Mukhtar the right to appear, plead and act in any criminal court ; it does not, however, give such an unlimited right in a civil court. On the contrary, it merely says that on enrolment a Mukhtar may practise in any civil court, but under s. 11 the High Court may make rules declaring what shall be deemed to be the functions, powers and duties of Mukhtan practising in the subordinate courts. It i~ clear to us that in declaring what shall be the functions and powers of mukhtars practising in the subordinate courts, the High Court can so delimit them as to regulate the right of practice. It will be wrong to treat the functions and powers as dissociated from the right to practise. The right to practise must depend on the functions and powers. It is also worthy of note that the expression used ins. 11 of the Act is much wid1ir than the expression used in s. 15 of the Indian Bar Council Act, 1926, (Act XXXVIII of 1926), which gives the Bor Council the power to make mies to provide for and regulate the rights and duties of Advocates of the High Court. We do not think that the majority decision in Aswini [( umar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose (1 ) is of any assistance to the petitioners. That decision depended on the interpretation of s. 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951. That section provided that "notwithstanding anything contained in the Bar Councils Act or any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Comt may be pertnitterl to practise in that High Court, every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to practise in any High Court whether or not ho is an Advocate of that High Court". It was held by the majority that a rule made by a Hig~ Court which denied to an Advocato of the Supreme Court the right to exercise an essential part of his function, by insisting on a dual agency on the Original Side was much more t,han a rule
