionaires and the Railway companies half The Jmw/1ada v. Sabh'l, yearly to the Dy. Commissioner, shall be the basis

¶177

Chhiridwara for the assessment of the tax. Under Rule 5, every Gajendragadkar, J. mining lessee has to submit a statement half yearly. On receipt of the statement, the assessment has to be made by the Chairman of the Independent Mining Local Board under Rule G. A notice of demand follows under rule 7. Fifteen days' period is given for filing objections under Rule 8. Rule !l provides for the consideration and disposal of the objections, and Rule 10 lays down that if no objection is filed, the Chairman's assessment shall be final, if any objection is received, the Independent Mining Local Board's decision shall be final and shall be communicated to the assesscc as soon as possible. It would thus be seen that the scheme of these Rules provides ample opportunity to the asscssees to object to the notice of demand served on them and in fact, the demand notices arc substantially based on the figtircs supplied by the railway companies <md the concessionaires and the statements submitted hv the asscssces themselves. Therefore. it would be idle to suggest that the impost of the tax authorised by the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules is a capricious administrative or executive affair and so, should be held to violate Art. Hl(l)(f) of the Constitution.

¶178

Then it is urged that the demand of the tax @fl pies pPr ton is invalid, because it is inconsistent with Rule;{ which has prescribed the maximum rate permissible to be levied against the assessees.

¶179

Vv e have already noticed thats. 7fl( l )(XV) authorised the making of a rule as to the maximum amounts or rates at which any of the articles can be taxed. This was introduced by an amendment made in Hl33 by C.P. Act VII of Hl33, and so, the argument is that Rule :~ which provides that the tax shall be levied @ :l pies per tnn must be deemed to pro-

¶180

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 193

¶181

vide for the maximum rate which can be levied and that is 3 pies per ton and no more. This argument is no doubt well-founded, because Rule 3 will have to be read in the light of the power conferred on the local Government by s. 79(XV) and that would mean that the rate of 3 pies per ton has been prescribed by the Rule of the maximum rate permissible. But this argument ignores the fact that this Rule has been subsequently deleted by a notification on September 6, 1943 published in the Government Gazette on September 10, 1943. When this notification was cited before us, the appellants conceded that the argument based on the construction of Rule 3 was not av'ailable to them. Therefore, the contention that Rule 3 prohibits the levy at a rate higher than 3 pies cannot succeed since the Rule itself has been subsequently deleted and was not a part of the Rules at the relevant time when the impugned notices were issued.

¶182

1962

¶183

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v.

¶184

The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara

¶185

Gajendragadkar, J,

¶186

It is then argued that the impo!!t of the tax at the rate of 9 pies per ton is not valid, because it does not comply with the requirements of s. 51 (2) of the Act, and that raises the question of the construction of the said section. Section 51(1) authorises the imposition of the tax, provided, of course, the procedure prescribed by it and the requirements laid down by it are satisfied. Sub-section (2) then lays down that the first imposition of any tax shall be subject to the previous sanction of the Provincial Government. The appellants contend that in the context, the "first imposition" means not only the first imposition in the sense of an initial imprnition, but it includes every fresh imposition levied at an increased rate. On the other hand, the respondent Sabha contends that the first imposition means only the initial levv or impost and cannot take in subsequent imposts or levies. In this connection, it is relevant to remember that sub-section (2) was added by the same Amending Act by which s. 79(XV) was amended, and

¶187

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶188

1962

¶189

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. TM Janapada Sabha, Chhindu:ara

¶190

Gajendra:adkar, /,

¶191

so, it would not be unreasonable to assume that when the legislature gave power to the local Government to prescribe by rules the maximum rates permissible to be levied, it introduced sub-section (2) ins. 51 because it was thought necessary that whenever the rates were changed, the imposition of the tax at the increased rates should receive the previous sanction of the Government. If the respondent's construction is accepted, it would mean that the respondent should obtain the previous sanction of the Government at the initial levy and thereafter may go on increasing the rate of the levy to any extent without securing the sanction of the Government in that behalf. Now that Rule 3 has been deleted and no maximum has been or can be prescribed by the Rules, it would be unreasonable to hold that the respondent is given an unfettered and unguided authority to levy the impost in question at any rate it likes. Since no ceiling has been placed by the Rules in that behalf, it would, we think, be fair to hold that if the rMes are increased and levy is sought to be imposed on the altered rates, the imposition of the levy at these altered rates should be deemed to be included in the expression "first imposition" under s. 51(2). We are, therefore, inclined to accept the appellants' construction of s. 51(2). That being so, it is necessary to enquire whether the imposition of the tax @ 9 pies has received the previous sanction of the local Government.

¶192

During the course of hb arguments, Mr. Sastri for the respondent attempted to suggest that sanction had been obtained for the increase in the rates from time to time and a typed summary of the notifications issued in that -behalf was supplied to us at the time of arguments. This summary refers to the three increments made in 1943, 1946 and 1947 respectively to which we have already referred. The summary read as if the increments had been sanctioned by the State Government. But Mr. Sachin Choudhury for the appellants contended that the

¶193

I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 195

¶194

1962

¶195

summary supplied by the respondent vvas incomplete and inaccurate and that the examination of the Gazette in which the notifications were published, would show that the amendments in the rates had been made not with the previous sanction of the Government, but by the Mining Local Board itself. Two of these notifications were then produced before us by the respondent, and they supported the conten· tion made by Mr. Choudhury. Therefore, the argument that the imposition @ 9 pies per ton has received the 'sanction of the Government must fail, and so, the impugned notices which seek to recover the tax from the appellants @ 9 pies per ton must be held to be invalid. The respondent is entitled to levy tax only @ a pies per ton because that levy has received the sanction of the Government, but if the respondent intends to increase the rate of the said tax, it must follow the procedure prescribed by s.51(2), provided of course, it is open to the respondent to increase the said tax.

¶196

The Amalgamated C•aljidds Ltd. v.

¶197

The Jan•Pada So/;h-, Chhindwara

¶198

Gajrndragadk1<r .. /.

¶199

There is yet another point on which the appellants arc entitled to succeed, and that has reference to 1he fact that the respondent is seeking to reopen some of the ;.sscssments made by it against the appellants. The argument is that once an assessment is made for a specific period, it becomes final and it is not open to the respondent to demand additional amount by way of tax in respect of the said period. The genesis of the tax is somewhat interesting. It appears that roads were constructed by the Independent .Mining Local Board at enormous cost at the request of the Mining interests and even debt had to be incurred by the Board for completing the work of the construction of roads. Since the mining companies received substantial benefit from the~e roads, the Legislature thought of levying a tax on coal, and that is the origin of the tax. When the first notification was issued on December 16, l 9H5 it authorised and sanctioned the imposition by the Independent

¶200

1962

¶201

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶202

The Amalgamated Coa(fields Ltd. v.

¶203

·he Jana~ada Sabha, Chhindwara

¶204

Gajendragadkar 1 J.

¶205

Mining Local Board at Chhindwara in the Chhindwara District "of a tax at 3 pies per ton on coal, coal dust or coke, manufactured at the mines, sold for export by rail or sold otherwise than for export by rail, within the jurisdiction of the Indepen· dent Mining Local Board." This tax was recovered by the Board and thereafter by the respondent in respect of coal whether sold inside the district of Chhjndwara or sold outside the district of Chhindwara or even outside the State of Madhya Pradesh. In other words, the total coal produced by each mining lease-holder substantially came to be taxed. But after the Constitution came into force, doubts arose as to whether Art. 286 of the Constitution did not preclude the respondent from reco':'ering tax in respect of coal exported out of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and in view of the advice given to the respondent by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, the respondent did not collect the tax in respect of coal which was exported by rail outside the State of Madhya Pradesh from about 1952. The respondent wanted to consult legal opinion on this point, but the State Government refused permission to the respondent to incur expenditure in that behalf. Subsequently, however, this question came to be decided by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a writ petition filed by 'M/s. Newton Chickli Collieries (Pvt.) Ltd. (No. 265 of 1957). The High Court held that the tax levied by the Janapada Sabhas under s.51 of the Act did not amount to a sales tax nor to an excise duty, and so, the respondent thought that it could levy tax even on coal exported by rail outside the State of M'adhya Pradesh. In fact after this judgment was pronounced by the High Court on August 6, 1958, the Provincial Government withdrew its instructions to the respondent not to levy tax on exported coal. That is how the respondent has issued notices against the appellants in respect of coal exported by rail out of the State of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the years for which assessment has already been levied against the

¶206

¶207

¶208

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶209

197

¶210

1962

¶211

appellants for the coal not so exported, and the contention of the appellants is that this reopening of the assessment is not permissible under the Rules.

¶212

This contention appears to be well-founded. We have already seen the scheme of the Rules and we have noticed that Rule 10 provides that if no objection is filed, the Chairman's assessment shall be final and if an objection is received, the decision of the Mining Board would be final. In other words, the scheme clearly provides that at the end of each six monthly period, the tax has to be assessed, notices to be issued to the asscssee, his objections to be considered and the tax to be ultimately determined in the light of the decision on the said objections; and under Rule 10, the two decisions specified therein become final. It may be that the Rules do nqt prescribe any limitation within which these steps have to be taken by the respondent for each period, but that is another matter. In view of the provisions of Rule 10, it is difficult to hold that the respondent is entitled to reopen assessments already made and rendered final under the said Rule. There is no other provision for reopening assessment as we lrave under sections 34 & 35 of the Indian Income Tax Act, and so, the respondent is not justified in issuing notices for the years which are covered by assessment orders already passed. The finality provided for by Rule IO will work as much against the respondent as against the assessees.

¶213

The Amalgamottd Coalfields Ltd. v. The J anapada Sabha: Chhiniwara

¶214

Gajendragadkar, J.

¶215

In support of the appeals, another argument was sought to .be raised against the increase of the rates. It was urged that the tax is in the nature of an excise duty or a sales-tax and, therefore, any increase in the said tax beyond the limit of 3 piesthe continuance of which has been saved by the provisions of Art. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 277 of the Constitution-will be invalid. This argument is based on the terms used

¶216

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.

¶217

1962

¶218

The Amalgamated Coalfoelds Ltd.

¶219

v, The Janapada Sabha, Ch hindwara

¶220

Gajtndrngadkar, J.

¶221

in the notification of December 16, 1935. Since coal is described as manufactured at the mines, the argument is that it is in the nature of an excise duty and since the notification also refers to coal sold for export by rail or sold otherwise than for export by rail, it is argued that it is a sales-tax. On the other hand, the respondent contends that it is neither a sales-tax nor an excise duty and as such, the rate can be increased subject, of course, to the requirements of s. 51 (2) of the Act. It appears that by notification issued on September 6, 1943, the preamble of the Rules was modified by substituting for the words "coal, coal dust or coke" by "coal and dust coal" and by deleting the words "manufactured at the mines". Curiously enough, these amendments have not been made in the original notification itself. We have already noticed that this latter notification deleted Rule 3. Some arguments were urged before us by learned counsel on both sides as to the effect of this notification which modified the preamble to the Rules. We do not, however, think it necessary to consider these arguments in the present appeals because of our conclusion that the impugned notices levying the tax @ 9 pies per ton are invalid for two reasons: the increase in the rates has not been sanctioned by the State Government under s. 51 (2) and an attempt to recover at the increased rate the tax for the years already covered by assessment orders passed in that behalf, is barred by Rule 10.

¶222

The result is, the appeals and the writ petitions are allowed and an appropriate direction or order is issued restraining the respondent from recovering the tax at a rate higher than 3 pies per ton and also restraining the respondent from recovering any additional tax in respect of the years for which tax has already been assessed against the. appellants. The same will be the order in the other companion appeals. The

¶223

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 199

¶224

appellants will be entitled to their costs, but one set of hearing fees will be taxed.

¶225

Appeals and writ petitions aUowed.

¶226

The A.mal:•m•l•I Coalfields Ltd.

¶227

v. The Janapada Salho, Chhi11dwara

¶228

Gojendragadkar, f,

¶229

TATA IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD.

1962

&ptnnber £1.

THE STATE OF BIHAR

(And connected appeals)

¶235

(B. P. SINHA, C, J., S. J. IMAM, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, jj.)

¶236

Gess-Annual net pro,fits from mines-Uvy of cess there- on-Mine- owner extracting ore and manufacturing productJJ tkertfrom-Legality of cess on ore extracted-Bengal Gess Act, 1888 (Ben. 9 of 1880), as amended in B,:/zar, ss. 5,6, 72.

¶237

The appellant company was the owner of certain mines in Bihar from where it extracted iron ore which it utilised in its factory atJamshedpur for making iron and steel. Under ss. 5 and 6 of the Bengal Gess Act, 1880, as amended in Bihar, all immovable property situate in any part of the State of Bihar was liable to payment of local cess which, in the case of mines, was to be assessed on the annual net profits from them. For the assessment year 1954-56, the company was assessed by the Gess Deputy Collector on the basis that it had made a profit of Rs. 4-7-0 per ton of iron ore extracted. The appellant claimed that it was not liable to the levy of cess under the Act because it did not sell any ore as such and could not therefore be treated as having made "any profit" from the mines within the meaning of s.6 of the Act. The question was whether the appellant company could in law be said to have derived "profit" from the mine when the ore extracted was not sold by it as such but was utilised by it for the purpose of manufacturing finished products which it sold.

¶238

HeU, that on the true construction of ss.5, 6 and 72 of the Bengal Cess Act, 1880, as amended in Bihar, where activities

The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Another v. the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara

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The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Another v. the Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara

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