Dismissed

Choudhury Saubhagya Mohan Dash v. State of Odisha

Orissa HC9 Jul 2025WP(C)/13245/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court dismissed a writ petition challenging engineering service recruitment rules because the petitioners unsuccessfully suppressed material facts regarding prior pending litigation. The Court imposed penalty costs on deposit with the Legal Services Authority.

What did the court decide?

The writ petition was dismissed and each petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 25,000 as costs.

Choudhury Saubhagya Mohan Dash Vs State of Odisha — Contempt of Court | Orissa HC (2025)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

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W.P.(C) No. 13245 of 2025

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Choudhury Saubhagya Mohan Dash …. Petitioners and others

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Mr. A. Mishra, Advocate

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-versus-

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…. State of Odisha and others Opposite Parties

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Mrs. Suman Pattanayak, Addl. Govt. Advocate for State Mr. Gautam Misra, Senior Advocate Assisted by Mr. J.R. Deo, Advocate (for Intervenor) Mrs. Pami Rath, Senior Advocate Assisted by Ms. Sonali Prusty, Advocate (for Intervenor)

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CORAM:

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HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

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AND

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HON’BLE MR JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

ORDER

Order No.

09.07.2025

W.P.(C) No.13245 of 2025 and I.A. Nos.11221 & 11335 of 2025

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1. The petitioners, who are six in number, have filed the instant writ petition assailing the validity and the legality of Rule6(b) of the Odisha Diploma Engineers Service (Methods of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2012 being opposed

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to the Constitutional provisions with a consequential prayer of declaration that the direct Degree Engineer (B. Tech) are also

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eligible for consideration of their candidatures in the post of Junior Engineer in terms of the aforesaid Rules read in conjunction with Rule-4(b) of the Combined Technical Services Recruitment Examination Rules, 2022.

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2. The instant writ petition running in several pages contained

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the averments on the vires of the aforesaid provision of the Rules with a further disclosure of the pending writ petitions in the preamble of the said writ petition. Obviously, the preamble is not an integral part of the pleadings, yet may be perceived as a disclosure of the facts.

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3. It is an ardent duty of the litigant to disclose the material facts having bearing on the cause of action pleaded therein duly verified by the deponent yet, we do not go into the intricacies of the technicalities once we noticed that in the preamble, the pending writ petitions have been disclosed.

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4. Mr. Gautam Misra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. J.R. Deo, learned counsel and Mrs. Pami Rath, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Sonali Prusty, learned counsel appear for

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the respective intervenors. Learned counsel for the intervenors were permitted to make their submissions as they have taken out their applications seeking intervention addition as the interested parties in relation to the cause of action and the reliefs claimed in the instant writ petition. We permitted them to make their submissions.

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5. The respective counsel appearing for the intervenors uniformly submit that the instant litigation has a chequered history as several litigations came to be filed before this Court, some of which are pending; others have been disposed of and one of such litigations has reached to the apex Court, which is stated to be pending. It is arduously submitted by the respective counsel appearing for the intervenors that the petitioners are guilty of suppression of the material facts, more particularly, in not disclosing the other writ petitions than the writ petitions which have been disclosed in the preamble, which were already disposed of by this Court.

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6. Some of the petitioners have challenged the order by filing intra-court appeals, some of which are pending and some of such appeals have already been disposed of by this Court. The details of

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those writ petitions and the intra-court appeals tabulated in a sheet is handed to the Court indicating that all the writ petitioners, in fact, have approached earlier by filing those writ petitions and also approached the appellate forum, but there is a conscious suppression of the aforesaid facts and, therefore, the person who does not come to the Court with clean hands should not be permitted to walk merrily from the corridors of the Court.

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7. Though the intervention applications are still pending, but

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we find that the intervenors have a direct interest and shall be the affected persons in the event the reliefs as claimed in the writ petition is decided one way or other, and therefore, this Court renders them be necessary and proper parties. We thus dispose of the applications filed by the intervenors directing them to be added parties as opposite parties to the instant writ petition.

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8. In view of the startling facts as disclosed by the learned counsel appearing for the intervenors, now the added opposite parties to the instant writ petition, we invited the attention of learned counsel for the petitioners on the veracity of the statements made by

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the intervenors and could not get the satisfactory answer except that a prayer is made before us to withdraw the instant writ petition. Obviously, such submission is advanced upon taking instructions from the writ petitioners, but after noticing the factum of suppression of the material facts, we are not denuded of the powers to refuse the prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition. Ordinarily, the Court may permit the party to withdraw the proceeding provided the party is not guilty of suppression of the material facts, but in the event, the Court finds that the machinery of the Court is abused and/or misused at the behest of unscrupulous litigants, the Court should not permit such errant litigants to steal the march but must put them on terms.

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9. We are conscious of the proposition of law that nondisclosure of every facts may not constitute the suppression. There is a distinction between the “suppression of facts” and “suppression of material facts”. The fact which does not germane nor constitute an integral part of the cause of action, if not pleaded, cannot be termed as “suppression of the material facts” but if the facts which has a bearing not only on the cause of action but the reliefs claimed therein, if not pleaded, the litigant should not be permitted to

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withdraw the said proceeding as he perceived such suppression a mere accidental or ministerial error. Had it been a case of misconstruction of the facts or what can be logically deduced from reading the facts pleaded in the litigation, the Court may not hold such litigants guilty of suppression of fact but once the Court finds that there has been a conscious and deliberate act of suppression of material facts which if disclosed in the pleadings may not entitle the litigant to the reliefs claimed therein, there is no fetter on the part of the Court to dismiss the writ petition by imposing the conditions in the form of costs.

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10. The writ Court is not only the Court of law but the Court of equity as well and, therefore, one who comes with clean hands may deserve equitable treatment but not the one who has approached the Court by suppressing the material facts. The equity is not a one-way traffic; one who seeks equity must also disclose all the material facts with precision.

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11. The number of the writ petitions tabulated in the sheet explicitly indicate that each of the petitioners filed the writ petition

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and the description whereof is set out hereinbelow which after the disposal by the single Bench travelled to the appellate Court in the intra-court appeals and the description is also given hereinbelow. We venture to tally the details of those writ petitions with the disclosure made in the preamble of the instant writ petition but to our dismay, there is no reflection of those writ petitions and, therefore, the petitioners have consciously and deliberately suppressed those facts.

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12. From time immemorial, the importance of the pleadings in an adversarial system of adjudication is recognized and wellaccepted. Even the procedural law guiding and regulating the proceedings in the Court contained the exhaustive provisions relating to the pleadings with an avowed object of avoiding any surprise to the adversary and to augment adequate opportunity of defending the cause. A litigant cannot be put on surprise when the facts are disclosed de hors the pleading as it would tantamount to denial of adequate opportunity to defend. The facts which are intricately related to the reliefs must be pleaded with precision, lucidity, explicitly and with clarity.

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13. The Courts have taken a stern view upon the litigant who approached the Court by suppressing the material facts and it is undeniable that such recalcitrant litigants should not be permitted to reap the benefit of such suppression but must be shown the outer door of the Court.

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14. The apex Court, in case of K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481 in unequivocal terms, held that a person who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction enjoined by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required to be truthful, frank and open and should disclose all the material facts without any inhibition and/or reservation. It is further held that the Court is supposed to know the law and not the facts and, therefore, the applicant who approaches the Court by suppressing the material facts shall not be permitted to invite the Court to exercise such extraordinary jurisdiction with soiled hands. The enlightening observations of the apex Court is adumbrated hereinbelow:-

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“38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who

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invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not facts”.

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39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the

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applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

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15. In a later decision rendered in case of Dalip Singh v. State

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of Uttar Pradesh , reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 , the apex Court made an opening remark by reminding themselves of the cherished values of life which is founded upon " the Satya" and " the Ahimsa" . The Satya (the truth) embraces the purity, the truthfulness and the candid disclosure without having any sense of ultimate decisions that would go adverse to him. The apex Court, in the said decision, articulated the concept of the disclosure and the revelation of the truth, i.e., the material facts and deprecated those litigants who do not have any respect for truth and shamelessly resorted the falsehood and unethical means with sinister motive to achieve the desired goal.

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The enlightening observations of the apex Court in the said decision is reproduced as under:-

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“1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.

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2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established

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that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

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7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)], and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462, para 35)

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In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full

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facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

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10. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule

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was reiterated in G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel [(2009) 3 SCC 141].”

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16. The cumulative effect of ratio decidendi deduced from the above decisions leaves no ambiguity in the mind that suppression of the material facts not only disentitles the litigant the reliefs claimed in the proceeding but also exposes himself to be dealt with stringently. No litigant should be permitted to abuse and/or misuse the process of law nor should be permitted to use the Court as a tool for granting reliefs upon suppression of the fact.

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17. This case is a glaring example of suppression of the material facts by the litigants who approached the Court by masquerading the mask of innocent and the moment the latent becomes patent, the Court would be failing in its duty if such litigants are not put to terms while showing the doors of the Court. The doors of the Court shall not be an ajar for such litigants and, therefore, it is the foremost duty of the Court to convey a strong message that a person cannot be permitted to misuse and/or abuse the process of law.

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18. Since the petitioners are guilty of suppression of the material facts, the instant writ petition deserves dismissal. The same is hereby dismissed.

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19. We would be failing in our duty if we do not impose the conditions in the form of cost after noticing the factum of suppression of the material facts. Therefore, we direct each of the petitioners to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Twenty Five Thousand) as costs which is a condition precedent for the ultimate order. It is also directed that such amount shall be deposited with the Odisha State Legal Services Authority (OSLSA) within a period of three weeks from date; on deposit, the OSLSA shall utilize the same for providing the basic amenities and the facilities to the street children. In the event the said amount of costs is not deposited, it is open to the OSLSA to take appropriate steps as permissible in law.

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(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice

(M.S. Raman)

Judge

S. Behera

Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: SUMANTA BEHERA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 14-Jul-2025 16:44:21

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Choudhury Saubhagya Mohan Dash v. State of Odisha

Case brief

What is this about?

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Choudhury Saubhagya Mohan Dash v. State of Odisha

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