Chairman -Cum- Managing Director, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, New Delhi Vs Sanjibani Raha

2. The petitioners have filed the present review petition seeking recall of the order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.26358 of 2024, whereby this Court upheld the impugned order dated 25.04.2024 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.20 of 2020 and also the order dated 09.07.2024 passed in R.A. No.12 of 2024.

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3. The matter was heard at length on four different dates. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners although could not point out any apparent error on the face of record, however, submitted that the learned Tribunal as well as this Court erred in

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law while interpreting the VRS Scheme. It is also contended that the order under question is suffering from serious illegality in terms of construction of the terms of the Scheme, inasmuch as it failed to appreciate Clause-7(iii) of the B.S.N.L. Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019. It is contended that the withdrawal option provided under the Scheme was only permissible through a prescribed online mode and the opposite party subsequent physical withdrawn was invalid being contrary to the expressed provision of the scheme.

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4. The contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is purely on merits. Therefore, the review jurisdiction is not the appropriate remedy to address the grievances. It is no gainsaying that the review jurisdiction of the Court is confined only to be decided within purview of Order 47 of Rule-1 of C.P.C. The law in this aspect is settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati¹ , wherein it was held that :

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15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)

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16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54, 56 & 58)

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1 (2013) 8 SCC 320

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5. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat² , wherein it was held that:

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6. By the impugned order [Vinod Kumar Rawat v. Shri Ram Sahu, 2017 SCC OnLine MP 2064] the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC has allowed the review petition and has reviewed the judgment and order dated 10-12-2013 passed in Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat [Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, 2013 SCC OnLine MP 10238] insofar as deleting the observations made in para 20 as regards the possession of the disputed property, which were in favour of the appellants-original plaintiffs. From the impugned order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has deleted the observations made in para 20 as regards possession of the plaintiffs mainly/solely on the ground that the issue of possession was neither before the learned trial court nor was it before the first appellate court and no such issue with respect to possession was framed by the learned trial court. Therefore, the short question that falls for consideration before this Court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court is justified in allowing the review application in exercise of powers under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC on the aforesaid grounds?

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7. While considering the aforesaid question, the scope and ambit of the Court's power under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC is required to be considered and for that few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to.

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7.1. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78] while considering the scope and ambit of Section 114CPC read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC it is observed and held in paras 14 to 18 as under : (SCC pp. 8384)

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“14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170] it was held that : (SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)

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„8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the

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2 (2021) 13 SCC 1

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High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389] speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations : (SCC p. 390, para 3)

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“3. … It is true … there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” ‟

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7.2. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India [Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] , it is observed and held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed in the said decision that the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 : (1921-22) 49 IA 144 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526] .

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7.3. In Inderchand Jain v. Motilal [Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 461] in paras 7 to 11 it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 668-69)

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“7. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) provides for a substantive power of review by a civil court and consequently by the appellate courts. The

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words “subject as aforesaid” occurring in Section 114 of the Code mean subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court but such limitations have been provided for in Order 47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as under : (Kamal Sengupta case [State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 735] , SCC p. 631, para 17)

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„17. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which reads as under: “1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

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(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

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(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

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(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

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and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the court which passed the decree or made the order.” ‟

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8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai [Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai, (2007) 15 SCC 513 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 584] this Court held : (SCC p. 514, para 6)

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9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an

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application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason.

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10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order.

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11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India [Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] this Court held : (SCC p. 251, para 56)

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„56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.‟ ”

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8. The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] , this Court has held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise.”

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6. In view of the aforesaid settled principles of law governing the exercise of review jurisdiction, it becomes manifest that the grounds urged by the petitioners do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference in exercise of review jurisdiction. The submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners essentially seek a re-appreciation of the merits of the case, which is impermissible in a review proceeding. As reiterated time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that “the review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.” Since no new and important matter or evidence has been brought to the notice of this Court, nor has any patent error or mistake apparent on the face of

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the record been demonstrated, and the petitioner has failed to point out any ground which falls within the parameters of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C., we are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Hence, the present review petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed and the same fails.

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7. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed.

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(Manash Ranjan Pathak)

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Judge

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