Dismissed

Bachittar Singh and Ors. v. Maya Devi (Deceased) and Ors.

Punjab & Haryana HC20 Sept 2024CR/2579/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This revision petition challenged a trial court order setting aside a 1963 compromise decree as void due to Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. The High Court, upholding settled law, held that even void decrees must be challenged within the limitation period of three years.

What did the court decide?

Impugned order dated 17.12.2019 setting aside the 1963 compromise decree is set aside; application dismissed as barred by limitation.

Bachittar Singh and Ors. Vs Maya Devi (Deceased)… — Property and Title | Punjab & Haryana HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

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I. CR-2574-2020 (O&M) Mohinder Singh (since deceased) through LRs . . . . Pe��oners

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Vs.

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Maya Devi (deceased) through LRs and Others . . . . Respondents ** II. CR-2579-2020 (O&M) Bachi/ar Singh and Others** . . . . Pe��oners Vs.

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Maya Devi (deceased) through LRs and Others . . . . Respondents

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Reserved on: 03.09.2024 Pronounced on: 20.09.2024

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

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Argued by:- Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh, Mr. Ni�n Sansanwal, Mr. Vishal Thakur and Mr. Namish Sodhi, Advocates for the pe��oners in CR-2574-2020 (O&M).

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Mr. Gagandeep Singh, Advocate for the pe��oners in CR-2579-2020 (O&M).

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Mr. Gurvinder Singh Sidhu, Advocate for the respondents.

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DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

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Both these revisions have been filed against same order dated 17.12.2019, whereby an applica�on under Sec�on 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing CIS No. CM-138-2015 (CNR No. PBSAB-00010092-2015) filed by Maya Devi deceased through her legal representa�ves (now contested respondents in both the cases) against Bachi;ar Singh and others (pe oners in both these pe ons) was partly allowed by Learned Addi�onal Civil Judge (Senior Division) Dera Bassi.

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CR-2574-2020 (O&M)

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CR-2579-2020 (O&M)

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2.1 Facts are being no�ced from CR No. 2574 of 2020.

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2.2 One Rulia son of Punjaba was owner of 162 Bigha 11 biswa of the land to the extent of 1/2 share, as per Jamabandi for the year 1958-59, situated in the Village Malakpur, Tehsil Rajpura, besides a house, fully detailed and described in head note of plaint (Annexure P-1) of Civil Suit No. 442 of 1962 decided on 05.01.1963 �tled as “Sawan Singh vs. Maya Devi and Anr.” . On the death of said Rulia, his en�re land was mutated in favour of his widow Smt. Maya Devi. Rulia and Maya Devi did not have any issue.

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2.3 Sawan Singh son of Chhota claimed that he alongwith Bakhtaura son of Dalel Singh were collaterals in third genera�on of Rulia and so, they are legal heirs and claimed to have inherited the suit property aBer the death of Rulia by alleging that Maya Devi was not the widow of Rulia and that she had got the muta�on of inheritance sanc�oned in her favour by way of impersona�on. With these allega�ons, Sawan Singh brought civil suit No. 442 of 1962 by impleading Maya Devi as Defendant No.1 and Bakhtaura as Defendant No. 2.

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2.4 The two defendants of that suit i.e. Maya Devi and Bakhtaura filed wri;en statement (Annexure P-2) claiming that Maya Devi was the widow of Rulia and that muta�on of inheritance was rightly sanc�oned in her favour. The claim of Sawan was contested by them.

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2.5 During the pendency of abovesaid suit, a compromise was effected between the par�es on 5.1.1963, copy of which is Annexure P-3 , as per which Maya Devi was declared as owner of 4 Killas of land; whereas, she was agreed to be en�tled to the produce of remaining land during her life �me. As per the compromise, aBer the death of Maya Devi, Plain�ff of that case Sawan and defendant No. 2 Bakhtaura will be en�tled to inherit the en�re remaining land in equal share. It was also agreed that Maya Devi will not be en�tled to execute any giB deed, Will, mortgage, sale deed etc. in respect of the remaining land, though she will be en�tled to cul�vate the said land. On the basis of this compromise dated 05.01.1963 (Annexure P-3) , the suit was decreed on

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CR-2574-2020 (O&M)

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CR-2579-2020 (O&M)

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05.01.1963 vide Annexure P-4 .

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3.1 The aforesaid compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 was challenged by Maya Devi by bringing Civil Suit No. 84GT of 1983 filed on 14.03.1983. During the pendency of the suit, Maya Devi expired and her legal representa�ves were brought on record. Those legal representa�ves are now the pe��oners in these two revisions.

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3.2 It was claimed in the said suit filed by Maya Devi that aBer the death of Rulia and sanc�oning of muta�on in her name, she had become absolute owner in possession of the en�re suit property in view of Sec�on 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and that compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 was the result of fraud and misrepresenta�on, inasmuch as she was residing with Bakhtaura Singh, who impressed upon her that in case she didn't agree to the compromise, she may have to lose the en�re rights in the suit property. The said suit filed by Maya Devi on the ground of fraud, was decreed by Ld. Sub-Judge 1^st Class, Rajpura on 01.08.1987 vide Annexure P5 .

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3.3 The appeal filed by the defendants of that suit namely Bachi;ar Singh and others, was dismissed on 03.06.1988 vide Annexure P6 .

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3.4 RSA No. 1741 of 1988 was filed by defendants of that case, i.e., Bachi;ar Singh and others, which was allowed vide order dated 19.08.2015 ( Annexure P7) by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court on the ground of maintainability by holding that the compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 could not have been challenged by bringing a fresh suit in view of provisions of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC.

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3.5 Special Leave to Appeal [C] No. 30206/2015 against the above said order of the High Court was dismissed by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 02.11.2015 vide Annexure P8 without going into the merits of the case and making it clear that dismissal of the suit filed by the pe��oner (plain�ffs) will not prevent them from seeking redress in the appropriate proceedings before the Court that passed the original decree on compromise.

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CR-2579-2020 (O&M)

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3.6 During the course of proceedings before the High Court in the aforesaid li�ga�on, the respondents of the case had been directed to deposit the mesne profits in the High Court and their dispossession was stayed. The plain�ffs of that suit i.e. LRs of Maya Devi were held en�tled to withdraw the same on furnishing the adequate security.

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4.1 ABer the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the LRs of Maya Devi filed an applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC on the same ground that the compromise decree dated 5.1.1963 was the result of fraud and so, the same was null and void and that Maya Devi was the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of Sec�on 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and that no fe;ers could have been placed upon her rights in the suit property. It was further claimed by the applicants that by virtue of a Will executed by Maya Devi, they had become owner of the suit property.

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4.2 The applica�on was opposed by the respondents thereof i.e., pe oners of these two pe ons on various grounds, par�cularly on the ground of limita�on. They also raised the issue of estoppel. They denied the compromise decree to be the result of any fraud and submi;ed that Maya Devi herself had appeared in the Court and had made the statement regarding the compromise.

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4.3 The trial Court framed following issues.

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Whether the applicants are en�tled to the relief of declara�on as prayed for? OPA

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Whether the applicants are en�tled to the relief of mandatory injunc�on as prayed for? OPA

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Whether the present applica�on is �me barred? OPR

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Whether the present applica�on is not maintainable? OPR

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Whether the present applica�on is barred by the principle of resjudicata? OPR

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Relief.

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4.4 Evidence produced by both the par�es was taken on record. In order to decide issue N: 1, Learned Addi�onal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dabwali, divided this issue in following points:-

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a) Whether Maya Devi inherited the property of Rulia.

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b) Regarding the validity of the compromise and the judgment and decree dated 05.01.1963.

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c) Whether the applicants before the Court were the legal representa�ves of Maya Devi.

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d) Regarding the maintainability of the applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC on the issue of limita�on and on the plea of res judicata.

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4.5 It was held by the trial Court that Maya Devi was the widow of Rulia and that aBer the death of said Rulia, she had inherited the en�re property of Rulia, regarding which muta�on had been sanc�on in her favour. Learned trial Court also referred to the compromise (Annexure P-3), as had taken place in the suit of 1962, wherein also she had been referred as widow of Rulia. Not only this, trial Court also referred to a giB deed dated 31.07.1963 (Ex.R-8) executed in favour of Dev Singh and Bachi;ar Singh sons of Bakhtawar Singh, where also Maya Devi had been referred as widow of Rulia. Based upon the en�re evidence, it was held that Maya Devi was the legal heir of Rulia and had inherited his property and that this issue could not be re-agitated again.

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4.6 Trial Court further held that the compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 cannot be said to have been obtained by exercise of fraud or undue influence. At the same �me, Trial Court held that the said compromise and the judgment and decree dated 05.01.1963 based on the same were contrary to law, public policy and hence the same were illegal, null and void being contrary to provisions of Sec�on 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to be read with Sec�on 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act and as such, the impugned judgment and decree based upon the compromise dated 05.01.1963 were held as null, illegal and void.

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4.7 It was further held by the Trial Court that the applicants of applica�on under sec�on 151 CPC were the legal representa�ves of Maya Devi and that this issue had been decided in the earlier li�ga�on also and could not be re-agitated again. Further, by referring to the order of this Court and also that of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed previously in the same li�ga�on, it was held that applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC was maintainable, as the separate suit under Order 23 Rule 3A CPC was barred by law.

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4.8 Trial Court further held that suit was not barred by limita�on, as an invalid compromise, which cannot be enforced under the law and consent decree dated 05.01.1963 is no decree in the eyes of law and therefore, the issue of limita�on to challenge such a decree, which is already invalid under the eyes of law, cannot arise. The trial Court for this purpose relied upon the “Dalip Singh and ors. v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals) Punjab, Chandigarh” 2015 (1) RCR Civil 274 by observing that law relaxes the rigors of limita�on for defence, for in a defensive ac�on, when the decree is invalid or effec�ve, there is no fe;er of limita�on at all.

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4.9 On the plea of res judicata trial Court held that the applica�on under sec�on 151 CPC was not barred by the principles of res judicata.

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4.10 By deciding all above points, issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the applicants to hold that compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 and the consequen�al judgment and decree are null, illegal and void and were liable to be set aside, having no bearing on the rights of Maya Devi so as to alienate the suit property and that the condi�ons imposed in the compromise and the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.01.1963 were contrary to the se;led principles of law and cannot be enforced.

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4.11 However, issue No. 2 was decided against the applicants by observing that the scope of applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC was only limited to the validity of the compromise and the consent decree based thereupon and that applicants could not be granted any extra relief regarding possession or

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mesne profits in the applica�on. At the same �me, the trial Court held that as the earlier compromise and consent decree dated 05.01.1963 had been set aside and the applicants were the legal heirs of Maya Devi, who had inherited the suit property, therefore cause of ac�on had arisen in their favour to claim the relief of possession, mesne profits by filing a separate suit and that said relief could not be granted in the present applica�on. With these observa�ons, the issue was decided against the applicants.

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4.12 The finding on issue No. 3 to 5 went against the respondents in view of the observa�ons earlier made under issue No. 1.

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4.13 With all these findings, trial Court vide impugned order dated 17.12.2019 partly allowed the applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC by holding the compromise decree dated 05.01.1963 and the judgment and decree dated 05.01.1963 based thereon, are null, illegal and void and liable to be set aside having no bearing on the rights of Maya Devi to alienate the property and the condi�on imposed by the compromise and the decree are contrary to the law, which cannot be enforced. However, the relief for mandatory injunc�on was declined without prejudice to the rights of the applicants to claim the relief for possession or mesne profits in a separate suit.

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The aforesaid order dated 17.12.2019 has been assailed before this code in the present two revisions, filed by two separate sets of the respondents of the applica�on.

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6.1 Pe��oners before this Court have assailed the impugned order mainly on the issue of limita�on. The conten�on of learned counsel is that impugned judgment and decree were passed way back in January, 1963 and that present applica�on under Sec�on 151 of CPC has been moved in 2015 i.e. aBer 52 years and therefore, it is absolutely barred by limita�on. Learned counsel contends that even if the earlier suit filed in 1983 is to be taken into considera�on, s�ll the same was filed by Maya Devi aBer more than 20 years from passing of the impugned consent decree.

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6.2 Learned counsel contends that even if for the sake of arguments, the consent decree is held to be void in view of Sec�on 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, s�ll it was required to be challenged within period of limita�on, as even the void decree is required to be challenged within the period of limita�on of 3 years. Learned counsel has referred to “State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh” 1991 AIR Supreme Court 2219 ; “Devi Sarup v. Smt. Veena Nirwani” 2006(3) PLR 454 ; and “Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup” 2009 (2) RCR (Civil) 129 .

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents (applicants before the trial Court) have defended the impugned order passed by the trial Court by submiOng that as it has been found that the consent decree was void ab ini o being contrary to the provisions Sec�on 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, therefore, there was no limita�on so as to assail the said decree. He prayed for dismissal of the two revisions.

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I have considered submissions of both the sides and have perused the record carefully.

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It is undisputed that Rulia son of Punjaba was owner of the en�re land, who died in 1962 and his estate was inherited by his widow Smt. Maya Devi, in whose favour a muta�on of inheritance was sanc�oned. Since Maya Devi inherited the estate of Rulia aBer coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, there can be no dispute that she became the absolute owner of the en�re estate including the suit property and no fe;ers could have been placed upon her rights in respect of the suit property in any manner whatsoever.

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Further, even a decree which is based upon approval by the Court upon the compromise, is required to be lawful. The decree dated 05.01.1963 is not lawful, as its object was to deprive Maya Devi from her absolute rights in the estate of Rulia and as such, there can be no dispute in holding that decree dated 05.01.1963 was null and void being contrary to the law. At the same �me,

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there is categoric finding of the trial Court to the effect that said decree was not based upon any fraud or misrepresenta�on, inasmuch as Maya Devi had herself appeared in the Court so as to make the statement, on which basis decree was passed. Even in the suit, which was filed in 1983 by Maya Devi, it had come in evidence that she herself used to appear before the Court. Besides, the finding of the trial Court to the effect that decree dated 05.01.1963 was not based upon fraud or misrepresenta�on, is not under challenge before this Court.

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The only ques�on to be determined by the Court is that as to whether the applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC moved in 2015 is within limita�ons so as to assail the judgment & decree dated 05.01.1963, even if it is found that the said decree is null, illegal and void being contrary to law.

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The decree was assailed by Maya Devi by bringing the suit on 14.03. 1983. During pendency of suit, Maya Devi expired and her legal representa�ves were brought on record. The suit was ini�ally decreed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court but this High Court by way of an order passed on 19.08.2015 (Annexure P7 ), dismissed the suit being not maintainable in view of Order 23 Rule 3A CPC, as independent suit was not maintainable. Said order of this Court was approved by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 2.11.2015 vide Annexure P8, but making it clear that the order was not a bar for the applicants to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with the law.

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The fact that Hon’ble Supreme Court granted rights to the applicants to approach the Court by availing appropriate remedy as per law, does not mean that applica�on could have been filed beyond limita�on. The trial Court was s�ll required to see as to whether the applica�on under 151 CPC was within limita�on or whether it was not barred by any other law. Even if the period from 14.03.1983 to 2.11.2015, during which the applicants were availing the remedy by filing the suit is taken out of considera�on, s�ll the applica�on filed aBer 20 years is clearly barred by limita�on. In other words, even aforesaid period of 14.03.1983 to 2.11.2015 is excluded for the purpose of computa�on of limita�on, s�ll the applica�on moved in 2015 under Sec�on 151 CPC is clearly

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barred by limita�on, as a period of 3 years is provided for moving any such applica�on under Ar�cle 137 of the Limita�on Act.

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It is not the law of the land that a void decree can be challenged at any point of �me. Even a void decree is required to be challenged within the period of limita�on as permissible under law. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon “Sneh Gupta V. Devi Sarup” (supra), wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under.

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“42. There cannot be any doubt that even if an order is void or voidable, the same must be set aside, as has been held by this Court in M. Meenakshi v. Matadin Agarwal [(2006) 7 SCC 470] and Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba [(2004) 2 SCC 377].

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45. If the compromise has been accepted in absence of all the par5es, the same would be void. But if the same having resulted in grant of a decree, the decree based on compromise was required to be set aside. The compromise may be void or voidable but it is required to be set aside by filing a suit within the period of limita5on. {[See Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa & Ors. [(1996) 7 SCC 767]}. Limita�on is a statute of repose. If a suit is not filed within the period of limita�on, the remedy would be barred.”

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Same view was taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Punjab vs. Gurudev Singh” (supra), which has also been referred in Sneh Gupta's case.

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In “Devi Sarup v. Smt. Veena Nirwani” (supra) , similar were the facts, inasmuch as a compromise decree dated 25.04.1998 was found to be void ab ini o but the same was challenged beyond the period of limita�on. The conten�on was raised that a void decree could be challenged at any �me. This conten�on to the effect that law of limita�on did not apply to challenge and the same could be challenged at any �me was negated by this Court by holding as under.

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“32. This submission is not acceptable to this Court. The se;led law is that order may be void or voidable, a declara�on has to be sought from a Court of law. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Page 10 of 12

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reported as Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subha and Ors. (2004) 2 S.C. 377 . The same view of law was taken by our own Hon'ble High Court reported as Sawarna Ram v. State of Punjab 2004 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) page 25 in which it was held as under:

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‘It is a se;led proposi�on of law that even void orders have to be challenged so that the same can be declared void. Even void orders con�nue to have effect �ll the same are declared non-est.’

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Even if the decree dated 25.4.1998 is void, the law of limita�on is not abrogated. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, 1991 (3) SCT 91 (SC) as under:

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‘It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declara�on that the order against him is inopera�ve and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limita�on. If the statutory �me limit expires the Court cannot give the declara�on sought for.’

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court was also pleased to observe in Gurdev Singh 's

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case (supra) as under:

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‘The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of ac�on arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be ins�tuted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is ins�tuted.’

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35.It was also observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Singh 's

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case (supra) as under:

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‘First of all, to say, that the suit is not governed by the law of limita�on runs afoul of our Limita�on Act. The statute of limita�on was intended to provide a �me limit for all suits conceivable. Sec�on 3 of the Limita�on Act provides that a suit, appeal or applica�on ins�tuted aBer the prescribed "period of limita�on" must subject to the provisions of Sec�ons 4 to 24 be dismissed although limita�on has not been set up as a defence. Sec�on 2(j) defines

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the expression "period of limita�on" to mean the period of limita�on prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or applica�on. Sec�on 2(j) also defines, "prescribed period" to mean the period of limita�on computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.”

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Thus, as per the se;led legal posi�on, even if the compromise is void and it has resulted in grant of a decree, the said decree based on compromise is required to be set aside. The said compromise may be void or voidable but it is required to be set aside by filing a suit within the period as permissible under law. The conten�on that a void decree can be challenged at any �me or that law of limita�on does not apply to challenge such a decree, has no merits.

¶125

In view of the aforesaid legal posi�on, this Court has no hesita�on to conclude that the applica�on under Sec�on 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was clearly barred by limita�on and therefore, the same was liable to be dismissed on account of bar of limita�on. As such, the impugned order passed by the trial Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law on the said ground.

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Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.12.2019 passed by the trial court, is hereby set aside by holding that applica�on under Sec�on 151 CPC was not maintainable being barred by limita�on and so, the same is hereby dismissed. Both these revision pe��ons are accordingly accepted.

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A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.

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20.09.2024

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Nee ka Tuteja

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(DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE

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Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes Whether reportable? Yes

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