Dismissed

Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab

Punjab & Haryana HC23 May 2012CRM-M/28456/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a PIL challenging a Special Judge's order taking cognizance of a corruption case without prior sanction, the High Court held that Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act does not apply to public servants removable by subordinate authorities like the District Collector, thus dismissing the petition.

What did the court decide?

The petition challenging the impugned order taking cognizance was dismissed as there was no requirement for prior sanction.

Amarjit Singh Vs State of Punjab — Corruption | Punjab & Haryana HC (2012)

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Criminal Misc. No. M-28456 of 2011 -1-

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

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CRM No. M-28456 of 2011 Date of Decision:-23.5.2012

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Amarjit Singh (Patwari) …Petitioner Vs.

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State of Punjab …Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

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Present:Mr.O.P.Hoshiarpuri, Advocate for the petitioner.

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Mr.C.S.Brar, D.A.G. Punjab for the respondent.

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Mehinder Singh Sullar , J.

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Exhibiting the deep concern with regard to the corruption in public life, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Billa Nagul Sharief v. State of A.P. 2010(11) SCC 575, has noticed the feeling of a common man that “when the work is enshrined to different persons bribe is demanded by one of them, when all are invariably in collusion, cannot be lost sight of. If Senior Officers ensure that the works of the citizens are done without payment of bribe, Junior Officers and employee may abandon the demand and this country would not have prominently figured as one of the most corrupt nations of the World, as it is widely accepted that the corruption flows from the top.” The enactments of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as “the P.C.Act) and The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 are the appropriate steps in the right direction to eradicate the corrupt practice by certain categories of public servants and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. India is passing through a very crucial phase of corruption. Perhaps, time has now come to take effective steps to control it, but, in the present case, the Vigilance Department of State of Punjab prima facie does not appear to be very serious in this relevant connection.

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Tersely, the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the

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instant petition and emanating from the record, are that, petitioner Amarjit Singh son of Surain Singh, was employed and working as a Patwari at the relevant time in the area of Guru Har Sahai, District Ferozepur, in relation to the affairs of the revenue department of State of Punjab. He demanded an amount of Rs.2000/- as bribe from complainant Raj Kumar son of Ajit Singh (for brevity “the complainant”) as illegal gratification, for sanctioning the mutation in question. Dissatisfied with the conduct of the Patwari, the complainant informed the Vigilance Department. A raiding party was prepared. Having followed the established procedure, a raid was conducted on 2.2.2005. In pursuance of the raid, the petitioner was caught red handed, while accepting the illegal gratification of the indicated amount from the complainant and bribe money of Rs.2000/- was recovered at the spot. All the requisite formalities were completed and evidence was collected at the spot by the police of Vigilance Department. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of complaint of the complainant, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner-accused, by means of FIR No.9 dated 2.2.2005, on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act by the police of Vigilance Bureau, Ferozepur. 3. Although the petitioner was caught red handed while accepting the illegal gratification and amount of bribe money of Rs.2000/- was recovered at the spot, but subsequently, the Vigilance Bureau just ignored the entire evidence with impunity and submitted the cancellation reports (Annexures P4 & P6) in a very casual manner. As soon as, the complainant came to know, in the meantime, he opposed the cancellation reports on the ground that Amarjit Singh, Patwari (petitioner) has accepted the bribe money from him in the presence of shadow witness Hardev Singh. He handed over the money, which was duly recovered from his agent Gulzar Singh at the spot. Thus, the petitioner has committed the pointed offences. In this manner, the complainant prayed for rejection of the cancellation

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reports.

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Taking the entire evidence and seriousness of the corruption case, into focus, the Special Judge, while disagreeing with the cancellation reports filed by the prosecution, referred the matter for further deep probe by the officer, not below the rank of SP Vigilance and for further investigation, by virtue of orders dated 3.5.2008 (Annexure P5) & 31.3.2010 (Annexure P7), but in vain. Ultimately, the Special Judge took cognizance of the case and issued notice to the petitioneraccused, vide impugned order dated 7.5.2011 (Annexure P9).

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The petitioner did not feel satisfied and preferred the present petition to challenge the impugned order (Annexure P9) under Section 482 Cr.PC. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at quite some length, having gone through the record and legal position with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition in this context.

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Ex facie, the cosmetic argument of learned counsel that since the Special Judge could not take cognizance against the petitioner in the absence of sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act, so, the impugned order (Annexure P9) is liable to be set aside, is neither tenable nor the observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in cases R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antulay AIR 1984 SC 684(1) ; R.Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala 1996(2) RCR(Criminal) 765; Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar and another (2000) 5 SCC 15; P.K.Pradhan v. The State of Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau of Investigation 2001(3) RCR(Criminal) 835 and of this Court in case Dr.Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and another 2006(4) RCR (Criminal) 525, are at all applicable to the facts of the present case.

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As is clear in R.S.Nayak's case (supra), accused Abdul Rehman Antulay was the Chief Minister of the State of Maharashtra at the relevant time. The complainant moved the Governor of Maharashtra by his application

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requesting him to grant sanction to prosecute the accused as required by Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947. It was held that “the policy underlying S.6 is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servant. Existence thus of a valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by the public servant. A trial without a sanction renders the proceedings ab initio invoid. The terminus qua for a valid sanction is the time when the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence. If therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him.”

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Sequelly, in R.Balakrishna Pillai's case (supra), the charge against the accused was that he while functioning as Minister for Electricity, Government of Kerala, between May, 1982 and 5.6.85 and his co-accused while functioning as Technical Member/Chairman of the Kerala State Electricity Board, Thiruvananthapuram, between 1.2.84 and 30.11.85, in their capacity as such public servants, entered into a criminal conspiracy to sell electricity to the State of Karnataka to be supplied to M/s Graphite India Limited, Bangalore, Karnataka State, without the consent of the Government of Kerala, which was an illegal act as per the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act and relevant Rules.

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Likewise, in P.K.Pradhan's case (supra), a First Information Report was lodged for prosecution of Shri Nar Bahadur Bhandari, the then Chief Minister of Sikkim and the appellant (therein), who was the then Secretary of Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, besides certain contractors under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 5 (old Act) corresponding to Section 13(2) the PC Act. The State Cabinet of Sikkim decided to implement 36 Rural Water Supply Schemes in the State of Sikkim under minimum

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needs programme and at the time of approving the proposal, the Cabinet specifically decided that the works worth more than Rs.1,00,000/- shall be put to open tender while works below Rs.100,000/- shall be executed through Panchayat nominees. The approval of the State Cabinet was communicated to the Rural Development Department for necessary follow up action for implementation of these schemes. The department issued notice inviting tender for the indicated works from enlisted contractors having resources and experience in such government works. It was alleged that when the matter was thus being processed, Shri Nar Bahadur Bhandari, the then Chief Minister of Sikkim, Shri P.K.Pradhan, the then Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, entered into a criminal conspiracy with the object of securing contract works in favour of the said contractors by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing their position as public servants and got the works awarded in favour of contractors aforesaid at low rates thereby causing pecuniary loss to the State.

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Similarly, in Gauri Shankar Prasad and Dr.Jaswant Singh's cases (supra), it was observed that “a valid sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC is a condition precedent or pre-requisite for taking cognizance of an offence.”

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Accordingly, on the peculiar facts and in the special circumstances of those particular cases, while interpreting the provisions of Section 197 Cr.PC and Section 19 of the P.C.Act, it was held that the requisite sanction is essential before taking cognizance of the offence. There can hardly be any dispute in regard to the aforesaid observations, but, to me, the same would not come to the rescue of the petitioner in the instant controversy.

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As is evident from the record that, the petitioner was employed and working as a Patwari at the relevant time in the area of Guru Har Sahai, District Ferozepur, in relation to the affairs of the revenue department of State of Punjab. On the basis of raid, he was caught red handed while accepting the tainted/marked

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bribe money from the complainant. The tainted currency notes were recovered at the spot. The police has completed all the requisite formalities and collected the evidence from the initial stage of entertaining the complaint till the conclusion of formalities of recovery of the amount, vide recovery memos. Strange enough, the police just ignored the entire evidence with impunity and submitted the cancellation reports (Annexures P4 & P6). The Special Judge did not agree with the same and directed the SP Vigilance to further probe and re-investigate the matter, through the medium of orders (Annexures P5 & P7). Again, instead of conducting a fair investigation, the Vigilance Department submitted the cancellation report in a very casual manner, for the reasons best known to it. 14. Finding no alternative, the Special Judge took cognizance of the case and issued notice to the petitioner-accused, vide impugned order (Annexure P9), which, in substance, is as under:-

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“Heard. The perusal of the F.I.R. shows that accused Amarjit Singh, Patwari was caught red handed while accepting bribe of Rs.2000/- from complainant Raj Kumar for sanctioning mutation of inheritance of Prem Singh, on the basis of Will dated 25.10.2004. As per prosecution case number of tainted amount recovered from the accused were tallied with the numbers noted in the pre trap memo. The color of his hand with which he dealt with tainted money was also changed when put in the phenolphthalein powder' solution. However, prosecution has filed cancellation report on the ground that accused has already passed mutation order on the basis of natural inheritance. The perusal of the record shows that this is third cancellation report submitted by the prosecution. Previous cancellation reports were sent back with the direction to re-investigate the matter. The perusal of the order dated 31.3.2010 shows that the prosecution has not complied with the directions given in the order dated 3.5.2008 passed by Shri J.S.Chauhan, then learned Special Judge, Ferozepur. Now even on this file there is nothing which could show the compliance of the directions of that order. Statements of various witnesses as well as recovery memos and other record on the file point the needle of suspicion against the accused. Thus, a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The complainant has also not agreed with this cancellation report. There is nothing on the file that the prosecution ever joined the complainant in the re-investigation ordered by the Special Judges many times. In this view of the matter no purpose would be served by sending this report

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again for re-investigation. No cogent and convincing ground has been made by the prosecution for filing this cancellation report. In this view of the matter I take cognizance of this case. Now notice be issued to the accused for 1.6.2011 so that he may join the trial of the case.”

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Instead of appearing and submitting to the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, the petitioner straightway jumped to file the present petition, to challenge the impugned order (Annexure P9), invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC. That is how I am seized of the matter. Thus, it would be seen that the facts of this case are neither intricate nor much disputed.

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Such thus being the position on record, now the short and significant questions, though important that, arise for determination in this case are, as to whether any sanction under section 19 of the P.C.Act is legally required in the case of such public servant (Patwari) and in the absence of the same, the impugned order is liable to be quashed or not ?

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Having regard to the legal position, material on record and rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative.

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At the very outset, it cannot possibly be denied that Hon'ble Apex Court in a line of judgments has held that the very object of sanction is to protect the eligible public servant from malicious and vexatious prosecution. The intention is not to put a wall around public servants, who act mala fidely. The policy is not to set an official above the common law and if he commits a common offence, then, he cannot avail peculiar privilege.

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As indicated here-in-above, the petitioner was employed and working as Patwari at the relevant time & place. He was caught red handed while accepting the bribe money of Rs.2000/- from the complainant as illegal gratification for sanctioning the mutation and thus committed the indicated offences. Section 19 of the P.C.Act postulates that “no court shall take cognizance

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of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction (clause (b)), in the case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government.”

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As it is apparent that indeed, the P.C.Act is a special enactment dealing with a very particular & sensitive subject of corruption and will have overriding effect on the provisions of general law. It is now well settled principle of interpretation of statute, that the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary, popular and natural meaning. If such meaning is clear and unambiguous, the effect should be given to a provision of a statute in the same manner whatever may be the consequences. The basis of this principle is that the object of all interpretations being to know what the legislature intended, whatever was the intention of the legislature has been expressed by it through words which are to be interpreted accordingly, because the intention of the legislature can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. If the language of a statute is clear, the only duty of the Court is to give effect to it and the Court has no business to look into the consequences of such interpretation. The Court is under an obligation to expound the law as it exists and leave the remedy to the legislature, even if harsh conclusions result from such exposition. Equally, it is now well recognized proposition of law that mandatory provisions and command of law have to be complied with in the same manner as envisaged and mandated by any statute and it cannot be interpreted otherwise.

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A conjoint and meaningful reading of these provisions of Section 19 of the P.C.Act would reveal that the sanction is only required in case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and (+) is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that

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Government and not otherwise . The words “ not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government ” are most important, carry a very significant intent & meaning and is most essential ingredient to invoke the protection as contemplated under Section 19 of the P.C.Act (emphasis supplied) . The entire provision has to be conjunctively (not disjunctively) construed as such and cannot be read in isolation. The intention of the legislature is very clear and intended to protect only those public servants, who are removable from their office by the State Government and not otherwise.

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Sequelly, to my mind, the strict and natural interpretation would reveal that Section 19(1)(a) of the P.C.Act regulates the public servants, who are removable by the Central Government and clause (b) deals with the public servants, who are removable by the State Government, whereas clause (c) is only applicable to other persons (public servants), employed with the affairs of variety of other financial institutions, banks, corporations & boards etc. (not the public servants of Central or State Governments). That means, the pointed particular category of employees of Central Government can claim protection under clause (a), whereas the eligible employees of the State Government can avail the benefit of sanction in clause (b) and the employees of other financial institutions, banks, corporations & boards etc. are covered under clause (c) of Section 19(1) of the P.C.Act.

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Faced with this grave situation, the submission of learned counsel that the case of the petitioner falls within the domain of clause (c) of Section 19 (1) of the P.C.Act, sans merit as well. Had the intention of the legislature was to extend the protection of sanction under this section to all categories of public servants employed in relation to the affairs of the Central or State Governments' department, as the case may be, in that eventuality, it would and ought to have so mentioned that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act, except

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the prior sanction in case of and all public servants are entitled to the protection of sanction and only this one line would have (suffice) served the purpose. Hence, there was no occasion for the Legislature to create different categories of such employees in clauses (a) & (b), who are removable by the Government. Likewise, there was no necessity to create 3^rd category of other employees (not the employees of Central or State Governments) as mentioned in clause (c) as well. This demonstrates the clear intent of the Legislature to grant protection of sanction to a particular category of employees removable by the respective Governments in this behalf. If the argument of learned counsel that the case of petitioner falls within the ambit of clause (c) is accepted as such, then, to me, it will amount to nullifying and re-writing the relevant provisions of the P.C.Act by this Court, which is not legally permissible.

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What cannot possibly be disputed here is that as the petitioner was employed as Patwari in connection with the affairs of revenue department of State of Punjab at the relevant time and was removable by the District Collector (not the State Government), therefore, no sanction is legally required to prosecute him, as urged on his behalf.

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The next celebrated submission of learned counsel for petitioner that no such classification can be made by the legislature that the persons, who are removable by the Central or State Governments, as the case may be, are entitled to protection under this section and other categories of persons, who are liable to be removed by some subordinate authorities, are not entitled for this benefit, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well.

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Possibly, it cannot be disputed that the legislature has the vast power to legislate different laws in respect of different categories of public servants (Government employees). Various pieces of Central & State legislations are available on statute books in this direction. For example, the legislature has

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granted the protection of sanction to a different category of persons in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of powers conferred under Section 7 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1990 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Armed Forces Act”).

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Sequelly, The Punjab Disturbed Areas (Amendment) Act, 1989 (for short “the Disturbed Areas Act”) differentiate such categories of employees (police officials of State) and postulates that any Magistrate or Police Officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector or Havildar in case of the Armed Branch of the Police, have only been authorized to use force depicted in section 4 and are only entitled to such protection of sanction of the Centre Government under Section 6 of that Act. In other words, any public servant, below the rank of SI of the Punjab Police or Havildar in the case of Armed Branch of the police, is not at all entitled to such protection of Centre Government. The inherent distinction between Section 7 of the Armed Forces Act and Section 6 of the Disturbed Areas Act was noticed by this Court in case Atma Singh Bhullar & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. CRM No. M-7861 of 2005 ( in paras 33 to 35 of judgment dated 14.5.2012) . Moreover, Section 8 of the Mysore Police Act (5 of 1908) also indicates the different categories of such employees. The distinction to create such type of categories for the purpose of sanction under different special enactment is the power/jurisdiction inherently vested in the Legislature. 28. This is not the end of the matter. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the pari-materia provisions of Section 197 Cr.PC in case Nagraj v. State of Mysore AIR 1964 SC 269 has held that “if any officer not below the rank of SI is removable by any subordinate authority then no sanction is required.” The same view was reiterated by this Court in case Sant Kumar, SHO, Police Station Raikot and another vs. The State of Punjab and another 2003(2) RCR (Criminal) 431 and Delhi High Court in case Gurbachan Singh v. State AIR 1970 Delhi 102,

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wherein it was ruled that “if a public servant is not removable from his office by or with the sanction of the Central or State Governments, as such he is not entitled to the protection of sanction.”

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Likewise, in case Habib Khan and another v. State 1952 Crl. L.J. 1391 it was held by the Patna High Court that “the provisions of grant of sanction under section 197 Cr.PC has no application to a case where a public servant like a chaukidar or daffadar commits an act of extortion in discharge of his duties, because he is not a public servant as contemplated under section 197 Cr.PC as he can be dismissed by a Sub-divisional Magistrate and certainly by an authority lower than the State Government.”

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Similarly, in case Ghanairam Pachhuram v. The State Misc. 1954 Crl. L.J. 1367 (Nagpur), it was noticed that the sanction of the Central Government for the prosecution of its employee for an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty is necessary only when such employee is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government . It was also held that there are four classes of railway servants and the employees falling in the fourth class are removable by the head of the office. In the circumstances, therefore, the protection afforded by S.197 of the Criminal PC cannot be availed of by such fourth class employees.

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Sequelly, it was observed in case S.Kuppuswami Rao v. The King AIR 1949 FC 1 = 1949 Cr.L.J. 625 , that “before invoking the sanction two conditions must be satisfied that (i) the public servant is removable from office either by the Union Government or a State Government and not by any lower authority; and (ii) he is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.” The words ”save or by” occurring in this section mean that the section will apply only and can

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be made by Government and not by any subordinate authority.

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Not only that, an identical question came to be decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in case S.A.Venkataraman v. The State AIR 1958 SC 107(1) , wherein while interpreting the pari-materia provisions of Section 6 of the old Act (Section 19 of the new PC Act), it was ruled (para 14) as under:-

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“When the provisions of S.6 of the Act are examined it is manifest that two conditions must be fulfilled before its provisions become applicable. One is that the offences mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant and the other is that that person is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or is a public servant who is removable from his office by any other competent authority. Both these conditions must be present to prevent a Court from taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office. If either of these conditions is lacking, the essential requirements of the section are wanting and the provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a Court taking cognizance without a previous sanction.”

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In this manner, keeping the above indicated distinction of different categories of employees into focus and the legal position, to me, it cannot possibly be saith that the Legislature was not empowered to create different categories of public servants for the purpose of grant of sanction to prosecute them. The argument of learned State counsel that the petitioner, who was employed as Patwari in connection with the affairs of revenue Department of the State, is only removable by the District Collector (not by the State Government), is not entitled for the protection under section 19 of the P.C.Act, has considerable force, whereas the contrary contentions of learned counsel for petitioner pale into insignificance “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the crux of the statutory provisions and the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of this case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand.

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Therefore, if the epitome of the facts, legal position, material on

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record, the intention of Legislature of special Act and totality of other facts & circumstances, oozing out from the record, as discussed here-in-above, are put together and analyzed in a right perspective, then, to my mind, no one can escape in recording, the conclusion is inescapable & irresistible and it is hereby held that indeed only those public servants of the Central or the State Governments, as the case may be, are entitled to the umbrella of protection under section 19 of the P.C.Act, who are employed in connection with the affairs and are removable by the respective Governments and not otherwise. Meaning thereby, the public servants, who are liable to be removed by lower/subordinate authority than the Government, they indeed are and would not at all be entitled to such protection. As indicated earlier, since the petitioner was working as Patwari at the relevant time/place and was removable by the District Collector (not by the State government), so, no prior sanction is required to prosecute him in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

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Likewise, there is another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed from entirely a different angle. As depicted here-in-above, the Special Judge has taken the cognizance of the case and issued notice to the petitioner, vide impugned order (Annexure P9). Section 19(3) & (4) of the PC Act posit as under:-

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“(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,

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1973 (2 of 1974)--

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(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

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(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

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(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

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(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of

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justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

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Explanation-- For the purposes of this section--

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(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;

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(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.”

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Meaning thereby, even otherwise, the impugned order cannot legally be assailed on the ground of absence and omission of the sanction, as envisaged under clause (3) of Section 19 of the P.C.Act, as it has not remotely been pointed out by the learned counsel that how and in what manner, the absence of sanction at this stage has occasioned or resulted in the failure of justice and prejudiced the case of petitioner in any manner. Thus, seen from any angle, to my mind, no ground to set aside the impugned order (Annexure P9) is made out, in view of law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in case Surat Ram Sharma v. State of

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Punjab and another 2010(4) RCR (Criminal) 500.

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No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the counsel for the parties.

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In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main case, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed as such.

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Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits of the main case, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the indicated controversy of sanction involved in the present petition.

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(Mehinder Singh Sullar) Judge

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23.5.2012 AS

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Whether to be referred to reporter ? Yes/No

Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab

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Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab

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