Allowed¶69

Ullash Ch.Samantray v. State of Orissa

Orissa HC8 Dec 2025CRLMC/2361/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of criminal complaint; inherent powers/Section 482 CrPC; abuse of process of law; civil dispute given cloak of criminal offence; parentage/impersonation allegation (son of Lokanath Samantray vs Raghunath Samantray); partition suit and compromise decree; common hotchpotch; CMA under S. 151 CPC alleging fraud; proceeding under Section 144(2) Cr.P.C dropped as civil; harassment-motivated prosecution; Usha Chakraborty (2023) 15 SCC 135 relied on; Paramjeet Batra; Kapil Aggarwal; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (seven categories) appearing in quoted extract; High Court of Orissa at Cuttack; CRLMC.

What did the court decide?

The criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar stands quashed. ¶69

Ullash Ch.Samantray Vs State of Orissa — Orissa HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

The criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar stands quashed.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, initiated at the instance of Opposite Party No.2, is liable to be quashed. +1 more

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Court's answer

In view of the above and the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (in Usha Chakraborty, (2023) 15 SCC 135), this Court held that the present complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of law and accordingly quashed the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar.

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Ratio / Principle

The dispute between the parties is primarily civil in nature, relating to ownership and partition of the properties under the common hotchpotch; the allegations in the complaint arise out of the same civil dispute and there is no material on record to prima facie suggest that the Petitioner has committed any criminal offence.

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Key takeaways

Raghunath Samantray's deed of gift of 1976 describing the Petitioner as his nephew has not been disputed by Opposite Party No.2, and the acknowledgment in official records (Record-of-Rights of 1962, matriculation certificate, Aadhar Card) that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray prima facie shows no material that incriminates the Petitioner or establishes any criminal conduct on his part.ratio¶35
The initiation of the present criminal proceeding appears to be motivated solely for harassment and to create unnecessary litigation, without any genuine criminal cause of action.ratio¶65

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

CRLMC No.2361 of 2016 (High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, Chittaranjan Dash, J., judgment dated 08.12.2025): Petition to quash complaint case 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, instituted at the instance of Opposite Party No.2 (son of Pramila Paikray), alleging that the Petitioner, who claims to be the son of Lokanath Samantray, impersonated parentage and sold properties and procured a compromise decree against his mother. Background: Pramila Paikray's partition suit (Civil Suit No.825 of 2006, Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Bhubaneswar) ended in a compromise decree accepted in 2009 acknowledging the Petitioner as son of Lokanath Samantray; her share was mutated and alienated; her CMA No. 35/11 under S. 151 CPC to annul the decree for fraud was stayed by this Court in CRP No.3/12 (order dated 03.02.2012) and remains pending; her CMC No.636 of 2015 under Section 144(2) Cr.P.C was dropped on 28.07.2015 by the Addl. DCP-cum-Executive Magistrate as civil in nature. Held: the dispute is primarily civil in nature (partition/common hotchpotch and parentage); the Record-of-Rights of 1962 (Plot No. 37-E), matriculation certificate, Aadhar Card and a 1976 gift deed in which Raghunath Samantray described the Petitioner as his nephew consistently acknowledge the Petitioner's parentage; no incriminating material exists; the proceeding, initiated by the Petitioner's nephew, is motivated solely by harassment. Relying on Usha Chakraborty & anr. v. State of West Bengal & anr., (2023) 15 SCC 135, the Court held the complaint to be an abuse of the process of law and quashed the criminal proceeding.

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AFR IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

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CRLMC No. 2361 of 2016

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Ullash Ch. Samantray …. Petitioner

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Mr. N. Lenka, Advocat e , Advocate

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-versus-

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State of Odisha and another ….

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Opposite Parties

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Ms. S. Mohanty, Addl. P. P. Mr. Samir Kumar Mishra, S r . Advocate Fo r O.P. No.2

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CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

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Date of Judgment: 08.12.2025

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Chittaranjan Dash, J.

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By mea n s of this application, the Petitioner s e eks to quash the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before t he learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar i n itiated at the instance of the O pposite Party No.2.

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The bac k ground facts of the case are that the m other of the Opposite Party N o.2, namely Pramila Paikray, the sister of the present Petitioner filed a Civil Suit No.825 of 2006 i n the court of learned Civil J u dge, (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar against the Petitioner prayi n g for decree of partition of the s u it properties allotting 1/4th s h are in her favour. In the said suit, the m other of the Opposite Party N o.2 described the Petitioner as th e son of the Raghunath Sam a ntray and nor Lokanath Samntaray. Finally, the aforesaid suit w a s decreed on the basis of the compro m ise filed by

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the Parties, whe r ein it was admitted that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samnt r ay and not Raghunath Samantray. Ha v ing satisfied with the decree passed by the learned court on the basis of the compromise, the mother of the Opposite Party No.2 na m ely Pramila Paikray got the properties fell in her share mutated i n her name. Subsequently, s h e sold away the said properties in f a vour of one Gangadhar Sah o o of Baramunda, Bhubaneswar in t h e district of khurda. It is alleged by the Petitioner that while filin g the suit, the said Pramila Pai k aray intentionally described the Peti t ioner as son of Raghunath S a mantray instead of Lokanathi Sama n tray but the Petitioner consis t ently asserted him to be the son of s a id Lokanath Samantray. Afte r about 3 years of the said final de c ree, the said Pramila Paikray filed CMA No. 35/11 before the l earned Civil Court U/s 151 CPC, inter alia, praying to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that the same has been obtained by committing frau d . The petitioner contested the said p r oceeding by submitting his o b jection. Despite the objection, the l earned Trial Court accepted the case of the Petitioner for c onsideration whereupon the Petitioner preferred Criminal Revi s ion Petition before this Hon h le Court in CRP No.3/12. This Court by order dated 03.02.201 2 stayed the further proceeding in t he aforesaid CMA No. 35/2011. When the matter stood thus, in t h e year 2015, the said Pramila Paikray filed another CMC No.636 of 2015 under Section 144 (2) C r.P.C against the Petitioner and some others, inter, alia, seeking for order under the said provision of la w not to raise any constructio n over the scheduled-A land of the s aid Petition. When an interi m order was passed in the said pr o ceeding, the

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Petitioner challe n ged the aforesaid order in CRLRE V No.457 of 2015 before this Court. During pendency of the afore s aid Criminal Revision, the A d dl. DCP-cum-Executive Magistrate, B hubaneswar vide order dat e d 28.07.2015 was pleased to dr o p the said proceeding, inte r alia, mentioning therein that the dis p ute are civil in nature. It is fu r ther alleged by the Petitioner that in t h e meantime, Pramila Paikray filed so many cases before the learn e d civil court including the sai d CMA No.35 of 2011 but the CMA N o.35 of 2011 got stayed by t h is Court. In the meanwhile, on th e basis of a complaint case filed by the son of Pramila Paikr a y, inter alia allegeing that th e Petitioner is the son of Late Raghuna t h Samantray but claimed to be the adopted son of Lokanath Sama n tray and has sold certain pro p erties and further that the Petitioner managed to obtain a compr o mise decree in the civil suit agains t his mother namely Pramila P aikray. His mother Pramila Paikray, being an old lady did not kn o w the implication of putting signat u re on court paper and her si g nature in the alleged compromise de c ree and now she has been s u ffering and claiming himself to b e the son of Lokonath Samn a tray, the Petitioner sold some properties in the name of Hrusi k eh Samantray, S/o. Raghunath Sa m antray. It is further alleged t hat the Petitioner sold certain prop e rties to one Swarnalata Moh a nty as Ullash Samantray, S/o. Lokan t h Samantray and subsequentl y cancelled the same through a deed of cancellation. In the above c i rcumstances, the Petitioner has ap p roached this Court seeking to challenge the initiation of the crimin a l proceeding instituted at the b ehest of the son of Pramila Paikray a n d has prayed for quashing of t h e same.

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Mr. Len k a, learned counsel for the Petitioner, s u bmitted that the entire set of allegations in the complaint arises o u t of a longstanding propert y dispute between the parties, which i s purely civil in character, an d that the criminal court ought not to entertain matters that es s entially pertain to civil rights ove r immovable property. He co n tended that right from the institutio n of the civil suit, Opposite P a rty No.2, namely Pramila Paikray, the elder sister of the Petitioner , with the sole objective of appropriat i ng the entire properties of L okanath Samantray, deliberately d isputed the parentage of t h e Petitioner by describing him as the son of Raghunath Sa m antray. Ultimately, however, the matter was amicably settled and a compromise decree was pass e d wherein it stood acknowle d ged that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray. Onl y after alienating the properties that ha d fallen to her share pursuant t o the compromise decree, Pramila Paik r ay instituted proceedings cha l lenging the said compromise decree, despite the fact that it had already been fully acted upon. Lea r ned counsel further argued t h at the complaint case discloses no ca u se of action whatsoever and that the issues raised therein have a lready been settled between t he parties. The land in question, acco r ding to him, does not fall wit h in the common hotchpotch nor was i t the subject matter of the co m promise decree. Therefore, even ass u ming for the sake of argumen t that the Petitioner has executed certa i n documents describing hims e lf as the son of Lokanath Samantray , no criminal liability can be attached to him, as no right in the property of Opposite Party N o.2 or her son stands affected ther e by. It is his specific submis s ion of Mr. Lenka that the core o f the dispute

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revolves around whether the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray or R aghunath Samantray, which is a m a tter already settled in multip l e unimpeachable records. He drew at t ention to the Record-of-Right s of the year 1962 pertaining to Pl o t No. 37-E, wherein the Pet i tioner has been recorded as the son of Lokanath Samantray. Lik e wise, the matriculation certificate i s sued by the Board of Secon d ary Education, an unimpeachable document, also reflects the P e titioner’s parentage as the son o f Lokanath Samantray. The same description appears consist e ntly in the Aadhar Card a nd other official documents issue d thereafter. Further, in a g i ft deed executed in the year 197 6 , Raghunath Samantray hims e lf described the Petitioner, Ullash C h . Samantray, as his nephew, t hereby acknowledging that the Petiti o ner was not his son. Relying on these materials, Mr. Lenka conten d ed that there is no manner of d oubt that the Petitioner is the son of Late Lokanath Samantray. He therefore submitted that the pres e nt criminal proceeding, initi a ted at the instance of the Petitioner’s nephew, is nothing but an attempt to usurp property and to subject the Petitioner to un w arranted harassment, and is liable to b e quashed.

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Mr. Sa m ir Kumar Mishra, learned Seni o r Advocate appearing for O pposite Party No.2, vehemently contested the submissions ad v anced by Mr. Lenka, learned cou n sel for the Petitioner. He s u bmitted that the property in questio n , which has been alienated b y the Petitioner by impersonating hims e lf as the son of Lokanath Sa m antray, squarely attracts the offences a lleged in the complaint. Acco r ding to him, the averments in the co m plaint, taken at their face val u e, clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences

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alleged and ma k e out a prima facie case against the P etitioner. In such circumsta n ces, it was contended that the re q uest of the Petitioner for qu a shing the complaint is wholly unten a ble and does not merit consid e ration.

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Having h eard the learned counsel for the resp e ctive parties and upon perusa l of the documents, it is established th a t the mother of Opposite Part y No.2 had filed Civil Suit No.825 of 2 006, naming the Petitioner a s a defendant. In the said suit, the m other of the plaintiff claime d a partition of the property under t he common hotchpotch to t h e extent of one-fourth share, whi c h ultimately ended in a comp r omise, and a compromise decree was passed under the joint signat u res of all the parties in the suit, i n cluding the Petitioners Pur n a Chandra Samantray, Swarnalat a Badajena, Jharana Baliarsi n gh, Urmila Mohanty, and Pramila P aikray. The verification atta c hed to the joint petition specifies the d etails of the property involv e d in the common hotchpotch, fro m which the mother of the pl a intiff claimed her share.

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Consider i ng the submission of the learned co u nsel for the Petitioner that t h e property allegedly sold by the Pet i tioner forms part of his share i n the common hotchpotch, both parti e s were asked to submit affi d avits regarding the properties. T h e Petitioner submitted an af f idavit providing details of the prope r ties forming part of the com m on hotchpotch and covered by the compromise decree. The Op p osite Party, however, filed an affi d avit without giving specific d etails of the land in the common ho t chpotch and reiterated their e a rlier contentions.

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The join t petition, upon which the compromis e decree was based, was acce p ted by the competent court in 2009, granting the mother of Oppo s ite Party No.2 her one-fourth share in the property of the common hotchpotch. After the decree, the p roperty was mutated in her f a vor and has since been alienated by h er. It is also not disputed tha t the mother of Opposite Party No.2 filed a civil application chal l enging the compromise decree on t h e ground of fraud, which is still pending before the competen t court. The allegations in th a t civil application form the basis of t h e complaint case filed by th e nephew of the Petitioner, registered a s 1CC Case No.315 of 2016.

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The Peti t ioner’s contention that Raghunath Samantray, in his deed of gift in 1976, described the Petitioner as hi s nephew has not been disp u ted by Opposite Party No.2. F urther, the acknowledgmen t by the mother of Opposite Party N o.2 that the Petitioner is the s on of Lokanath Samantray, along wi t h documents reflecting the sa m e, prima facie shows no material that incriminates the Petitioner or e stablishes any criminal conduct on hi s part.

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In the m a tter of Usha Chakraborty & another vs. State of West Bengal and another reported in (2023) 15 S C C 135, the Hon’ble Suprem e Court held as follows:-

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“8. In P a ramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakh a nd, this Court he l d: (SCC p. 676, para 12)

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“12. W hile exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 o f the Code the High Court has to be c autious. This p o wer is to be used sparingly and onl y for the purpose of preventing abuse of the proces s of any court o r otherwise to secure ends of justice. W hether a co m plaint discloses a criminal offence or not

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depen d s upon the nature of the facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal off e nce are presen t or not has to be judged by the High C ourt. A compl a int disclosing civil transactions m a y also have a criminal texture. But the High Court m ust see wheth e r a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. I n such a situati o n, if a civil remedy is available and is , in fact, adopte d as has happened in this case, the Hi g h Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal pro c eedings to pre v ent abuse of process of the court.”

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×××

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In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, th i s Court held tha t Section 482 is designed to achi e ve the purpose o f ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitte d to generate into weapons of harassment.

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In th e decision in State of Haryana v. Bhaj a n Lal, a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the s tatutory provisio n s as also the earlier decisions and held as under: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

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“102.... (1) Where the allegations made in t he first infor m ation report or the complaint, even if t hey are taken at their face value and accepted i n their entiret y do not prima facie constitute any of f ence or make o ut a case against the accused.

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(2) W h ere the allegations in the first inf o rmation report and other materials, if any, accompan y ing the FIR d o not disclose a cognizable offence, j u stifying an in v estigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magis t rate within the purview of Section 1 5 5(2) of the Co d e.

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(3) W h ere the uncontroverted allegations m ade in the FI R or complaint and the evidence coll e cted in suppo r t of the same do not disclose the co m mission of an y offence and make out a case against the accuse d .

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(4) W here the allegations in the FIR do not constit u te a cognizable offence but constitut e only a non-c o gnizable offence, no investigation is permit t ed by a police officer without an or d er of a Magis t rate as contemplated under Section 1 5 5(2) of the Co d e.

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(5) W here the allegations made in the FIR or compl a int are so absurd and inherently im p robable on the basis of which no prudent person c an ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficien t ground for pr o ceeding against the accused.

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(6) W h ere there is an express legal bar eng r afted in any o f the provisions of the Code or t he Act concer n ed (under which a criminal proce e ding is institu t ed) to the institution and continuanc e of the procee d ings and/or where there is a specific provis i on in the Code or the concern e d Act, provid i ng efficacious redress for the grievan c e of the aggrie v ed party.

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(7) W here a criminal proceeding is m a nifestly attend e d with mala fide and/or where the pr o ceeding is mal i ciously instituted with an ulterior m o tive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and wit h a view to spit e him due to private and personal grud g e.

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×××

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As n oticed hereinbefore, the respondent alleged commiss i on of offences under Sections 323, 3 8 4, 406, 423, 46 7 , 468, 420 and 120-B IPC aga i nst the appellant s . A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredie n ts to attract them, as adverted to here i nbefore would reveal that the allegations are vague a nd they did not c a rry the essential ingredients to const i tute the alleged o ffences. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint that the appellants herein had caused hurt on the r e spondent so also, they did not revea l a case that the a ppellants had intentionally put the res p ondent in fear o f injury either to himself or another or by putting h im under such fear or injury, dis h onestly induced him to deliver any property or v aluable

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security. The same is the position with respe c t to the alleged o ffences punishable under Sections 4 0 6. 423. 467, 46 8 , 420 and 120-B IPC. The ingred i ents to attract th e alleged offence referred to hereinbe f ore and the nat u re of the allegations contained in the applicati o n filed by the respondent would und o ubtedly make it c lear that the respondent had failed t o make specific allegation against the appellants h e rein in respect o f the aforesaid offences.

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The factual position thus would reveal t hat the genesis as also the purpose of criminal procee d ings are nothing b ut the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute i nvolved is essentially of civil nat u re. The appellant s b and the respondents have given a c loak of criminal offence in the issue. In such circu m stance when th e respondent had already resorted to the available civil remedy and it is pending, goin g by the decision in Paramjeet Batra, the High Cour t would have qu a shed the criminal proceedings to pre v ent the abuse o f the process of the Court but for the conceal m ent.

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In t h e aforesaid circumstances, coupled w ith the fact that in respect of the issue involved, whi c h is of civil nat u re, the respondent had already approa c hed the jurisdicti o nal civil court by instituting a civil s u it and it is pendi n g, there can be no doubt with respe c t to the fact that t he attempt on the part of the respond e nt is to use the c r iminal proceedings as weapon of harassment against t h e appellants. The indisputable facts that the responde n t has filed the pending title suit in t he year 2015, he got no case that he obtained an interi m relief against h i s removal from the office of Secreta r y of the School M anaging Committee as also the tru s teeship, that he f iled the stated application for an o r der for investiga t ion only in April 2017 together with absence of a case that despite such removal he got a rig h t to get informed of the affairs of the school and also t h e trust, would o n ly support the said conclusion. 23. For a l l these reasons, we are of the conside r ed view that this case invites invocation of the pow e r under

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Section 4 82 CrPC to quash the FIR registered b ased on the direc t ion of the Magistrate Court in the af o restated applicati o n and all further proceeding in p u rsuance thereof. Also, we have no hesitation to h o ld that permittin g continuance of the criminal pro c eedings against t h e appellants in the aforesaid circu m stances would re s ult in abuse of the process of court a nd also in miscar r iage of justice.”

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Having c onsidered the submissions of the lea r ned counsel for the respecti v e parties and upon perusal of the r ecords, it is evident that the dispute between the parties is prim a rily civil in nature, relating t o ownership and partition of the pro p erties under the common hot c hpotch. The allegations in the compl a int arise out of the same civil dispute, and there is no material on re c ord to prima facie suggest t h at the Petitioner has committed a ny criminal offence.

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It is fu r ther clear from the documents fi l ed and the compromise dec r ee passed in Civil Suit No. 825 of 2 006 that the Petitioner’s pare n tage as the son of Lokanath Samant r ay has been consistently ack n owledged, including in official recor d s such as the Record-of-Right s , educational certificates, and othe r documents. The initiation o f the present criminal proceeding a p pears to be motivated solel y for harassment and to create unnecessary litigation, witho u t any genuine criminal cause of action.

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In view of the above, and the principle laid d own by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view th a t the present complaint consti t utes an abuse of the process of law. A ccordingly,

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the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before t h e learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar sta n ds quashed.

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(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

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Bijay

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Signature Not Verified