submitted that as a matter of fact, the Arbitrator as also the tribunal has miserably failed to appreciate the scope of expression “except in any investment made in, or any loan taken from the society” used in Rule 34(1)(b) of the Rules. Learned counsel submitted that the matter with regard to disqualification of a member to contest the election as member of the Management Committee of the respondent-bank is obviously governed by Rule 34(1)(b) of the Rules and therefore, the provisions of bye law 26(A)(8) of the Bye-laws to the extent it runs contrary to the provisions incorporated in the Rules cannot operate. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of this court in the matters of Devi Chand v. State of Rajasthan , 1995(2) WLC 281 and Pukhraj Mehta v. the State of Rajasthan , 1995(2) WLC 140 and a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik & Ors ., (1984) 2 SCC, 50. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly, the transactions were in respect of the loans obtained by the borrowers and neither by the proprietorship business concern of the petitioner nor by the company, in which the petitioner was Director. Accordingly, it is submitted that the findings recorded by the Arbitrator, affirmed by the tribunal are ex facie erroneous and perverse and therefore, the orders impugned deserve to be set aside.