order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression interlocutory order' has not been defined in the Code. In **_Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana, 1978(1) SCR 222,_** this Court has held that the expression interlocutory order' in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely donates orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and any order which substantially affects the rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order'. In **_Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1978(1) SCR 749,_** a three Judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In **_V.C. Shukla v. State, 1980(2) SCR 380,_** this Court has held that the term interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. This being the position of law, it would not be appropriate to hold that an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 would apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order in view of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code.”
