M/S Central Electronics Ltd. Vs M/S Surya International

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

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W.P.(C) No.2332 of 2022

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(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950).

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M/s. Central Electronics Limited & …. Petitioner (s) Anr.

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-versus-

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…. M/s. Surya International Opposite Party (s)

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Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode :

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For Petitioner (s) : Mr. D.P. Nanda, Sr. Adv.

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Along with Mr. Rupesh Kumar Kanungo, Adv. : For Opp. Party (s) Mr. S.S. Padhy, Adv. On behalf of Mr. Gouri Mohan Rath, Adv.

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CORAM:

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DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

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DATE OF HEARING:-31.07.2025 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-20.09.2025

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Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

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1. The present Writ Petition has been preferred seeking quashing of the order dated 26.11.2021 passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack in ARBP No.7/2021 to the extent that the Ld. District Judge has rejected the Petition filed by the present Petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereby declined to entertain the application filed under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 read with Section 34 of the A & C Act.

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

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2. That, the Petitioner No. 1 namely, M/s Central Electronics Limited is a Govt. of India Enterprise under Department of Scientific & Industrial Research (DSIR), Ministry of Science &. Technology. It was established in 1974 with an objective to commercially exploit the indigenous technologies developed by National Laboratories and R&D Institutions in the country.

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3. The Container Corporation of India Ltd., a Public Sector Enterprise under the Ministry of Railways (hereinafter, referred to as “CONCOR/ Employer”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter, referred to as “MOU”) with the Petitioner No. 1 for Solar Electrification of 106 Households in Badil Bigha and 305 Households in Bahsa Pipra, along with 3 Solar Water Pumps and drip irrigation systems in Badil Bigha in Gaya District of Bihar.

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4. Pursuant to the MOU dated 23.6.2015, the Petitioner No. 1 issued Tender Call Notice No. C-2(b) /RC/0700/4325/2015 dated 14.7.2015 (hereinafter, referred to as “Tender Notice”), for the “Supply of Balance of System, Installation, Commissioning and AMC of 5 years for Solar Mini Grid Power Plant in Gaya Bihar”.

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5. Vide purchase order dated 29.9.2015, the present Opposite Party was allotted the work of supply of balance system, installation, testing, commissioning, warranty (including annual maintenance) for five years for a complete/composite work of 1 Nos. of Solar Mini grid Powerplants for Badil Bhiga village and 2 Nos. 15 KW Solar mini grid power plant for Bahsa Pipra village adhering to the standardized norms. The

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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total value of the work allotted was Rs. 1,68,90,500/-. In the Purchase order, dated 29.9.2015, it was specified that, all specifications, terms and conditions will be followed as per Tender Notice and that payment will be made on “back to back basis”.

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6. After installation and commissioning of 12KWP Solar Mini Grid at Badil Bigha Village Gaya-Bihar, on 12.8.2016, a Joint Site Survey was conducted by the Representatives of CONCOR and Petitioners, pursuant to which a Joint Inspection Certificate, dated 28.01.2017 was issued. As the Solar Power plant at Badil Bigha Village was commissioned and was working properly, the requisite payment of Rs. 65,95,750/-(Rupees Sixty Five Lakh Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty only) as against this portion of the purchase order was made to the Opposite Party.

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7. Disputes arose between the party qua the remaining portion of work, i.e. 2 Nos. 15 KW Solar mini grid power plant for Bahsa Pipra village. Resultantly, the present Opposite Party filed a claim application before the MSEFC, Odisha, Cuttack on 11.3.2019 which was registered as MSEFC Case No. 19 of 2019.

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8. Upon receiving notice dated 5.4.2019, the present Petitioners appeared before the MSEFC and submitted their reply in May, 2019. The parties were notified by the MSEFC on 24.7.2019 to appear on 3.8.2019 for ‘settlement of case’.

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9. On 3.8.2019, the MSEFC was pleased to observe that the claim of the present Opposite Party is admitted and payable by the present Petitioner and that the present Petitioner is liable to pay outstanding

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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dues to the present Opposite Party. The matter was thereafter adjourned to 20.9.2019.

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10. On 20.9.2019, the present Opposite Party submitted before the Council that their unit is in financial crunch due to an amount of Rs.1,01,56,030.00 towards principal and Rs.1,07,44,861.53 towards interest were laying outstanding upon the present Petitioner. The present Petitioner agreed to it and submitted that the reconciliation process is going on to clear up the dues of the Petitioner. The Council directed both the parties to make an amicable settlement with each other within 15 days and report its outcome for final hearing on 16.11.2019.

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11. On 16.11.2019, the MSEFC recorded that conciliation has failed and on the self-same date proceeded to pass the award directing the present Petitioner to pay the principal amount as well as interest as calculated up to 31.1.2019 within 30 days to the present Opposite Party. A copy of the order dated 16.11.2019 is alleged to have been received by the present Petitioners on 16.12.2019.

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12. Aggrieved, the present Petitioners had approached this Court on 16.2.2020 vide W.P.(C) No. 6776 of 2020 challenging the order dated 16.11.2019 for having been passed during the conciliation process without affording a proper opportunity of hearing to the present Petitioners. Vide order dated 16.3.2021, this Court was pleased to direct the present Petitioners to prefer an appeal u/s 19 of the Act along with a petition for condonation of delay within three weeks, in which case the petition for condonation of delay would be disposed of in accordance with law ‘liberally’ as the matter was pending before this Court.

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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13. The present Petitioners preferred a Special Leave Petition (SLP(C) No. 6627 of 2021) before the Apex Court against the order dated 16.3.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 6776 of 2020, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.5.2021.

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14. Thereafter, the present Petitioners preferred ARBP No. 7 of 2021 before the Court of the Ld. District Judge, Cuttack u/s 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 r/w S. 34 of the A&C Act on 18.6.2021. The Petition was accompanied by an I.A. u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 465 days in preferring the Petition as the matter was sub-judice before this Court and the Apex Court for a large period of the alleged delay and meanwhile, the Apex Court had also periodically extended the period of limitation in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No. 3/2020.

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15. Vide the impugned order, the Ld. District Judge was pleased to reject the I.A. u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 465 days in preferring the Petition and consequently, the petition u/s 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 r/w S. 34 of the A&C Act was dismissed as not admitted.

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16. Aggrieved, the present petition has been preferred.

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17. Now that the facts leading up to the instant Appeal has been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised.

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II. PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSIONS:

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18. The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the arbitral award in question cannot trigger limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, unless and until a signed copy of the award

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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was duly delivered to the Petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that delivery of a signed copy to the party itself is not a mere formality but a substantive requirement, and limitation begins only from such date of receipt. In the present case, the award was received by the Petitioner only on 16.12.2019, and therefore any computation of limitation must commence from that date. The learned District Judge gravely erred in treating the earlier date of receipt by counsel as sufficient compliance with Section 31(5).

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19. Without prejudice, even assuming some delay in filing the application under Section 34, the Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the orders of the Supreme Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re , whereby the period from 15.3.2020 to 28.2.2022 stood excluded for the purposes of computation of limitation. The Petitioner was diligently prosecuting remedies before this Court and the Apex Court, including a writ petition and a Special Leave Petition, challenging the arbitral award on jurisdictional grounds. In such circumstances, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 squarely applies, as the Petitioner acted in good faith and with due diligence before forums which were ultimately held to lack jurisdiction. Hence, rejection of the condonation application on technical grounds gravely prejudices the Petitioner’s rights.

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III.

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OPPOSITE PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS:

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20. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the Opposite Party submits that the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hopelessly barred by limitation. The certified copy of the arbitral award was admittedly obtained by the Petitioner’s advocate on 9.12.2019. In view of the settled law, knowledge and possession of the

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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award by an advocate duly authorised to act on behalf of a party is sufficient notice to the party itself. The Petitioner cannot artificially extend limitation by claiming receipt at its office on a later date. Accordingly, as the limitation period commenced on 9.12.2019, and the application filed thereafter is beyond the statutory period of three months and the further condonable period of thirty days.

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21. It was further contended that, the reliance of the Petitioner on the Supreme Court’s suo motu orders in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re is misplaced. The said orders were never intended to revive causes of action or cure delays which had already occurred prior to 15.3.2020. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot seek shelter under the blanket extension of limitation. Furthermore, the plea of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is untenable as the Petitioner’s writ proceedings and SLP were tactical attempts to bypass the statutory remedy under Section 34. Hence, the District Judge rightly dismissed the condonation application, and no interference is warranted.

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IV.

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ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

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22. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court here has identified the following solitary to be determined:

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A. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the Petitioner’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the award passed by the Facilitation Council, deserves to be condoned in view of the statutory framework, the Supreme Court’s orders extending limitation during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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V. ISSUE A: WHETHER IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE DELAY IN FILING THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, CHALLENGING THE AWARD PASSED BY THE FACILITATION COUNCIL, DESERVES TO BE CONDONED IN VIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK, THE SUPREME COURT’S ORDERS EXTENDING LIMITATION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, AND THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 14 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963?

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23. On a careful perusal of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it is apparent that the statute mandates the delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party. The significance of such delivery lies not merely in authenticating the correctness of the award, but also in ensuring that the limitation period, whether for enforcement under Section 36 or for filing objections under Section 34, commences. A “signed copy” within the meaning of Section 31(5) clearly denotes a copy bearing the signature of the Arbitrator.

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24. Further, on a close reading of Section 36, this Court finds that an arbitral award becomes enforceable only when the time prescribed for making an application to set aside the award under Section 34 has elapsed. Section 34(3) provides that such an application must be made within a period of three months from the date on which the party making the application has received the signed copy of the award. The proviso to Section 34(3) authorises the Court to condone a delay of up to 30 days beyond the original three months, provided sufficient cause is shown. However, the outer limit of condonation cannot exceed 30 days. The limitation period of three months is triggered only upon the receipt of

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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the signed copy of the arbitral award, and such receipt necessarily means receipt by the party of a signed copy.

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25. Section 32 of the Act contemplates the termination of arbitral proceedings, which termination necessarily follows compliance with Section 31, including the delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party. In a recent judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Pvt Ltd .¹ , their Lordships held that the termination would take place only when there is a complete compliance of Section 31 of the Act which would include the delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party.

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26. It follows, therefore, that it is mandatory for the sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal to ensure delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party so that the limitation period prescribed under Section 34 may begin to run. In the absence of such delivery, the statutory period of three months does not commence.

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27. The next issue that arises for consideration is the permissible modes of delivery of such signed copies. One method is to summon the parties on the date of pronouncement of the award and hand over signed copies at that time, with appropriate endorsement on the original record signed by the parties. Where this may not be feasible, the Arbitrator may insist on the presence of authorised representatives of each party at the time of pronouncement. Alternatively, signed copies may be transmitted through registered or speed post with acknowledgment due, ensuring proper delivery to each party. Copies may also be sent

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1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 157

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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via email or handed to the parties’ counsel, though the safest course is delivery directly to the parties or their authorised representatives at the time of pronouncement, to preclude disputes.

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28. At this stage, it is important to notice that Supreme Court in various judgments while interpreting Section 31 has held that delivery of a signed copy to the party is not a mere formality. The Court while interpreting the phrase “a signed copy shall be delivered to each party” has held that the delivery of a signed copy is not only mandatory but it has to be delivered to a responsible officer representing the party. If the party is a large organization, then the delivery of copy to the counsel or clerk has been found to be not sufficient. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors² , where the Supreme Court has held as under:

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“8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received” by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the

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2 (2005) 4 SCC 239

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.

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xxxxxx

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12. The learned Single Judge of the High Court as also the Division Bench have erred in holding the application under Section 34 filed on behalf of the appellant as having been filed beyond a period of 3 months and 30 days within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 34. There was a delay of 27 days only and not of 34 days as held by the High Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the application deserves to be condoned and the application under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act filed on behalf of the appellant deserves to be heard and decided on merits.”

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29. Next judgment is in State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd .³ where the Apex Court has held as under:

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“17. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors [(2005) 4 SCC 239 : (AIR 2005 SC 1832)] and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what Section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.

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18. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the respondent claimant but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case.”

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3 (2011) 4 SCC 616

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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30. Next judgment on the subject is in Banarsi Krishan

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Committee v. Karamyogi Settlers Pvt. Ltd .⁴ where the Supreme Court has held that:

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“15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision [Karmyogi Shelters (P) Ltd. v. Benarsi Krishna Committee, AIR 2010 Del 156] of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” has been amply dealt with in Tecco Trichy Engineers case [(2005) 4 SCC 239 : (AIR 2005 SC 1832)] and also in ARK Builders (P) Ltd. case [(2011) 4 SCC 616 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 413 : (AIR 2011 SC 1374)], referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an advocate to act as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his or her agent, or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31(5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award on the party himself and not on his advocate, which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act.

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16. The view taken in Pushpa Devi Bhagat case [(2006) 5 SCC 566 : (AIR 2006 SC 2628)] is in relation to the authority given to an advocate to act on behalf of a party to a proceeding in the proceedings itself, which cannot stand satisfied where a provision such as Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act is

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4 (2012) 9 SCC 496

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concerned. The said provision clearly indicates that a signed copy of the award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed award is not delivered to the party himself, it would not amount to compliance with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act. The other decision cited by Mr Ranjit Kumar in Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti case [AIR 1962 SC 666 : (1962) 2 SCR 551] was rendered under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not have a provision similar to the provisions of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act. The said decision would, therefore, not be applicable to the facts of this case also.

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17. In the instant case, since a signed copy of the award had not been delivered to the party itself and the party obtained the same on 15-12-2004, and the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on 3-2-2005, it has to be held that the said petition was filed within the stipulated period of three months as contemplated under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act. Consequently, the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner herein cannot be sustained and, in our view, was rightly rejected by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.”

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31. This Court, therefore, holds it to be settled law that the delivery of a signed copy to each party is a sine qua non for the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3).

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32. The case of the present Petitioner is that an award was rendered just before the Covid-19 Pandemic engulfed the country and consequent thereto a lockdown was declared in March 2020. The Petitioner in such context has referred to an order dated 23-3-2020 in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re⁵ passed by the Supreme Court whereby the Supreme Court extended the period of limitation in relation to all proceedings including arbitration proceedings. The case of the

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5 (2020) 19 SCC 10

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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Petitioner is that the impugned award was made available/received by the appellant on 16.12.2020 and that three months thereto, would bring the Petitioner within the benevolence of the Supreme Court qua the order for extension of limitation.

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33. The Petitioner has submitted that it pursued legal remedies by way of writ proceedings and a Special Leave Petition, contending inter alia that the Facilitation Council, having entertained the matter in conciliation, could not validly proceed to arbitration on the same day and render an award without due hearing.

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34. This writ petition was filed during the period the nation was hit by the Covid-19 Pandemic and more particularly when orders passed by the Supreme Court extending limitation to file legal proceedings were in operation, by virtue of which generally the limitation to file proceedings had stood extended in terms of its orders in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re (supra). The order dated 8.3.2020 passed by the Supreme Court reads thus:

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“1. Due to the onset of Covid-19 Pandemic, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). By an order dated 23-3-2020 this Court extended the period of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not with effect from 15-3-2020 till further orders. The order dated 23-3-2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the courts and tribunals are

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functioning either physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated 23-3-2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should come to an end. 2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions:

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1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15-3-2020 till 143-2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15-3-2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15-3-2021.

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2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15-3-2020 till 14-3-2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15-3-2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15-3-2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

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3. The period from 15-3-2020 till 14-3-2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

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4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to State.

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‘Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services and other necessary functions, such as, time-bound applications, including for legal purposes and educational and jobrelated requirements.’

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3. The suo motu writ petition is disposed of accordingly.”

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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35. Thereafter, by an order dated 10.1.2022 in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re⁶ , the Supreme Court further extended the limitation up to 28.2.2022. The order dated 10.1.2022 passed by the Supreme Court reads thus:

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“1. In 3-2020, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing pet applications/suits/appeals/all other quasi proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 Pandemic.

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2. On 23-3-2020, this Court directed extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before courts/tribunals including this Court w.e.f. 15-3-2020 till further orders. On 8-3-2021, the order dated 23-3-2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 153-2020 and 14-3-2021. While doing so, it was made clear that the period of limitation would start from 15-3-2021.

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3. Thereafter, due to a second surge in Covid-19 cases, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (Scaora) intervened in the Suo Motu proceedings by filing Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 seeking restoration of the order dated 23-3-2020 relaxing limitation. The aforesaid Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 23-9-2021 in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, wherein this Court extended the period of limitation in all proceedings before the courts/tribunals including this Court w.e.f 15-32020 till 2-10-2021.

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4. The present miscellaneous application has been filed by the Supreme Court advocates-on-record association in the context of the spread of the new variant of the Covid-19 and the drastic surge in the number of Covid cases across the country. Considering the prevailing conditions, the applicants are seeking the following:

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6 (2022) 3 SCC 117

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(i) allow the present application by restoring the order dated 23-3-2020 passed by this Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re; and

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(ii) allow the present application by restoring the order dated 27-4-2021 in Cognizance For Extension of Limitation, In re passed by this Court in MA No. 665 of 2021 in Suo Motu WP (C) No. 3 of 2020; and

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(iii) pass such other order or orders as this Court may deem fit and proper.

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5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re with the following directions:

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(I) The order dated 23-3-2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3-2021 in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, 27-4-2021 in Cognizance For Extension of Limitation, In re and 23-9-2021, it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

¶131

(II) Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-10-2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 1-3-2022.

¶132

(III) In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3-2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

¶133

(IV) It is further clarified that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial

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¶135

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

¶136

Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

¶137

6. As prayed for by learned Senior Counsel, MA No. 29 of 2022 is dismissed as withdrawn.”

¶138

36. It not disputed that it is by way of application dated 22.11.2019 filed by the Petitioner that certified copy of the order dated 16.11.2019 was applied for and the certified copy was provided to the advocate of the petitioner on 9.12.2019. The petitioners have received the certified copy of the so called award i.e. order dated 16.11.2019 at their office situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh on 16.12.2019 only.

¶139

37. Thus, the aforesaid periods of delay if any were required to be considered in the context of the limitation, Section 34(3) of the A&C Act would prescribe with reference to receipt of the order on 16.12.2019 and not 9.12.2019 keeping in mind the discussion above. Section 34(3) provides for limitation of three months and the extended period of 30 days to assail the arbitral award in the following terms:

¶140

“ 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. —

¶141

xxxx

¶142

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:

¶143

Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the

¶144

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

¶146

application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

¶147

38. Considering the aforesaid position in law and the facts of the case as noted by us, this Court does not find any fault with the petitioner in pursuing its legal remedies before this Court or the Apex Court, as at the time of filing of the first writ petition on 16.2.2020, the limitation qua the Application u/s19 of the MSMED Act r/w S.34 of the A&C Act had not expired.

¶148

39. In these circumstances, we are inclined to accept the appellant's contention that even assuming that there is a delay in filing of Section 34 proceedings, the same would be required to be condoned applying the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This clear position, not only on facts but also in law, has been completely overlooked and/or missed by the learned District Judge in passing the impugned order.

¶149

40. Even assuming that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in filing Section 34 proceedings, the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act certainly is an acceptable proposition, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The following discussion would aid our conclusion. In such context, at the outset, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are required to be noted, which reads thus:

¶150

“ 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good

¶151

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

¶154

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

¶155

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order 23 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under Rule 1 of that order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.

¶156

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

¶157

(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;

¶158

(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; and

¶159

(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”

¶160

41. It appears to be a settled position in law that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be available to a party seeking condonation of delay even in filing of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and qua the limitation, as prescribed under subsection (3) of Section 34 of the A&C Act. In Consolidated Engg.

¶161

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

¶163

Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt .⁷ , the Supreme Court in such context held that there is no provision under the A&C Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the applications under Section 34 of the A&C Act. It was observed that Section 43 of the A&C Act in fact makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the arbitration proceedings. The court held that the proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C Act are for the purpose of challenging the award, whereas the proceedings referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with the proceedings of a suit. It was held that Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act, will apply to the proceedings of the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. It was held that if under sub-section (4) of Section 43 of the Act, the period between commencement of arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, in such event, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the A&C Act, more particularly, when no provision is to be found in the A&C Act, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application made under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The court thus held that having regard to the legislative intent, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted

¶164

7 (2008) 7 SCC 169

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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under Section 34 of the A&C Act for setting aside an arbitral award. In reaching such conclusion, the court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Goa v. Western Builders⁸ , wherein the court had taken a similar view. Referring to such decision, the Supreme Court also held that the interpretation of Section 14 has to be liberal, the language of beneficial provision contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally so as to suppress the mischief and advance its object. In the context of applicability of Section 14, the Supreme Court in para 21 of the decision observed that five conditions are required to be satisfied for Section 14 of the Limitation Act to be pressed into service. The observations in para 21 read thus:

¶168

“Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:

¶169

(1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

¶170

(2) the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

¶171

(3) the failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

¶172

(4) the earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue; and

¶173

(5) both the proceedings are in a court.”

¶174

42. In the aforesaid context, to attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court observed that due diligence and caution are essential prerequisites for attracting the provisions of

¶175

8 (2006) 6 SCC 239

¶176

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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Section 14 and that due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute standards as the due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular circumstances. It was held that the time during which a court holds up a case while it was discovering that it ought to have been presented in another court, must be excluded, as the delay of the court cannot affect the due diligence of the party. It was held that Section 14 requires that the prior proceeding should have been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence. In such context referring to the definition of “good faith” as found in Section 2( h ) of the Limitation Act, it was observed that the definition of good faith would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. The court observed that Section 14 will not help a party who is guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction, however, there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to what amounts to good faith and the same is required to be decided on the facts of each case.

¶179

43. In Deena v. Bharat Singh⁹ , the Supreme Court similarly held that the main factor which would influence the court in extending the benefit of Section 14 to a litigant is whether the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and good faith. It was observed that a party prosecuting a suit in good faith in the court having no jurisdiction is entitled to exclusion of that period. In observing on the expression “good faith” as used in Section 14 the court observed that it would mean “exercise of due care and attention” as the expression “good faith”

¶180

9 (2002) 6 SCC 336

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

¶183

qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. Thus, it was held that the finding as to good faith or the absence of it, is a finding of fact. Also, referring to the decision in Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi¹⁰ , the Supreme Court observed thus:

¶184

“14. The main factor which would influence the court in extending the benefit of Section 14 to a litigant is whether the prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and good faith. The party prosecuting the suit in good faith in the court having no jurisdiction is entitled to exclusion of that period. The expression ‘good faith’ as used in Section 14 means ‘exercise of due care and attention’. In the context of Section 14 expression ‘good faith’ qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. The finding as to good faith or the absence of it is a finding of fact. This Court in Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Dev i¹⁷ observed:

¶185

‘The expression good faith qualifies prosecuting the proceeding in the court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. Failure to pay the requisite court fee found deficient on a contention being raised or the error of judgment in valuing a suit filed before a court which was ultimately found to have no jurisdiction has absolutely nothing to do with the question of good faith in prosecuting the suit as provided in Section 14 of the Limitation Act.’”

¶186

44. On the aforesaid discussion, in this Court’s opinion, this is a case wherein the Petitioner cannot be labelled as a litigant who was not conscious of its rights to assail the impugned arbitral award.

¶187

45. In this Court’s opinion, considering the provisions of Section 34(3), which provides for a limitation of three months to file an application for

¶188

10 AIR 1985 SC 1669

¶189

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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setting aside of the arbitral award from the date the award was received and for a further extended period of 30 days as ordained by the proviso, considering the peculiar facts of the case, it ought not to be a situation that the delay condonation application as filed by the petitioner was required to be rejected by the learned District Judge taking a strict view of the matter.

¶192

46. Before parting, this Court is constrained to observe that in taking any decision which is likely to render a party remediless, the court would be required to exercise utmost care and caution, to minutely examine the facts in applying the relevant provisions of the law of limitation. This is a clear case wherein there was blending of the Covid-19 period, in respect of which orders were passed by the Supreme Court as well as bona fide pursual of the matter before other courts. All these were vital considerations in the context of the law which this Court has applied and more so keeping in mind the judicial conscience this Court wields. The interest of justice is paramount, it cannot be either, dealt casually or under any narrow and pedantic interpretation of the provisions of law, which would in any manner render the justice in the case to be a casualty.

¶193

47. This Court deems it appropriate to clarify that it is not, at this stage, entering into any adjudication as to whether the decision rendered by the Facilitation Council constitutes a valid “arbitral award” within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. That question goes to the very root of jurisdiction and enforceability, and it would be premature for this Court to record findings on the same while dealing

¶194

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

¶196

only with the issue of limitation and condonation of delay. It is precisely for this reason that this Court has considered it necessary to ensure that the Petitioner’s application under Section 34 is entertained and decided on merits. A determination on the legal status of the Facilitation Council’s order, and the attendant consequences flowing therefrom, must be made by the learned District Judge upon a full hearing of the parties, rather than foreclosed at the threshold on a technical ground of limitation.

¶197

VI. CONCLUSION:

¶198

48. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, in this Court’s opinion, the Petition needs to succeed. Hence, the following order:

¶199

( i ) The impugned judgment and order dated 26.11.2021 passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the I.A. under Section 5 of Limitation Act filed by the Petitioner is quashed and set aside.

¶200

( ii ) The I.A. under Section 5 of Limitation Act is allowed by condoning the delay in the Petitioner filing Section 34 application, challenging the order/award dated 16.11.2019 passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Cuttack.

¶201

( iii ) Section 19 MSMED Act r/w Section 34 A&C Act proceedings shall be decided by the learned District Judge on merits and in accordance with law.

¶202

( iv ) All contentions of the parties on said proceedings are expressly kept open.

¶203

49. The Petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKARReason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUT TACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47

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50. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

¶207

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge

¶208

Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 20^th September, 2025/

¶209

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M/S Central Electronics Ltd. v. M/S Surya International

Case brief

What is this about?

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M/S Central Electronics Ltd. v. M/S Surya International

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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What the court decided

Issues for consideration

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