the other hand, Garner‟s Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge Vrs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 = (1963) 2 All ER 66 = (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL), Megarry, J. in John Vrs. Rees, (1969) 2 All ER 274 = 1970 Ch 345 = (1969) 2 WLR 1294 stating that there are always „open and shut cases‟ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the „useless formality theory‟ is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that „convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms‟. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the „useless formality theory‟ in R. Vrs. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton, 1990 IRLR 344 by giving six reasons. (See also his article „Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?‟ 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the „useless formality theory‟ has been made much earlier in „Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow‟ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch, (1971) 2 All ER 1278 = (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL) and Glynn, (1971) 2 All ER 89 = (1971) 1 WLR 487 were decided. Foulkes wrongly (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making
