Sitaram Sharma S/O Shri Babulal Vs Kajodmal Sharma S/O Shri Rameshwar

The present civil miscellaneous appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC') assailing the order dated 08.09.2025 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Chaksu, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, (Head Quarter Chaksu), whereby the learned Trial Court allowed the Temporary Injunction application filed by the respondent/plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, restraining the appellant/defendant from selling or alienating the suit property, and directing the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the possession and record of the suit property.

¶13

Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a civil suit for specific performance and permanent injunction in respect of the suit land, on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 11.02.2024. As per the said agreement,

¶14

[2025:RJ-JP:44242]

¶15

(2 of 5) [CMA-4735/2025]

¶16

the respondent/plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 51,00,000/- in cash to the appellant/defendant as part of the sale consideration at the time of execution of the contract.

¶17

Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that, as per the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 11.02.2024, a period of seven months was stipulated for performance of the obligations, including execution of the sale deed. However, the respondent/plaintiff deliberately prolonged the matter, and only after the appellant/defendant issued a legal notice, the main suit was filed before the learned Trial Court.

¶18

Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant further submits that despite execution of the agreement dated 11.02.2024, the respondent/plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated therein. Hence, the learned Trial Court erred in granting the temporary injunction. Accordingly, he prays that the impugned order dated 08.09.2025 may kindly be set aside.

¶19

Heard and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and perused the material available on record. 6. From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the agreement dated 11.02.2024 was executed between the parties, and the main suit has been filed for specific performance of the said agreement. Neither party has disputed the execution of the agreement, nor have they disputed the receipt of the part sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement. However, the contention of the appellant/defendant is that the

¶20

[2025:RJ-JP:44242]

¶21

(3 of 5) [CMA-4735/2025]

¶22

respondent/plaintiff failed to adhere to the time schedule stipulated in the agreement, and since time was the essence of the contract, the learned Trial Court ought not to have granted the interim injunction.

¶23

From a bare perusal of the record, it is also evident that though a timeline was prescribed in the agreement dated 11.02.2024 for execution of the sale deed, as per the averments in the plaint, certain disputes arose between the parties due to which the sale deed could not be registered. Moreover, the proposed questions, i.e., whether time was the essence of the contract and whether the respondent/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, are mixed questions of fact and law and are to be tried in the main suit.

¶24

Furthermore, it is also revealed that vide impugned order dated 08.09.2025, the learned Trial Court has merely preserved the subject matter of the suit property by restraining the appellant/defendant from selling or alienating the same, and has directed the parties to maintain the status quo with respect to the record and possession of the suit property during the pendency of the main suit.

¶25

Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Wander Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Antox India P. Ltd.¹ , while laying down the scope of appeals in case of temporary injunctions, held as under:

¶26

"In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of

1 1990 Supp SCC 727

(4 of 5)

[2025:RJ-JP:44242]

[CMA-4735/2025]

discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion."

¶32

Since the learned Trial Court has duly considered the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, it cannot be said that the learned Trial Court acted capriciously, arbitrarily, perversely, or in ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant of temporary injunctions. Accordingly, the learned Trial Court has rightly passed the injunction order dated 08.09.2025 to preserve the subject matter of the suit property.

¶33

Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 08.09.2025. Accordingly, the present civil miscellaneous appeal, being devoid of merit and having no force, stands dismissed.

¶34

At the same time, it is clarified that the order to maintain the status quo shall not be construed as a legal impediment over the defendant/appellant's right to the peaceful and lawful use of the suit property during the pendency of the main suit.

¶35

However, it is made clear that the observations made herein,

¶36

as well as those contained in the impugned order dated 08.09.2025, shall not influence the final adjudication of the main suit. The learned Trial Court shall be at liberty to decide the main suit independently, on its own merits.

[2025:RJ-JP:44242]

[CMA-4735/2025]

(5 of 5)