enomciated in the Dnche..ss of Kingsto1~'s case('). In that oaso it was observed that from the variety of Ca.BPS relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suiti;, these two deductions seem·to follow as generally true : "Firnt, that the judgment <>fa Court of concurrnnt jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as cvidonce, conclusive between the same parties, upon the Rame matter, directly i.J1 question, in another Court, secondly, thnt the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is in like manner conclusivti upon the ·same ·matter, between the same partiC!l, coming incidenmll~, in queition in another Court for a different purpose". The basis of the rule of res judicata .is that. an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause, and the libPral 'construction of tho word "suit" would be consistent with ·this bal!is, otherwise if tho competonoo of the ealilier Court is ;going to be judged by reforence to itti eompctenee to try the entire Ru it as subsequently instituted, in many cases where the matter directly and substantially in issue has been tried between the parties by the earlier Court it may have to he tried again.in a &ubsequont suit because the earlier Court had no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit l1aving regard to it11 .pecuniary jurisdiction. That, it is urged, would be anomalous and inconsistent with the prinoi1ile underlying the doctrine of res judicata.
