Dismissed

Commissioner Cum Secy, Revenue and Disaster Management Deptt v. Bijaya Kumar Mohapatra

Orissa HC8 Jul 2025WA/524/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Orissa High Court dismissed an interlocutory application seeking condonation of delay for filing a writ appeal. The court held that the State failed to show 'sufficient cause' for a 213-day delay, rejecting administrative procedural delays as inadequate excuses and noting the appellants' lackadaisical conduct.

What did the court decide?

The application for condonation of delay and the writ appeal are dismissed due to lack of sufficient cause.

Commissioner Cum Secy, Revenue and Disaster… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Orissa HC (2025)

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ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

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I.A. No.2107 of 2025

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(an Application for appropriate order)

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I.A. No.1276 of 2025

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(an Application for condonation of delay) in

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W.A. No.524 of 2025

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In the matter of an Application to condone the delay in filing Appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948

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read with

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Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna

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and

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Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948

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***

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1. Commissioner- cum -Secretary to Government, Revenue & Disaster Management Department, Odisha Secretariat, Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.

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2. Collector & District Magistrate, Cuttack.

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3. Tahasildar, At/P.O.: Salepur District: Cuttack.

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Appellants (Opposite parties in the Writ Petition).

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I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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Page 1 of 70

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-VERSUS-

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Sri Bijaya Kumar Mohapatra, Aged about 57 years Son of Late Bibhutibhusan Mohapatra, at present working as Adhoc Assistant Revenue Inspector in the Office of The Sadar R.I. Circle under Tahasildar, Salepur, District: Cuttack, Permanent resident of At: Khajuripada, Nuasahi, P.O.: Kalapathar, District: Cuttack. … Respondent (Petitioner in the Writ Petition).

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Counsel appeared for the parties:

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For the Appellants : Mr. Bimbisar Dash, Additional Government Advocate For the Respondent : M/s. Prabhat Kumar Sahoo,

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Additional Government Advocate

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Vivekananda Swain and Prabhat Kumar Panda, Advocates

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P R E S E N T:

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HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE

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MR. HARISH TANDON

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AND

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HONOURABLE

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MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

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Date of Hearing : 08.07.2025 :: Date of Order : 08.07.2025

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I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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Page 2 of 70

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ORDER

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I.A. No.2107 of 2025

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2. The interlocutory application is filed at the instance of the respondent for passing appropriate orders with the following prayer:

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“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon‟ble Court, may graciously be pleased to direct the Appellants/Opposite Parties particularly the Appellant/Opposite Party No. 2 (the Collector) to reinstate the Respondent prior to his retirement on 30.04.2025” .

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2.1. After perusal of averments made in the Interlocutory Application for passing appropriate order to direct the appellants, more particularly to the Collector to reinstate the respondent and the relief so claimed therein, it appears that the said Application has virtually become infructuous and, accordingly, dismissed as infructuous.

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I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in WA No.524 of 2025

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3. The question for consideration in the interlocutory application praying therein to condone the delay of 213 days in filing the intra-Court appeal under the provisions of Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII

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I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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Page 3 of 70

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of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948. The prayer of the appellants runs thus:

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It is therefore, humbly prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this Writ Appeal and condone the delay of about 213 days in filing the present Writ Appeal under such terms and conditions as may be deemed just and proper.

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4. The order of learned Single Judge impugned in the writ appeal has been passed on 02.07.2024 in WPC (OA) No.365 of 2018¹ , but the appeal has been filed on

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1 Direction of the learned Single Judge contained vide Order dated 02.07.2024 passed in WPC (OA) No.365 of 2018 is as follows:

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“7. Having heard learned counsel for the Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that Petitioner pursuant to the notice issued by Opposite Party No.2 on 10.04.1990 under Annexure-1-Series participated in the selection process as against the post of RI./Chain Man. Petitioner on coming out successful, he was appointed as a Collection Moharirr on ad hoc basis vide the order of appointment initially issued on 29.09.1992. As found from the record Petitioner was allowed to continue with one day break vide different orders issued under Annexure-2-Series.

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7.1. It is further found from the record that claiming regularization of his services, Petitioner approached the Tribunal in O.A. No.1659(C) of 1994 and the Tribunal while issuing notice of the matter vide order dtd.13.07.1994 passed an interim order that Petitioner shall not be terminated without leave the Tribunal. The Tribunal ultimately vide order dtd.22.06.2017 disposed of the matter with a direction on the Opposite Parties to consider the claim of the Petitioner to get the benefit of regularization as against any available vacancy. While directing so, the Tribunal also came to a conclusion that since the Petitioner was appointed by facing regular recruitment test, he is otherwise eligible for such regularization.

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7.2. It is found that on the face of such direction issued by the Tribunal, Opposite Party No.2 instead of passing of an order either rejecting or allowing the claim, passed the order of disengagement vide the impugned order dtd.17.01.2018. It is the view of this Court that while complying the direction issued by the Tribunal vide its order dtd.22.06.2017, Opposite Party No.2 could not have disengaged the Petitioner from his services instead of taking a decision either way with regard to the claim of the Petitioner for regularization.

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7.3. Therefore, in view of such material irregularity, which is apparent on the face of the impugned order, this Court is inclined to quash the same. While quashing the same, this Court directs Opposite Party No.2 to reinstate the Petitioner in his services and consider his case for regularization as directed b y the Tribunal in its order under Annexure-5. O pp osite Part y

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01.03.2025. Therefore, it is pointed out by the Stamp Reporter that there is delay of 212 days in presenting the writ appeal.

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5. To examine whether the appeal suffers from delay and laches as inordinate delay has occurred in preferring the remedy, this Court is called upon to delve into whether “sufficient cause” has been shown to condone the delay of 213 days, as prayed for to condone the delay by way of the interlocutory application, in preferring the writ appeal.

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6. Sri Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate for the appellants placed the fact leading to delay in preferring the appeal by stating that after receipt of the copy of the Order under challenge in the writ appeal, the file was processed for fling of writ appeal after approval from the Administrative Department vide Letter No.38976, dated 12.11.2024. The claim of the respondent was examined and the file was submitted before the learned Advocate General for filing of writ appeal vide Letter No.5295, dated 25.11.2024. Thereafter, the matter was sent to the Law Department

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No.2 is directed to issue an order of reinstatement within a period of three (3) weeks from the date of receipt of this order and take a final decision with regard to regularization of the services of the Petitioner in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal within a further period of three (3) months. However, it is observed that such reinstatement and regularization of service of the Petitioner, if any, shall be subject to final outcome of the vigilance case, in which it is fairly admitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that charge sheet has already been filed.

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8. Accordin g l y, the Writ Petition stands dis p osed o f .”

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for views. After necessary vetting on 20.12.2024, step was taken to file writ appeal and the same could be filed on 01.03.2025.

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6.1. Sri Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate contended that the writ appeal is required to be considered inasmuch as the order of the learned Single Judge is vulnerable inasmuch as the same involves pertinent question of law, viz., the direction to reinstatement in service is justified in law in view of pendency of vigilance case against the respondent. He, therefore, placed heavy reliance on the observation made in paragraph 37 of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through L.Rs. & others Vrs. Union of India and another, (2023) 13 SCR 743 :

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“Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent‟s inability to the present appeal within time, for the reason assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the

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working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.”

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6.2. He, therefore, urged that considering the merit in the appeal, the delay of 213 days, as reflected in the prayer of the interlocutory application, warrants condonation for consideration of the writ appeal on merits.

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7. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sahoo, learned Advocate for the respondent, per contra, vehemently contested the matter by contending that the respondent prior to retirement on 30.04.2025 was entitled not only to be considered for reinstatement in service but also regularisation in service having been engaged to work since 1992.

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7.1. He would further address this Court by stating that the appellants herein (opposite parties before the writ Court) purposefully delayed the process of disposal inasmuch as sufficient and ample opportunities were granted to them, yet they did not choose to file counter affidavit. The learned Single Judge had, in the Order dated 02.07.2024, observed that “even though notice of the writ petition has been issued since 28.06.2018, but no counter affidavit has been filed as on date”. Since the matter was old case relating to the year 2018, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter basing on the material available on record and submissions advanced by the counsels for the both sides.

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7.2. Expanding his argument, it is submitted by learned Advocate that the State does not enjoy special status in order to confer itself benefit of approaching the Court to question the veracity of the order of this Court by way of intra-Court appeal at its sweet-will. Since inordinate delay of 213 days has not been explained by the appellants sufficiently much less reasonably, the appellants are not entitled to any relief in the present proceeding.

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7.3. He further submitted that the ratio of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) , relied on by the learned Additional Government Advocate is not applicable to the fact-situation of instant case as the merits of the matter needs no consideration for the purpose of undertaking exercise of discretion to condone the delay in filing appeal. The appellants were aware of the date of age of superannuation of the respondent. Even though time to comply with the direction contained in the order passed in writ petition was extended vide Order dated 27.01.2025 passed in contempt petition, bearing CONTC No.7313 of 2024, the same was not carried out; as sequel, another CONTC No.1206 of 2025 has been filed.

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7.4. He, thence, submitted that the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) has a marked distinction on facts, which is culled out by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development

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Authority Vrs. Tejpal, (2024) 5 SCR 1211, wherein it has been made categorical that:

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“38. Similarly, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra), the marked distinction was the scope of interference by this Court while exercising judicial review of an order of condoning delay passed by a High Court. This Court distinguished between the two situations, namely:

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(i) its constraints while sitting in appeal over a discretionary order; and

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(ii) itself considering an application for condonation of delay.

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Such a distinction is discernable from the following passage in Sheo Raj Singh (supra):

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„30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question… ‟

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39. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants‟ request on the aforesaid account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic indifference,

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without requiring demonstration of bona fide or an act of mala fide on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance.”

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7.5. He would submit that this Court in many cases has not shown inclination to entertain writ appeal filed belatedly as the same suffers from delay and laches following the view expressed in the judgment/order in the case of State of Odisha Vrs. Surama Manjari Das, W.P.(C) No.15763 of 2021, dismissed on 16.07.2021 , challenge against said order got dismissed vide Order dated 05.04.2023 by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (C) Diary No.9259 of 2023 .

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8. On perusal of the record, it is the requirement of law that for consideration of petition for condonation delay the party seeking relief is required to demonstrate “sufficient cause”/“good cause”.

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9. The nomenclature of cause title of the petition for condonation of delay is styled as “An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay

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under Chapter VI, Rule 27(a) of Orissa High Court Rules, 1948”. Strictly speaking, such a petition filed under the Limitation Act, 1963, is not maintainable inasmuch as for the purpose of considering condonation of delay in filing writ appeal, special provision is available under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948.

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9.1. The writ appeal before this Court has been filed invoking provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna read with Rule 6 of Chapter-III of the Rules of the High Court Orissa, 1948, which stands thus:

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“Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court

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9. And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall have power to remove and to try and determine, as a Court of extraordinary original Jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any Court subject to its superintendence, when the said High Court may think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the reasons for so doing being recorded on the proceedings of the said High Court.

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10. And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the

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superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of Government of India Act and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made (on or after the first day of February one thousand nine hundred and twenty nine) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”

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9.2. Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 stands as follows:

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“The High Court of Orissa shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Province of Orissa, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the prescribed day is exercisable in respect of the said territories or any part thereof by the High Court in Patna.”

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9.3. Relevant provisions contained in Chapter-III and Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, are given hereunder:

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“Chapter-III

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6. Appeals to the High Court under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna from the Judgment of a Bench confirming the judgment of a lower Court under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges including both or either of the Judges of the Bench from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred and, if from the judgment of one Judge or a Bench of two Judges, it shall be heard by a Bench consisting of at least two Judges other than the Judge from whose judgment the appeal is preferred.

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Chapter-VIII

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2. (1) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 every appeal to the High Court under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional and not a jurisdiction, being

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sentence or order passed or made in the

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exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution, shall be presented to the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the judgment appealed from unless a Bench in its discretion, on good cause shown, shall grant further time . The Registrar shall endorse on the memorandum the date of presentation and after satisfying himself that the appeal is in order and is within time shall cause it to be laid before a Bench for orders at an early date. It shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment appealed from together with a neatly typed second copy thereof.

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(2) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 every application for a Certificate under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna in the case of a judgment of a Single Judge of the Court deciding a second appeal shall be made orally to the Judge in question immediately after the judgment is delivered. No subsequent application will be entertained unless upon a duly stamped special application supported by affidavit filed within thirty days and not more from the date of the judgment the Judge is satisfied that circumstances existed rendering an immediate application impossible.

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(3) If the Judge certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal a duly stamped memorandum of

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appeal may be presented to the Registrar within a period not exceeding sixty days from the date of the judgment unless the Judge in his discretion on good cause shown shall grant further time for its presentation.

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(4) The memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment of decree appealed from.”

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9.4. Above provisions would go to indicate that the writ appeal under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna is required to be presented before this Court within thirty days from the date of the Judgment appealed from as provided for in Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. In the event the appeal is not preferred within the said stipulated period, it is the Bench which is empowered to use its “discretion” to “grant further time”, subject to, of course, appreciation of “good cause”.

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9.5. Nevertheless, with the contents contained in the petition, bearing I.A. No.1276 of 2025, praying therein to condone the delay caused in filing the writ appeal, this Court now examines whether with the available material on record as provided by the State of Odisha in said petition “discretion” can be exercised to condone the delay in preferring intra-Court appeal for “good cause” shown by

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the appellants. Finding good cause shown, this Court by exercising discretion may condone the delay in filing the writ appeal by granting “further time”.

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9.6. May it is in general connotation the word “discretion” means „prudence‟, „individual choice or judgment‟, „power of free decision‟ and „freedom to act according to one‟s own judgment‟, but in legal parlance, it is confined to the exercise of freedom to act; squeezes one‟s individual choice. It prescribes direction to the authority upon whom discretion is vested to act in conformity with statutory provisions and rule of law. It follows that the judgment of the delegate of power, who is vested with discretion, is his own application of reasonable, conscience mind and thought unguided and uncontrolled by opinion/judgment of others. Discretion is the power delegated specially or implied from the wordings of the statute is oft coupled with responsibility and duty.

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9.7. Conspectus of propositions of catena of decisions rendered by different Courts indicates that “discretion” means use of private and independent thought. When anything is left to be done according to one‟s discretion the law intends it to be done with sound discretion and according to law. Discretion is discerning between right and wrong and one who has power to act at discretion is bound by rule of reason. Discretion must not be

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arbitrary. The very term itself stands unsupported by circumstances imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill as contra-distinguished from unthinking folly, heady violence or rash injustice. When applied to a Court of Justice or Tribunal or quasi judicial body, it means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. Discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute. It is the power given by a statute to make choice among competing considerations. It implies power to choose between alternative courses of action. It is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. [See, Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182; K.K. Gopalan & Co. Vrs. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), (2000) 118 STC 111 (Ker) ].

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9.8. In this regard, therefore, the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause” as found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has bearing on the question that is involved in the instant case.

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9.9. It needs to be discussed about the connotation of “good cause” vis-à-vis “sufficient cause”. In Arjun Singh Vrs. Mohindra Kumar, (1964) 5 SCR 946, these two terms have been considered as follows:

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“Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Setalvad— learned counsel for the appellant, it would be convenient to mention a point, not seriously pressed before us, but which at earlier stages was thought to have considerable significance for the decision of this question viz., the difference between the words „good cause‟ for non-appearance in Order IX, Rule 7 and „sufficient cause‟ for the same purpose in Order IX, Rule 13 as pointing to different criteria of „goodness‟ or „sufficiency‟ for succeeding in the two proceedings, and as therefore furnishing a ground for the inapplicability of the rule of res judicata. As this ground was not seriously mentioned before us, we need not examine it in any detail, but we might observe that we do not see any material difference between the facts to be established for satisfying the two tests of „good cause‟ and „sufficient cause‟. We are unable to conceive of a „good cause‟ which is not „sufficient‟ as affording an explanation for non-appearance, nor conversely of a „sufficient cause‟ which is not a good one and we would add that either of these is not different from „good and sufficient cause‟ which is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the other hand, there is any difference between the two it can only be that the requirement of a „good cause‟ is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of „sufficient cause‟ and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the decisions in the two proceedings, if the court finds

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in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not discharged, it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter in the later, where the standard of proof of that matter is, if anything, higher.”

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9.10. The meaning of „sufficient‟ is „adequate‟ or „enough‟, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word „sufficient‟ embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. „Sufficient cause‟ means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been „not acting diligently‟ or „remaining inactive‟. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or not, the Court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the Court from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. “Sufficient cause” is thus the cause

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for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the Court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application. [Ref.: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 = (1962) 2 SCR 762; Lonard Grampanchayat Vrs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia Vrs. Vijay Kumar Sood, (1992) 1 SCC 70; Orinental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vrs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459; Parimal Vrs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Sudarshan Sareen Vrs. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4412; State of Bihar Vrs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94; Madanlal Vrs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535; Davinder Pal Sehgal Vrs. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 156; Ram Nath Sao Vrs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, Kaushalya Devi Vrs. Prem Chand, (2005) 10 SCC 127, Srei International Finance Ltd. Vrs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 95; Reena Sadh Vrs. Anjana Enterprises, (2008) 12 SCC 589].

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9.11. “Sufficient cause” has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard-and-fast guidelines can be prescribed. The Courts have a wide discretion in

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deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause” for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex parte proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant approaches the Court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits. [Ref.: G.P. Srivastava Vrs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54; A. Murugesan Vrs. Jamuna Rani, (2019) 20 SCC 803]. The Court, in its discretion, has to consider the „sufficient cause‟ in the facts and circumstances of every individual case. Although in interpreting the words „sufficient cause‟, the Court has wide discretion but the same has to be exercised in the particular facts of the case. See, Hira Sweets & Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Hira Confectioners, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823.

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9.12. In Balwant Singh Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 the ingredients of “sufficient cause” for the purpose of condonation of delay has been discussed as follows:

¶148

“7. *** However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows „sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression „sufficient cause‟ commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9(2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus categorically demonstrating that they are to be decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an application has to be guided by similar precepts.

¶149

¶150

8. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 where there was delay of 565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, and the High Court had observed, „taking into consideration the averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition". While setting aside this order, this Court found that the explanation rendered for condonation of delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as under:

¶151

„3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is

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an essential prerequisite to condonation of delay.

¶155

4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.5.1995 is:

¶156

„*** at that time the Advocate General‟s office was fed up with so many arbitration matters (sic) equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 2.9.1995.‟

¶157

5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge, Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable

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or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

¶161

6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.‟

¶162

***

¶163

10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana Vrs. Koppisetti Subba Rao, AIR 2009 SC 2907 again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression „sufficient cause‟. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy

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Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321 in its para 9 held as under:

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„11. The words „sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation‟ should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.‟

¶168

***

¶169

15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321. In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under:

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„(i) The words „sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation‟ should be understood and applied in a

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reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona tides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.

¶174

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

¶175

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.

¶176

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The

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courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects.

¶180

(i)

¶181

Want of „diligence‟ or „inaction‟ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. ***

¶182

16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed

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beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi�benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.”

¶186

9.13. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 , it is observed as under:

¶187

“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in

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his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

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9.14. It is significant to notice the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Vrs. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 wherein while explaining the term “sufficient cause”, the nature of approach of the Court and the methodology in deciding the application for condonation of delay have been discussed with reference to earlier precedents. The said Court in the mentioned reported case held as follows:

¶192

“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to Courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.

¶193

31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the Courts must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and

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an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an „excuse‟. Although people tend to see „explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

¶197

32. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an „excuse‟ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher Courts for adjudication.

¶198

***

¶199

34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21^st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra), Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC

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634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 is one such decision apart from University of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above.

¶203

***

¶204

40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur Vrs. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 … where the same Bench of three Hon‟ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State‟s functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:

¶205

„7. was But while concluding as above, it necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a Government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law

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of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned.

¶209

8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the Government‟s functioning where individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.‟

¶210

41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to condone the delay on account of the first respondent‟s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.”

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9.15. It is reported in the decision of Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company Vrs. Normandin, (1917) AC 170 that:

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“*** The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th Edn., page 596 and the following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done.”

¶215

9.16. The aforesaid observation has also been followed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala Vrs. ITO, (1961) 41 ITR 12 (SC) = AIR 1961 SC 200.

¶216

9.17. In Bhavnagar University Vrs. Palitana Sugar Mill P. Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 511 it has been observed that:

¶217

“23. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort

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must be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant.”

¶221

9.18. In “Crawford on the Construction of Statutes” at page 516 , it is stated that,

¶222

“ The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other.”

¶223

9.19. The expression “satisfies the Court” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has significance. “Satisfaction” before completion of the proceedings under the Act is a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. It is the satisfaction of the Court in the course of the proceedings regarding the delay in approaching the Court with sufficient reason, which constitutes the basis and foundation of the proceedings for consideration of condonation of delay. There must be something which shows from the record itself that in the course of the proceedings the Court was satisfied that there was sufficiency of reason for not approaching the Court in stipulated period and, therefore, it is a case in which the appeal deserves to be admitted for hearing on merit. To be satisfied with a state of things means to be honestly

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satisfied in one‟s own mind. Satisfaction is essentially a condition of the mind. It means that there is a substantial ground for the conclusion on the material available the phrase „satisfied‟ means, makes up its mind; actual persuasion; a mind not troubled by doubt or a mind which has reached a clear conclusion.

¶227

9.20. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 it has been succinctly stated:

¶228

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. This section raises two questions for consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; and

¶229

the second, what is the meaning of the clause „within such period‟? ”

¶230

***

¶231

In construing Section 5·it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light, heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which

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cannot be-ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna Vrs. Chattappan, 1890 ILR 13 Mad 269:

¶235

„Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in·which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words „sufficient cause‟ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.‟

¶236

Now, what do the words „within such period‟ denote? It is possible that the expression „within such period‟ may sometimes mean during such period. But the question is: Does the context in. which the expression occurs in Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file an application to act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on any day during the said period and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when the delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it

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should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed. In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in construing the words of Section 5. The context seems to suggest that „within such period‟ means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Section 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. To hold that the expression „within such period‟ means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in the context. We would accordingly hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error taking the view that the failure of the appellant to account for its non-diligence during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal necessarily disqualified it from praying for the condonation of delay, even though the delay in question was only for one day; and that too was caused by the party‟s illness.

¶240

***

¶241

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the

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court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. ***”

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9.21. The discretionary exercise of power amounts to something that is not compulsory, but it is left to the discretion of the person or authority involved, such as a discretionary grant. It is opposite to “mandatory”. Therefore, “discretionary” is a term which involves an alternative power, i.e ., a power to do or refrain from

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doing a certain thing. In other words, it would be power of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds.

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9.22. In S.P. Road Link Vrs. State of Tripura, (2006) 144 STC 380 (Gau) reference has been made to Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182 to observe that “discretion” means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself.

¶250

9.23. The following observations made in Lanka Venkateswarlu Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCR 217 are pertinent to be referred to:

¶251

“21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by LRs Vrs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs., (2002) Suppl.5 SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272, this Court again emphasized that provisions contained in the Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard further progress of the proceedings. The provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in

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the administration of justice. It was further observed that laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing a substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. In the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vrs. Annabai Devram Kini, (2003) 10 SCC 691, this Court again reiterated that inasmuch as abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be considered liberally. It was further observed as follows:

¶255

„The Courts have to adopt a justice oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the·indulgence of the court.‟

¶256

22. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 = (2010) 8 SCC 685 as follows:

¶257

„25. We may state that even if the term „sufficient cause‟ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing

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liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of „reasonableness‟ as it is understood in its general connotation.

¶261

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.‟

¶262

***

¶263

24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay.

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25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order ·itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the Government pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that „This is a classic case, how the learned Government pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients.‟ Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the concerned Government pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at which the Government pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found the justification given by the Government pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay.

¶267

26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as „liberal approach‟, „justice oriented approach‟, „substantial justice‟ cannot be employed to

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jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst consideiing applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.”

¶271

9.24. In Pathupati Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. Vrs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024 INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier decisions, the principles for consideration of condonation of delay have been expounded in the following terms:

¶272

“6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the

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proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation.

¶276

***

¶277

9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.

¶278

***

¶279

12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word „shall‟ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the Court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the Courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives „sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the Courts are conferred with discretionary powers to

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admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.

¶283

13. It is very elementary and well understood that Courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.

¶284

¶285

17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing „sufficient cause‟ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.

¶286

¶287

26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

¶291

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

¶292

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

¶293

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

¶294

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

¶295

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

¶299

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

¶300

9.25. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following principles are culled out:

¶301

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

¶302

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- E oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

¶303

(ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

¶304

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

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(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

¶308

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

¶309

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

¶310

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

¶311

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

¶312

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

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(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

¶316

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

¶317

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

¶318

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

¶319

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

¶320

(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

¶321

(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

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(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

¶325

(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

¶326

9.26. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of “sufficient cause” qua official business has been perceived in the following manner:

¶327

“There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient cause” for explaining every day‟s delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma, (2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237 the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the

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ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.”

¶331

9.27. Having thus discussed the gamut of “sufficient cause” vis-à-vis “good cause” with reference to the parameters of consideration of germane grounds for condonation of delay in preferring appeal, this Court feels expedient to observe that in State of M.P. Vrs. Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7 SCC 372, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that if an appeal is time barred, the Court should either return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant to submit it along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or should provide a chance to file application for condonation of delay. The Court cannot, under such circumstances, dispose of the appeal on merit. In S.V. Matha Prasad Vrs. Lalchand Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722, it has been clearly held that while dealing with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court cannot dispose of an appeal on merit and such a course has been disapproved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India.

¶332

9.28. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, made it clear that,

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“5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

¶336

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

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7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.”

¶340

9.29. Taking note of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, in the cases of State of Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560; State of Gujarat Vrs. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3517; State of U.P. Vrs. Sabha Narain, (2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India Vrs. Central Tibetan Schools Admin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 119; Union of India Vrs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 263; Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs. Shamshuddin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518 identical view has been expressed by the Supreme Court of India.

¶341

10. Thus being the delineated legal perspective for consideration of petition for condonation of delay, the decisions of the Courts as referred to supra, it is to be seen whether the petition under consideration filed by the State suggests sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing writ appeal by conscientious application of discretion.

¶342

10.1. The cause shown by the appellants for the delay has been stated in the petition, I.A. No.1276 of 2025, in the following lines:

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“3. That it is humbly submitted that after receipt of the copy of the impugned order dated 02.07.2024 under Annexure-1, the file was processed for filing of writ appeal. Approval from the Administrative Department for filing of appeal was received on 12.11.2024 vide Letter No.38976.

¶346

4. That the Petitioners had to obtain opinion and approval from several quarters before filing of the present writ appeal in accordance with the Govt. of Odisha Rules of Business and due to such administrative exigencies, the present writ appeal is being filed on 01.03.2025.

¶347

5. That it is humbly submitted that the said delay is not deliberate and the same has been caused due to inter Departmental, certain official consultative and approval reference processes, which were beyond the control of the Appellants.

¶348

6. That the Petitioner/Appellant No.2 submitted all the records to the office of the Advocate General for filing of writ appeal vide Letter No.5295 dated 25.11.2024 and thereafter, the file was entrusted to the Law Officer on 20.12.2024 and the matter was briefed to him by the departmental authority in the last week. After which, the writ appeal was made ready filed today causing a delay of 213 days, which is neither intentional nor deliberate but for the bona fide reasons stated above.

¶349

7. That the Law is well settled by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through LRs. & Others Vs. Union of India & Another decided on 09.10.2023 in Civil Appeal No.5867 of 2015, wherein it was categorically stated that:

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„37. ***‟

¶353

8. That, the delay in filing the writ appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate but due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the petitioners.

¶354

9. That unless the delay caused in filing the Writ Appeal is condoned, the appellants will be highly prejudiced.”

¶355

10.2. Cursory glance at the substance and circumstances demonstrated in the petition with regard to the gap between 02.07.2024 to 12.11.2024; and no explanation with respect to administrative exigencies till 01.03.2025. No whisper is made with respect to contempt proceedings faced by the appellants before the learned Single Judge. This Court feels it expedient to take cognizance of the fact that such a vital non-disclosure would tantamount to suppression of material fact in the petition for consideration of condonation of delay.

¶356

10.3. Another pertinent fact which needs to be highlighted here with respect to fact that despite receipt of all the records to the office of the Advocate General for filing of writ appeal under Letter No.5295 dated 25.11.2024, and entrustment to the Law Officer on 20.12.2024 for taking steps, no reason is found mentioned in the interlocutory application with respect to delay caused till filing of the writ appeal before this Court on 01.03.2025.

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10.4. The position of law as discussed with regard to condonation of delay in Office of the Chief Post Master General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 1 SCR 1045 = 2012 INSC 105 may throw light on the issue at hand. In the said case the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India was considering with respect to inordinate delay of around 427 days caused by functionaries of the Government in filing SLPs and the said Hon‟ble Court held as follows:

¶360

“12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making

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several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

¶364

13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

¶365

10.5. This Court in Radharaman Store Vrs. Odisha Sales Tax Tribunal and Another, 1997 SCC OnLine Ori 98 = 85 (1998) CLT 657 = (1998) 108 STC 284 (Ori) has been pleased to make following observation for non-furnishing plausible explanation by the Government:

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“9. The question remains whether any plausible or acceptable reason was indicated by the Revenue while seeking condonation, and whether the Tribunal considered the matter in its proper perspective. The reasons indicated in the petition filed by the Revenue extracted in its entirety reads as follows:

¶369

„That the delay in filing of the appeal is nondeliberate. The delay was due to the process of decision-making in Government office.‟

¶370

The Tribunal‟s order in its entirety reads as follows:

¶371

„Heard the learned Addl. S.R. for the State and the learned advocate for the assessee. The 1st appeal orders were received in the the office of Commissioner of Sales Tax on December 14, 1993 and due date of filing of the appeals was February 12, 1994, but the appeals have been filed on April 4, 1994 causing a delay of 50 days. In the petition for condonation of delay it has been explained that the delay in filing of the appeal was due to process of decision-making for filing of the second appeals. On a perusal of the administrative file it appears that the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for his opinion on December 31, 1993 and decision was made on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second appeal. Thereafter the appeals were filed on April 4, 1994. So, the delay of 50 days in filing the second appeal in decision-making which was considered sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal in time. Hence, the petition is allowed and the delay is condoned. Register the appeals.‟

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10. The factual backdrop and few relevant facts need to be noted. It is an accepted position that the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for opinion on December 31, 1993, and he passed an order on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second appeal. No cause has been indicated as to why the Addl. S.R. took such a long time, and what transpired during that period. In fact no explanation whatsoever has been offered. Tribunal‟s reasoning is that there was delay in decision-making process and that was considered to be sufficient cause. The conclusion does not stand to reason. On the contrary, it shows non-application of mind to the germane issue. Even though a liberal approach has to be adopted, that does not mean that any plea without any plausible or acceptable basis, and not even hearing semblance of rationality has to be accepted, and delay has to be condoned. That shall be against the very spirit of law. Prescription of timelimit for filing appeals would become meaningless in such event. Merely because State is involved, that does not mean that any lethargic or supine inaction has to be condoned or ignored, and even if no reason is indicated that would be inconsequential. The subject-matter was not very complex and rather the grounds of appeal filed appear to be of very routine nature. As has been observed by this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Koraput Division v. State of Orissa [1976] 38 STC 538, delay caused by the concerned officer in giving his opinion, without any explanation whatsoever does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the aforesaid premises, the inevitable conclusion is that the Tribunal has not

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applied its judicial mind to the question whether delay was to be condoned.

¶378

Certain interesting and relevant features are noticed on perusal of the administrative file produced. Up to end of page 2, the proposed grounds of appeal have been written in hand. Interestingly from page 3, they are typed. Except that portion, next are hand written. This aspect assumes greater importance because in the margin of page 2, the following endorsement has been made on March 25, 1994 “signature is wanting”. Whose signature was wanting and who detected it on March 25, 1994 remains a mystery. If the file was with the Addl. S.R. till March 30, 1994, how another officer handled it to notice absence of signature.

¶379

That has not been explained. If records have been manipulated, it is a very serious matter and needs an enquiry by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa.”

¶380

10.6. As is apparent from the above explanation, the appellants have not given material particulars with sufficient reasons for the delay. Furthermore, there is no explanation whatsoever is placed on record to show as to why there was delay during the prescribed period of limitation in terms of the provisions for filing writ appeal under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. In this regard, State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 deserves to be noticed, wherein the following observations have been made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India:

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¶383

“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

¶384

„13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

¶385

„15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court

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¶388

could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.‟

¶389

14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant.‟

¶390

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression „sufficient cause‟ cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

¶391

5.1. In Union of India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 = 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the

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opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

¶395

„24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

¶396

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

¶397

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is

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held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

¶401

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

¶402

¶403

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was its exercising supervisory

¶404

I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

¶407

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case .

¶408

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.‟

¶409

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State . Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

¶410

6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating

¶411

I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

¶414

7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1^st day and the 90^th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and

¶415

I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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¶417

pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 = AIR 1981 SC 733).”

¶418

10.7. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vrs. Shantaram Baburao Patil, AIR 2001 SC 2582 , the Hon‟ble Court observed that,

¶419

“A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression „sufficient cause‟ the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. ”

¶420

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¶422

10.8. It needs to be emphasised age-old maxim “Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt”, meaning thereby equity avails to the vigilant, not the person who sleeps over his right. The Courts will not help the person who sleeps over their rights but help those who are aware of their rights. A person is said to be liable for laches when he comes to the Court to affirm rights after a reasonable delay in that respect.

¶423

10.9. To a query from the Court, Sri Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate could not put forth reason as to what prevented the appellants to approach this Court at right point of time and present the memorandum of appeal after disposal of contempt proceedings before this Court. In contempt proceeding being CONTC No.7313 of 2024 vide Order dated 27.01.2025 it has been stated thus:

¶424

“Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, this contempt petition is disposed of by granting one month further time to the opposite party-contemnor to comply with the order passed on 02.07.2024. However, if the order is not complied with within the extended time, it will be held as deliberate violation of this Court‟s order. ”

¶425

10.10. Even after such extension of period to comply the order of this Court in writ petition, when the appellants were well-aware that the age of superannuation would

¶426

I.A. No.1276 of 2025 in W.A. No.524 of 2025

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be 30.04.2025, the respondent was constrained to file another contempt application being CONTC No.1206 of 2025 on 10.03.2025. It seems the appellants in a spree not to comply with the direction contained in Order dated 02.07.2024 in WPC (OA) No.365 of 2018 deliberately have filed the writ appeal on 01.03.2025. The lackadaisical conduct of the appellants smacks lacking bona fides.

¶429

10.11. As it appears from the above order in contempt, in order to avoid rigours of guilty of contempt, the learned Single Judge extended the period to comply with the Order dated 02.07.2024 in writ petition. By way of filing writ appeal at a belated stage, the appellants attempted to frustrate the directions contained in the order.

¶430

10.12. This Court, therefore, comes to the irresistible conclusion that stating the dates of movement of file would not be construed as “sufficient cause”/“good cause” so as to warrant consideration of cause for the delay in filing writ appeal as genuine.

¶431

11. Under the above premises, the petition for condonation of delay does not demonstrate sufficient/good cause; as such, this Court does not deem it a fit case deserving condonation of inordinate delay in filing writ appeal.

¶432

12. In view of the above discussions on the facts and the law, the interlocutory application, being I.A. No.1276 of

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2025, is dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal bearing W.A. No.524 of 2025 stands dismissed. All other pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

¶436

(HARISH TANDON) CHIEF JUSTICE

¶437

(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE

¶438

Signature Not Verified

¶439

Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: Personal Assistant (Secretary-in-Charge) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 14-Jul-2025 18:44:15

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High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 8^th July, 2025//Aswini/MRS/Laxmikant

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Commissioner Cum Secy, Revenue and Disaster Management Deptt v. Bijaya Kumar Mohapatra

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Commissioner Cum Secy, Revenue and Disaster Management Deptt v. Bijaya Kumar Mohapatra

Case brief

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What the court decided

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