Dismissed

Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited v. Laxmi Meena D/O Shri Johri Lal Meena

Rajasthan HC16 Jan 2026CW/7097/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Employer challenged a Labour Court award reinstating a workman discharged during probation without inquiry. The High Court held the discharge was stigmatic, found no perversity in the award, dismissed the writ petition but permitted the employer to conduct a fresh departmental inquiry.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed; petitioners at liberty to conduct a departmental inquiry into alleged misconduct after taking respondent back on duty.

Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport… — Labour and Industrial Disputes | Rajasthan HC (2026)

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

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S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7097/2019

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Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

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The Chief Manager, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited, Sanganer Depot, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

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----Petitioners

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Versus

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Laxmi Meena D/o Shri Johri Lal Meena, R/o Plot No. 49-B, Bajrang Colony, Jagatpura, Jaipur.

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----Respondent

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For Petitioner(s)	: Mr.	Arnav Singh for
	Mr.	SandeepPathak
For Respondent(s)	: Mr.	Pradeep Singh
	Mr.	Jitesh Kumawat

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order

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16/01/2026

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Instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioners, (non-claimants/employers), aggrieved by the award dated 16.10.2018 passed in LCR No. 16/2018 titled "Laxmi Meena versus Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited and another" by the Labour Court-I Jaipur.

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Instant writ petition is preferred with the following prayer: “It is, therefore most humbly prayed that the order dated 16.10.2018 passed by Labour Court, Jaipur-I in Case No. L.C.R. 16/2018 titled as Laxmi Meena V. Manging Director, JCTSL & Anr.' whereby the Learned Labour Court has arbitrarily allowed the claim of the Respondent and directed for reinstatement with consequential benefits, may kindly be quashed and set aside.

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That the Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to dismiss the claim petition filed by the Respondent/Workman.

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Any other appropriate relief which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, may kindly also be passed in favour of the Petitioners.”

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The brief facts of the case are that the respondent employee/workman filed a petition under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1947”), pursuant to liberty granted vide order dated 19.12.2017 in SBCW Writ Petition No. 7020/2016 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. After registration of the LCR, notice was issued to the employer, i.e., the present petitioners, and after filing of the written statement, the Labour Court arrived at a conclusion that the termination order dated 16.03.2016 was arbitrary and punitive in nature and was passed without conducting a mandatory inquiry as required under the law. Aggrieved from the award dated 16.10.2018, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition. The award dated 16.10.2018 is reproduced as under:

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^^vr% mijksDr foospuk ds vk/kkj ij jkT; ljdkj ls izkIr fookn ds jsQjSal esa fuEu vokMZ ikfjr fd;k tkrk gSa&

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Jfed izkFkhZ;k Jhefr y{eh eh.kk iq=h Jh tksgjh yky eh.kk 49ch] ctjax dksyksuh] txriqjk] t;iqj dks vizkFkhZx.k 1&izca/k funs”kd] t;iqj flVh VªkaliksVZ lfoZlst fy0 t;iqj f}rh; ry iqjkuk efgyk gksLVy usg: iSysl ds ihNs] ykydksBh Vksad jksM+] t;iqj] 2&eq[; izca/kd] t;iqj flVh VªkaliksVZ lfoZlst fy0 lkaxkusj vkxkj] t;iqj jkt0 }kjk fnukad 16-3-2016 ls lsok eqDr fd;k tkuk vuqfpr ,oa voS/k gSA izkFkhZ;k dks lsok dh fujUrjrk ds

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lkFk iqu% lsok esa fu;ksftr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk mls fiNyk leLr osru o ykHk fnyk;s tkrs gSaA **

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the respondent workman was on probation and her services were not found satisfactory; therefore, her services were discontinued and she was discharged. He further submitted that the appointment order itself contained Condition No. 4, which provides that if the probation is not found satisfactory, the employee shall be discharged in accordance with Regulation 13 (II) of the Standing Order. He further submitted that the discharge of respondent workman was not a stigmatic order and, therefore, there was no mandate to conduct an inquiry. He also submitted that the principles of natural justice are not attracted and learned the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction while considering the grounds advanced in favour of the respondent workman.

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Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent workman, who referred to the order dated 18.01.2017 passed in DB Special Appeal Writ No. 1460/2016, Jaipur City Transport Services Ltd. and another versus Dinesh Kumar, by the Division Bench of this Court, and submitted that in an identical case, the writ petition was alowed by the learned Single Judge and thereafter Special Appeal Writ was dismissed. He further submitted that there is no perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Labour Court, therefore, present writ petition is not maintainable.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.

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The short controversy involved in the instant case is as to whether the petitioners discharged the respondent workman during the term of probation and the order of discharge was stigmatic in nature, which would warrant a departmental enquiry, and consequently, the award passed by the Labour Court is justified.

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It is settled law that interference with an award passed by the Labour Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is warranted only in cases where the findings are perverse or there is patent illegality. The award of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is final and no statutory appeal is provided once the award is passed by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal.

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In the case of General Manager, ONGC, Silchar versus ONGC Contractual Union, reported as (2018) 12 SCC 275, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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“We have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. This Court has held time and again that the High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. The observations in Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd.'s case (2003) 6 SCC 416) are to this effect and it has been highlighted that the High Court would be fully justified in interfering with an Award of an Industrial Court on account of a patent illegality. In Seema Ghosh's case ((2006) 7 SCC 722), this Court observed that the High Court's interference under

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Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an Award of the Labour Court was justified as the Award had been rendered contrary to the law laid down by this Court and as a measure of "misplaced sympathy", and was thus perverse. The other judgments cited by Mr. Dave lay down similar principles and need not be dealt with individually. It will be seen therefore that the interference would be limited to a few cases and as already noted above, in the case of a patent illegality or perversity. On the contrary, Mr. Sanyal's reliance on Sadhu Ram's case (AIR 1984 SC 1467) is more appropriate to the circumstances herein. It has been observed as under:

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"The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to re-adjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the

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Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management".

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We are therefore of the opinion that in the light of the facts that have come on record we find no perversity or patent illegality in the Award of the Industrial Tribunal and on the contrary must appreciate that it has minutely examined the evidence in arriving at its decision. In this view of the matter, it was inappropriate for the Learned Single Judge to have re- appraised the evidence and come to a different conclusion.”

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Thus it is necessary for the petitioners to establish a case of patent illegality or perversity in the award/judgment passed by the Labour Court. The law on the point is settled that even if, on the facts and circumstances of the case, another view is also possible, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to reappreciate the material as considered by the Labour Court.

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In the case of Jaipur City Transport Services Ltd. versus Dinesh Kumar (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while placing reliance upon the judgment dated 13.01.2017 passed in case of Jaipur City Transport Services Ltd. versus Kuldeep, DB Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1453/2016 , relied upon the following observation: “By way of these appeals, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge has set aside the order of termination.

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counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. vs. Zakir Hussain, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 447, the issue of alternative remedy was not decided.

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Admitting appeal on that point will be detrimental to the appellant. In that view of the matter, the alternative submission made by Mr. Rajendra Prasad, AAG which has been accepted that the reinstatement which has been directed by the learned Single Judge will be subject to further enquiry against the present respondents and pending that enquiry, they will not ask for any benefit of confirmation since they are on probation. 5. While examining the matter, matter, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The order of termination is confirmed only in view of the fact that not conducted. We are not the enquiry was expressing any opinion on the alternative remedy or anything but the reinstatement will be subject to enquiry which shall be allowed to be conducted by the appellant with rider that the respondent will not be entitled for confirmation till pendency of the enquiry.

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The order is passed in the interest of all concerned. If the respondent are aggrieved, it will be open for them to file the review application.

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The appeals stand disposed of."

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The material on record clearly indicated that the probation of the respondent was extended on 21.09.2015 after noticing an act of misconduct. Again, the probation was extended on 20.10.2015 for a period of three months, again noticing misconduct. Ultimately, the respondent was discharged on

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16.03.2016. The discharge of the respondent was prima facie stigmatic, and no employee can be discharged even during probation on a stigmatic ground.

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Having considered the legal position as referred to hereinabove, there are no grounds for interference in the award passed by the Labour Court. However, after taking the respondent on duty, the petitioners are at liberty to conduct a detailed inquiry as per the standing orders or the applicable rules.

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In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed along with the pending application, if any. The petitioners are at liberty to conduct a departmental inquiry into the alleged misconduct, as noticed during earlier term of employment of the respondent workman, in accordance with the standing orders/rules applicable to the respondent.

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(ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J

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PREETI VALECHA /13

Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited v. Laxmi Meena D/O Shri Johri Lal Meena

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Managing Director, Jaipur City Transport Services Limited v. Laxmi Meena D/O Shri Johri Lal Meena

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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