Lilima Dash Vs State of Odisha(Vig.)

By means of this application, the Petitioners seek to set aside the impugned order dated 18.02.2025, passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna, in G.R.(V) Case No.11 of 2013 arising out of Korapur Vigilance P.S. Case No. 27 of 2013, whereby the petition filed by the Petitioner seeking their discharge from the aforesaid case has been rejected.

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The background facts of the case are that the husband of the Petitioner was trapped in Koraput Vigilance P.S. Case No.16 of 2013, pursuant to which search was conducted in the residential house of the Petitioner. During the course of search, documents were seized and on scrutiny thereof a separate enquiry was undertaken. During enquiry it was found that the Petitioner’s husband, after completing Diploma in Civil Engineering, had joined

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Government service on contractual basis as a Technical Consultant (TC) in the office of the District Project Coordinator, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, Kalahandi in the year 1999. It was further found during enquiry that during the check period the Petitioner’s husband had acquired assets worth Rs.1,77,39,254/-, incurred expenditure of approximately Rs.26,95,022/-, and the disproportionate assets were assessed at Rs.1,59,94,897/-, constituting 136.34% of his total income. On the basis of the said enquiry, Koraput Vigilance P.S. Case No.27 of 2013 was registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 109 of the IPC against the Petitioner’s husband and the present Petitioner. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and cognizance was taken by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna. The Petitioner having filed an application for discharge, the same came to be rejected by order dated 18.02.2025, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present criminal revision before this Court.

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Mr. Zafarulla, learned counsel for the Petitioner, vehemently argued against the impugned order and submitted that the learned trial court committed a manifest error in rejecting the prayer for discharge without properly appreciating the materials placed on record. Learned counsel contended that the property statement submitted by the Petitioner clearly discloses lawful acquisition of assets from known and independent sources of income, including her professional earnings as an Ayurvedic medical practitioner, which fact has not been disputed by the

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prosecution. It was urged that several years of admitted income of the Petitioner, along with lawful receipts such as gifts received at the time of marriage and family ceremonies, advances received towards sale of property, hand loans, and financial assistance received from relatives, have either been ignored or wrongly treated as assets of the public servant, thereby vitiating the entire computation of alleged disproportionate assets. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Special Judge failed to examine whether the essential ingredients of Section 109 of the IPC were prima facie made out against the Petitioner. According to learned counsel, there is no material in the charge-sheet or investigation record to indicate any act of abetment, conspiracy, or intentional aid on the part of the Petitioner, and mere existence of properties in her name, particularly when she is an earning member with independent sources of income, cannot constitute abetment in law. It was also contended that the valuation of immovable properties has been erroneously inflated and that assets legitimately acquired by the Petitioner have been mechanically attributed to the husband without any prima facie material to show that the same were benami or sourced from the income of the public servant. Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial court, instead of scrutinising whether a grave suspicion was made out, proceeded on the assumption that all such issues must necessarily be decided at trial, thereby abdicating the jurisdiction vested under Section 227 CrPC. In sum, Mr. Zafarulla urged that the impugned order suffers from nonapplication of mind, results in serious prejudice to the Petitioner, and permits continuation of criminal proceedings in the absence of

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prima facie material, amounting to abuse of the process of court, warranting interference in this revision.

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Per contra, Mr. S. Das, learned Standing Counsel for the State, supported the impugned order and submitted that the learned Special Judge has rightly rejected the application for discharge upon due consideration of the materials collected during investigation. Learned counsel argued that at the stage of discharge the court is only required to examine whether the materials on record disclose a prima facie case or give rise to grave suspicion against the accused, and a meticulous examination of the defence documents or correctness of calculations is wholly impermissible. It was contended that the investigation has brought on record sufficient materials to show that during the check period substantial assets were created in the name of the Petitioner, who is the spouse of the principal accused, and that such assets prima facie appear to be disproportionate to the known sources of income of the public servant. Learned counsel submitted that whether the assets standing in the name of the Petitioner were acquired from her independent income or were benami in nature is a matter requiring evidence and cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of discharge. Learned Standing Counsel further argued that the plea of independent income, alleged gifts, loans, and advances raised by the Petitioner are all matters of defence which can only be established during trial. Merely producing income-tax returns or property statements does not ipso facto demolish the prosecution case so as to warrant discharge under Section 227 CrPC. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Shanthi @ Pugazhenthi v. State , reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 558, to contend that at the stage of framing of charge or consideration of discharge, the court is not expected to conduct a roving enquiry into the probative value of materials or to weigh the defence version, and if the materials disclose grave suspicion, the accused must face trial. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the State urged that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and calls for no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

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Having heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the State, and upon careful perusal of the materials placed on record, this Court proceeds to examine whether the impugned order rejecting the prayer for discharge suffers from any illegality, impropriety or material irregularity warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

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At the outset, it is apposite to reiterate that at the stage of consideration of a petition for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is not required to conduct a roving enquiry or a mini trial. The jurisdiction is confined to assessing whether the materials placed by the prosecution, if taken at face value, disclose the existence of a prima facie case or give rise to grave suspicion against the accused. Where such grave suspicion exists and remains unexplained, the court would be justified in framing charge; conversely, if the materials do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offences, discharge would be warranted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of

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Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , reported in 2023 SCC

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OnLine SC 1294 , has held as follows:-

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“11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.

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The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of primafacie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.

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The power and jurisdiction of Higher Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chandra (2012) 9 SCC 460 where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:

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“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.”

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This Court in the aforesaid judgement has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C. is sought for as under:

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“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

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27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

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27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

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27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

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27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine

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whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

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27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

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The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.”

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In the instant case, the prosecution alleges that during the check period substantial assets were acquired which were disproportionate to the known sources of income of the principal accused and that several such assets were created in the name of the Petitioner. The charge-sheet and the documents annexed thereto indicate that the Vigilance authorities have assessed the disproportionate assets to be in excess of the permissible limits. At this stage, the correctness of such calculation or the adequacy of explanation offered by the accused cannot be conclusively adjudicated, as the same would necessarily require appreciation of evidence.

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The principal contention of the Petitioner is founded on her property statement and the plea of independent professional

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income. While the Petitioner has produced documents indicating that she had sources of income during the relevant period, the question whether such income was sufficient to account for the assets standing in her name, and whether the assets were acquired solely from such income, are matters which require evidentiary determination. At the stage of discharge, the court is not expected to weigh the probative value of such defence material, particularly when the prosecution materials disclose a prima facie nexus between the assets and the alleged offence.

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For clarification, the argument that a non-public servant cannot be proceeded against for abetment of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is no longer res integra. As clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi vs. State , reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 558 , a non-public servant who knowingly assists, facilitates, or holds disproportionate assets on behalf of a public servant may be liable for abetment under Section 107 read with Section 109 IPC. The relevant exposition of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is extracted hereinbelow.

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In P. Nallamal (Supra), it was contended before this Court that an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act cannot be abetted by a non-public servant. Further, that there is no provision in the 1988 Act which provides punishment for abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) whereas it provides punishment for abetment of some other offences under the 1988 Act. However, after discussing the history of Section 13 of the 1988 Act which was a substitute for some of the provisions of Chapter-IX of IPC which deals with offences by or relating to public servants, this Court held that an offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988

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Act can be abetted by any other person. After reading Section 107 of IPC and accepting suggestions of Counsel, this Court gave illustrations that how even a person who is not a public servant can abet the offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:

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“24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which, according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments fitting with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. The first illustration cited is this: If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of how other public servants have become more wealthy by receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do the same in order to become rich and the public servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.

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Next illustration is this:

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Four persons including the public servant decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons prompt the public servant to keep such money in their names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.

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The last illustration is this:

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If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he cannot keep them as he has no known source of income to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A's name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.

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Such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act can be abetted by non-public servants. The only mode of prosecuting such offender is through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.”

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(Emphasis Provided)

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In other words, any person who persuades a public servant to take bribes, decides to raise money through bribes along with a public servant and prompts such public servant to keep the wealth with him/her or keeps the amassed wealth of a public servant in his/her own name is guilty of committing the offence of abetment of offence under section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. We must also note that the 2018 Amendment to the 1988 Act has substituted Section 12 of 1988 Act and made all offences under the 1988 Act abettable.”

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It is also well settled that while exercising revisional jurisdiction, this Court does not sit as a court of appeal to reappreciate the materials on record. Interference is warranted only where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or non-application of mind. On perusal of the impugned order, this Court finds that the learned Special Judge has adverted to the materials on record, the submissions advanced, and the settled principles governing discharge before rejecting the prayer.

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In view of the foregoing analysis and upon consideration of the materials available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution materials, if taken at face value, disclose a prima facie case in respect of the offences alleged. The issues raised by the Petitioner relating to correctness of the property statement, sufficiency of independent income, valuation of assets, and absence of abetment are matters which necessarily require appreciation of evidence and cannot be conclusively adjudicated at the stage of discharge.

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This Court finds that the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna has applied the correct legal principles governing consideration of discharge under Section 227 CrPC and has not

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committed any illegality, impropriety or material irregularity in rejecting the discharge application. The impugned order, therefore, does not call for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

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12. Consequently, the CRLREV stands dismissed.

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It is, however, made clear that any observation made herein is confined to the limited purpose of adjudication of the present revision and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case at the stage of trial.

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(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

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A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: SARBANI DASH Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 15-Jan-2026 10:36:29

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Lilima Dash v. State of Odisha(Vig.)

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Lilima Dash v. State of Odisha(Vig.)

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