Allowed

Duryodhan Samal v. State of Odisha(Vig.)

Orissa HC10 Dec 2025CRLREV/280/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed the revision petition and quashed the order rejecting the petitioner's discharge application. The Court found no prima facie case as the impugned order failed to appreciate that subsequent contracts awarded to others did not establish conspiracy or substandard work by the petitioner.

What did the court decide?

Prayer for discharge allowed; impugned order dated 23.05.2025 quashed.

Duryodhan Samal Vs State of Odisha(Vig.) — Criminal Trial and Appeal | Orissa HC (2025)

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AFR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV No. 280 of 2025

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Duryodhan Samal …. Petitioner

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Mr. P.R. Chhato i , Advocate

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-versus-

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…. State of Odisha (Vig.) Opposite Party

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Mr. Sangra m Das, S.C. For Vigilance D epartment

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CORAM:

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Judgment: 10.12.2025

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Chittaranjan Dash, J.

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By mea n s of this application, the Petitio n er seeks to challenge the or d er dated 23.05.2025 passed by the le a rned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack in T.R. Case No.77 of 2009 , wherein the learned court d ecline to allow the prayer of t h e Petitioner discharging him f rom the offences alleged.

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The bac k ground facts of the case, in brief, are that on 07.12.2006, one M. Sethi, Inspector of Vigilance, C .D., Cuttack lodged a written report before the S.P., Vigilance, Cut t ack Division alleging misapp r opriation of Government funds by of f icials of Aul Block in the execution of three road works, whereupo n a vigilance enquiry was in i tiated. During enquiry, it was revealed that an estimate for im p rovement of Manapur–Nadikula vill a ge road was prepared by the Junior Engineer, Sri Pitabas Mishra o f Aul Block

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for an amount of Rs.5,00,000/-, which was technical l y sanctioned by the Assistant Engineer, Aul Block, namely Sri Sa n tosh Kumar Balabantaray on 14.09.2004 and administratively app r oved by the Collector, Kend r apara on 11.11.2004 from MPLA D funds. The work order for t h e said work was issued by the B.D.O . in favour of the present Petiti o ner on 14.11.2004, and the Petitioner executed the work between D ecember 2004 and January 2005. It is further alleged that an o ther estimate amounting to Rs.2.4 0 lakhs was prepared for the same road, though under a changed n ame, by the same Junior Eng i neer on 07.12.2005, and the work wa s executed by one Jayant Kum a r Jena. Similarly, for construction of t he C.C. road from the irrigati o n embankment to Aayatpur village, a n estimate of Rs.2 lakhs was p repared by the same Junior Engineer, a nd the work order dated 22. 0 9.2005 was issued in favour of o n e Biswanath Mallik. On the b a sis of the F.I.R., investigation was un d ertaken, and the technical wi n g of the Vigilance found that the Go v ernment had suffered a total l oss of Rs.3,56,603/- due to inflated m easurements recorded by the c oncerned Assistant Engineer and Jun i or Engineer, who had allege d ly entered into a criminal conspir a cy with the contractors and t hereby shown undue official favour. The learned trial court, upon r eceipt of the Charge-Sheet, took cog n izance of the offences and is s ued summons to the Petitioner. T h e Petitioner appeared pursua n t thereto and moved an application u nder Section 227 Cr.P.C. see k ing discharge from the offences allege d , which was rejected, hence t h is revision.

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Mr. Chh a toi, learned counsel for the Petition e r, submitted during the cour s e of hearing that the order of the l earned court declining to di s charge the Petitioner is illegal, er r oneous, and

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unsustainable in law. According to him, the learned c o urt failed to appreciate that the Petitioner had executed the w o rk between December 2004 and January 2005, and that the bill i n his favour was passed only after due check measurement. It is his submission that if, at the sa m e location, a subsequent work order w as issued in favour of anothe r contractor under a changed descript i on, the same cannot be attrib u ted to the present Petitioner, nor can any criminal liability be fast e ned on him in connection with suc h subsequent work. In the ab s ence of any clear report indicating t h at the work executed by the P etitioner was either beyond the appr o ved scope or deficient in qua l ity, no offence is made out against h im. Learned counsel further contended that the trial court failed to take into account the tech n ical inspection report dated 11.07.20 0 6 submitted by one Mr. B.P . Das, J.E., Vigilance, wherein it wa s specifically observed, with r e gard to the subsequent work (Sl. No. II), that the pre-facing estim a te had not been furnished, thereby c asting doubt on the necessity of repeated execution in the same a r ea. On these premises, it was a rgued that the Petitioner had no role w hatsoever in the work subseq u ently awarded for the selfsame locati o n to another contractor, and t hat his implication in the case is u n founded and unsupported by t h e record.

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Mr. San g ram Das, learned counsel for the Stat e (Vigilance), on the other hand, submitted that the grounds u r ged by the Petitioner are essentially matters of defence, which can appropriately be examined during the course of trial a nd not at the stage of dischar g e. He, however, fairly submitted th a t there is no report indicatin g that the work executed by the Petit i oner was of non-standard qu a lity.

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The Ho n ’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 , has held a s follows:-

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“11. The defence of the accused is not to be loo k ed into at the sta g e when the accused seeks to be dischar g ed. The expressio n “the record of the case” used in Sec t ion 227 Cr.P.C. i s to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code d oes not give any r ight to the accused to produce any doc u ment at the stage of framing of the charge. The submissi o n of the accused i s to be confined to the material produced by the investiga t ing agency.

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The p rimary consideration at the stage of fr a ming of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this st a ge, the probative value of materials o n record need not be gone into. This Court by referri n g to its earlier d e cisions in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held t h e nature of evalu a tion to be made by the court at the stage of framing o f the charge is to test the existence o f primafacie cas e . It is also held at the stage of fra m ing of charge, t h e court has to form a presumptive o p inion to the existence of factual ingredients constitu t ing the offence a lleged and it is not expected to go d e ep into probative value of the material on record and t o check whether t he material on record would certainl y lead to convictio n at the conclusion of trial.

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The p ower and jurisdiction of Higher Cou r t under Section 3 9 7 Cr.P.C. which vests the court with t h e power to call fo r and examine records of an inferior co u rt is for the purp o ses of satisfying itself as to the leg a lity and regulariti e s of any proceeding or order made i n a case. The obje c t of this provision is to set right a pate n t defect or an err o r of jurisdiction or law or the perversi t y which has crept in such proceedings. It would be ap p osite to refer to t h e judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chandra (2012) 9 SCC 460 where s cope of Section 397 has been considered and s u ccinctly explaine d as under:

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“12. S ection 397 of the Code vests the court with the powe r to call for and examine the recor d s of an inferi o r court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to th e legality and regularity of any procee d ings or order made in a case. The object of this pro v ision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jur i sdiction or la w . There has to be a well-founded err o r and it may n ot be appropriate for the court to scrut i nise the order s , which upon the face of it bears a t oken of caref u l consideration and appear to be in ac c ordance with l aw. If one looks into the various judg m ents of this C ourt, it emerges that the revisional jur i sdiction can be invoked where the decisions under c h allenge are g r ossly erroneous, there is no complia n ce with the p r ovisions of law, the finding recorded is based on n o evidence, material evidence is ig n ored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitr a rily or perve r sely. These are not exhaustive classes , but are merel y indicative. Each case would hav e to be deter m ined on its own merits.

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A n other well-accepted norm is that the r e visional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very li m ited one and c a nnot be exercised in a routine manner . One of the i n built restrictions is that it should not b e against an in t erim or interlocutory order. The Cou r t has to keep in mind that the exercise of r e visional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice e x facie. Wher e the Court is dealing with the questi o n as to whet h er the charge has been framed properl y and in accor d ance with law in a given case, it may be reluc t ant to interfere in exercise of its r e visional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the c a tegories aforestated. Even framing of c harge is a mu c h-advanced stage in the proceedings u n der the CrPC.”

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This C ourt in the aforesaid judgement has a lso laid down p r inciples to be considered for exe r cise of jurisdicti o n under Section 397 particularly in th e context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr.P. C . is sought for as under:

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“27. H aving discussed the scope of jurisdicti o n under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Sec t ion 482

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of t h e Code and the fine line of juris d ictional distin c tion, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which th e courts shoul d exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best a n d upon objec t ive analysis of various judgments of th i s Court, we a r e able to cull out some of the principles to be consi d ered for proper exercise of juri s diction, partic u larly, with regard to quashing of char g e either in e x ercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Secti o n 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

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27.1. Though there are no limits of the powe r s of the Cour t under Section 482 of the Code but the m ore the powe r , the more due care and caution i s to be exerc i sed in invoking these powers. The power of quas h ing criminal proceedings, particula r ly, the charg e framed in terms of Section 228 of t h e Code shoul d be exercised very sparingly a n d with circu m spection and that too in the rarest of rare cases .

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27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the u ncontroverted allegations as made f r om the recor d of the case and the documents s u bmitted there w ith prima facie establish the offence o r not. If the a l legations are so patently absurd and i n herently impr o bable that no prudent person can ev e r reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingre d ients of a cri m inal offence are not satisfied then t h e Court may i n terfere.

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27.3. The High Court should not unduly inte r fere. No metic u lous examination of the evidence is needed for consi d ering whether the case would end in conviction or no t at the stage of framing of charge or q uashing of ch a rge.

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27.9. Another very significant caution that t h e courts have to observe is that it cannot examine t h e facts, evide n ce and materials on record to d e termine whet h er there is sufficient material on the basis of whic h the case would end in a conviction; th e court is conc e rned primarily with the allegations ta k en as a

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whol e whether they will constitute an offenc e and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court le a ding to injust i ce.

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27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exceptio n to the rule o f continuous prosecution. Where the o f fence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should b e more inclined to permit continuation of prosecuti o n rather than i t s quashing at that initial stage. The Co u rt is not expe c ted to marshal the records with a view t o decide admi s sibility and reliability of the docu m ents or recor d s but is an opinion formed prima facie. ”

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The r evisional court cannot sit as an appell a te court and star t appreciating the evidence by fin d ing out inconsist e ncy in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally p ermissible. The High Courts ough t to be cognizan t of the fact that trial court was dealing with an applicati o n for discharge.”

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In view o f the submissions made by the respective parties, the case record, and in light of the principles enun c iated by the Hon’ble Supre m e Court in the aforesaid decision of Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (Supra), it appears that the Petitio n er was duly awarded the wo r k, executed it in accordance with t h e sanctioned estimate, and, fo l lowing check measurement, was rele a sed with the corresponding b i ll. The subsequent act of the officials in awarding another contract for the same work cannot, in the ab s ence of any material indicati n g that the Petitioner conspired with t h e subsequent contractors or of f icials, be attributed to him. There is n o material on record to sugg e st that the subsequent work was executed in collusion with t h e Petitioner or that the earlier work c a rried out by him was of su b -standard quality resulting in any loss to the Government exc h equer. Admittedly, the trial court did not consider this aspect whil e adjudicating the application under Section 227 Cr.P.C.

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Having r egard to the above and applying the test of existence of a p rima facie case, this Court finds no material on record that wou l d necessitate continuation of the tri a l against the Petitioner merel y on the ground that subsequent work w as awarded in the same lo c ation. In these circumstances, the p rayer of the Petitioner is allowed, and the impugned order dated 2 3.05.2025 is quashed.