Krishna Bapi Raju G Vs Union of India

02 . 1. We are conscious of the proposition of law that the appellate Court should be slow and circumspect in interfering with the order passed on exercise of discretion vested in law, unless the Court finds that such exercise of discretion is irrational, unreasonable and beyond the settled legal parameters.

¶17

2 . The moment the discretionary orders have challenged before the appellate Court, it is imperative on the part of the Court, at the first instance, to record brief reasons with regard to passing an interim order pending final adjudication. It would assist the

¶18

Page 1 of 8

¶19

appellate Court to ascertain whether the discretion exercised by the Court warrants interference or not.

¶20

3 . The importance of providing the reasons has been time and again highlighted by the apex Court in a catena of decisions, including in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others , reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 , which is reiterated at a contemporaneous time in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das , reported in (1994) 4 SCC 225 .

¶21

3.1. “Reason”, being heartbeat of every decision making process, it has been restated in Nareshbhai Bhagubhai Vrs. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 1 as follows:

¶22

“In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vrs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 this Court held that:

¶23

“12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak Vrs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262.

¶24

***

¶25

47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

¶26

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

¶27

Page 2 of 8

¶28

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

¶29

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

¶30

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

¶31

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

¶32

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

¶33

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

¶34

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decisionmaking justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

¶35

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the Judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system.

¶36

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

¶37

Page 3 of 8

¶38

(k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

¶39

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

¶40

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the Judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. [See David Shapiro in “Defence of Judicial Candor”, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37].

¶41

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decisionmaking, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz TorijaVrs. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553, EHRR, at p. 562 para 29 and AnyaVrs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires,„adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions‟.

¶42

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.”

¶43

3.2 . Conceding the position that giving reasons facilitates the detection of errors of law by the Court, this Court in Santosh Kumar Paikray Vrs. State of Odisha, 2016 (II) OLR 1131 (Ori)

¶44

Page 4 of 8

¶45

discussed importance of assignment of reason in the following lines:

¶46

“8. The meaning of the expression „reason‟ as stated by Franz Schubert:

¶47

„reason is nothing but analysis of belief.‟

¶48

In Black‟s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, „reason‟ has been defined as:

¶49

„a faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts and from propositions.‟

¶50

In other words, reason means the faculty of rational thought rather than some abstract relationship between propositions and by this faculty, it is meant the capacity to make correct inferences from propositions, to size up facts for what they are and what they imply, and to identify the best means to some end, and, in general, to distinguish what we should believe from what we merely do believe. The importance of giving reason, it reveals a rational nexus between facts considered and conclusions reached.

¶51

9. In Union of India Vrs. Madal Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 and Uma Charan Vrs. State of MP, AIR 1981 SC 1915, the Apex Court held reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. The fair play requires recording of germane and relevant precise reasons when an order affects the right of a citizen or a person irrespective of the fact whether it is judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. The recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record

¶52

Page 5 of 8

¶53

and it is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice.”

¶54

3.3. It is authoritatively held in the above reports that it is obligatory on the part of the Court while exercising the extraordinary power of granting an injunction/restrainment/stay/interim order to record the reasons in support thereof. It becomes more onerous, in the event, an interim order is passed without serving a notice to the other side as provided under Order 39, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

¶55

3.4 . Recording of reasons is one of the fundamental facets in the adjudicatory system. Each litigant has a right to know the reasons which swayed the Court in passing an interim order and, therefore, providing the reasons at the interlocutory stage is indispensible. Any order bereft of reason cannot be regarded as a proper order in the eye of law. The reason is the heartbeat and the soul of an order without which it cannot survive. Since it is the soul of an order, it is an ardent duty of the Court to record a brief finding which invites an interim order to be passed.

¶56

4 . There is no fetter put on the Court in passing an interim order to protect the right of the parties and prevent the parties to alter the position during the pendency of the proceedings. The interim order passed by the Court is always intended to prevent the parties to do a thing forbidden in law or an act which is required to be determined after a full-fledged trial.

¶57

Page 6 of 8

¶58

4.1. In this scenario, the recording of the reasons plays an important role which, in our opinion, is a statutory responsibility cast upon the Court. We are not unmindful of the proposition that the power to grant an interim relief or to pass an interim order cannot be taken away nor be abridged as the same is ingrained and inhered into the Court, which is entrusted to adjudicate the dispute finally. Equally, it does not absolve the Court of its solemn duty in not recording the reasons while passing an interim order.

¶59

4.2. Three golden parameters, well-recognized in the legal parlance, should be manifested in the order and, in the event, the interim order is passed without affording an opportunity of hearing or calling for an affidavit, the balance of convenience and inconvenience as well as the irreparable loss and injury acts as sentinel on the qui vive in this regard and should be ensured rigorously.

¶60

5 . Since we had no occasion to go into the merit of the case and the impugned order is tested on the anvil of the requirement to provide the reasons, none of the observations shall create any impact at the time of considering the prayer for interim order.

¶61

6 . The order impugned is hereby set aside. It is open to the writ petitioner to renew the prayer for interim order without any further application to be taken out in this regard. In the event such prayer is renewed, it is open to the Court to consider the

¶62

Page 7 of 8

¶63

same on merit within the strict parameters of the requirements of law including the reasons to be provided in support thereof.

¶64

7 . The setting aside of the impugned order, which is solely based upon the test of reasons, cannot be construed as a denial for an interim order and the Court is free to decide the same independently on the basis of the merit of the case.

¶65