Abhisek Dash Vs Sumitra Padhy

1. The petitioner-husband is before this Court challenging the order dated 18.11.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bhanjanagar, Ganjam in I.A. No.11 of 2025.

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2. The I.A. No.11 of 2025 arises out of MAT Case No. 62 of 2021 filed and pending before the said Court. The

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MAT Case No.62 of 2021 was filed U/s.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the opposite party-wife in the marriage seeking restitution of the conjugal rights.

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3. The learned counsel for the petitioner is heard at length. The available pleadings of the parties and materials on record have been gone into in detail and are deliberated upon.

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In view of the judgment that is going to be rendered notice is not issued to the opposite party.

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4. The I.A. was filed U/s.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, claiming maintenance pendentelite @ ₹2,00,000/per month and a consolidated litigation expenses of ₹30,000/-. However, while allowing the application the Court has directed payment of ₹40,000/- per month to the wife in the marriage who is also the mother of the minor child. The maintenance granted is the consolidated sum for both the mother and the child.

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5. The learned counsel for the petitioner was heard extensively and he raises the following contentions challenging the order: referring to the 98^th “Report of Law Commission of India, Sections 24 to 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Orders for interim maintenance and orders for the maintenance of children in matrimonial proceedings”; it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the course W.P.(C) No.3370 of 2026 Page 2 of 15

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adopted by the opposite party-wife in claiming maintenance pendentelite should have been an application U/s.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act for her and application U/s.26 of the Hindu Marriage Act for the child and not a consolidated application/single application.

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6. In response to the said submission suffice it would be to observe that Chapter 7, recommendations of the report itself clarifies that the Commission has suggested amendment of the Act and nothing beyond that. After the suggestions were made the Act has not been amended. The Section 24 remains as it is.

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7. This Court cannot nor the learned trial Court that has decided the matter could have referred/relied on the Law Commission Report so as to accept the interpretation that is tendered by the learned counsel.

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It has to be held that the law Commission report unless reflected in the statute by amendment brought in by the Parliament in a Central Statute cannot be utilized to interpret a provision by the learned trial Court or this Court in a writ petition challenging the order of the trial Court.

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8. Regarding the quantum of maintenance granted i.e. ₹40,000/- instead of ₹2,00,000/- as demanded, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that

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determination of ₹40,000/- as maintenance is result of incorrect appreciation of material on record by the learned trial court. On being asked, the learned counsel takes this Court through the paragraphs-4 and 5 of the impugned order, where the learned trial court has discussed which are reproduced herein:

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“ 4. Both parties have filed their respective assets and liabilities and the documents in support of their contentions made above.

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5. Heard the counsels from the respective sides. On verification of the case record vis-à-vis the documents on record, it is seen that the petitioners have filed the original MAT case for restitution of conjugal right of petitioner no.1 with the respondent. It is pleaded by the petitioners that the respondent deserted petitioner no.1 without any just cause which is stoutly denied by the respondent in his counter who has alleged that it is the petitioner no.1 who voluntarily withdrawn herself from the society of her husband since 09.09.2021. Hence, the disputed question relating to alleged desertion is the subject matter of adjudication of the main MAT case and no conclusive remark to that effect can be given in this interim application. But it is an admitted fact that the petitioner no.1 is the legally married wife of the respondent and the said fact is also admitted by the respondent in his counter. It is further admitted by the respondent that they were blessed with a male child on 24.10.2018. It is asserted by the petitioners that the respondent is working as a software engineer in a multinational company and earning Rs.40,00,000/- per annum. To that effect, the respondent has filed his assets and

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liabilities wherein his monthly income is mentioned as Rs.1,69,199/-. Additionally, the respondent has also filed list of documents including his pay slip for the month of April, 2025 which goes to reveal that his monthly gross income is Rs.2,69,908/- and after deduction he is drawing Rs.1,69,199/-. It is contended by the respondent that the petitioner no.1 is a highly qualified lady for which she can maintain herself. But there is absolutely nothing on record to show that petitioner no.1 has any independent source of income. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners during course of argument, relied on decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh -v- Neha & Others, Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena -v- Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, Manish Jain -v- Akanksh Jain, Shailja & another -v- Khobbanna and Bhuban Mohan Singh -v- Meena & others and decisions of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the cases of Sikha Badhani -v- Hemant Badhani and Pravin Kumar Jain -v- Anju Jain and submitted that the educational qualification of the wife has nothing to do while grant of maintenance and the Court must take into consideration the status of the parties and capacity of the spouse to pay for her/his support. It is also submitted that the test for determination of maintenance in matrimonial disputes depends on the financial status of the respondent and the standard of living that the applicant was accustomed to in her matrimonial home. In the case at hand, it reveals from the assets and liabilities of the petitioner that petitioner no.1 is an MCA degree holder but there is nothing on record to show that she has any independent source of income. Admittedly, petitioner no.2 is the minor son of the litigating parties who is aged about 07 years. On the other

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hand, the respondent is a salaried person having sound source of income and law is well settled that a husband is duty bound to maintain his wife and minor children. It reveals from the case record that the evidence in the MAT case is yet to begin and as such, it might take some time to finish the proceeding. In the meantime, the petitioner no.1 who is staying at her parental house with her minor son with no source of income needs some maintenance for herself as well as her child during pendency of the MAT case.”

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9. After going through paragraph-5 of the judgment it can been seen that the learned trial Court has accepted the monthly gross income of the husband to be ₹2,69,908/- and has also accepted the deduction from income to arrive at a conclusion that the petitioner is receiving ₹1,69,199/- per month.

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Regarding deductions about Rs.1,00,000/- from monthly gross salary showing the petitioner the trial Court has given no reason apart from referring to the pay slip.

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10. On being asked to refer to the pay slip that was on record before the learned trial Court, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it has not been annexed to the petition.

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In considered opinion of this Court, at this stage, the legality or otherwise of the approach of the trial

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Court to reduce the salary from ₹2,69,908/- to ₹1,69,199/- need not be gone into by this Court.

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11. The learned counsel was further asked that to support the submissions regarding income of the opposite party-wife what was the material adduced before the learned trial court. In response, the learned counsel refers to the ‘counter filed by the petitioner’, who was the respondent before the learned trial court.

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Having gone through the said reply dated 12.08.2025 filed by the opposite party-present petitioner, it can be seen that paragraph-10 is the only paragraph which refers to the income of the opposite party-wife and it does not come to the aid of the petitioner-husband.

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12. In Rajnesh v. Neha¹ payment of maintenance to wife in the marriage has been extensively dealt with. The paragraphs relied upon and applied in deciding the present matter are reproduced herein from SCC Print:

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Guidelines/Directions on maintenance

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13. Maintenance laws have been enacted as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependent wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy. Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India provides that:

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1 (2021) 2 SCC 324

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“15. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.”

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Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India, which envisages a positive role for the State in fostering change towards the empowerment of women, led to the enactment of various legislations from time to time.

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14. Krishna Iyer, J. in his judgment in Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal, (1978) 4 SCC 70 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 508] held that the object of maintenance laws is : (SCC p. 74, para 9)

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“9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out

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of two alternatives which advances the cause — the cause of the derelicts.”

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xxx xxx xxx xxx

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II. Payment of Interim Maintenance

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62. The proviso to Section 24 of the HMA (inserted vide Act 49 of 2001 w.e.f. 24-9-2001), and the third proviso to Section 125 CrPC (inserted vide Act 50 of 2001 w.e.f. 24-9-2001) provide that the proceedings for interim maintenance, shall as far as possible, be disposed of within 60 days from the date of service of notice on the contesting spouse. Despite the statutory provisions granting a time-bound period for disposal of proceedings for interim maintenance, we find that applications remain pending for several years in most of the cases. The delays are caused by various factors, such as tremendous docket pressure on the Family Courts, repetitive adjournments sought by parties, enormous time taken for completion of pleadings at the interim stage itself, etc. Pendency of applications for maintenance at the interim stage for several years defeats the very object of the legislation.

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63. At present, the issue of interim maintenance is decided on the basis of pleadings, where some amount of guesswork or rough estimation takes place, so as to make a prima facie assessment of the amount to be awarded. It is often seen that both parties submit scanty material, do not disclose the correct details,

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and suppress vital information, which makes it difficult for the Family Courts to make an objective assessment for grant of interim maintenance. While there is a tendency on the part of the wife to exaggerate her needs, there is a corresponding tendency by the husband to conceal his actual income. It has therefore become necessary to lay down a procedure to streamline the proceedings, since a dependent wife, who has no other source of income, has to take recourse to borrowings from her parents/relatives during the interregnum to sustain herself and the minor children, till she begins receiving interim maintenance.

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(c) Where wife is earning some income

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90. The courts have held that if the wife is earning, it cannot operate as a bar from being awarded maintenance by the husband. The courts have provided guidance on this issue in the following judgments:

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90.1. In Shailja v. Khobbanna [Shailja v. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 308; See also the decision of the Karnataka High Court in P. Suresh v. S. Deepa, 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 8848 : 2016 Cri LJ 4794 (Kar)], this Court held that merely because the wife is capable of earning, it would not be a sufficient ground to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. The court has to determine whether the income of the wife is sufficient to enable her to maintain herself, in accordance with the lifestyle of her husband in

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the matrimonial home. [Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356] Sustenance does not mean, and cannot be allowed to mean mere survival. [Vipul Lakhanpal v. Pooja Sharma, 2015 SCC OnLine HP 1252 : 2015 Cri LJ 3451].

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90.2. In Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha [Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 753 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 589] the wife had a postgraduate degree, and was employed as a teacher in Jabalpur. The husband raised a contention that since the wife had sufficient income, she would not require financial assistance from the husband. The Supreme Court repelled this contention, and held that merely because the wife was earning some income, it could not be a ground to reject her claim for maintenance.

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90.3. The Bombay High Court in Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale [Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 694] while relying upon the judgment in Sunita Kachwaha [Sunita Kachwaha v. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 753 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 589] , held that neither the mere potential to earn, nor the actual earning of the wife, howsoever meagre, is sufficient to deny the claim of maintenance.

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90.4. An able-bodied husband must be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money to maintain his wife and children, and

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cannot contend that he is not in a position to earn sufficiently to maintain his family, as held by the Delhi High Court in Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani [Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani, 1968 SCC OnLine Del 52 : AIR 1968 Del 174] . The onus is on the husband to establish with necessary material that there are sufficient grounds to show that he is unable to maintain the family, and discharge his legal obligations for reasons beyond his control. If the husband does not disclose the exact amount of his income, an adverse inference may be drawn by the court.

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90.5. This Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan [Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 274 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 785] cited the judgment in Chander Parkash [Chander Parkash v. Shila Rani, 1968 SCC OnLine Del 52 : AIR 1968 Del 174] with approval, and held that the obligation of the husband to provide maintenance stands on a higher pedestal than the wife.”

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13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan² , dealt with the issue of payment of maintenance to wife in the marriage by the husband have held at paragraphs 19 and 20 (SCC online web edition print), which are reproduced herein:

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“19. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid that the obligation of the husband is on a higher pedestal when the question of maintenance

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2 (2015) 5 SCC 705

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of wife and children arises. When the woman leaves the matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of many a comfort. Sometimes her faith in life reduces. Sometimes, she feels she has lost the tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition for grant of maintenance allowance.

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20. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court has reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs.4000 to Rs.2000. As is manifest, the High Court has become oblivious of the fact that she has to stay on her own. Needless to say, the order of the learned Family Judge is not manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would show that order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, no Revisional Court should have interfered with the reason on the base that it would have arrived at a different or another conclusion. When substantial justice has been done, there was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her head in the parental house, but other real expenses cannot be ignored. Solely because the husband had retired, there was no to reduce the justification maintenance by 50%. It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife that it deserved reduction. It only reflects the non-application of mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order.

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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14. In view of the above discussions and the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the question that falls for adjudication for entertaining the application is that:

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(i) whether the order passed by the learned Family Judge is manifestly perverse;

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(ii) whether there is anything perceptible which is to show that the order is sanctuary of errors;

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(iii) whether the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record;

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(iv) if all the above three points are answered in favour of the petitioner who is challenging, whether this Court can interfere being the revisional Court only because it would arrive at a different or another conclusion;

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(v) whether substantial justice has been done by the learned court which has passed the order.

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15. Applying these principle as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamima Farooqui (supra) , in considered view of this Court, it has to be held that the judgment dated 18.11.2025, under challenge is based on correct appreciation of materials on record.

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There is no perceptible error in the judgment.

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To arrive at the conclusion as has been done by the learned trial court, it has gone through and appreciated the pleadings in their proper perspective. It has taken note of the affidavits filed by both the parties indicating assets and liabilities.

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16. Further voluntary desertion was argued by the petitioner as a defence for not paying any maintenance, the Court has left the said issue open during pendency of the C.P.

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17. In view of the discussions made above it has to be and is held that the petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed.

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18. Copy of this order shall be forwarded to the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhanjanagar, Ganjam to be kept on records in MAT Case No.62 of 2021.

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(Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge

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Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 10^th February, 2026/Radha

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: RADHARANI JENA Reason: Authentication Location: OHC Date: 11-Mar-2026 11:30:23W.P.(C) No.3370 of 2026

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Abhisek Dash v. Sumitra Padhy

Case brief

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Abhisek Dash v. Sumitra Padhy

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