Petitioner challenged Labour Court award upholding stoppage of increments for carrying unsold passengers. Court held 10-year delay rendered dispute stale. Found no illegality or perversity. Rejected writ under Article 227.
The writ application was rejected with no order as to costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR
ORDER
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2022/2009
Hajari Lal Versus
Judge Labour Court, Ajmer & Ors.
Date of Order :: 14th March, 2014
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA
Mr.Aslam Khan for the petitioner. Mr.O.P. Sheoran, for the respondents.
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BY THE COURT :
The impugned order and award dated 3rd February, 2004 passed by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer in Case No.SITR-19/2000, is the subject matter of the challenge in the instant writ application by the petitioner/workman, an employee of the respondent - Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent/Corporation', for short). The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal upheld the penalty of stoppage of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect, inflicted upon the petitioner/workman.
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Route. Since, the reply to the charge-sheet was not found satisfactory, therefore, a domestic enquiry was conducted against the petitioner/workman. The Enquiry Officer returned a finding of the charge partially proved. The Disciplinary Authority having considered the facts, circumstances and materials available on record, found the petitioner/workman guilty of carrying seven passengers without ticket, on the bus of the respondent/Corporation after having received a sum of Rs.10.50. The petitioner also misbehaved with the 'Inspection Team'. The Disciplinary Authority having considered the totality of the facts, circumstances and materials available on record, imposed a penalty of stoppage of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect vide order dated 30th September, 1990. The appeal preferred by the petitioner/workman was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority, confirming the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner/workman has neither placed the memo of the appeal on record, nor challenged the order of the Appellate Authority, confirming the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Be that as it may, the petitioner/workman raised an industrial dispute by way of an application before the Conciliation Officer and on submission of a failure report, the State Government made a reference to the Labour Court/Tribunal. The statement of claim filed by the petitioner/workman was responded by the respondent/Corporation repelling the pleaded facts and grounds. The Labour Court/Tribunal taking into consideration the pleaded facts, materials available on record and evidence produced, declined
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to interfere with the order of penalty imposed by the respondent/Corporation vide impugned order/award dated 3rd February, 2004.
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the event of a dispute, the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court may interfere in the cases when there is (i) want of good faith; (ii) when there is victimization or unfair labour practice is adopted; (iii) when the Management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials; the finding is completely baseless or perverse. The learned counsel for the respondent/Corporation therefore, submitted that the instant case at hand, calls no interference by this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
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initiated proceedings before the Conciliation Officer. No doubt, there is no statutory limitation prescribed in the Act of 1947, but at the same time when a dispute becomes stale, it is always open for the competent authority to decline to make a reference. So also every dispute raised by a workman is not an 'industrial dispute' as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act of 1947. However, in the instant case at hand, the matter was sent to the State Government after a failure report, in turn resulting into a reference to the Labour Court/ Tribunal, whereupon the Labour Court/Tribunal after having considered the pleaded facts, materials and evidence available on record, upheld the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority.
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while he is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, it is expected from such an employee to exhibit utmost trustworthiness and exhibit the highest degree of integrity.
“5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that in the employer's own case in case of another conductor, almost under identical circumstances a similar direction was upheld. Reliance was placed on U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors. : (2000) ILLJ1113SC .
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authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra : (1963)ILLJ239SC held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishment authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for which punishment "can lawfully imposed", it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in (SIC) the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction of the findings prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct he Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view as reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur: (1972)ILLJ1SC . It is true that in Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P.: (1983) IILLJ1SC a Bench of two Judge of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the
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appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/ Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami v. State of T.N.: AIR 1989 SC 1137 a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that is no case, the High Court/Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India's case : (1994)ILLJ872SC where the Court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not advanced to the relevant facts, it was (SIC) to the appellate authority to impose
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appropriate punishment.
The review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are (SIC) with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude on gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
"The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England can be summarized as follows:
(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not
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bona fide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury 1948 1 KB 223 test.
(2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational - in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU 1985 AC 374 principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay 1987 AC 514, Brind 1991 (1) AC 696 and Smith 1996 (1) All ER 257 as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done.
(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the
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restriction thereupon.
(4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority.
(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of "proportionality" and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Article 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14.
Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of "proportionality". There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to "irrationality", there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no
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sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur : 1988CriLJ158 ".
In Ranjit Thakur this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In other words, this Court felt that, on facts. Wednesbury and CCSU tests were satisfied. In another case, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India : (1996) ILLJ1231SC a three-Judge Bench said the same thing as follows: (SSC p. 762, para 18) "18. .....The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." Similar view was taken in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora: AIR1997SC1030 that the Court will not
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intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate.
In such a situation, unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi's case that the Court might - to shorten litigation - think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.). For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar : (1988) IILLJ62SC cannot be of any help."
"Thus, from the above principles and decided
cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms
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nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment."
(VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA), J.
Sunil/P.A.
All corrections made in the judgment/order have been incorporated in the judgment/order being emailed.
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(Sunil Solanki) P.A.
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the High Court should interfere with the Labour Court/Tribunal's award upholding stoppage of three annual grade increments imposed for gross misconduct.
Whether the delay of ten years in raising the industrial dispute warrants rejection of the writ application.
Whether the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority was arbitrary or perverse under the Wednesbury test.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah & Ors. v. Hoti Lal & Anr.Explained¶31
Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah & Ors. v. Hoti Lal & Anr.: (2003) 3 SCC 605 · Who else cites this
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors.Referred¶32
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors. : (2000) ILLJ1113SC
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.Followed¶34
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. : (1996) ILLJ1231SC
State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan MohapatraRelied on¶35
State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra : (1963)ILLJ239SC
Union of India v. Sardar BahadurRelied on¶36
Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur: (1972)ILLJ1SC
Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P.Distinguished¶36
Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P.: (1983) IILLJ1SC
Rangaswami v. State of T.N.Explained¶37
Rangaswami v. State of T.N.: AIR 1989 SC 1137 · Who else cites this
State Bank of India's caseExplained¶39
State Bank of India's case : (1994)ILLJ872SC
Union of India and Anr. v. G. GanayuthamExplained¶43
Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham: (2000) IILLJ648SC
Ranjit ThakurDistinguished¶56
Ranjit Thakur : 1988CriLJ158
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar AroraFollowed¶57
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora: AIR1997SC1030
State of Maharashtra v. M.H. MazumdarDistinguished¶60
State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar : (1988) IILLJ62SC
Om and Ors. v. Union of IndiaFollowed¶61
Om (SIC) and Ors. v. Union of India: 2000(7) SCALE524
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Hajari Lal
Judge Labour Court, Ajmer
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
Veerendr Singh Siradhana
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
