Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik v. State of Odisha

Orissa HC12 Mar 2025WP(C)/8435/2017

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

GPTA disengagement; MGNREGS Mayurbhanj; Kusumi Block; show-cause reply not considered; non-speaking order; bald and flimsy reasons; application of mind; audi alteram partem; principles of natural justice; civil consequences; duty to record reasons; Kranti Associates; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das; Rajendra Nath Mohanta parity reinstatement; W.P.(C) No.8435 of 2017; Articles 226 & 227; Annexure-7 and Annexure-8 set aside; writ disposed; no costs.

What did the court decide?

Setting aside of Letter No.5481/DRDA dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-8) issued to the BDO, Kusumi and of the decision dated 13.04.2017 (Annexure-7) of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj; writ petition disposed of with no order as to costs. ¶251

Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik Vs State of Odisha — Writ and Judicial Review | Orissa HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the decision dated 13.04.2017 (Annexure-7) of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj and the consequent disengagement letter dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-8) were passed without considering the petitioner's detailed show-cause reply and without recording cogent reasons, rendering them arbitrary and unsustainable. +1 more

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Court's answer

The decision dated 13.04.2017 of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj is bereft of reason, much less cogent reason, and tainted with non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, which is the minimum requirement while considering a show-cause reply.

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Ratio / Principle

None of the explanations furnished in the petitioner's show-cause reply (Annexure-6) was taken note of or dealt with by the Collector, save stating that the reply was not satisfactory; such a bald order without ascribing reasons is untenable in the eye of law.

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Key takeaways

Bald and flimsy reasons assigned to disengage the petitioner do not indicate application of mind of the authority concerned; the Court was not persuaded that an apt decision had been taken by the Collector.ratio¶218
The decision taken against the petitioner leads to civil consequence, which demands adherence to the principles of natural justice.ratio¶93
The direction contained in Letter No.5481/DRDA dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-8) and the decision dated 13.04.2017 (Annexure-7) forming part thereof were set aside, and the writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Orissa High Court (Murahari Sri Raman, J.) set aside the decision dated 13.04.2017 (Annexure-7) of the Collector & District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj and the consequent Letter No.5481/DRDA dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-8) by which the petitioner, working as Gram Panchayat Technical Assistant (GPTA), Kusumi Block under the MGNREG scheme, was disengaged on the basis of a joint enquiry report alleging financial and procedural irregularities in six projects. Holding that the decision entailed civil consequences and that the Collector had rejected the petitioner's elaborate show-cause reply without taking note of any of his explanations, assigning only bald and flimsy reasons indicative of no application of mind, the Court found the decision bereft of cogent reason and tainted with non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, relying on Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 2 SCR 968, Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, Ram Chander v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1173, and related authorities on the duty to record reasons. The Court also took note of its earlier order dated 13.04.2018 in W.P.(C) No.9052 of 2017 (Rajendra Nath Mohanta), where a Gram Rojagar Sevak of the same Kusumi Block was directed to be reinstated in similar circumstances, to which the learned Additional Standing Counsel conceded during hearing. Writ petition disposed of with no order as to costs; the petitioner had continued in the post under the interim status quo order dated 11.05.2017.

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ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

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W.P.(C) No.8435 of 2017

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In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950

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Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, Aged about 50 years, Son of Late Amulya Ratna Pattnaik, At: Jail Road, P.O.: Keonjhargarh, District:Keonjhar, At present working as Gram Panchayat Technical Assistant, Kusumi Block, Mayurbhanj. … Petitioner -VERSUS-

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1. State of Odisha, represented through its Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Odisha Secretariat Building, Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.

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2. Collector and District Magistrate, District Rural Development Agency, Mayurbhanj, At/PO/Town/District :Mayurbhanj.

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3. Project Director, District Rural Development

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Agency (DRDA), Mayurbhanj, At/P.O./Town/District :Mayurbhanj.

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4. Block Development Officer, Kusumi Block, At: Badampahar, Via: Rairangpur, Town/District: Mayurbhanj. … Opposite Parties.

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Counsel appeared for the parties:

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For the Petitioner : M/s. Umesh Chandra Patnaik, S.D. Mishra, S. Pattnaik and M.R. Sahoo, Advocates For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Anshuman Sethy, Additional Standing Counsel

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P R E S E N T:

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HONOURABLE

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MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

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Date of Hearing : 12.03.2025 :: Date of Order : 12.03.2025

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ORDER

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Seeking to challenge the Order dated 21.04.2017 under Anneuxre-8 passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, District Rural Development Agency, Mayurbhanj-opposite party no.2, wherein the Petitioner was disengaged from the post of Gram Panchayat Technical Assistant, Kusumi Block basing on the joint enquiry report conducted by the Additional Project

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Director (Technical), MC-II and J.E. (Estimator), DRDA, Mayurbhanj, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition craving to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayer(s):

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“The petitioner therefore humbly prays that your Lordships may graciously be pleased to issue Rule Nisi calling upon the opp. parties to show cause as to why the impugned order under Annexure-8 be not quashed and they be not directed to allow the petitioner to discharge his duty and continue with the contractual service as GPTA in Mayurbhanj, District under Kusumi Block and on perusal of causes shown, if, or upon insufficient causes shown be pleased to make the said Rule absolute.

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And may pass such other order(s) as deem just and proper.

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And of this act of kindness the petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray.”

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Facts:

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2. The petitioner by virtue of order dated 23.12.2006 was engaged to function as Gram Panchayat Technical Assistant (GTPA) under Moroda Block, Mayurbhanj on contractual basis under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee (MGNREG) Scheme.

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3. The terms of engagement being renewed from time to time, the petitioner entered into an agreement with

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opposite party no.3 on 24.12.2007 for a period of one year and has discharged his duties in execution of the various projects under the said scheme in Moroda Block.

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4. On satisfactory performance in discharge of duty, opposite party no.2 vide order dated 12.06.2012 transferred the petitioner to Kusumi Block, Mayurbhanj. Pursuant to such order, the petitioner has been discharging his duties as entrusted to him in Kusumi Block under MGNREG scheme.

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5. Opposite party no.3 issued show-cause notice dated 06.02.2017 to the petitioner taking into account the allegation levelled against him by one Sk. Rashid and other villagers of Kusumi Gram Panchayat with respect to irregularities in execution of six projects. Accordingly, a joint enquiry report was submitted. The petitioner has proffered explanation to each point of allegation vis-à-vis the observations made in the report in response to show cause notice.

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6. On 13.04.2017, the Petitioner was appeared for personal hearing before the Opposite Party No.2, pursuant to the notice issued to him. But vide letter dated 21.04.2017 under Annexure-8 has come to be issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj-Opposite Party No.2 instructing the Block Development Officer, Kusumi to disengage the petitioner from the post of

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GPTA, Kusumi Block. The said letter was issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj after taking decision on 13.04.2017 (Annexure-7).

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7. Dissatisfied thereby, the Petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

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Rival contentions and submissions:

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8. Sri Umesh Chandra Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner vehemently contended that though a detailed reply with reference to each of the allegations has been submitted to the Collector-cum-DPC, MGNREGS, Mayurbhanj, not a single explanation has been referred to or taken into consideration while taking decision on 13.04.2017 vide Annexure-7. Therefore, he submitted that the decision on show-cause submitted by the petitioner is a terse one being bereft of reason leading to depict that the letter dated 21.04.2017 read with decision dated 13.04.2017 is arbitrary and fanciful. The petitioner is entitled for reason for rejection of his explanation offered in connection with the show cause notice. It is submitted that the show-cause notice and reply thereto cannot be an empty formality.

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9. Sri Anshuman Sethy, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite parties-State

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submitted that the decision dated 13.04.2017 of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj vide Annexure-7 is depicting sufficient reason to disengage the petitioner for the irregularities found on enquiry being made pursuant to allegation by the villagers. Therefore, he submitted that though a detailed reasons for rejecting the show-cause reply being not given, the Administrative Authority, i.e ., Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj has taken appropriate decision which warrants no interference of this Court in exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

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Hearing:

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10. Pleadings, being completed and exchanged between the learned counsel for respective parties, on their consent, this matter is taken up for final hearing at the stage of admission.

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10.1. Accordingly, heard Sri Umesh Chandra Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Anshuman Sethy, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite parties-State.

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Discussion and conclusion:

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11. At the outset, it is necessary to have reference to the decision dated 13.04.2017 taken by the Collector and

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District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj, pursuant to which instruction to disengage the petitioner was issued by the said Authority to the Block Development Officer, Kusumi vide letter dated 21.04.2017. The said decision dated 13.04.2017 is reproduced hereunder:-

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“Decision on the Show Cause submitted By Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, GPTA, Kusumi Block in compliance to the Show Cause Notice No.1711, Dated 06.02.2017.

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Dated: 13.04.2017

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Whereas, on joint enquiry into the allegation made by some villagers of Kusumi G.P. gross negligence, serious financial and procedural irregularities detected on execution of following projects under MGNREGS and 4th SFC in Kusumi G.P. under Kusumi Block for the year 2014-15 & 2015-16.

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1. Construction of Pindi at Kusumi weekly Hatpadia under Kusumi G.P. of Kusumi Block.

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2. Improvement of weekly Hatpadia (Land Leveling) with School Play Ground under Kuysumi G.P. of Kusumi Block.

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3. Renovation of Balia Pokhari at Kusumi under Kusumi G.P. of Kusumi Block.

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4. Renovation of Rehedagadga MIP at Kendrai.

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5. Improvement of Play Ground at Kendrai under Kusumi G.P. of Kusumi Block.

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6. Construction of road from Deogan PMGSY road to Muslim Smasan near Sports Field under Kusumi G.P. of Kusumi Block.

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And whereas, reportedly, the following serious irregularities detected in the above projects;

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1. Improper maintenance of case record.

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2. Manipulation/fabrication of master roll.

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3. Non-signature in the CS forms.

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4. Photographs (three stages) are not kept in the case record.

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5. Non-preparation of work estimate.

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6. Initial measurement has not taken in the level section.

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7. Improper maintenance of Measurement Books.

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8. Non maintenance of the work site register.

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9. Improper maintenance or non-maintenance of running account bill.

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And whereas, out of the above irregularities, the following serious financial irregularities detected on execution of the work “Improvement of play ground at Kendrai under Kusumi G.P. of Kusumi Block”.

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i. There is no pit found from where earth has been borrowed.

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ii. Project-4 i.e. “Renovation of Rehedagadha MIP at Kendrai” is very adjacent to this project. The soil has been excavated from the pond and spread over the playground development project.

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iii. As per online report dated 09.01.2017 an amount of Rs.1,25,280/- has been expended in the play ground development project towards wage component.

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iv. Though, the project is shown as complete in online, physically it was not completed.

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And whereas, the enquiry team suggested to take stringent action as deemed fit against the concerned GPTA and other executants of the above projects, therefore, Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, GPTA was noticed to show cause as to why disengagement proceeding shall not be initiated against him for such financial irregularities and dereliction in Government duties.

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And whereas, the show cause reply submitted by Sri Pattnaik, GPTA found not satisfactory as against the charges of above financial irregularities, therefore, for the principle of natural justice, Sri Pattnaik was directed vide No.4859 dated 31.03.2017 to appear in person before the Collector & District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj to avail the opportunity of being heard.

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And whereas, in course of hearing, except challenging the joint enquiry report, no satisfactory reply given by Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, GPTA against the irregularities detected.

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And whereas, the work executed under MGNREGS is implemented by the Govt. for development of rural people and accordingly, agreement has been executed with certain terms and condition engaging the GPTA in the Block for execution of the work smoothly within the targeted period. Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, GPTA had to perform his duty according to the terms and condition of agreement. But, the performance/conduct of the GPTA is found quite violation of the terms & condition of the agreement executed by him, causing gross financial irregularities. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that further continuance of Sri Pattnaik as GPTA may detrimental to smooth execution of projects under MGNREGS.

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And whereas, the Collector-cum-C.E.O., Zilla Parishad is vested with the power of engaging 2nd party, transferring him from one block to other within the district and taking disciplinary action including removal as and when required on getting feedback from the Program Officer.” Now, therefore, I am inclined to order to disengage Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik from the post of GPTA of Kusumi Block for violation of terms and conditions of agreement for the interest of public.

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Intimated all concerned.

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Sd/Collector, Mayurbhanj”

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12. Sri Umesh Chandra Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drew attention of this Court to the aforesaid decision by laying emphasis on the following sentence:-

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“ And whereas, in course of hearing, except challenging the joint enquiry report, no satisfactory reply given by Sri Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik, GPTA against the irregularities detected.”

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13. Perused the reply to show-cause notice, as submitted by the petitioner, which is placed at Annexure-6 to the writ petition. From the said reply, it is discernable that the petitioner has elaborately and minutely furnished explanation to each of the allegations. It transpires from the decision dated 13.04.2017, as extracted hereinabove, that none of the explanations has been taken note of or objected to by the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj save and except saying that the reply is not satisfactory. This Court on very many occasions deprecated such practice of authorities who decided matters against the noticee without considering and discussing the explanation on merits. Such bald order without ascribing reason is untenable in the eye of law. The decision taken by the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj against the petitioner leads to

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civil consequence, which demands adherence to

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principles of natural justice. Sri U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel urged that the Collector has never afforded opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.

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14. In Canara Bank Vrs. Debasis Das, (2003) 2 SCR 968, it has been enunciated with regard to principles of natural justice as follows:

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“Residual and crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated; and if so, what extent any prejudice has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, "useless formality theory" can be pressed into service. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration. of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. The expressions „natural justice‟;, and „legal justice‟ do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies

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the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants‟ defence.

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The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the ·first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the „Magna Carta‟. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to „vocate interrogate and adjudicate‟. In the celebrated case of Cooper Vrs. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1963) 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated:

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„Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. „Adam‟ says God,

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„where art thouhas thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat‟.

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Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond.

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Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasijudicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. What is meant by the term 'principles of natural justice' is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in Ray v. Local Government Board, (1914) 1 KB 160 at p.199:83 LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision. Jn General Council of Medical Education & Registration of UK.Vrs. Sanckman, (1943) AC 627 = (1948) 2 All ER 337, Lord Wright observed that it was not desirable to attempt „to force it into any procrustean bed‟ and mentioned that one essential requirement was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal interest in the controversy, and further that it should give „a full and fair opportunity‟ to every party of being heard.

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Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on. the subject. The most important of them is the Board of Education Vrs. Rice, (1911) AC 179 = 80 LJKB 796, where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:

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„Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or

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determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari‟.

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Lord Wright also emphasized from the same decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view". To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne, LO in Spackman Vrs. Plumsiead District Board of Works, (1985) 10 AC 229 = 54 LJMC 81 ), where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:

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„No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their

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view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice‟.

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Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase „justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done‟.

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Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressed in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered Even an away. administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression „civil consequences‟ encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.

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Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura, (1855) 2 Macg. 1.8, Lord Cran worth defined it as „universal justice‟. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen, (1877-78) 3 App. Case 614, 623 JC Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, (1884-85(10) App. Case 229, 240), Earlof Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase „the substantial requirement of justice‟. In Vionet Vrs. Barrett, (1885 (55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as „the natural sense of what is right and wrong‟. While, however, deciding Hookings Vrs. Smethwick Local Board of Health, (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet‟s case (supra) chose to define natural justice as „fundamental justice‟. In Ridge Vrs. Baldwin,1963 (I) WB 569, 578, Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with „fair-play in action‟ a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621). In re R.N. (An Infant)1967 (2) B617, 530, Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as „a duty to act fairly‟. In fair mount Investments Ltd. Vrs. Secretary to State for Environment, (1976 WLR 1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as „a fair crack of the whip‟ while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. in Regina Vrs. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex ParleHosenball, (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase „common fairness‟.

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How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as

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representing the principles of natural justice .in judicial process, including therein quasi judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is „nemojudex in causasua‟ or „nemodebetessejudex in propriacausasua‟ as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, „no man shall be a judge in his own cause‟. Coke used the form „aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars‟ (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, „no man ought to be a judge in his own case,because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party‟. The form „nemo potest esse simul actor et judex‟, that is, „no one can be at once suitor and judge‟ is also at times used. The second rule is „audi alteram partem‟, that is, „hear the other side‟. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form „audietur at altera pars‟ is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely „qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram act quam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit‟ that is, „he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right‟ (See Bosewell‟s case (1605) 6 Co. Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, „justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done‟. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left. upon. All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated.

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What is known as „useless formality theory‟ has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta Vrs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237. It was observed as under:

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„Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of „real substance‟ or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch Vrs. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971) 2 All ER 1278, I-IL) (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn Vrs. Keele University: (1971) 2 A.II ER 89; Cinnamond Vrs. British Airports Authority: (1980) 2 All ER 368, CA) and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R Vrs. Ealing Magistrates‟ Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8) Admn. LR 35 I, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be „demonstrable beyond doubt‟ that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd Vrs. McMohan, (1987) (I) All ER 1118: CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy Vrs. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is „real likelihood-not certainty of prejudice‟. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge Vrs. Baldwin (1964 AC 40 =( 1963) 2 All ER66, I-IL), Mcgarry, J. in John Vrs. Rees

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(1969) (2) All ER 274) stating that there are always „open and shut cases‟ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the. „useless .formality theory‟ is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that „convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms‟. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the „useless formality theory‟ in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton ( 1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article „Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?‟1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the „useless formality theory‟ has been made much earlier in „Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow‟ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute,

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there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their „discretion‟, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, Rajendra Singh Vrs. State of MP., (1996)5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.

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We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the „useless formality theory‟ and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us, „admitted and indisputable‟ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J.‟

¶140

As was observed by this Court we need not go into „useless formality theory‟ in detail; in view of the fact that no prejudice has been shown. As is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants unless failure of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public interest to dismiss a petition on the fact situation of a case, this Court may refuse to exercise said jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vrs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 828. It is to be noted that legal formulations cannot be divorced from the fact situation of the case. Personal hearing was granted by the Appellate Authority, though not statutorily prescribed. In a given case post-decisional hearing can obliterate the procedural deficiency of a predecisional hearing. (See Charan Lal Sahu Vrs. Union of India etc., AIR 1990 SC 1480.

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Additionally there was no material placed by the employee to show as to how he has been prejudiced. Though in all cases the post-decisional hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, in the case at hand the position is different. The position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vrs. B. Karunakara and Ors., (1993) 4 sec 727 at para 31 which reads as follows:

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„Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer‟s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure,

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the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the state of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.‟

¶148

The position was again reiterated in Union Bank of India Vrs. Vishwa Mohan, (1998) 4 SCC 310 at page 314). The relevant para 9 reads as follows:

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„We are totally in disagreement with the above-quoted reasoning of the High Court. The distinction sought to be drawn by the High Court that the first charge-sheet served on the respondent related to the period when he was a clerk whereas the other three charge-sheets related to the period when he was promoted as a bank officer. In

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the present case, we are required to see the findings of the enquiry authority, the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order of the Appellate Authority since the High Court felt that the charges levelled against the respondent after he was promoted as an officer were not of a serious nature. A bare look at these charges would unmistakably indicate that they relate to misconduct of a serious nature. The High Court also committed an error when it assumed that when the respondent was promoted as a bank officer, he must be having a good report otherwise he would not have been promoted. This finding is totally unsustainable because the various acts of misconduct came to the knowledge of the Bank in the year 1989 and thereafter the first chargesheet was issued on 17.02.1989. The respondent was promoted as a bank officer sometime in the year 1988. At that time, no such adverse material relating to the misconduct of the respondent was noticed by the Bank on which his promotion could have been withheld. We are again unable to accept the reasoning of the High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case „it is difficult to apply the principle of severability as the charges are so inextricably mixed up‟. If one reads the four charge-sheets, they all relate to the serious misconduct which includes taking bribe, failure to protect the interests of Bank, failure to perform duties with utmost devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty, acting in a manner unbecoming of a bank officer etc. In our considered view, on the facts of this case, this principle has no application but assuming that it applies yet the High Court has erred in holding that the principle of severability cannot be applied in the present case. The finding in this behalf is unsustainable. As stated earlier, the appellant had in his possession the enquiry report/findings when he filed the statutory appeal as well

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as the writ petition in the High Court. The High Court was required to apply its judicial mind to all the circumstances and then form its opinion whether non-furnishing of the report would have made any difference to the result in the case and thereupon pass an appropriate order. In para 31, this Court in Managing Director, ECIL has very rightly cautioned: (SCC p. 758)

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„The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts‟.***”

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14.1. In Sical Logistics Ltd. Vrs. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., 2017 (II) ILR-CUT 1035 , it has been succinctly laid down that:

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“17. In South Delhi Municipal Corporation Vrs. Ravinder Kumar and another, (2015) 15 SCC 545 the Apex Court held that the Government being guardian of public finance it has right to refuse lowest or any other tender bid or bids submitted by bidders to it provided its decision is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable as it amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India .

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Similarly, in State of Assam and others Vrs. Susrita Holdings Private Limited, (2014) 11 SCC 192, the Apex Court held the validity of tender process has to be considered in the light of fairness and reasonableness and of being in the public interest.

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In Rajasthan Housing Board and another Vrs. G.S. Investments and another, (2007) 1 SCC 477, similar view has also been taken by the Apex Court. ***”

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14.2. In Broom‟s Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, Page 97) there can be found a useful principle, Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex , that is to say, „Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself‟.

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14.3. At this stage this Court takes note of direction contained in Order dated 02.03.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No.6316 of 2023, wherein in the presence of learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, Sri Prasanna Kumar Parhi, it was directed that the Executive Director of Indian Oil Corporation Limited would “consider the representation filed by the petitioner” and “pass appropriate order in accordance with law”. However, reading of Letter dated 17.03.2023 vide Annexure-11, which is impugned in the present writ application, does not reveal consideration of the representation in proper perspective.

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14.4. In Ram Chander Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1173 , it was held that the word „consider‟ occurring in the Rule must mean the Authority shall duly apply its mind and give reasons for its decision. The duty to give reason is an incident of the judicial process and emphasized that in discharging quasi -judicial functions the Authority must act in accordance with natural justice and give reasons for its decision.

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14.5. “Consideration” does not mean incidental or collateral examination of a matter by the Authority in the process of assessment/adjudication/determination. There must be something in the order to show that the Authority applied his mind to the particular subject-matter or the particular source of information with a view to arriving at its conclusion. See, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Gurjargravures Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1978 SC 40 .

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14.6. The word „consider‟ is of great significance. Its dictionary meaning of the same is, „to think over‟, „to regard as‟, or „deem to be‟. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term „consider‟ postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory Authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material on record. The order of the Authority should reveal such application of mind. The Authority cannot simply adopt the language employed in the document before it and proceed to affirm the same. [ Vide, Chairman, LIC of India Vrs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 ; Nilamani Jal Vrs. Collector, 2016 (II) OLR 190 (Ori) ].

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14.7. It is felt apposite to refer to Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vrs. Masood Ahmed Khan , (2010) 9 SCC 496 wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India has summarised the legal position as follows:

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“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

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(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

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(b) A quasi-judicial Authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

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(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

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(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

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(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

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(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

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(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

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(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

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(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery system.

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(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

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(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial Authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

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(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or „rubberstamp reasons‟ is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

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(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37).

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(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decisionmaking, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija Vrs. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR, at 562 para 29

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and Anya Vrs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, „adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions‟.

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(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of „due process‟.”

¶194

14.8. In Abhiram Caretaking & Expert Services Vrs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, 2017 (II) ILR-CUT 1029 the importance of assigning reason in detail has been emphasized with the following observations:

¶195

“10. Franz Schubert said:

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„Reason is nothing but analysis of belief.‟

¶197

In Black‟s Law Dictionary, reason has been defined as a—

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„faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions.‟

¶199

It means the faculty of rational thought rather than some abstract relationship between propositions and by this faculty, it is meant the capacity to make correct inferences from propositions, to size up facts for what they are and what they imply, and to identify the best means to some end, and, in

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general, to distinguish what we should believe from what we merely do believe.

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10.1 In Union of India Vrs. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 it has been held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasijudicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. Recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice.

¶204

Similar view has also been taken in Uma Charan Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1915, Patitapaban Pala Vrs. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Ltd., 2017 (I) OLR 5; and Banambar Parida Vrs. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Limited, 2017 (I) OLR 625.

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11. In S.N. Mukherjee Vrs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 the Apex Court held that keeping in view the expanding horizon of principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which governs exercise of power by administrative authorities. Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority is required to record reasons for its decision.

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12. In Menaka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 the Apex Court observed that the reasons, if disclosed, being open to judicial scrutiny for ascertaining their nexus with the order, the refusal to disclose the reasons would equally be open to the scrutiny of the court; or else, the wholesome power of a dispassionate judicial examination of executive orders could, with impunity, be set at naught by an obdurate determination to suppress the reasons.”

¶209

14.9. Decision bereft of reason renders the decision making process arbitrary. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Punjab Vrs. Bhag Singh , (2004) 1 SCC 547 , observed as follows:

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“6. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen Vrs. Amalgamated Engg. Union, (1971) 1 All ER 1148 = (1971) 2 QB 175 = (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA) observed:

¶211

„The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.‟

¶212

InAlexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. Vrs. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it was observed:

¶213

„Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.‟

¶214

Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the „inscrutable face of the sphinx‟, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise

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the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The „inscrutable face of a sphinx‟ is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. ”

¶218

14.10. Given the aforesaid principles regarding assignment of “reasons” and “consideration” by the Authority to discern application of mind while taking decision and conspectus of cases relating to scope of judicial review, this Court is not persuaded with the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Standing Counsel that apt decision has been taken by the Collector. Bald and flimsy reasons assigned to disengage the petitioner do not indicate application of mind of the Authority concerned.

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15. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the considered view that the decision dated 13.04.2017 of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj is bereft of reason much less cogent reason and tainted with non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, which is the minimum requirement while considering

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the show-cause reply to a notice issued by an Authority. The decision of the Collector being not in consonance with the principles set forth by the Courts, this Court is inclined to show indulgence in the instant matter.

¶223

16. At this juncture, this Court may also take note of submission of Sri U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner citing decision of this Court vide Order dated 13.04.2018 in W.P.(C) No.9052 of 2017 (Rajendra Nath Mohanta vrs. Secretary to Government, Panchayatiraj Department, Secretariat, Bhubaneswar & others ). It is submitted that in a similar set of allegations with respect to Rajendra Nath Mohanta, who was serving as Gram Rojagar Sevak (GRS) in Kusumi Block in the district of Mayurbhanj, this Court has been pleased to direct for reinstatement of the petitioner therein. It may be beneficial for the purpose of the present case to reproduce the said order of this Court in extenso; “Heard learned counsel for the parties.

¶224

This matter involves disengagement of Gram Rojagar Sevak (G.R.S.) of Kusumi G.P. under Kusumi Block in the District of Mayurbhanj.

¶225

Considering the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the allegation involving the petitioner, this Court finds, the allegations made therein are all involving technical aspects. Petitioner filing the show cause vide Annexure-4 has already expressed his innocence and bona fideness in the appearance of

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mistakes and requested the authority for giving him a further chance to improve his working capacity so as to avoid the mistakes not to be repeated in future.

¶229

Perused the order of disengagement at Annexures-7 & 8. This Court finds, there is no proper consideration of the objection of the petitioner while passing the orders vide Annexures-7 & 8.

¶230

From the records, it appears, looking to the educational background and level of training involving the Gram Rojagar Sevak, this Court finds, the defects shown there, are all highly technical. It is, under the circumstance and looking to the salary component involving the Gram Rojagar Sevak engaged in the State, this Court interfering in the decision involving disengagement of the petitioner, directs the authority to reinstate the petitioner in his service forthwith, but however, without entitlement of any back wages and if necessary, by entering into a fresh agreement.

¶231

The writ petition stands disposed of with the above observation and direction.

¶232

Issue urgent certified copy on proper application.”

¶233

17. A copy of the aforesaid order being served on Sri Anshuman Sethy, learned Additional Standing Counsel during the course of hearing, he has conceded such position.

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18. It is submitted by Sri U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the aforesaid order has been implemented by the opposite parties.

¶237

19. In the present case, vide order dated 11.05.2017, this Court while issuing notice, passed the following interim order:-

¶238

“Mr. U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mishra, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State.

¶239

The petitioner files this application against the order of Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj dated 21.04.2017 vide Annexure-8, wherein it has been directed to disengage the petitioner from the post of GPTA, Kusumi Block for serious irregularities detected in execution of some projects and violations of terms and conditions of Agreement.

¶240

Mr. U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner states that without applying the principle of natural justice, an order to disengage the petitioner has been passed, which is not permissible and more so, the order dated 21.04.2017 has yet not been communicated to the petitioner, where the petitioner has been disengaged from service. Issue notice.

¶241

Three extra copies of the writ petition be served on Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Addl. Government Advocate, appearing for opposite parties no.1, 2 and 4 within three days.

¶242

Requisites for issuance of notice to opposite party no.3 by speed post be filed within three days. Office shall send notice fixing an early returnable date.

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Misc. Case No.7668 of 2017

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Issue notice as above. Accept one set of process fee.

¶247

As an interim measure, status quo with regard to the post held by the petitioner shall be maintained till 21st June, 2017.

¶248

Issue urgent certified copy as per rules.”

¶249

20. It is submitted by Sri U.C. Patnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been continuing in the post of GPTA till date.

¶250

21. With the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons enumerated supra , there is no other option left but to set aside the direction of the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj, opposite party no.2, to the Block Development Officer, Kusumi Block, opposite party no.4 vide Letter No.5481/DRDA dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-8) and also the decision dated 13.04.2017 taken by the Collector and District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj (Annexure-7), which forms part of said Letter dated 21.04.2017.

¶251

22. With the above observation(s) and direction(s) the writ petition stands disposed of, but in the circumstances there shall be no orders as to costs.

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Signature Not Verified

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(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE

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High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

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The 12^th March, 2025//MRS/Laxmikant

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Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 13-Mar-2025 16:39:08

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Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik v. State of Odisha

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Sushanta Kumar Pattnaik v. State of Odisha

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