Partly allowed

Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

Supreme Court6 Mar 19611961 INSC 75 · [1962] 1 S.C.R. 1511961 INSC 75

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a police officer, affirming the Governor's power to dismiss under the Police Act. While dismissing the main appeal for discrimination in procedure since the rules were comparable, Justice Das Gupta dissented, holding the Tribunal Rules void for lacking an appeal mechanism available under the Police Regulations.

What did the court decide?

Appeal largely dismissed, but set aside by dissenting judge. Dismissal order upheld by majority.

What the court decided

Jagannath Prasad Sharma versus State of Uttar… — Service and Employment | Supreme Court (1962)

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1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 151

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whole of the mortgagees , interest. I t 1s · common r96r _ ground that no other relationship existed between Khan Bahadur the parties at the date of this letter, and the only sub- Shap°"' Fndoom sisting relationship was that of mortgagee and mort- Mazda gagor. This letter acknowledges the existence of the v. said jural relationship and amounts to a clear acknowDurg~ P.osad A t It . Chamana & Ors. ledgment un er s. d 19 o t e f h L1m1^{."t t"} a 10n c '• 1s con_ ceded that if this letter is held to be an ~cknowledg- Gajemfragadkar ]. ment there can be no other challenge agamst the decree under appeal.

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In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

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Appeal dismissed.

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JAGANNATH PRASAD SHARMA

r961

March 6.

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS.

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(S. K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA,

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J.C. SHAH and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)

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Public Servant-Disciplinary proceedings- Procedure--Two sets of Rules applicable-Selection of one, if discriminatory-Governor's power to dismiss police officer-U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, r947-U. P. Police Regulations-Police Act, r86r {V of r86r), s. 7-Constitution of India, Art. r4 .

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There were certain charges of immorality, corruption and gross dereliction of duty against the appellant who was a police officer. After an enquiry, the Governor of U. P. referred the case under s. 4 of the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, to a Tribunal. The Tribunal recommended on February 4, 1950, that the appellant be dismissed from service. The Governor then served a notice on the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and after considering the explanation submitted by him dismissed him with effect from December 5, 1950. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal, inter alia, on the grounds: (i) that the Governor had no power under s. 7 of the Police Act and the U. P. Police Regulations framed thereunder to dismiss a police officer and (ii) that the enquiry held by the Tribunal violated

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152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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1961 Art. 14 of the Constitution as of the two parallel procedures available under the Tribunal Rules and under the U. P. Police Jaga••••h Prasad Regulations, the mode prejudicial to the appellant under the Sharma Tribunal Rules was adopted.

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7. ult1 Held (per Das, Hidayatullah, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ.J that ~, the enquiry by the Tribunal and the ort\er of dismissal passed Stal• oJ<S- 0 Pradesh 1 "'by the Governor were legal and valid.

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Under para. 479(a) of the U. P. Police Regulations, framed under s. 7 of the Police Act, the Governor had the power to dismiss a police officer. Under the Tribunal Rules also, which were framed in exercise of the various powers vested in the Governor including the power under s. 7 of the Police Act, the Governor was authorised to dismiss a police officer. By virtue of Art. 313 of the Constitution these provisions remained m operation even after the coming into force of the Constitution. The authority vested in the Inspector-General of Police and his subordinates by s. 7 of the Police Act, was not exclusive; it was controlled by the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution which made the tenure of all civil servants of a province or state during the pleasure of the Governor.

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The procedure adopted did not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. Though at the time when proceedings were started against the appellant two distinct procedures for holding the enquiry were open for selection by the authorities, the order by the Governor referring the case under the Tribunal Rules having been passed before the Constitution, Art. 14 could have no application to it even if it was discriminatory. The procedure prescribed in the Police Regulations is substantially the same as the procedure prescribed by the Tribunal Rules, and by continuing the enquiry after the Constitution under the Tribunal Rules and not under the Police Regulations, a more onerous procedure prejudicial to the appellant was not adopted. The fact that an or<\er made by a police authority under the Police Regulations is made appealable whereas an ·order passed by the Governor under the Ti:ibunal Rules is not made appealable does not amount to discrimination within the_ meaning of Art. 14. The Tribunal Rules provide for the giving of reasonable opportunity to a public servant in all its aspects, viz., opportunity to deny his guilt, opportunity to defend himself and opportunity .to make his representation against ·the proposed punishment. The mere existence of two sets 91 parallel procedures is not discriminatpry unless it was shown that one set is more onerous than the other.

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Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad, [1953] S.C.R. 589 and Lac/lhmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay, [1952] S.C.R. 710, applied. ·

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Khem Chand v. The Union of India and.othm, [1954] S.C.R. 1080 and Sardar Kapur Singh v. Union of India, (1960} 2 S.C.R. 569, referred to.

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153

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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State of Orissa v. Dhirenaranath Das, A.LR. :i961 S.C. 1715, distinguished.

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z96r

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Per Das Gupta, J.-The U. P. Disciplinary Proceedingsfagannath Prasad (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947, are hit by Art. 14 of the Sharma Constitution. The absence of the right of appeal under the v. Tribunal Rules while a right of appeal is given to a police State⁰ 1 Uttar officer under the Police Regulations, results in unequal treat-Pradesh & Others ment in a substantial matter between police officers. proceeded against under the two procedures. Further, there is no principle to guide the Government in selecting which of the two procedures is to he applied in a particular case.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 490 of 1957.

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Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 22, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 7854 of 1951.

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G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.

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0. B. Agarwala, G. O. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

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March 6. The Judgment of S. K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. was delivered by J.C. Shah, J. K. C. Das Gupta, J. delivered a separate Judgment.

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SHAH, J.-In 1931, the appellant was admitted to the police force of the United Provinces and was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police. He was later promoted to the rank of Inspector, and in 1946 was transferred to the Anti-corruption department. In 1947, he was appointed, while retaining his substantive rank of Inspector, to the officiating rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Shortly thereafter, complaints were received by the Chief Minister and Inspector-General of Police, U. P. charging the appellant with immorality, corruption and gross dereliction of duty. In a preliminary confidential enquiry, the· Inspector-General of Police came to the conclusion that "a prima facie case" was made out against the

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Shah j.

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154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962)

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1 96 1 appellant. He then directed that a formal enquiry be Jagannath Prasad held against the a:ppellant afi:d passed orders reverting Sharma the appellant to his substantive rank of Inspector and v. placing him under suspension. An enquiry was held State of Uttar into the conduct of the appellant by the Superin- Pradesh '"' Others tendent of Police, Anti-corruption department. The report of the Superintendent of Police was forwarded Shah], to the Government of U. P., and the Governor acting under r. 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 194 7-hereinafter called the Tribunal Rules-referred the case for enquiry to a Tribunal appointed under r. 3 of the Tribunal Rules on charges of corruption, personal immorality and failure to discharge duties properly. The Tribunal framed three charges · against the appellant, and after a detailed survey of the evidence recommended on :February 4, 1950, that the appellant be dismissed from service. The Governor then served a notice requiring the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from s-ervice and after considering the explanation submitted by the appellant, the Governor ordered that the appellant be dismissed with effect from December 5, 1950. The appellant challenged this order by a petition instituted in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing' the proceedings of the Tribunal and for a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttar Pradesh to hold an enquiry under s. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.

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In support of his appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing his petition, the appellant has raised three contentions:

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that the order dismissing the appellant from the police force was unauthorised, because the Governor had no power under s. 7 of the Police Act and the regulations framed thereunder to pass that order;

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that even if the Governor was invested with power to dismiss a police officer, out of two alternative modes of enquiry, a mode prejudicial to the appellant having been adopted the proceedings of the Tribunal which enquired into the charges against him

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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 155

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z96z Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Shah J.

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.. were void, as the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated; and

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3, that the proceedings of the Tribunal were vitiated because of patent irregularities which resulted in an erroneous decision as to the guilt of the appellant.

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To appreciate the first two contentions, it is necessary briefly to set out the relevant provisions of the laws procedural and substantive in force, having a bearing on the tenure of service of members of the police force in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

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The appellant was admitted to the police force constituted under Act V of 1861. By s. 3 of that Act, superintendence throughout a general police district vests in and is exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate and except as authorised by the Act, no person, officer or court may be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary. By s. 4, the administration of the police throughout a general police. district is vested in the Inspector-General of Police. By s. 7, it is provided that subject to the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under the Act, the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police-officer of the subordinate rank whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same, or may award any one or more of the punishments (set out therein) to any police-officer of the subordinate rank who discharges his duty in a careless or negligent manner or who by any act of his own renders himself unfit for the discharge thereof.

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Section 46 sub-s. (2) authorises the State Government to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Act, and also to amend, add to or cancel the rules framed. The Government of Uttar Pradesh has framed rules called the Police Regulations under the Indian Police Act. Chapter 32 containing Regulations 477 to 507 deals with departmental punishment and

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156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962]

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z96z criminal prosecution of police officers and Ch. 33 con- J agann-;;;: Prasad taiii;ig Regu.ltions 508 to 516 deals with .appeals, Sharma • rev1s10ns, pet1t10ns etc. By Regulation 477, 1t is prov. vided that no officer appointed under s. 2 of the State of Uttar Police Act shall be punished by executive order other- Pradesh & Others wise than in the manner provided in the chapter. Shah J. Regulation 478A provides that the punishment of dismissal or removal from the force or reduction as defined in Regulation 482 may be awarded only after departmental proceedings. By Regulation 479 cl. (a), "full power" is reserved to the Governor to puniEh all police officers, and by cl. (b ), the Inspector-General is authorised to punish Inspectors and all police officers of "lower ranks". Regulation 489 provides for the departmental trials of police officers and Regulation 490 provides that the departmental trials of police officers must be conducted in accordance with the rules set out therein. Regulation 490 in its various clauses makes provisions about oral and document11ry evidence, framing of charges, explanation of the delinquent police officer, recording of statement of defence witnesses, recording of findings by the Superintendent of Police and the making of a report by the enquiry officer if he is of the view that the delinquent police officer should be dismissed or removed from the force. Clause (9) provides that the police officer may not be represented by counsel in any proceedings instituted against him under the rules. By Regulation 508, every police officer against w horn an order of dismissal or removal is passed is entitled to prefer one appeal against an order of dismissal from the police force to the authorities prescribed in that behalf, but against the order of the Governor in exercise of authority reserved under Regulation 4 79 cl. (a), no appeal is provided.

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By s. 96B of the Government of India Act., 1915, the tenure of all civil officers including police officers was at the pleasure of the Sovereign. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (2) of s. 96B, classification rules were framed by the local Governments. In the Government of India Act, 1935, ch. 2 of Part X dealt with civil services, their tenure, recruitment and

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157

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conditions of service. The section corresponding to r96r s. 96B of the Government of India Act, 1915, in the 1 -;; P d later Act was s. 240(1) and thereunder all members of agan;haa.marasa the civil service held office during the pleasure of the v. Sovereign. By the Government of India Act, 1935, State of Uttar to every civil servant a two-fold protection was gua- Pradesh & Others ranteed by els. (2) and (3) of s. 240(1) that he shall Shah J. not be dismissed from service by any authority sub. ordinate to that by which he was appointed and that he shall not be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. But these provisions did not apply to police officers for whom a special provision was enacted in s. 243. That section provided:

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"Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Act relating to those forces respectively." The conditions of service of the police force of the subordinate ranks were under the Government of India Act, 1935 therefore only such as were prescribed by rules framed under s. 7 and s. 46(2) of the Police Act. By the Constitution of India, the distinction between police officers and other civil servants in the matter of protection by constitutional guarantees is abolished and as from January 26, 1950, the recruit. ment and conditions of service of all persons serving the Union or the State are now governed by Art. 309 and their tenure by Art. 310 of the Constitution. By Art. 311, the protection granted under s. 240 els. (2) and (3) of the Government of India Act is extended to members of the police force as well. By Art. 309, the conditions of service of public servants are made sub. ject to the provisions of the Constitution and the Acts of the appropriate Legislature. By Art. 310, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, (i.e., except in cases where there is an express provision for dismissal of certain public servants e.g., Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts, Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, Chief Election Commissioner)

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158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962]

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'9⁶ ' all civil servants who hold office under the Union J agannath Prasad of ~ndia hold o;ffi?e during the pleasure of the Sharma President and all mvrl servants who hold office under v. the State hold it during the pleasure of the Governor. State of Uttar By virtue of Art. 313 of the Constitution, until other Pradesh &- Others provision is made, all laws in force immediately before the Constitution and applicable to any public ser- Shah J. vice which continues to exist under the Union or a State shall continue in force so far as consistent with the Constitution: the power of the police functionaries to dismiss police officers is therefore preserved. On November 4, 1947, the Governor of U. P. in exercise of the powers conferred inter alia by s. 7 of the Police Act, published the Tribunal Rules. By r. 1 cl. (3), these rules apply "to all Government servants under the rule making control of the Governor" and are applicable to any acts, omissions or conduct arising before the date of commencement of the rules as they are applicable to those arising after that date. Clause (c) of r. 2 defines "corruption'', cl. (d) defines "failure to discharge duties properly" and cl. {e) defines "personal immorality''. Rule 4 authorises the Governor to refer to a Tribunal constituted under r. 3, cases relating to an individual Government servant or class of Government servant or servants in a particular area only in respect of matters involving (a) corruption, {b) failure to discharge duties properly, (c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant of more than ten years' standing, and (d) personal immorality. By cl. (2), the Governor is also authorised in respect of a gazetted Government servant on his own request to refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of matters referred to in sub-r. (1). By r. 7, the proceedings of the Tribunal are to be conducted in camera and neither the prosecution nor the defence has the right to be represented by counsel. Rule 8 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal and r. 9 deals with the record to be maintained by the Tribunal. Rule 10 states that the Governor shall not be bound to consult the Public Service Commission on the Tribunal's recommendations and shall pass an order of punishment in the terms recommended by the Tribunal, provided "the Governor may for

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 159

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sufficient reasons, award a lesser punishment''. Rule r96r 12 provides that nothing in the rules shall be deemed - . to auec "" t th e con uc d t o f' d' . ismp .mary procee mgs m · l' d' · ]agannath Sharma Prnsad cases other than those spemfically covered by the prov. visions of the Tribunal Rules. Rule 13 authorises stale of Uttar the Governor to delegate the power to refer cases to p,adesh & Others gazetted officers in charge of districts and to pass an order of punishment under r. 10 to heads of depart- Shah]. ments.

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Enquiry against the appellant, though commenced before the Constitution was concluded after the Constitution, and the order dismissing him from the police force was passed in December, 1950. Under Police Regulation 479(a), the Governor had the power to dismiss a police officer. The Tribunal Rules were framed in exercise of various powers vested in the Governor including the power under s. 7 of the Police Act, and by those rules, the Governor was authorised to pass appropriate orders concerning police officers. By virtue of Art. 313, the Police Regulations as well as the Tribunal Rules in so far as they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution remained in operation after the Constitution. The authority vested in the Inspector-General of Police and his subordinates by s. 7 of the Police Act was not exclusive. It was controlled by the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution which made the tenure of all civil servants of a Province during the pleasure of the Governor of that Province. The plea that the Governor had no power to dismiss the appellant from service and such power could only be exercised by the Inspector-General of Police and the officers named in s. 7 of the Police Act is therefore without substance. But it is urged that the enquiry held by the Tribunal against the appellant and the order consequent upon that enquiry deprived the appellant of the equal protection of the laws and were therefore void as infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is true that when proceedings were started against the appellant for an enquiry for his alleged misdemeanours, one of two distinct procedures for holding an enquiry, was open for selection by the authorities. The police

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160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962)

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1961 authorities could direct an enquiry under the Police . -- Regulations under the procedure prescribed by Regu- Jagan .. ath Prasad lation 490; it was also open to the Governor to direct Sh':;'""_ an enquiry against the appellant, and as the charges State of Uttar against him fell within r. 4 of the Tribunal Rules, the Pradesh G Others procedure for enquiry was the one prescribed by r. 8 of the Tribunal Rules. Relying upon the existence Shah .I· of these two sets of rules simultaneously governing enquiries against police officers either of which could be resorted to at the option of the authorities in respect of charges set out in r. 4 of the Tribunal Rules, it was urged that in directing an enquiry against the appellant under the Tribunal Rules, discrimination was practised against him, and he was deprived of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. That an enquiry against the appellant could have been made under the procedure prescribed by Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations appears to be supported by rr. 1(3), 4 and 12 of the Tribunal Rules. Rule 1 subr. (3) provides that the Tribunal Rules shall apply to all Government servants under the rule making control of the Governor, and by r. 4, the Governor is authorised to refer cases to the Tribunal, but he is not obliged to do so. By r. 12, nothing in the Tribunal Rules is to affect the conduct of disciplinary proceedings in cases other than those specifically dealt with under the rules.

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But the order of the Governor directing an enquiry against the appellant was passed before the Constitution, and Art. 14 has no retrospective operation: it does not vitiate transactions even if patently discriminatory which were completed before the commencement of the Constitution. In Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (¹ ), this court was called upon to decide whether a trial of an offender commenced before the Constitution under the Special Tribunal Regulation promulgated by the Military Governor of the Hyderabad State was, since the Constitution, invalid in view of Art. 14. Mukherjea J. speaking for the majority of the court obse.rved:

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" ...... the effect of article 13(1) of the Constitution (1) [1953] S.C.R. 589.

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 161

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is not to obliterate the entire operation of the incon_ sistent laws or to wipe them out altogether from Jagannath Prasad the statute book; for to do so will be to give them Sharn•a retrospective effoct which they do not possess. Such v. laws must be held to be valid for all past transac- stat'⁰ ! Uttar · d c c · · h•~ d l" b"l" · d Pradesh & Othm t10ns an 1or en1orcmg rrg "" an ta i ities accrue _ before the advent of the Constitution. On this Shah ]. principle, the order made by the Military Governor referring this case to the Special Tribunal cannot be impeached and consequently the Spegial Tribunal must be deemed to have taken cognizance of the case quite properly, and its proceedings up to the date of the coming in of the Constitution would also have to be regarded as valid."

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Similarly, Das, J. in Lachhmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay(') in dealing with the validity of proceeding before a Special Judge holding a trial before the Constitution observed:

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"As the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot be questioned, however discriminatory it may have been ...... ".

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Selection by the authorities of one of two alternn-tive procedures at a time when Art. 14 was not in operation, does not therefore enable the appellant to contest the validity of the enquiry on the plea of denial of equal protection of the laws. It was also observed in Syed Qasim Razvi' s case(') by Mukherjea J. at p. 606:

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"In cases of the type (where the trial commenced before the Constitution) which we have before us where part of the trial could not be chall~nged as bad and the validity of the other part depends on the question as to whether the accused has been deprived of equal protection in matters of procedure, it is incumbent upon the court to consider, firstly, whether the discriminatory or unequal provisions of law could be separated from the rest and.even without them a fair measure of equality in the matter (I) [1952] S.C.R. 710. (2) [t953] S.C.R. 585. .

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	162 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1962]
*JagannathPrasad* *Sharma* v. *StateofUttar* Pradesh&- *Others* Shah].	ofprocedure could be secured to the accused.In thesecond place,ithas got to consider whetherthe procedure actually followed did or did not proceed uponthebasisofthe discriminatory provisions.In our opinion, a merethreator possibilityofunequal treatment is not sufficient.Ifactuallytheaccused has been discriminated against,thenandthen only he can com plain, not otherwise. We may mention herethattheimpossibilityof givingtheaccused the substanceofa trial accord- ing to normal procedureatthe subsequent stagemay arise not only from the factthatthediscriminatory provisions werenotseverable fromtherestofthe Actandthecourt consequentlyhadnooption to continueanyotherthanthe discriminatory pro- cedure; oritmay arise from something doaeatthe previous stage which though not invalidatthat time precludes the adoptionofa different procedure subsequently."

162
SUPREMECOURTREPORTS
(1962]

JagannathPrasad
Sharma
v.
StateofUttar
Pradesh&- Others
Shah].

ofprocedure could be secured to the accused.In
thesecond place,ithas got to consider whetherthe
procedure actually followed did or did not proceed
uponthebasisofthe discriminatory provisions.In
our opinion, a merethreator possibilityofunequal
treatment is not sufficient.Ifactuallytheaccused
has been discriminated against,thenandthen only
he can com plain, not otherwise.
We may mention herethattheimpossibilityof
givingtheaccused the substanceofa trial accord-
ing to normal procedureatthe subsequent stagemay
arise not only from the factthatthediscriminatory
provisions werenotseverable fromtherestofthe
Actandthecourt consequentlyhadnooption to
continueanyotherthanthe discriminatory pro-
cedure; oritmay arise from something doaeatthe
previous stage which though not invalidatthat
time precludes the adoptionofa different procedure
subsequently."

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The proceedings of the Tribunal prior to the commencement of the Constitution are therefore not open to challenge except to the limited extent indicated by Mukherjea J. The question which falls to be considered is whether the procedure followed by the Tribunal after the Constitution was discriminatory and operated to the prejudice of the appellant.

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Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations sets out the procedure to be followed in an enquiry by the police functionaries, and rr. 8 and 9 of the Tribunal Rules set out the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. There is no substantial difference between the procedure prescribed for the two forms of enquiry. The enquiry in its true nature is quasi-judicial. It is manifest from the very nature of the enquiry that the approach to the materials placed before the enquiring body should be judicial. It is true that by Regulation 490, the oral evidence is to be direct, but even under r. 8 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is to be guided by rules of equity and natural justice and is not bound by formal rules of procedure relating to evidence. It was urged that whereas the Tribunal may admit on record evidence which is hearsay, the oral

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I S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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evidence under the Police Regulations must b d e irect^, _ evidence and hearsay is excluded. We do not think Jagannath Ptasad that any such distinction was intended. Even though Sharma the Tribunal is not bound by formal rules relating to v. procedure and evidence, it cannot rely on evidence State⁰ 1 U1tar which is purely hearsay, because to do so in an Pradesh '"' Others enquiry of this nature would be contrary to rules of Shah J. equity and natural justice. The provisions for main. taining the record and calling upon the delinquent public servant to submit his explanation are substan. tially the same under Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations and r. 8 of the Tribunal Rules. It is urged that under the Tribunal Rules, there is a departure in respect of important matters from the Police Regula. tions which render the Tribunal Rules prejudicial to the person against whom enquiry is held under those rules. Firstly it is submitted that there is no right of appeal under the Tribunal Rules as is given under the Police Regulations; secondly that the Governor is bound to act according to the recommendations of the Tribunal and thirdly, that under the Tribunal Rules, even if the complexity of a case under enquiry justi. fies engagement of counsel to assist the person charg. ed, assistance by counsel may not be permitted at the enquiry. These three variations, it is urged, make the Tribunal Rules not only discriminatory but prejudicial as well to the person against whom enquiry is held under these Rules. In our view, this plea cannot be sustained. The Tribunal Rules and the Police Regulations in so far as they deal with enquiries against police officers are promulgated under s. 7 of the Police Act, and neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Police Regulations provide an appeal against an order of dismissal or reduction in rank which the Governor may pass. The fact that an order made by a police authority is made appealable whereas the order passed by the Governor is not made appealable is not a ground on which the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be challenged. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself. Equal protection of the Jaws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons. without

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164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962)

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1961 distinction: it merely guarantees the application1of the Jagaunath Prnsad same laws alike and without discrimination to all per. Sharma sons similarly situated. The power of the Legislature v. to make a distinction between persons or transactions Stato of Uiiar based on a real differentia is not taken away by the Pradesh ·- & Others equa pro 1 t cc t" ion cause. 1 Th ere1ore .c b y prov1 mg a "d" Shah .f. right of appeal against the order of police authorities acting under the Police Regulations imposing penalties upon a member of the police force, and by providing no such right of appeal when the order passed is by the Governor, no discrimination inviting the application of Art. 14 is practised. Under r. 10 of the Tribunal Rules, the Governor is enjoined to pass an order of punishment in terms recommended by the Tribunal, whereas no such obligation is cast upon the police authority who is competent to dismiss a police officer when an enquiry is held under Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations. To the extent that r. 10 requires the Governor to accept the recommendation Of the Tribunal, the rule may be regarded as inconsistent with the Constitution, because every police officer holds office during the pleasure of the Governor, and is entitled under Art. 311(2) to a reasonable opportunity to show cause to the satisf~c tion of the Governor against the action proposed to oe taken in regard to him. The partial invalidity of r. 10 however does not affect the remaining rules: that part of the rule which requires the Governor to accept the recommendation of the Tribunal as to the guilt of the public servant concerned is clearly severable. We may observe that in considering the case of the appellant, the Governor exercised his independent judgment and passed an order of dismissal and did not act merely on the recommendation of the Tribunal. The difference between the two sets of rules on the matter under consideration does not relate to the procedure of the enquiring bodies, but to the content of reasonable opportunity guaranteed by Art. 311 of the Constitu: tion.

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The rules relating to appearance of lawyers at enquiries under the Police Regulations and under the Tribunal Rules are also not different. Under cl. (9)

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 165

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1 !6.:

¶107

of Regulation 490 of the Police Reaulations, an accus- 1 !6.: ed police officer may not be represented by counsel in Jagannath Prasad any proceeding instituted under those Regulations, Sha.ma and by r. 7 of the Tribunal Rules, neither the prosecuv. t.ion nor·the defence have the right to be represented ffi Pradesh Stat' 0~ ~ u0ttahr t ers by counsel. Both the rules deny to t e po h 1me^. o cer _ the right to be represented by counsel. Shah J.

¶108

The procedure provided in the Police Regulations is substantially the same as the procedure prescribed by the Tribunal Rules, and by continuing the euquiry after the Constitution under the Tribunal Rules and not under the Police Regulations, a more onerous procedure prejudicial to the appellant was not adopted.

¶109

The Governor appointed the Tribunal for enquiry against the appellant before the Constitution, but the order of dismissal was passed after the Constitution came into force. The appellant was entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. Since the Constitution was enacted, the distinction which was made between members of the police force and other civil servants under ss. 240, 241 and 243 of the Government of India Act has disappeared and all civil servants including the police officers are entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2). The content of the guarantee was explained by this court in Khem Chand v. The Union of India (¹ ). It was observed by Chief Justice Das:

¶110

"To summarise: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provisions under consideration includes-

¶111

(a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based;

¶112

(b) an opportunity to defend himself by crossexamining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally

¶113

(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1080, 1096.

¶114

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982]

¶115

¶116

JtigannathPrasad
Shatnta
v.
StateofUttar
**Pradesh& ****Others**
ShahJ.

applying his mingtothegravityor otherwiseofthe
charges proved againstthegovernmentservant
tentatively proposes to inflict oneofthethree
punishmentsandcommunicatesthesame tothe
government servant;".
To a police officer charged with misdemeanour,
opportunity in all the three branches setoutin_Khem-
chand'scase(¹)is provided undertheTribunal Rules.
There is opportunity to the police officer against whom
anenquiry is madetodeny his guiltandtoestablish
his innocence; there is opportunity to defend himself
by cross-examinationofwitnesses produced against
himandby examining himselfandother witnesses in
supportofhis defence,andthere is also opportunity
to make his representation as to why the proposed
punishment should not be inflicted. The discrimina-
tion which is prohibited by Art.14is treatment in a
manner prejudicial as compared with another person
similarly circumstanced bytheadoptionofa law, sub-
stantive or procedural, different from the one applica-
ble tothatother person.In_Sardar Kapur Singhv.
_The Union of India('),_this court heldthatby direct-
ing an enquiry against a memberoftheIndianCivil
Service who was charged with misdemeanour under
the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850andnot
under r.55ofthe Civil Services (Classification, Con-
trolandAppeal) Rules when there was no substantial
difference between the material provisions, discrimi-
nation wasnotpractised.Itwas observed (at p. 581):
"Doestheholdingofan enquiry against a public
servant underthePublic Servants (Inquiries) Act,
1850 violate the equal protection clauseofthe Con-
stitution? The appellant submitsthattheGovern-
ment is invested withauthoritytodirect an enquiry
in oneoftwo alternative modesandby directingan
enquiry underthePublic Servants (Inquiries) Act
which Actitis submitted contains more stringent
provisions when againstanotherpublicservant
similarly circumstancedanenquiry underr.55 may
bedirected, Art.14oftheConstitution is infringed."
After consideringthespecial protection givento
(11[1958] S.C.R. 1080,'°'6.
(2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 569.

¶117

¶118

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 167

¶119

members of the Indian Civil Service and the essential r96r characteristics of the procedure for making enquiries (I . . ) A 1 aganna -t-h P rasa d under the Pu b he ervants nqmries^{. S} ct, 1850 , 1t^. was Sharma observed at p. 584: v. "The primary constitutional guarantee, a member State of Uttar of the Indian Civil Service is entitled to is one -of P,.desk & Others being afforded a reasonable opportunity of the con- Shah ]. tent set out earlier, in an enquiry in exercise of powers conferred by either the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act or r. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and discrimination is not practised merely because resort is had to one of two alternative sources of authority, unless it is shown that the procedure adopted operated to the prejudice of the public servant concerned. In the case before us, the enquiry held against the appellant is not in manner different from the manner in which an enquiry may be held consistently with the procedure prescribed by r. 55, and therefore on a plea of inequality before the law, the enquiry held by the Enquiry Commissioner is not liable to be declared void because it was held in a manner though permissible in law, not in the manner, the appellant says, it might have been held."

¶120

In Syed Qasim Razvi' s case (¹ ), it was held that if the substance of the special procedure followed after the Constitution in an enquiry or trial commenced before the Constitution is the same as in the case of a trial by the normal procedure, the plea of discrimination invalidating a trial must fail.

¶121

Counsel for the appellant in support of his plea that the enquiry by the Tribunal was vitiated because it was held under a discriminatory procedure relied upon a judgment of this Bench in the State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das('). In that case, a lower Divi- sion Assistant in the Secretariat of the Orissa Government was found guilty of certain misdemeanour by a Tribunal appointed under rules framed by the Orissa Government after an enquiry held in that behalf and was ordered to be dismissed from service. In a petition by the public servant under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ declaring illegal the order (1) (1953] S,C.R. 589, (2) A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 1715.

¶122

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962J

¶123

I96I
-
JagannathPrasad
Sharma
v
StateoiUttar
Pradesh_0_Others
ShahJ,

ofdismissalitwas held by the OrissaHighCourtthat
onthedateonwhichenquiry was directedagainst
h
· ·
h
'
f
l
·
t. epet1t10ne;-tere were two sets o ru cs mop~ra-
t10n,theTribunal Rules andtheBiharandOnssa
Subordinate Services Discipline and AppealRules-
anditwas open totheGovernmentofOrissa to select
either setofrules for enquiry againstanypublic ser-
vantagainstwhom a chargeofmisdemeanour was
made andthatselectionofone in preference tothe
othersetofrules was violativeoftheguaranteeof
Art.14oftheConstitution.TheHighCourt accord-
ingly declaredtheorder of dismissal inoperativeand
furtherdeclaredthatthe disciplinary proceedings be
restoredtothestage whichtheyhad reached when
thecase was referred totheTribunal. Againstthat
order,theStateofOrissa preferredanappealtothis
court. The relevant rules werenotinthatcase in-
corporated inthepaper-bookpreparedfor the hearing
nordid counsel fortheStateproduce for our conside-
rationthose rules. Counsel also concededthatbythe
adoptionoftheprocedure prescribed by theTribunal
Rules in preference totheprocedure inanenquiry
undertheService Rules, discrimination would be
practised because there were substantial differences
intheprotectiontowhichthepublic servants were
entitled undertheService RulesandtheTribunal
Rules. The only ground pressed in supportofthe
appeal wasthattheService Rules werenotin opera-
tionatthe time whentheenquiry in questionwas
directedandbydirectinganenquiry undertheTribu-
nalRules, discrimination wasnotpractised.Butthis
argumentraised forthefirst time questions which
were never investigatedandthis court declined to
allow counseltoraise them.Itwas observed inthat
case:

¶124

"If the two sets of rules were in operation at the material time when the enquiry was directed against the respondent and by order of the Governor, the enquiry was directed under the Tribunal Rules which are "more drastic" and prejudicial to the interest of the respondent, a clear case of discrimination arises and the order directing enquiry

¶125

169

¶126

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶127

... .)

¶128

z96r

¶129

against the respondent and the subsequent proceedings are liable to be struck down as infringingJagannath Prnsad Art. 14 of the Constitution." Sha,,na

¶130

Sha,,na v. 0~ ug,::rs Shah J._

¶131

Before us, counsel for the appellants has produced a.print.ed cop:y of the Disciplinary Proce.edings (Admi- p,~;:;h mstrat1ve Tribunal) Rules, 1951 published by the _ Government of Orissa. A perusal of these rules may Shah app:trently suggest that subject to certain minor differences, these rules are substantially the same as the Tribunal Rules framed by the State of U. P. We have however not been supplied with a copy of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935. The judgment of this court in The State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das (¹ ) can have no application to this case, because in that case, the order of the High Court was assailed on the limited ground that the High Court erred in a8suming that there were two sets of rules simultaneously in operation, and it was open to the Executive Government to select one or the other for holding an enquiry against a delinquent public servant. That contention was negatived and the judgment of the High Court was confirmed.

¶132

We do not think that there is any substance in the plea that discrimination was practised by continuing the enquiry under the Tribunal Rules after the Constitution was brought into force.

¶133

This appeal is filed with a certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution. By cl. (3) of Art. 132 the appellant is entitled to appeal to this court only on the ground that the High Court has wrongly decided a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution and unless this court grants leave to him, on no other. Counsel for the appellant has challenged the ·regularity of the proceedings of the Tribunal and we have heard him to assure ourselves that the proceeding of the Tribunal has not been vitiated by any serious irregularity, or that the appellant was not deprived of the protection under Art. 311 of the Constitution. We proceed to consider briefly the arguments advanced in support of that plea. It was urged (I) A.l,R. 1961 S.C. 1715 •

¶134

••

¶135

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962]

¶136

z96z in the first instance that the appellant was not per- ] agannat -h P rasa d mitted to appear at the enquiry before the Tribunal Sharma by a lawyer whereas the State Government was v. represented by a lawyer. It was averred in paragraph State of Uttar 14 of the affidavit of the appellant that the case for Pradesh & Othersthe prosecution was conducted by Jwala Prasad, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Legal Advisor Shah ]. to the Anti-corruption Department, and that the Tribunal was told that such a course would be contrary to the Tribunal Rules and in any case contrary to rules of equity and natural justice, because he-the appellant-was not permitted to appear by counsel. In reply, Hari Shankar Sharma, Deputy Superintendent of Police stated in his affidavit that it was not true that before the Tribunal prosecution was conducted by Jwala Prasad. He also stated that the Tribunal had required the presence of Sri Krishna who had made enquiries, but as Sri Krishna could not remain present, J wala Prasad attended the sitting of the Tribunal only on one day as Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., but he did not take any part in the proceedings, and "examination of witnesses and the cross-examination was all done by the members of the Tribunal" and the appellant. It does not appear that Jwala Prasad was a practising lawyer: he was not in any case permitted to appear as a lawyer and on the affidavit of Hari Shankar Sharma, it is clear that he did not take any part in the examination of witnesses or cross-examination. It was then urged that the explanation submitted by the appellant was not considered because the Governor felt bound by the recommendations of the Tribunal. But in para 25 of the affidavit, Hari Shankar Sharma stated that the explanation of the appellant was submitted to the Government by the Inspector-General of Police and the Governor duly considered the explanation and was of opinion that the appellant was unable to clear his conduct and therefore .under r. 10(1) of the Tribunal Rules the Governor ordered dismissal of the appellant from service after considering the merits of his .defence. It was then urged that the application submitted by the appellant for summoning witnesses and

¶137

:..

¶138

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

171

•

•

calling for certain records was not considered and the 1961 appellant had on that account been prejudiced. In Jagannath Prasad para 15 of his affidavit, the appellant stated that the Sharma Tribunal refused to call for certain records and though v. he wanted to summon certain defence witnesses, his StalB⁰ 1 Uttar application in that behalf was also refused. In answer Pradesh '"' Others to this averment, Hari Shankar Sharma stated that Shah J. the appellant had given a long list of defence witnesses and the Tribunal asked him to select those witnesses whose evidence in the opinion of the appellant would be relevant and thereupon the appellant "reduced his list to a much smaller number" and all those witnesses were summoned. Then it was urged that the assessor who is required under the rules to assist the Tribunal not having remained present at the hearing, the enquiry was vitiated. In paragraph 16 of the affidavit, the appellant has stated that during the enquiry S. N. Agha the assessor was absent on many days on which the case was heard and the evidence was recorded. In reply, Hari Shankar Sharma stated that the contents of paragraph 16 of the affidavit were not correct, that it was true that Agha could not attend on certain dates "due to unavoidable circumstances", but the appellant was specifically asked if he had any objection to the recording of evidence in Agha's absence and the appellant having stated that he has no objecbion, the proceedings were continued with his written consent. He further stated that the assessor was explained of the proceedings held on the days on which he had remained absent. The averments made in the affidavit of Hari Shankar Sharma were not controverted by the appellant.

¶144

On the materials placed on record, there is no substance in any of the pleas raised by the appellant relating to the regularity of the proceedings of the Tribunal. It may be pertinent to note that even though the appellant challenged before the High Court the regularity of the proceedings of the Tribunal, no argument was, it appears, advanced before the High Court in support thereof. The judgment of the High Court which is fairly detailed does not refer to any

)

•

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962]

¶149

i96r ground on which the contention was sought to be sustained. jagannath Prnsad Th l ,, il d . d' . d . h Sharma e a ppea 1a s an IS rnm1sse wit costs. v. State of Utta• DAS GUPTA, J.-I have had the advantage of read- Prndesh & Othersing the judgment prepared by Shah J.; but while I respectfully agree with the conclusions on all other Das Gupta 1 · points, I regret my inability to agree with the conclusion reached there on the main question in controversy, viz. whether the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 194 7 are void as being in contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they do not provide for any appeal against a decision by the Governor under Rule 10. The facts have been fully stated by my learned Brother and need not be repeated, especially as the facts in this particular case do not arise for consideration in the decision of the question of law, whether Art. 14 is contravened by the above provisions of the Tribunal Rules. Under these rules the Governor may refer to the Tribunal constituted in accordance with rule 3 "cases relating to an individual government servant or class of government servants or government servants in a particular area only in respect of matters involving-(a) corruption; (b) failure to discharge duties properly; (c) irremediable general inefficiency iu a public servant of more than ten year's standing; and (d) personal immorality." Under cl. 3 of rule 1 these rules apply to all government servants under the rule-making control of the Governor. It is not disputed that these rules apply to every member of the police service in Uttar Pradesh and that the Governor may refer to the Tribunal the cases relating to any individual government servant belonging to the police department in respect of any of the matters mentioned in cl. (1) of Rule 4. It is also not disputed that if the Governor does not make any such reference, the case of any such member of the police service in respect of any of these matters may be inquired into under the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. The co-existence of the provisions of Police Regulations on

._ '

•

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 173

¶154

/ -l

¶155

¶156

' the question of departmental punishment of police 1 96 1 h P d officers with the Tribunal Rules, thus results in the , • 1 a gannat rasa position that of two members of the pohce serv10e Sharma holding the same post and rank, one may be proceedv. ed against in respect of any of the matters mentioned State of Uttar in Rule 4(1) of the Tribunal Rules, under the Tribunal Pradesh & Others -- Rules and another may be proceeded against for the self-same matter under tie 1 P I o ice Regu at10ns. 1^. 'XTJ '• 1ere Das Gupta ]. the inquiry is held under the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal has to make a record of the charges, the explanation, its own findings and the views of the assessor and where satisfied that punishment be imposed, also formulate its recommendations about punishment. Under Rule lO the Governor will then decide the case and no appeal shall lie against the order so passed by the Governor. Where the action is taken under the Police Regulations procedure, a police officer against whom an order of dismissal, removal, suspension or reduction is passed has a right of appeal to the authority prescribed in Regulation 508. The question is whether the existence of the right of appeal under the Police Regulations procedure and the absence of the right of appeal against the decision by the Governor in the Tribunal Rules' procedure amounts to unequal treatment. On behalf of the respondent it has been urged that there is no unequal treatment as in one case it is the order ctf the Governor which is made not a11pealable and in the other case it is the order of a police functionary which is made appealable. The argument seems to be that only if in the Police Regulations an order made by the Governor had been made appealable while under the Tribunal Rules the order made by the Governor was not appealable there could be any scope for a complaint of unequal treatment. With great respect to my learned brethren who have taken the contrary view, I am of the opinion that this argument misses the realities of the position and is really an attempt to slur over the difficulty. The real position that requires examination appears to me to be this: Suppose A and B are two police officers holding the same rank and post and A is proceeded against under the

¶157

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962]

¶158

'9⁶'
-
JaKannath P•asad
Sharma
v.
StateofUttar
Pradesh&Others
_DasGupta1 _·

'fribunalRules on a chargeofcorruption while B is
proceeded against on a similar chargeofcorruption

d
h p l'
R
1 ·
d
fi
un·ert e o10e
egu at10ns proce ure.Intherst
caseifthe Tribunal finds A guiltyandrecommends,
say, dismissal;andtheGovernor makesanorderof
dismissal, against this order there is no appeal. Sup-
pose in B's case also the punishing authority makes
anorderofdismissal;butagainstthisB has a right
ofappeal.Itis obviousthatwhileinthelattercase
B has some chanceoftheappellate authority taking a
different view either about his guilt or aboutthe
quantumofpunishmentandsetting asideormodify-
ing the order, A has no such chanceatall.Itwill be
little consolation to Athatthe order in his case has
been passed by suchanhigh authority astheGover-
nor.Hecan,itseems to me, legitimately complain
thatthereis a real difference between the way he is
treatedandB is treated becauseofthis existenceof
B'srightofappeal againstthepunishing authority's
order while he has no such right. Unless one assumes
thatthe rightofappeal is only in name, I donotsee
how one can denythatthere is a legitimate basis for
thiscomplaint. I cannot agreethattherightofap-
peal is a right without substance. Whenever one
authoritysitsinappeal overanotherauthoritythere
is always a chancethattheappellate authority may
takea different viewoffacts oroflawandas regards
thequantumofpunishment requisite, fromthe
authority whose decision is under appeal.Itis this
chance which is denied,ifa rightofappeal istaken
away. Iamthereforeofopinionthatthe absenceof
therightofappeal under Rule10oftheTribunal
Rules while a rightofappeal is given to a police officer
underthePolice Regulations, results in unequal treat-
mentin a substantial matter, as between a police
officer proceeded against undertheTribunal Rulesand
anofficer who is proceeded against underthePolice
Regulations procedure. Nor isitpossible to discover
anyprincipletoguide the discretionofthe Govern-
mentto select some police officerstobe proceeded
against undertheTribunal Rules while leavingout
other police officerstobeproceeded against,inrespect

¶159

¶160

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 175

¶161

¶162

of similar matters, under the Police R.egulations procedure.

¶163

z96z

¶164

Jagannath Prasad Sharma v:

¶165

I have therefore come to the conclusion that the Tribunal Rules in so far as they provide that no appeal shall lie against the decision of the Governor . I . th C t't t' b . . t t' is n tra v1res e ons 1 u 10n, emg rn con raven 10n of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

¶166

State⁰ 1 Uttar P.adesh & Others Das ~upta ;.

¶167

As has been noticed by Shah J. a somewhat similar question fell to be considered by us in Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1959 (State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das). Comparing the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951 of the Orissa Government under which Dhirendranath Das had been proceeded against and dismissed from service with the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Service Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935 this Court held that inasmuch as there was a right of appeal to the authority immediately superior to the punishing authority under the Service Rules while there is no such appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal, the proceedings were substantially different. The court further pointed out that as inquiries could be directed according to procedures substantially different at the discretion of the executive authority "exercise whereof is not governed by any principles having any rational relation to the purpose to be achieved by the inquiry, the order selecting a prejudicial procedure, out of the two open for selection, is hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution." I cannot find anything here that would justify a revision of the view taken by us in that case.

¶168

As in my judgment the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 are hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, I would allow the appeal and set aside the order of dismissal passed against the appellant.

¶169

BY CouRT.-ln view of the majority Judgment of the Court, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

¶170

·Appeal dismissed.

Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

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Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.

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