“15. In this context, proviso (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 33, has to be appreciated. It is quite plain that it empowers the Judge of the High Court to delegate the duty of examination and impounding the instrument to such officer as the Court appoints in that behalf. The question arises where the nature of document is disputed, the same can be done by the delegated authority. For example, if a document tendered is a sale deed and dispute arises with regard to its character, namely, sale deed or deed of mortgage, can it be done by the officer concerned. The stamp duty payable on a lease deed or a licence may be different. The delegation by a Judge of the High Court will not clothe the officer with the jurisdiction of determining the nature and character of the instrument inasmuch as such fact needs to be determined by the Judge while exercising judicial function. Such judicial function is not to be delegated to an officer of the Court by the Judge of the High Court. What is delegated under the proviso (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 33 is only to examine the instrument for the purpose of determining as to whether the instrument is duly stamped or not and for impounding the same. We are disposed to think that Section 33(2)(b) does not contemplate or permit any adjudication as regards the nature and character of the instrument. The delegated power has to be restricted to cover the area, that is, whether the instrument bears the proper
