Banambar Sahoo Vs Itishree Sahoo

The petitioner-husband in the marriage is before this Court challenging the judgment dated 19.12.2024 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Jagatsinghpur in Crl. Proceeding No.69 of 2023. 2. The Crl. Proceeding No.69 of 2023 was filed by the wife in the marriage and the minor child then aged about 8 years born from the wedlock, under Section125 of Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the petitioner-opposite

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party-husband-father. A lump sum amount for both the mother and the child @ Rs.10,000/- per month was sought for. The petition was favoured, however, directing Rs.5,000/- for the wife and Rs.1,000/- for the minor girl child.

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3. The matter was earlier heard on 16.03.2026 at some length the facts and the propositions of law were noted and the learned counsel for petitioner had adjournment to address further on the issues as noted in the order of the said date. The said order is reproduced herein:

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“I.A. No.597 of 2025 & RPFAM No.394 of 2025

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1 . The I.A. has been filed for condonation of reported delay of 231 days in filing the revision application.

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2 . The petitioner-husband in the marriage is before this Court challenging the judgment dated 19.12.2024 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Jagatsinghpur in Crl. Proceeding No.69 of 2023.

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3. The Crl. Proceeding No.69 of 2023 was filed by the wife in the marriage and the minor child then aged about 8 years born from the wedlock U/s.125 of Cr.P.C. seeking maintenance from the petitioner-opposite party-father. A lump sum amount for both the mother and the child @ Rs.10,000/- per month was sought for. The petition was favoured, however, directing Rs.5,000/- to be paid to the wife in the marriage and Rs.1,000/- to the minor girl child.

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4. In view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324:2020 INSC (63), the amount directed to be paid to the wife and child as

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maintenance is in the nature of a money decree. The petitioner in order to challenge the decree has to secure the same. If he has paid any amount that should be disclosed before this Court to be taken note of.

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5. The amount of Rs.6,000/- per month was directed from the date of application i.e. from 13.06.2023. The total amount due till March, 2026 comes to Rs.2,04,000/-.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks and has adjournment.

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6. List in the week commencing 06.04.2026.”

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The matter was passed over when it reached, in absence of the learned counsel and is taken up thereafter on being mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notice in the matter should be issued by this Court to the opposite party.

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4. In considered opinion of this Court without considering whether a prima facie case has been made out, issuance of notice to opposite parties would not be in accordance with law for this Court exercising revisional jurisdiction.

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Further, the petitioner, as instructed to his learned counsel does not wish to secure the amount directed to be paid as maintenance as would be expedient as per principles in terms of the provisions contained in Order

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XLI Rule 10 of C.P.C. for sustaining the challenge before this Court in revision.

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Provisions contained in Order XLI Rule 10 and Rule 11 are reproduced herein:

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“Order XLI

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Appeals from Original Decrees

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10. Appellate Court may require appellant to furnish security for costs. (1) The Appellate Court may in its discretion, either before the respondent is called upon to appear and answer or afterwards on the application of the respondent, demand from the appellant security for the costs of the appeal, or of the original suit, or of both:

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Where appellant resides out of India.- Provided that the Court shall demand such security in all cases in which the appellant is residing out of India, and is not possessed of any sufficient immovable property within India other than the property (if any) to which the appeal relates.

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(2) Where such security is not furnished within such time as the Court orders, the Court shall reject the appeal.

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11. Power to dismiss appeal without sending notice to Lower Court.- (1) The appellate Court after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his pleader and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day may dismiss the appeal.

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(2) If on the day fixed or arty other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed.

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(3) The dismissal of an appeal under this rule shall be notified to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred.

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(4) Where an Appellate Court, not being the High Court, dismisses an appeal under sub-rule (1), it shall deliver a judgment, recording in brief its grounds for doing so, and a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment.

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11A. Time within which hearing under rule 11 should be concluded .-Every appeal shall be hear under rule 11 as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude such hearing within sixty days from the date on which the memorandum of appeal is filed.”

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5. It would be apt to note that summary dismissal in limine is not an exception, but an integral feature of the judicial process. This principle finds express statutory recognition in Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which empowers the appellate court to dismiss an appeal at the admission stage without issuing notice if it finds no sufficient ground for interference. Similarly, the revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397– 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is inherently discretionary and supervisory in nature. In writ proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, which by its very nature does not compel the Court to entertain every petition or issue notice in every case.

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6. In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi¹ , the Apex Court underscored the duty of courts to prevent abuse of process and to filter out litigations at the threshold. This duty would be rendered illusory if courts were compelled to issue notice even in cases that are manifestly devoid of merit. The paragraphs from K.K. Modi apt to be relied upon, 43 and 44 are reproduced herein:

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“43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell in paragraphs 18/19/33 (p. 344) explains the phrase “abuse of the process of the court” thus:

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“This term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. … The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material.”

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44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation

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1 (1998) 3 SCC 573

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may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the court's discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding.”

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7. In Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan² , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately dealt with the scope of interference by this Court in exercising revisional jurisdiction when revision of judgment rendered by Family Court is sought for.

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In Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) the Apex Court dealt with scope of revision by High Court of a judgment passed by the learned Family Court in a proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and have laid down the law authoritatively. The paragraphs those would be apt to be applied for the present case, paragraphs-20 and 21 (from SCC Online print) are reproduced herein:

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“20. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court has reduced the amount of maintenance from Rs 4000 to Rs 2000. As is manifest, the High Court has become oblivious of the fact that she has to stay on her own. Needless to say, the order of the

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2 (2015) 5 SCC 705: AIR 2015 SC 2025

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learned Family Judge is not manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would show that order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, no Revisional Court should have interfered with the reason on the base that it would have arrived at a different or another conclusion. When substantial justice has been done, there was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her head in the parental house, but other real expenses cannot be ignored. Solely because the husband had retired, there was no justification to reduce the maintenance by 50%. It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife that it deserved reduction. It only reflects the non-application of mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order.

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21. Having stated the principle, we would have proceeded to record our consequential conclusion. But, a significant one, we cannot be oblivious of the asseverations made by the appellant. It has been asserted that the respondent had taken voluntary retirement after the judgment dated 17-2-2012 with the purpose of escaping the liability to pay the maintenance amount as directed to the petitioner; that the last-drawn salary of the respondent taken into account by the learned Family Judge was Rs 17,564 as per salary slip of May 2009 and after deduction of AFPP Fund and AGI, the salary of the respondent was Rs 12,564 and hence, even on the basis of the last basic pay (i.e. Rs 9830) of the respondent the total pension would come to Rs 14,611 and if 40% of commutation is taken into account then the pension of the respondent amounts to Rs 11,535; and that the respondent, in addition to his pension, had received encashment of commutation to the extent of 40% i.e. Rs 3,84,500 and other retiral dues i.e. AFPP, AFGI, gratuity and leave encashment to the tune of Rs 16,01,455. The aforesaid aspects have gone

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uncontroverted as the respondent husband has not appeared and contested the matter. Therefore, we are disposed to accept the assertions. This exposition of facts further impels us to set aside the order of the High Court.”

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8. In the present case, the learned Judge, Family Court has taken note of the pleadings and submissions made by the present petitioner who was the opposite party, at paragraph-3 of judgment which is reproduced herein; the underlined portions are considered by this court for the present adjudication:

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“3 . The opposite party having entered his appearance, filed his show cause/objection inter alia denying almost all the averments made in the petitioner. However, he admitted his marriage with the petitioner no.1. It is stated that his counsel had wrongly filed a proceeding for divorce before this court, though he had intention to file a case U/s.9 of the Hindu Marriage Act to take back the petitioner no.1 and his daughter to his house. It is stated that as already an interim order of maintenance to the extent of Rs.3000/- has been passed in the aforesaid civil proceeding, the present proceeding for maintenance is not maintainable. It is further stated that the opposite party is a manual electric mechanic and he is earning a sum of Rs.3000/- per month and he has no landed property. It is further stated that the father of the petitioner no.1 is a rural labour and he has not given any dowry articles at the time of marriage, save and except a sum of Rs.55,000/- to the elder brother of the opposite party, which was spent during the marriage ceremony. With the aforesaid pleading, the opposite party has prayed to dismiss the proceeding.”

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9. Witnesses have been examined by the learned Judge, Family Court to arrive at conclusion as noted in paragraph5 of the impugned judgment. The factum of marriage has been proved as indicated in paragraph-7 of the impugned judgment. The following issues have been framed by the learned Family Court:

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“ (I) Whether the petitioners are unable to maintain themselves?

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(II) Whether the opposite party having sufficient means is neglecting or refusing to maintain the petitioners without any lawful reason?”

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10. The discussions of the materials on record such as - pleadings, written statement, depositions have been noted in detail by the learned Family Court and the issues have been answered.

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The paragraphs from Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) are noted by this Court, the principles of law laid down therein are applied to consider whether this Court can interfere with the judgment in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The relevant paragraphs from Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) are reproduced herein :

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“8. So far as the point no.1 relating to the inability of the petitioners is concerned, the petitioner no.1 in her affidavit evidence has stated specifically that she has no independent source of income to maintain herself and her minor daughter and her father is a very poor man, who is also unable to maintain the petitioners. It is seen that during her crossexamination, the aforesaid evidence was not

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challenged specifically nor did the opposite party adduce any evidence to establish any independent source of income of the petitioner no.1. In that view of the matter, this court having found that the petitioner no.2 has no independent source of income and the petitioner no.2 being the minor, has held that the petitioners are unable to maintain themselves.

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9. So far as the sufficient means of the opposite party is concerned, law is well settled that “sufficient means” always does not indicate any visible means or property and if a person is healthy and able to bodied, he should be held to have “sufficient means” to maintain his wife, children and parents.

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In the instant case, though the petitioner no.1 has stated in her affidavit evidence that the opposite party owns and possesses sufficient agricultural land and carrying business and his monthly income from both the sources is Rs.30,000/- per month, during her cross-examination., she stated that the opposite party is an electrician by profession. The opposite party has also stated in his objection that he is an electrical mechanic. Therefore, in absence of any other materials regarding the business or landed property of the opposite party except the oral evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, the alleged income of the opposite party cannot be accepted. However, considering the fact that the opposite party is an electrician by profession and he being an able bodied man, this Court has held that the opposite party has sufficient means to maintain the petitioners.

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10. So far as refusal and neglect on the part of the opposite party in maintaining the petitioners is concerned, the petitioner no.1 corroborating the averments made in the petition has stated categorically in her affidavit evidence that after marriage, she was subjected to torture for nonfulfillment of further demand of Rs.1,00,000/- and consequent thereupon, she was also abused and her daughter was also not taken care properly by the

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opposite party and his family members. It is stated that for the aforesaid reason, she was taken by her father to her parental house on 24.09.2016. The aforesaid evidence of the petitioner no.1 goes to show about the neglect on the part of the opposite party in maintaining them. The petitioners have been residing separately from the opposite party since the year 2016, but there is nothing on record, which would go to show that the opposite party has paid anything towards their maintenance, rather the evidence of the petitioners goes to show that the opposite party had filed a proceeding for divorce vide C.P.No.186 of 2021 though he has subsequently withdrawn the same. Though the opposite party gave suggestion during the cross-examination of the petitioner no.1 that the petitioner no.1 had filed a divorce proceeding vide C.P. No.155 of 2017 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Jagatsinghpur, but nothing was adduced from the side of the opposite party to substantiate the same. Therefore, considering the aforesaid oral evidence of the petitioner no.1 and her father, this court held that it is the opposite party, who has neglected in maintaining the petitioners and now refusing to maintain them. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that since this court has already passed an interim order of maintenance in C.P. No.186 of 2021, no further maintenance should be awarded in favour of the opposite party. But the fact remains that the C.P. No.186 of 2021 has been disposed of in the mean time and such order of maintenance passed for pendentlite maintenance of the petitioner no.1 is no more in force. The opposite party has not stated or proved any other ground to deny paying maintenance to the petitioners. It is already held that the opposite party has sufficient means to maintain the petitioners. Therefore, the opposite party should be directed to pay maintenance to the petitioners.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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11. Further, analysis regarding quantum of maintenance have been made at paragraph-11 of the judgment of the learned Family Court that is considered by this Court for present adjudication:

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“ 11. So far as the quantum of maintenance is concerned, in the instant case, admittedly there is nothing on record to substantiate the exact income of the opposite party, but it is admitted that the opposite party is an electrician mechanic. Therefore, considering the aforesaid avocation of the opposite party, the cost of the living of an individual in the present days, necessary expenses for survival of the petitioners in the present days and the status of the parties, this court deems it fit to direct the opposite party to pay at least a sum of Rs.5000/- per month to the petitioner No.1 and another sum of Rs.1000/to the petitioner No.2 per month till she attains majority towards their maintenance from the date of application. Hence, it is ordered:”

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12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the judgment of the learned Family Court is erroneous as the learned court has not appreciated evidence in its proper perspective. Learned counsel has been apprised of the law laid down in Shamima Farooqui (supra) and that it is required to be shown from the written statement filed by the petitioner and evidence laid before learned trial court in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court in Shamima Farooqui ( supra ), to support the contentions raised.

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13. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner stayed for fourteen years in his in-laws’ place. In considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner staying in in-law’s place for fourteen years, is not a relevant consideration by the learned Judge, Family Court for determining and awarding monthly maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. nor for this Court in revision.

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14. Regarding the liability of the husband to pay the maintenance at paragraphs 16, 17, 18 of Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) the apex Court have extensively dealt with the issue. The law laid down is applied by this Court to the present adjudication and the paragraphs (from SCC Online Print) are reproduced herein :

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16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived as a measure of social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai [(2008) 2 SCC 316 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356], it has been ruled that : (SCC p. 320, para 6)

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“6. … Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [(1978) 4 SCC 70: 1978 SCC (Cri) 508] falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents

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when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787] .”

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17. This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning.

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18. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Chander Parkash Bodh Raj v. Shila Rani Chander Prakash [1968 SCC OnLine Del 52 : AIR 1968 Del 174] wherein it has been opined thus : (SCC OnLine Del para 7)

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7. … an able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for such able-bodied person to show to the Court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable, for reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be easily permissible against him.”

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[Underlined to supply emphasis]

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15. Regarding the plea of the petitioner-herein, before the learned trial court that he is unable/in capable to pay, the discussions and the observations made by the apex Court in

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Shamima Farooqui ( supra) at paragraphs-15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are apposite and are reproduced herein:

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“15. While determining the quantum of maintenance, this Court in Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge, Dehradun [(1997) 7 SCC 7] has held as follows : (SCC p. 12, para 8)

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“8. … The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable expenses for his own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the law and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in the prosecution of her case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be excessive or extortionate.”

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16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived as a measure of social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai [(2008) 2 SCC 316 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356] , it has been ruled that : (SCC p. 320, para 6)

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“6. … Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [(1978) 4 SCC 70 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 508] falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to

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maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787]”

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17. This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning.

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18. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Chander Parkash Bodh Raj v. Shila Rani Chander Prakash [1968 SCC OnLine Del 52 : AIR 1968 Del 174] wherein it has been opined thus : (SCC OnLine Del para 7)

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7. … an able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for such able-bodied person to show to the Court cogent grounds for holding that he is unable, for reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the presumption will be easily permissible against him.

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19. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid that the obligation of the husband is on a higher pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and children arises. When the woman leaves the matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of many a comfort. Sometimes her faith in life reduces. Sometimes, she feels she has lost the tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give monetary

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comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition for grant of maintenance allowance.”

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16. By applying the above principles to the present case, it is apparent that the present petitioner husband being able bodied, has to be presumed to be capable of earning sufficient money to maintain his wife, he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough. It was for the opposite party-husband to show cogent grounds to the learned Family Court to hold that for reasons beyond his control he is unable to earn enough, to discharge his legal obligation. From reading of the judgment impugned it is apparent that before the learned Judge, Family Court the petitioner-herein has not made any such endeavor. There was no legally permissible ground shown before the learned Judge, Family Court to accept the plea of the petitioner that he would not pay any maintenance.

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To deny his employment and earning therefrom the opposite party-husband did not bother to adduce any positive evidence.

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In Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) the Hon’ble Supreme Court commenting on reduction of amount of maintenance from ₹4,000/- to ₹2,000/- by order of the High Court observed “it only reflects the non-application of mind and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order…”

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17. Following the above well settled legal principles, it has to be and is held that it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife and minor children, he cannot be heard to plead that he is unable to maintain his wife due to financial constraint as long as he is able bodied and/or educated and/or capable of earning.

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18. Nature and scope of Section 125 CrPC (since repealed and substituted by pari materia provision contained in Section 144 of the BNSS, 2023), the legislative policy behind the enactment and the constitutional philosophy that has guided such enactment have been elaborately discussed in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v Neha³ .

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The paragraphs from Rajnesh ( supra ) relied upon and applied by this Court for deciding the present revision application are reproduced herein (from SCC Online web edition print):

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“ (d) Section 125 CrPC

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32. Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for maintenance of wife, children and parents in a summary proceeding. Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC may be claimed by a person irrespective of the religious community to which they belong. The purpose and object of Section 125 CrPC is to provide immediate relief to an applicant. An application under Section 125 CrPC is predicated on two conditions : (i) the husband has sufficient means; and (ii) “neglects” to maintain his wife, who is unable to maintain herself. In such a case, the husband may be directed by the Magistrate to pay such monthly

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3 ( 2021 ) 2 SCC 324

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sum to the wife, as deemed fit. Maintenance is awarded on the basis of the financial capacity of the husband and other relevant factors.

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33. The remedy provided by Section 125 is summary in nature, and the substantive disputes with respect to dissolution of marriage can be determined by a civil court/Family Court in an appropriate proceeding, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

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34. In Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi [Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 563] the Supreme Court held that under Section 125(1) CrPC only a wife who is “unable to maintain herself” is entitled to seek maintenance. The Court held : (SCC p. 392, para 19)

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“19. The object of these provisions being to prevent vagrancy and destitution, the Magistrate has to find out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for such moderate living can be fairly determined, only if her separate income, also, is taken into account together with the earnings of the husband and his commitments.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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35. Prior to the amendment of Section 125 in 2001, there was a ceiling on the amount which could be awarded as maintenance, being Rs 500 “in the whole”. In view of the rising costs of living and inflation rates, the ceiling of Rs 500 was done away with by the 2001 Amendment Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act states that the wife had to wait for several years before being granted maintenance. Consequently, the Amendment Act introduced an express provision for grant of “interim maintenance”. The Magistrate was vested with the power to order the respondent to make a monthly allowance towards interim maintenance during the pendency of the petition. Under sub-section

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(2) of Section 125, the court is conferred with the discretion to award payment of maintenance either from the date of the order, or from the date of the application. Under the third proviso to the amended Section 125, the application for grant of interim maintenance must be disposed of as far as possible within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the respondent.

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xxx xxx xxx xxx

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37. In Chaturbhuj v.Sita Bai [Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316: (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356] this Court held that the object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife by providing her food, clothing and shelter by a speedy remedy. Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice especially enacted to protect women and children, and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3), reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution.

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38. Proceedings under Section 125 Cr PC are summary in nature. In Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena[Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 321 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 200] this Court held that Section 125 CrPC was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a woman who had left her matrimonial home, so that some suitable arrangements could be made to enable her to sustain herself and the children. Since it is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to the wife and minor children, the husband was required to earn money even by physical labour, if he is ablebodied, and could not avoid his obligation, except on any legally permissible ground mentioned in the statute.

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xxx xxx xxx

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III. Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance

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77. The objective of granting interim/permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There is no straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. 78. The factors which would weigh with the court inter alia are the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant is educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant has any independent source of income; whether the income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed prior to her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife.

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79. In Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain [Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain, (2017) 15 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712] this Court held that the financial position of the parents of the applicant wife, would not be material while determining the quantum of maintenance. An order of interim maintenance is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim has no independent income, sufficient for her or his support. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. The court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay for her or his support. Maintenance is dependent upon factual situations; the court should mould the claim for maintenance based on various factors brought before it.

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80. On the other hand, the financial capacity of the husband, his actual income, reasonable expenses for his own maintenance, and dependent family members

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whom he is obliged to maintain under the law, liabilities if any, would be required to be taken into consideration, to arrive at the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid. The court must have due regard to the standard of living of the husband, as well as the spiralling inflation rates and high costs of living. The plea of the husband that he does not possess any source of income ipso facto does not absolve him of his moral duty to maintain his wife if he is able-bodied and has educational qualifications.

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81. A careful and just balance must be drawn between all relevant factors. The test for determination of maintenance in matrimonial disputes depends on the financial status of the respondent, and the standard of living that the applicant was accustomed to in her matrimonial home. [Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 356] The maintenance amount awarded must be reasonable and realistic, and avoid either of the two extremes i.e. maintenance awarded to the wife should neither be so extravagant which becomes oppressive and unbearable for the respondent, nor should it be so meagre that it drives the wife to penury. The sufficiency of the quantum has to be adjudged so that the wife is able to maintain herself with reasonable comfort.

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84. The Delhi High Court in Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde [Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622 : (2007) 140 DLT 16] laid down the following factors to be considered for determining maintenance : (SCC OnLine Del para 8)

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“1. Status of the parties.

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2. Reasonable wants of the claimant.

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3. The independent income and property of the claimant.

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4. The number of persons, the non-applicant has to maintain.

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5. The amount should aid the applicant to live in a similar lifestyle as he/she enjoyed in the matrimonial home.

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6. Non-applicant's liabilities, if any.

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7. Provisions for food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attendance and treatment, etc. of the applicant.

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8. Payment capacity of the non-applicant.

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9. Some guesswork is not ruled out while estimating the income of the non-applicant when all the sources or correct sources are not disclosed.

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10. The non-applicant to defray the cost of litigation.

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11. The amount awarded under Section 125 CrPC is adjustable against the amount awarded under Section 24 of the Act.”

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Discussion and Directions

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109. The judgments hereinabove reveal the divergent views of different High Courts on the date from which maintenance must be awarded. Even though a judicial discretion is conferred upon the court to grant maintenance either from the date of application or from the date of the order in Section 125(2) CrPC, it would be appropriate to grant maintenance from the date of application in all cases, including Section 125 CrPC. In the practical working of the provisions relating to maintenance, we find that there is significant delay in disposal of the applications for interim maintenance for years on end. It would therefore be in the interests of justice and fair play that maintenance is awarded from the date of the application.

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V. Enforcement of orders of maintenance

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114. Enforcement of the order of maintenance is the most challenging issue, which is encountered by the applicants. If maintenance is not paid in a timely manner, it defeats the very object of the social welfare legislation. Execution petitions usually remain pending for months, if not years, which completely nullifies the object of the law. The Bombay High Court in Sushila Viresh Chhadva v. Viresh Nagshi Chhadva held that : (SCC OnLine Bom para 7)

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“7. … The direction of interim alimony and expenses of litigation under Section 24 is one of urgency and it must be decided as soon as it is raised and … the law takes care that nobody is disabled from prosecuting or defending the matrimonial case by starvation or lack of funds.”

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117. Section 125(3) CrPC provides that if the party against whom the order of maintenance is passed fails to comply with the order of maintenance, the same shall be recovered in the manner as provided for fines, and the Magistrate may award sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or until payment, whichever is earlier.

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VI. Final Directions

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127. In view of the foregoing discussion as contained in Part B — I to V of this judgment, we deem it appropriate to pass the following directions in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

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(d) Date from which maintenance is to be awarded

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131 . We make it clear that maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the application for maintenance, as held in part B-IV above.”

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19. Having perused the judgment of the learned Family Court, the discussions in the judgment regarding examination in chief of P.W.1, P.W.2 and the discussions made on the pleadings of the parties; by applying the tests laid down in Shamima Farooqui ( supra ) it has to be and is held that there is nothing perceptible which would show that the judgment of the learned Judge, Family Court is a sanctuary of errors. Further it has to be and is held that the order is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record.

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As observed by the Hon’ble apex Court, this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction would not interfere with, as because, this Court would arrive at a different or another conclusion.

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20. Further it has to be held that this Court would not interfere when in the case at hand substantial justice has been done by the learned Family Court. The awarded amount of ₹5,000/- for wife and ₹1,000/- for child per month as maintenance is not a huge fortune that has been showered on them and it does not deserve reduction.

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21. In considered opinion of this Court, no case is made out for revision of the judgment of the learned Judge, Family Court, Jagatsinghpur dated 19.12.2024 passed in Criminal Proceeding No.69 of 2023. The reported delay of 231 days in filing the revision application is not condoned.

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The revision application being devoid of any merit fails and is dismissed.

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…………………… M.S. Sahoo, J.

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Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 8^th April,2026/Gs

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: GAGAN BIHARI SAMAL Reason: Authentication Location: ohc Date: 05-May-2026 12:39:54