of delay in approaching the court. But it is only a rule of discretion by exercise of self-restraint evolved by the court in exercise of the discretionary equitable jurisdiction and not a mandatory requirement that every delayed petition must be dismissed on the ground of delay. The Limitation Act stricto sensu does not apply to the writ jurisdiction. The discretion vested in the court under Article 226 of the Constitution therefore has to be a judicious exercise of the discretion after considering all pros and cons of the matter, including the nature of the dispute, the explanation for the delay, whether any third-party rights have intervened, etc. The jurisdiction under Article 226 being equitable in nature, questions of proportionality in considering whether the impugned order merits interference or not in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction will also arise. This Court in Basanti Prasadv. Bihar School Examination Board [Basanti Prasad v. Bihar School Examination Board, (2009) 6 SCC 791 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 252] , after referring to Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, AIR 1967 SC 1450] , Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] and State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566] , held that if the delay is properly explained and no third-party rights are being affected, the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution may condone the delay, holding as follows : (Basanti Prasad case [Basanti Prasad v. Bihar School Examination Board, (2009) 6 SCC 791 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 252] , SCC p. 796, para 18)
