Dismissed¶61

Smt. Prem Devi Wife of Late Shri Biramal, v. Santosh Meena S/O Shri Badrinarayan Meena

Limitation – Condonation of delay – Section 5, Limitation Act

Rajasthan HC11 Feb 2025CMA/1371/2024

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Delay condonation refused; 597-day delay in CMA 1371/2024 against MACT No.1 Jaipur Metro-II award dated 20.04.2022 (Rs. 33,46,200/-, claim case 314/2017, SS. 166 & 140 MV Act); Section 5 Limitation Act application dismissed as grounds general/unexplained; Katiji, Balwant Singh, Brijesh Kumar/Esha Bhattacharjee and P. Subba Reddy (2024 INSC 286) applied; appeal dismissed, no costs.

What did the court decide?

The ground of delay mentioned in the application is not tenable and there is no other ground which could justify the delay of 597 days in filing the instant appeal; the assigned reasons are simple and general in nature, and the same claimants had earlier filed their claim petition within 40 days of the accident. ¶58

Smt. Prem Devi Wife of Late Shri Biramal, Vs Santosh… — Motor Accident Claims | Rajasthan HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the delay of 597 days in preferring the civil miscellaneous appeal against the Tribunal's award should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. +1 more

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Court's answer

Since there is no ground, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be allowed and is liable to be dismissed.

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Ratio / Principle

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Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Limitation – Condonation of delay – Section 5, Limitation Act – S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1371/2024 (High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench; Ashok Kumar Jain, J.; order dated 11/02/2025): Appellants, the widow and son of the deceased, sought condonation of a 597-day delay in appealing against the award dated 20.04.2022 in claim case No. 314/2017 of MACT No.1, Jaipur Metro-II (petition under Sections 166 and 140, Motor Vehicles Act) awarding Rs. 33,46,200/- to the claimants. Relying on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353), Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010 (8) SCC 685), Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana ((2014) 13 SCC 291) and P. Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024 INSC 286), the court held that the assigned reasons were simple and general and did not specifically explain the delay; noting that the same claimants had filed their claim petition within 40 days of the accident and that an award of Rs. 33,46,200/- already stood in their favour, it found the ground untenable and no other ground justificatory of the 597-day delay. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal were dismissed; no order as to costs; pending applications disposed of.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

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S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1371/2024

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Smt. Prem Devi Wife Of Late Shri Biramlal, Aged About 43 Years, (Deceaseds Wife) Resident Of Survey No-95, Teela No-6 A, Jawahar Nagar Kachhi Basti, Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.).

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Om Prakash Bairwa Son Of Late Shri Biramlal, Aged About 23 Years, (Deceaseds Son) Resident Of Survey No-95, Teela No-6A, Jawahar Nagar Kachhi Basti, Jawahar Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.).

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----Appellants

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Versus

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Santosh Meena S/o Shri Badrinarayan Meena, Aged About 43 Years, Resident Of Purana Ghat Ka Balaji, Galta Road, Jaipur.(Rajasthan) (Driver Of Vehicle Truck Dumper No. Rj-14-Ge-4003).

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Om Prakash Sharma S/o Shri Sitaram Sharma, Resident Of-28, Behind Jain Mandir, Khaniya Purana Ghat, Agra Road Jaipur Rajasthan(Registered Owner, Vehicle Truck Dumper No. Rj14-Ge-4003).

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Manager, New India Insurance Company Ltd. AddressSecond Floor, Nehru Palace, Tonk Road Jaipur (Insurance Company Truck Dumper No. Rj14-Ge-4003). (Policy No. - 33170031160200019232 (Validity Till 25-11-2016 To 2411-2017).

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Shri Ramkaran Bairwa Son Of Late Shri Raichand, Aged About 75 Years, Resident Of Harijan Mohalla, Devliyan Kalaan, Tehsil Binay, District Ajmer.

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----Respondents

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. H.C. Mourya, Advocate For Respondent(s) :

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN

Order

11/02/2025

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Dis-satisfied from award dated 20.04.2022 in claim case No. 314/2017 passed by learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal No.1, Jaipur Metro-II, Jaipur in a petition under Section 166 and 140 of Motor Vehicles Act, instant civil misc. appeal is preferred by appellant-claimant.

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Learned counsel for appellant submits that appellants are illiterate person and not aware about the award passed by the Tribunal. He further submits that the appellant-claimants were suffering from several difficulties and were not having enough means to file appeal, therefore, the delay in filing instant appeal be condoned.

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Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the material placed on record.

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Office has pointed out a delay of 597 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

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Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period.

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In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

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Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the

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very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

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"Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

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When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

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There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

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It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

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In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and

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Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of

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delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equibenches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

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In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291 , while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

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Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:-

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

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A claim petition was filed on 01.07.2017 for the accident of 27.05.2017. It indicates that within 40 days of accident, a claim petition was filed by same claimants. When an award was passed on 20.04.2022, instant civil misc. appeal was preferred on 07.03.2024. The ground of delay is not specifically explained in application. Assigned reasons are simple and general in nature.

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Learned Tribunal has already passed an award of ₹33,46,200/- in favor of claimants. It appears that the award was also not challenged by any of the non-claimant. The deceased was working in Nagar Nigam and it is claimed that his monthly income was ₹35,000/- p.m. AW-3 Nidhi Khandelwal came in witness-box to prove income of deceased. Looking to this fact, the ground mentioned in application is not tenable. There is no other ground which could justify delay of 597 days in filing the instant appeal.

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