State of Odisha Vs Prasanta Kumar Nayak

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ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

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W.A. No.862 of 2022

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In the matter of an Appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948

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read with

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Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna and

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Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948

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1. State of Odisha Represented through its Commissioner- cum -Secretary (now, Principal Secretary) School and Mass Education Department, Odisha Secretariat Building At/P.O.: Bhubaneswar District: Khordha.

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2. Director, Secondary Education At: Heads of Department Building P.O.: Bhubaneswar District: Khordha.

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3. District Education Officer, Jajpur …

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At/P.O./District: Jajpur.

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Appellants (Opposite party Nos.1, 2 and 4 in the Writ Petition).

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-VERSUS-

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1. Prasanta Kumar Nayak Aged about 49 years

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Son of Krupasindhu Nayak At/P.O.: Gatiroutpatana P.S.: Kandarpur District: Cuttack at present residing At: Mansinghpatna P.O.: Tulasipur, P.S.: Lalbag District: Cuttack.

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Respondent (Petitioner in the Writ Petition).

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2. State Project Director Odisha Primary Education Programme Authority (now, Odisha School Education Programme Authority) Sikhya Bhawan, Bhubaneswar District: Khordha.

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… Pro forma Respondent (Opposite party No.3 in the Writ Petition).

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Counsel appeared for the parties:

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For the Appellants : Rabi Narayan Mishra, Advocate For the Respondent No.1 : M/s. Sameer Kumar Das, Niranjan Jena and Prasanta Kumar Pattnaik Advocates

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P R E S E N T:

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HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH

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AND

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HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

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Date of Hearing : 01.03.2024 :: Date of Judgment : 20.05.2024

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JUDGMENT

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MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.—

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THE CHALLENGE MADE IN THE INTRA-COURT APPEAL:

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Beseeching intervention in the Judgment dated 17.08.2021 rendered in WPC (OAC) No.1629 of 2015, whereby and whereunder allowing writ petition invoking power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the respondent No.1 had requisite qualification of Bachelor of Education from University recognized by the National Council for Teacher Education having affiliation of the Utkal University, as such is entitled to be considered for engagement as Contract Teacher (Hindi), the appellants, functionaries of the State Government preferred the present intra-Court appeal.

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THE FACTS:

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2. As it appears from the material on record of the writ petition, submitting application in pursuance of Resolution bearing No. VIII(B)SME-(X)-32/2014— 23404/SME, dated 27.10.2014 of the Government of Odisha in School and Mass Education Department for “Recruitment Procedure of Teaching Staff in Government Secondary Schools” treating it to be advertisement, the respondent No.l-writ petitioner offered his candidature in respect of Contract Teacher (Hindi) in Government

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Secondary School, giving preference of five districts, such as, (i) Jajpur, (ii) Jagatsinghpur, (iii) Ganjam, (iv) Balasore and (v) Angul.

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2.1. By filing counter, the Director of Secondary Education asserted that an advertisement was published on 27.10.2014 inviting applications for filling up of 5634 numbers of posts of Contract Teachers in Government High Schools throughout the State of Odisha.

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2.2. In this writ appeal it has been averred by the appellants that though the last date for receiving application from the intending candidates was fixed to 20.11.2014, after submission of such application by the respondent No.l, a corrigendum was issued to the said advertisement, extending the last date for receiving the application up to 28.01.2015. Accordingly, after due verification of documents a check list was issued by the verifying authority on 16.03.2015 and thereafter, provisional tabulation sheet of candidates was published from the Office of the Director of Secondary Education, where the name of the respondent No.l did find place at Sl. No.203.

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2.3. Later on, upon verification, it is stated by the appellants that citing “not having requisite qualification”, the name of Respondent No.l was placed at Sl. No. 535, in the list of rejected candidates of Contract Teacher (Hindi) published.

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2.4. Dissatisfied thereby, the Respondent No.l had approached the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack by way of filing Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which was registered as O.A No.1629 (C) of 2015 with prayer inter alia “to declare that B.Ed. from Jammu University with Hindi as one of the subjects and mediums of examination in Hindi as the requisite qualification for Hindi Teacher as required by the State Government and the petitioner be made eligible to remain in draft select list”.

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2.5. Record of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal reveals that vide Order No.04, dated 13.05.2015, while issuing notice on admission, the following interim Order was passed:

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“***

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Issue notice on admission

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***

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So far as prayer for interim relief is concerned application of the applicant may be considered for further processing by respondent Nos.2 and 3 but his candidature shall abide by the result of the O.A.”

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2.6. As is stated in the writ appeal by the appellants, by the time such order was passed, the candidature of the respondent No.1 had already been rejected. While matter stood thus, after abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and

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Training) Notification F. No. A-11014/10/2015-AT [G.S.R.552(E).], dated 2^nd August, 2019), the said case got transferred to this Court, and O.A. No. 1629 (C) of 2015 has been registered before this Court as WPC (OAC) No.1629 of 2015.

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2.7. The matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on 12.08.2021 for hearing and upon hearing counsel for both the sides, a Judgment came to be delivered on 17.08.2021.

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JUDGMENT OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE:

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3. Following are the concluding observations and directions of the learned Single Judge in the impugned Judgment:

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“28. Since the petitioner has got the basic qualification and training qualification along with B.Ed. from Jammu University, his application should not have been rejected on the ground of want of requisite qualification. More so, the University from which the petitioner acquired the training qualification is duly recognized by NCTE and affiliated by Utkal University, as is evident from the materials available on record. Therefore, rejection of his application mentioning “not having requisite qualification” cannot sustain in the eye of law. As such, the petitioner has received information under the Right to Information Act, 2005, on 21.12.2016, from the choice list, namely, Angul District, 19.04.2018 there are 24 numbers of posts of teachers and out of which 2 belongs to SEBC category and on the basis of R.T.I. information dated 24.02.2018 so far as

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Jajpur district is concerned, total 42 numbers of posts of contract teacher Hindi are lying vacant, out of which 2 belonged to SEBC category, and on 04.06.2018, the Director of Secondary Education also provided information indicating that out of total 799 contract teachers in Hindi, 388 posts are still lying vacant. Therefore, if the petitioner’s application is considered for selection and engagement as contractual teacher in Hindi, it will not cause prejudice to anyone.

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29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the relief sought by the petitioner, so far as prayer No.(c)(i-a)¹ is concerned, the same cannot be acceded to, but, so far as relief sought in prayer No.(c)(i)² is concerned, as the vacancies are available, the petitioner’s application should be considered for engagement as contract teacher in Hindi as per his choice exercised by him, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of communication of this judgment.”

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3.1. Laying challenge against such construction with respect to requisite qualification vis-à-vis eligibility condition for recruitment of Contract Teacher (Hindi) and the direction for consideration of the application for

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1 Issue appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the condition of having B.Ed in Hindi/Parangat from 3 particular institutions i.e. under Sub-Clause (d) to Clause (2) of the Advertisement dated 27.10.2014, i.e; Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra/B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University/B.Ed. in Hindi (Course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras, an institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University under Annexure-1 (of the writ petition).

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2 Issue appropriate writ/writs, order/orders to quash the rejection of the petitioner’s candidature to the post of Contractual Hindi Teacher as per Annexure10 ( o f the writ p etition ) .

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engagement in said position, the appellants have carried the matter in this intra-Court appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948.

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HEARING OF THE WRIT APPEAL:

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4. This matter was on board on 01.03.2024 under the heading “Admission”. Counsel for both the sides conceded that this case can be disposed of at this stage, as pleadings have already been completed before the writ Court as also this Division Bench and no further material needs to be placed. As the matter of recruitment pertains to the year 2014-15 and on agreed position that many more vacant positions are still available in the post of Contract Teacher (Hindi), this Court took up the matter for final hearing and heard Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the appellants and Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate for the respondent No.1-writ petitioner.

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4.1. On conclusion of hearing, permission being sought for and granted, while written note of submission has been furnished by the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 on 04.03.2024 and the learned Additional Government Advocate on 05.03.2024.

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THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND SUBMISSIONS:

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5. Pressing the grounds of appeal, Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate while contending that it was not the domain of the writ Court to interfere with the qualification prescribed by the requisitioning authority, on misreading of the requisite qualification specified in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014 of the School and Mass Education Department for considering eligibility for the position of Contract Teacher (Hindi), the learned Single Judge came to erroneous conclusion in favour of the respondent No.1 that “B.Ed. qualification, which he obtained from the University of Jammu may be considered to be equivalent”.

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5.1. Advancing his argument further, Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that intermeddling with the decision of the appellants in rejecting the candidature of the respondent No.1 on the ground that he did not possess requisite qualification of B.Ed. in Hindi from the institutions found mentioned in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014 for being recruited as Contract Teacher (Hindi) by the learned Single Judge is not only inappropriate, but also contrary to well-settled principle that Court can discern from interference in decision making process vis-à-vis decision itself in view of Dr.

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(Major) Meeta Sahai Vrs. State of Bihar, (2019) 15 SCR 273 .

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5.2. Referring to the ratio laid down in Ankita Thakur Vrs. H.P. Staff Selection Commission, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1472, it is submitted that eligibility criteria/conditions specified in the advertisement are sacrosanct, unless provided otherwise in the extant rules or the advertisement, and the same must be fulfilled by the candidate by the last date for receipt of applications specified in the advertisement.

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6. Strongly opposing the contentions of Sri Rabi Narayana Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate, the counsel for the respondent No.1, Sri Sameer Kumar Das, urged that the suggested construction of eligibility criteria contained in the advertisement/Resolution dated 27.10.2014 deserves to be repelled for the simple reason that the respondent No.1 had the requisite qualification and the qualification of B.Ed. acquired from Jammu University, being declared equivalent by the Utkal University, cannot be treated to be disqualification for the position of Contract Teacher (Hindi).

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6.1. Relying on sub-clause (c) and sub-clause (d) of Clause 1 of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, it is vehemently argued by the counsel for the respondent No.1 that in case a candidate having acquired qualification from outside this State, at the time of verification he could

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produce authenticated proof of equivalency and recognition of National Council for Technical Education in support of the qualification. The respondent No.1 having possessed such qualification supported by the necessary proof thereof, the learned Single Judge having analysed these aspects correctly adjudicated the issue, which does not warrant interference.

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6.2. Drawing parity of treatment with identically circumstanced persons, Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate in furtherance to his submission amplified his argument by making statement that the appellants, having given engagement to such persons to work as Contractual Teacher (Hindi), cannot deny the instant respondent No.1 the position prayed for.

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CONSIDERATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND REASONS FOR THE DECISION:

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7. The learned Single Judge in the Judgment dated 17.08.2021 observed that though the respondent No.1 as required under the advertisement/Resolution has the basic qualification, i.e., Bachelor’s Degree in Arts from recognized University with Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha, he did not have training qualification. Nevertheless, this could not alone be disqualification for engagement as Contract Teacher (Hindi). It is observed that “one may have got initial qualification, but he is

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bound to acquire the training qualification from the two institutions as prescribed in the advertisement itself”.

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7.1. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to decide the matter on the basis that the rejection of candidature of the respondent No.1 by merely ascribing reason “not having requisite qualification” would not sanctify the action of the authority concerned.

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7.2. This apart, it has been observed that notwithstanding the fact that the respondent No.1 had the qualification of B.Ed. (Hindi) from Jammu University, which is not specified in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution, dated 27.10.2014, in view of the stipulation appended thereto to the effect that “the untrained candidates shall have to undergo required training within the timeline as prescribed by Government”, he could be considered for engagement to work as Contract Teacher (Hindi). Hence, the learned Single Judge bearing in mind the information provided to the respondent No.1 on 24.02.2018 under the Right to Information Act, 2005, that total forty-two numbers of posts of Contract Teacher (Hindi) are lying vacant and further information provided by the Director of Secondary Education on 04.06.2018 revealed that out of 799 Contract Teacher (Hindi), 388 posts are still lying vacant. It is, thus, held that no prejudice would be caused to any other person,

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if the application of the respondent No.1 is given due consideration.

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ANALYSIS OF THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED TO QUALIFY TO BECOME CONTRACT TEACHER (HINDI):

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8. It may be apt to have the following conceptual understanding of prescribing requisite qualification by the employer-appointing authority for a particular post vide Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank Vrs. Anit Kumar Das, (2020) 9 SCR 925 :

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“7. In the case of Yogesh Kumar Vrs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 3 SCC 548 = (2003) 2 SCR 662, it is observed and held by this Court that recruitment to public service should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post.

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***

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7.3 Thus, as held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of the qualifications for any post and it is not for the Courts to consider and assess. A greater latitude is permitted by the Courts for the employer to prescribe qualifications for any post. There is a rationale behind it. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need and interest of an Institution or an Industry or an establishment as the case may be. The Courts

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are not fit instruments to assess expediency or advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing qualifications for posts.”

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9. With the aforesaid background of prescribing educational qualification for a post being domain of the employer/recruiting authority, relevant portion of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, inter alia prescribing for the post of Hindi Teacher vis-à-vis other faculties is extracted hereunder for ready reference:

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“Government of Orissa School and Mass Education Department

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No. VIII(B)SME-(X)-32/2014— 23404/SME, dated 27.10.2014

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RESOLUTION

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Sub.: Recruitment procedure of teaching staff in Government Secondary Schools .

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The procedure for engagement of teachers in Government Secondary Schools on contract basis has been outlined in S&ME Department Resolution No. 10562/SME Dated 21.05.2005. In the meantime, General Administration Department Notification No. 32010/Gen. Dated 12.11.2013 and No.1147/Gen., dated 17.01.2014 read with Notification No.4587/Gen., dated 15.02.2014 has prescribed the rules for recruitment to the Group-C, D and B posts respectively. The Finance Department while concurring the proposal for filling up of the vacant teaching posts in Government Secondary Schools, have advised to follow the stipulations contained in the above

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Notifications. Accordingly, Government in School & Mass Education Department have decided to fill up of the vacant teaching posts in Government Secondary Schools in supersession of Resolution No. 10562/SME, Dated 21.05.2005 in the following manner:

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1. Eligibility:

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In order to be eligible for engagement, a candidate must satisfy the following conditions.

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(a) He/She must be a citizen of India.

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(b) (i) He/She must have passed the High School Certificate of any equivalent or any higher examination with Odia as a language subject, or

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(ii) He/She must have Odia as a medium of examination in non-language subject at the High School Certificate or equivalent examination, which He/She have passed.

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(iii) Candidates having Bachelor degree in Arts/Commerce/Science with Bachelor degree in Education from any universities of the State or its equivalency are eligible.

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Regarding Universities/Institutions of outside State, the candidates shall only be eligible for engagement after verification of genuineness of their educational/training qualification from concerned university/institutions from which they have obtained the degree by the concerned DEO.

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(d) Such outside university/Institution candidates shall have to produce the authenticated proof of equivalency and NCTE recognition in support of their qualification at the time of verification failing which they will not be eligible in the selection process.

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(e) The case of PH candidates shall be referred to Appellate Medical Board constituted by the W&CD Department vide Notification No.16430/WCD Date 06.09.2011 for re-examination. Engagement order shall be issued if such candidates are found genuine by the Board.

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2. Age: ***

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3. Educational Qualification:

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(a) Arts Teacher.— ***

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(b) Science Teacher.— ***

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(c) Classical Teacher.— ***

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(d) Classical (Urdu).— ***

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(e) Classical (Telugu).— ***

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(f) Hindi Teacher.—

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Bachelor’s degree from a recognized University with Hindi as one of the elective subject with minimum 50% marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates) or with Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha or with Sastri from Orissa

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Rastrabhasa Parisada, Puri or with Snataka (Acquired by June, 2005, the date up to which the temporary recognition has been granted) from Hindi Sikshaya Samiti, Orissa, Cuttack or an equivalent degree from a recognized Institution with at least 50% marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates) and Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra/B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from a Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized university/B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha Madras, a Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized university.

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OR

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Bachelor’s degree with Hindi as one of the optional/Hons. subject with minimum 50% of marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/ SEBC candidates) and M.A. In Hindi with minimum 50% marks In aggregate from a recognized University.

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(The untrained candidates shall have to undergo required training within the timeline as prescribed by Govt.)

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(g) PET.— ***”

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9.1. Careful reading of aforesaid Resolution would clarify that in Clause 1 of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, unless a candidate fulfils the eligibility criteria enumerated thereunder, he would not be entitled to apply for

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different positions as contained in Clause 3, under which different types of educational qualifications were sought to be secured by candidates for different nature of posts.

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9.2. Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate with reference to sub-clause (c) and sub-clause (d) of said Clause 1, sought to advance argument ( vide page 5 of his written note) that “if a candidate has secured qualification/certificate from outside the State, he has to produce the equivalency certificate and NCTE recognition order. In fact the relevant documents are available on record”.

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9.3. Therefore, this Court now proceeds to examine each document qua qualification claimed to have been acquired by the respondent No.1 as enclosed to the Original Application being O.A. No.1629(C) of 2015.

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9.4. Annexure-2 is the copy of Certificate issued by the Revenue Officer on 04.02.2015 showing the respondent No.1 as “SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY BACKWARD CLASS” under the Government of Odisha, Department of Tribal Welfare Resolution No.25455 Emp. (VII)-M-23/93/(TW), dated 10.09.1993 with certification that “he does not belong to the persons/sections (Creamy layer) mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule appended to the Office Memorandum No.4030 dated 29.01.1992, EMP (VII) 9293”.

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9.5. Annexure-3 is a copy of Mark-Sheet issued by the Utkal University reflecting the respondent No.1 as having secured “second class” in the “THREE YEAR DEGREE COURSE EXAMINATION, 2002”.

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9.6. Annexures-4 and 5 are copies of Certificate dated 25.12.2012 issued by Rastrabhasa Prasar Samiti, Wardha indicating that the respondent No.1 has qualified “Rastrabhasa—Ratna” with marks awarded.

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9.7. Annexure-6 is the copy of Certificate issued on 15.03.2014 by the University of Jammu showing marks awarded in the Annual-2013 of B.Ed. Examination and Annexure-7 is the copy of the Admit Card issued in respect of “B.Ed. Examination Annual 2011-12” with one of the subject as “Teaching in Hindi”.

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9.8. Annexure-8 shows the Check List of Documents to be verified (of applicants for post of Contract Teachers in Government High Schools during as per advertisement published in November-December 2014), wherein the candidate— Prasanta Kumar Nayak, has disclosed the following particulars so far as educational qualifications are concerned disclosing “the post applied for Hindi”:

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Documents relatingto Educationa	l & Professional Qualific	ation
Examination / qualification	Pass Certificate	Mark sheet
	(Indicate	(Indicate
	Y/N/NA)	Y/N/NA)
_1. _HSC Exam/10^th	Y	Y

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+2/12 th Y Y
3. +3/B.A./B.Sc./B.Com. Y Y
4. B.Ed. Y Y
5. M.A.
6. Acharyra
7. Snatak
8. Rastrabhasha Ratna Y Y
9. Sastry
10. Sikhyan Pravin
11. Sikhya Shastri
12. BHEd
13. CPEd
14. BPEd
15. BEd (Telugu)
16. Fazil
17.
18.
Other Documents in case of candidates having qualification from other States
A) In case of candidates having
qualifications from other States
i. Current NCTE Recognition Certificate N
ii. Current Equivalence Certificate Y
issued by any University of Odisha
iii. Current Affiliation Certificate from a N
recognised University
B) In case of candidates passing HSC
Examination in medium other than Odia

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i. Odia Language Pass Certificate issued by BSE, Odisha

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Prasanta Kumar Nayak Sd/Signature of Candidate Signature of Verifying Officer”

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9.9. It is quite clear from bare reading of sub-clause (c) and sub-clause (d) of Clause 1 of the Resolution that provisions have been made so as to enable the candidate to adduce evidence as to acquisition of qualification in Bachelor Degree Education from “any university of the State or its equivalency” and it also provides for production of evidence with respect to such certificate from University/Institutions of “outside State”. In the instant case, the respondent No.1-writ petitioner has the qualification of Bachelor Degree Education, i.e., “Three Year Degree” from Utkal University. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 based on these clauses to the effect that “it is incorrect on the part of the appellants to state that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification” is fallacious inasmuch as the objection has been raised by the appellants with regard to lack of “requisite qualification” is with respect to “Educational Qualification” as required under Clause 3(f) of the Resolution for the post of Contract Teacher (Hindi).

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10. To have better conception of the requirements enlisted under Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014 as extracted herein above, it is prudent to divide the

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“educational qualification” required for Contract Teacher (Hindi) into two categories. The following are the essential qualifications that emerge on dissection of said clause dealing with “Educational Qualification” for the purpose of “Hindi Teacher”:

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Category-I

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i. Bachelor’s degree from a recognized University

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(a) WITH Hindi as one of the elective subject with minimum 50% marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates)

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OR

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WITH Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha

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OR

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WITH Sastri from Orissa Rastrabhasa Parisada, Puri

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OR

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WITH Snataka (Acquired by June, 2005, the date up to which the temporary recognition has been granted) from Hindi Sikshaya Samiti, Orissa, Cuttack

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OR an equivalent degree from a recognized Institution

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WITH at least 50% marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates)

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AND

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(b) Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra

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/

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B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University

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/

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B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha Madras, an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University.

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OR

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Category-II

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ii. Bachelor’s degree

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WITH

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Hindi as one of the optional/Hons. subject with minimum 50% of marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates)

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AND

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M.A. in Hindi with minimum 50% marks in aggregate from a recognized University.

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(The untrained candidates shall have to undergo required training within the timeline as prescribed by Government).

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INTERPRETATION OF THE KEY WORDS “OR”, “AND”, “WITH” AND SYMBOL “/” EMPLOYED IN THE ENUMERATION OF REQUISITE QUALIFICATION IN CLAUSE 3(f) OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 27.10.2014:

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11. As a prelude, this Court bears in mind the following dicta as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Competition Commission of India Vrs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 11 SCR 112 :

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“42. Expressum facit cessare tacitum.— Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other. (Expression precludes implication). This doctrine has been applied by this Court in various cases to enunciate the principle that expression precludes implication. [Union of India Vrs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416]. It is always safer to apply plain and primary rule of construction. The first and primary rule of construction is that intention of the legislature is to be found in the words used by the

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legislature itself. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by construing the meaning of the word in the light of the discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which an enactment is directed. [State of Himachal Pradesh Vrs. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277 and Padma Sundara Rao Vrs. State of T.N., AIR 2002 SC 1334].”

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11.1. In Radha Sunder Dutta Vrs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24 it has been laid down that,

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“Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if there be admissible two constructions of a document, one of which will give effect to all the clauses therein while the other will render one or more of them nugatory, it is the former that should be adopted on the principle expressed in the maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’.”

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12. Similar principles govern use of the words “and” and “or”. Ordinarily, as in everyday English, use of conjunctive “and” in a list means that all of the enlisted essentials must be satisfied. The use of the disjunctive word “or” gives the meaning that only one of the enlisted requirements need be satisfied. However, if a strict grammatical construction frustrates evident legislative intent, the word “and” may be read as “or”, or “or” as “and”. It can be noticed from R.S. Nayak Vrs. A.R. Antuley, (1984) 2 SCC 183 that depending upon the context, ‘or’ may be read as ‘and’ but the Court would not do it unless it is so obliged because ‘or’ does not

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generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’.

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12.1. In Spentex Industries Ltd. Vrs. CCE, (2015) 11 SCR 487 it has been succinctly put as follows:

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“23. We are conscious of the principle that the word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive (See Union of India Vrs. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh, (1968) 1 SCR 463). However, there may be circumstances where these words are to be read as vice-versa to give effect to manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context.

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24. Of course, these two words normally ‘or’ and ‘and’ are to be given their literal meaning in unless some other part of same Statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done. However, wherever use of such a word, viz., ‘and’/‘or’ produces unintelligible or absurd results, the Court has power to read the word ‘or’ as ‘and’ and vice-versa to give effect to the intention of the Legislature which is otherwise quite clear.”

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13. The use of the word “or” gives scope to understand that it is in the alternative. It has been the observation in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. Vr. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 2 SCR 321 that,

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“50. We find that the High Court has totally erred in taking into consideration only clause (c) of subsection (4) of Section 29 of the said Act. It is to be noted that, whereas, the legislature has used the word ‘or’ after clauses (a) and (b) in sub-section (2)

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of Section 29 of the said Act, it has used the word ‘and’ after clauses (a) and (b) in sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the said Act. It could thus be seen that the legislative intent is very clear. Insofar as subsection (2) of Section 29 of the said Act is concerned, it is sufficient that any of the conditions as provided in clauses (a), (b) or (c) is satisfied.”

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13.1. It may be relevant to have reference to the following proposition contained in Competition Commission of India Vrs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 11 SCR 112:

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“28. It is a settled principle of law that the words ‘or’ and ‘and’ may be read as vice versa but not normally. ‘You do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’ ***’ [Green Vrs. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co. (1928) 1 KB 561 p. 568)]. As pointed out by Lord Halsbury, the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be resorted to, ‘unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention: of it requires that to be done.’ [Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Vrs. Henderson Bros. (1888) 13 AC 595 at 603)]. The Court adopted with approval Lord Halsbury’s principle and in fact went further by cautioning against substitution of conjunctions in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vrs. Tek Chand Bhatia [(1980) 1 SCC 158], where the Court held as under:

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‘11. *** As Lord Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey Docks & Harbouk Board Vrs. Henderson [LR (1888) 13 AC 603], the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’

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is not to be resorted to ‘unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done’. The substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes made without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted whether some of the cases of turning ‘or’ into ‘and’ and vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation.’ ***”

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14. It is trite to say that the word ‘and’ should normally be given its ordinary meaning and should be understood in a conjunctive sense. In Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences Vrs. Bikartan Das, (2023) 11 SCR 731 = 2023 INSC 733, the interpretation of “and” has been given as under:

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“32. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and the word ‘and’ is normally conjunctive. Both of them can be read as vice-versa, but that interpretation is adopted only where the intention of the legislature is manifest.

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33. Justice G.P. Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Thirteenth Edition 2012) page 485 has stated as follows:

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‘The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive but at time they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As stated by SCRUTTON, L.J.:

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‘You do sometimes read ‘or’ as ‘and’ and in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and

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‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not to be resorted to, ‘unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done’. Where provision is clear and unambiguous the word ‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’ by applying the principle of reading down. But if the literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd, result ‘and’ may be read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of ‘and’ and ‘or’ produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the portion following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in place of ‘and’. The alternatives joined by ‘or’ need not always be mutually exclusive.’ ***”

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15. The meaning of the word ‘with’ is generally gathered from the context and has to be considered in conjunction with words which precede and those which follow it. [Refer, Delhi Development Authority Vrs. Durga Chand Kaushish, AIR 1973 SC 2609 = (1974) 1 SCR 535 ]. Further reference to U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vrs. Ram Krishna , (2002) 3 SCC 11 makes it clear that the meaning of the word “with” is — “at the same time”; “in the company of”.

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15.1. Meaning of the word “with” and its application to the eligibility has been discussed in A.K. Raghumani Singh Vrs. Gopal Chandra Nath, (2000) 4 SCC 30 as follows:

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“6. There is no dispute that as on 1991 Respondent 1/ writ petitioner had put in more than 6 years’ regular service in the grade. Of that period only a little over 2 years was after he was granted the AMIE Diploma. The controversy hinges on the interpretation of the word “with” used in the eligibility criteria.

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7. The word “with” has been defined in the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1993), diversely the meaning depending on the context in which it is used. But when it is used to connect two nouns it means:

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‘Accompanied by; having as an addition or accompaniment. Frequently used to connect two nouns, in the sense ‘and’ — ‘as well’.’

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8. Applying the definition to the eligibility criteria it is clear that it requires the prescribed educational qualification and 6 years’ experience as well. Given the plain meaning of the phrase, the Court would not be justified in reading a qualification into the conjunctive word and imply the word “subsequent” after the word “with”.”

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16. The “/” [slash (/) is also known as: forward slash, stroke, oblique] is often used to indicate “or”.

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APPLYING THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATIONS ENUMERATED IN CATEGORY-I:

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17. Plain reading of Clause 1 and Clause 3 of the aforesaid Resolution of the School and Mass Education, unequivocally would suggest that they set forth different qualification(s) for different positions in school. While

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Clause 1— “Eligibility” specifies general requirement of a candidate for making application for “teaching posts in Government Secondary Schools”, Clause 3— “Educational Qualification” prescribes special/specific qualifications for different categories of faculties of teacher, viz. , Arts Teacher, Science Teacher, Classical Teacher, Classical (Urdu), Classical (Telugu), Hindi Teacher and PET. Each Teacher in different subjects was required to have special/specific qualification so as to make himself available for undertaking particular nature of subject assigned. Therefore, rationality is attached, while promulgating Resolution dated 27.10.2014, thereby requiring special nature of educational qualification for specific faculty of teacher.

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18. The interpretation of the words “or”, “and” and “with” does not admit of any doubt in mind in the present context that literal meaning is to be ascribed while reading the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, as each clause enumerated therein with respect to essential requirement of specific educational qualification is separately couched. Each clause is conjoined with conjunction— “and”, “or”, “with” and “/”.

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19. The word “and” appearing in the Category-I makes it abundantly manifest that in addition to “Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized University” “with Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha”, the

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candidate seeking position of Contract Teacher (Hindi) had to have “Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra or B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University” or “B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras, an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University.”

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19.1. The learned Single Judge at paragraph 11 of his Judgment, therefore, has observed that “a candidate may have different initial qualifications, but he has to possess training qualification acquired from the place mentioned in the advertisement” and “the word ‘and’ used in the advertisement cannot be considered to be ‘or’, thereby no liberal construction can be given to such meaning rather the meaning is very clear in its grammatical form which is to be given effect to instead of read into same.”

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19.2. Given the meaning of the words— “with” and “and”, the principle involved and the weight of precedents, in the view of this Court it must be held that the qualifications enumerated after the alternative clauses beginning with the word “with”, the clauses following the word “and” are to be construed as ‘and’ — ‘as well’, ‘at the same time’, ‘in the company of’ and in conjunction with words which precede and those which follow it. Hence, it can safely be

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concluded that the evidence of qualification acquired by the respondent No.1 does not fall within the ambit of Category-I.

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19.3. If the educational qualification of the respondent No.1 is considered under Category-I so as to ascertain eligibility for Contract Teacher (Hindi), then his qualification would stand as “Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized University”, i.e., “three year degree course from Utkal University” “with Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha”, but he does not have either “Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra / B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University ” or “B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha Madras, an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized university”.

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19.4. It is given to understand by Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate that while the admit card at Annexure7 to the original application/writ petition shows that the medium of B.Ed. Examination for Annual 2011-12 was “Hindi”, and one of the papers for examination in the Marks Sheet vide Annexure-6 thereof clearly shows as “Teaching of Hindi”. It is submitted that such fact is relevant to construe that the respondent No.1 has

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requisite qualification as it can be considered as B.H.Ed. qualification as reflected at Category-I. In other words, in addition to Bachelor’s Degree from the Utkal University, the respondent No.1 has qualification of “Rastrabhasa Ratna from Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti, Wardha” and “B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognised University”. Therefore, he submitted that since the respondent No.1 is qualified under Category-I, there was no requirement to undertake examination into educational qualification contained in Category-II.

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19.5. Annexure-C enclosed to Additional Affidavit dated 28.01.2021 sworn to by the writ petitioner-Prasanta Kumar Nayak filed during the pendency of the writ petition, as available on the record, is reproduced hereunder for better appreciation:

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“1409844

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Roll No. 1994534 Registration No.BWD11029145N

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S. No. 718707 emblem

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This is to certify that Prasanta Kumar Nayak parentage Krupasindhu Nayak has passed Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) Examination of this University held in the year 2013 in 2^nd Division in Theory and 1^st Division in Practice of Teaching.

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Dated 02.02.2014 Sd/Controller of Examinations”

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19.6. Said document appears to have been issued in the year 2014, but from the records it is ascertained that said document did not form part of the original application. Annexure-6 is Mark Sheet of B.Ed. issued by the University of Jammu and Annexure-7 is the Admit Card of B.Ed. Examination. So, it is manifest that before the authority along with application in response to advertisement/Resolution, the respondent No.1 has not furnished such document for verification.

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19.7. Be that be, aforesaid Provisional Certificate merely depicts that the respondent No.1 has qualified “B.Ed.”. Nevertheless, said document is not testimony to the fact of acquisition of “B.H.Ed.”— which is one of the required qualifications which is mentioned in Category-I.

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19.8. Perusal of document, i.e., Letter No.AC/RTI-765/ 59122/2011, dated 15.12.2011 issued by the Deputy Registrar (Special Cell) of Utkal University, showing approved list of Universities whose B.Ed./B.Ed. Special Education/M.Ed. Regular and Correspondence Courses have been made equivalent with the corresponding B.Ed./B.Ed. Special Education/M.Ed. Regular and Correspondence Courses of the Utkal University, as enclosed to “Compilation of documents filed in the writ petition” furnished by the respondent No.1 indicates that

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“B.Ed. (Regular)” course of the Jammu University (University of Jammu) is declared equivalent to B.Ed. course imparted by the Utkal University. Even then, for the purpose of engagement as “Hindi Teacher” as per the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, certain categories of educational qualifications have been prescribed. Neither the admit card nor has the mark-sheet enclosed to the original application filed before the Odisha Administrative Tribunal makes it clear whether the respondent No.1 was “B.Ed. (Regular)” or otherwise. On assumed notion it cannot be acceded to the contention of the counsel for the respondent No.1 that the qualification acquired by him falls within the meaning of equivalence as per Letter dated 15.12.2011.

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APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED TO THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATIONS ENUMERATED IN CATEGORY-II:

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20. It transpires on a cursory glance at the aforesaid two categories that first category of educational qualification suggesting apart from Bachelors degree from a recognised University, a candidate for Contract Teacher (Hindi) is required to have qualified one of the alternative qualifications enumerated under item (a), which are conjoined with the word “or” and also one of the alternatives given at item (b). The Category-I specifies requisite qualification so far as already trained graduates are concerned.

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20.1. Nonetheless, it seems the qualifications specified in the above stated second category are relevant in respect of untrained graduates, who can be engaged to perform as Contract Teacher (Hindi), but they are required to undergo training within the timeline as prescribed by the Government. In other words, it can be stated that being not trained graduate, taking aid of qualifications envisaged in Category-II of the Resolution, such candidate has a scope to be appointed to work as Contract Teacher (Hindi) subject to condition that “the untrained candidates shall have to undergo required training within the timeline as prescribed by Government”.

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20.2. On the next argument advanced by Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate, that as the respondent No.1 has obtained the B.Ed. qualification in Hindi Medium, which has been recognised by the National Council for Technical Education, and declared equivalent by the Utkal University, the stand of Sri Rabi Narayan Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate is unacceptable, this Court takes up examination whether the qualification as mentioned in the application form filled in by the respondent No.1 would answer requisite educational qualification contain in Category-II.

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20.3. As per Category-II, the candidate is required to have Bachelor’s degree with Hindi as one of the

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optional/Honours subjects with minimum 50% of marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates). Besides this qualification, he should also have secured M.A. in Hindi with minimum 50% marks in aggregate from a recognized University.

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20.4. There is nothing on record to suggest that the respondent No.1 has the requisite qualification as recited in Category-II above.

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20.5. In order to claim to have required educational qualification under Category-II, it needs to be demonstrated that the candidate not only has Bachelor Degree with Hindi as one of the optional/Honours subjects with minimum 50% of marks in aggregate (45% for SC/ST/PH/OBC/SEBC candidates), but also M.A. in Hindi with minimum 50% marks in aggregate from a recognised University. No evidence is brought on record that the respondent No.1 has the additional essential qualification, i.e., M.A. in Hindi with minimum 50% marks in aggregate from a recognised University.

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20.6. It is, thus, unequivocal that the respondent No.1 does not have requisite qualification as stipulated under the heading “educational qualifications” detailed in Category-II. It has rightly been argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate that since the B.Ed. Certificate from University of Jammu is not provided in the advertisement/Resolution itself, there was

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justification in rejecting the candidature of the writ petitioner.

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PRESCRIBING EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION IS POLICY DECISION:

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21. Minute examination of application of the respondent No.1, as extracted herein above, would show that against serial No.4— B.Ed., it is stated “Y”, but against serial No.12— B.H.Ed., nothing is stated, i.e., that column is left blank. This clearly indicates that the respondent No.1, though had Bachelor of Education qualification, he did not have Bachelor of Education in Hindi qualification. It is interesting to notice that realising that the respondent No.1 has no requisite qualification in terms of educational qualification prescribed under Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, an amendment to the writ petition was sought for. The amendment prayed to be incorporated stood as follows:

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“(i-a) Issue appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the condition of having B.Ed. in Hindi/Parangat from three particular institutions, i.e., under sub-clause (d) to Clause (2) of the Advertisement dated 27.10.2014, i.e.; Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra/B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University/B.Ed in Hindi (Course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras, an institution recognized by

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NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University under Annexure-1.”

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21.1. It is, in this context, deserves to be taken note of that in Banarsi Das Vrs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 520 = 1956 SCR 357, it has been stated that “the Government are within their rights to lay down certain qualifications for the new recruits.” Conspectus of Commissioner, Corporation of Madras Vrs. Madras Corporation Teachers’ Mandram, (1997) 1 SCC 253 and Basic Education Board, U.P. Vrs. Upendra Rai, (2008) 2 SCR 707 giving rise to question whether direction to prescribe the minimum qualification for a post be given has been answered to the effect that “it is the legal or executive policy of the Government to create a post or to prescribe the qualifications for the post. The Court or Tribunal is devoid of power to give such direction”; and “the Court cannot interfere with policy decisions of the Government unless it is in violation of some statutory or constitutional provision”.

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21.2. In Puneet Sharma Vrs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., (2021) 4 SCR 351 , the prescription as to qualification has been analysed in the following manner:

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“26. In Zahoor Ahmad Rather Vrs. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019) 2 SCC 404 = (2018) 14 SCR 1082 the post in question was “Technician-III” in the Power Development Department in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The relevant stipulation with respect to qualification was “Matric with ITI in the relevant

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trade.” The appellants held diploma in Electrical Engineering and were included in the list of disqualified candidates. This resulted in litigation which ultimately culminated in the judgment of this court. This Court held in its judgment (2019) 2 SCC 404 = (2018) 14 SCR 1082:

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‘Under the above provisions as well as in the advertisement which was issued by the Board, every candidate must possess the prescribed academic/professional/technical qualification and must fulfil all other eligibility conditions. The prescribed qualifications for the post of Technician III in the Power Development Department is a Matric with ITI in the relevant trade. The Board at its 116^th meeting took notice of the fact that in some districts, the interviews had been conducted for candidates with a Diploma in Electrical Engineering while in other districts candidates with a diploma had not been considered to be eligible for the post of Technician III. Moreover, candidates with an ITI in diverse trades had also been interviewed for the post. The Board resolved at its meeting that only an ITI in the relevant trade, namely, the Electrical trade is the prescribed qualification specified in the advertisement.’

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27. Thereafter, the Court discussed the previous rulings in P.M. Latha Vrs. State of Kerala, (2003) 3 SCC 541 = (2003) 2 SCR 653, Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 and State of Punjab Vrs. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 = (2014) 14 SCR 819, then concluded that the candidature of the diploma holders was correctly rejected and held as follows:

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‘26. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretation which has been placed on the judgment in Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 in the subsequent decision in State of Punjab Vrs. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170. The decision in Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 turned on the provisions of Rule 10(a)(ii). Absent such a rule, it would not be permissible to draw an inference that a higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition of another, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 turned on a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower qualification. The absence of such a rule in the present case makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench [Imtiyaz Ahmad Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12.10.2017 (J&K)] of the High Court was

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justified in reversing the judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Rather Vrs. State of J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936] of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion that the appellants did not meet the prescribed qualifications. We find no error in the decision [Imtiyaz Ahmad Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12.10.2017 (J&K)] of the Division Bench.

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27. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies of administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrative decisionmaking. The State as a public employer may well take into account social perspectives that require the creation of job opportunities across the societal structure. All these are essentially matters of policy. Judicial review must tread warily. That is why the decision in Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 must be understood in the context of a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the post. It was in the context of specific rule

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that the decision in Jyoti K.K. Vrs. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 turned.’

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28. It would be also useful to notice a later judgment of this Court, in Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank Vrs. Anit Kumar Das, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 897 where the issue was, whether for the post of peon in the appellant Bank, a degree holder (graduate) could be appointed, given the conscious decision of the employer, that only those who held 10+2 pass qualifications would be considered and those with graduation qualification could not be considered. This court held that the appointment of the respondent, who was a graduate, after he suppressed the fact that he held a degree, and did not disclose it, was unsupportable. In this context, it was observed that as to what qualifications are applicable to what class of posts, is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the employer, which the courts would be slow to interdict. This decision too supports the conclusions in the present case, since the employer, HPSEB asserts that it considers degree holders eligible for appointment to the post of JE.

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29. In the present case, what is evident from the rules is that direct recruitment to the post of JEs in HPSEB is to the extent of 72%. Undoubtedly, eligibility is amongst those who passed in matriculation or 10+2 or its equivalent qualification. However, this Court is of the opinion that the diploma holders’ contention that the minimum qualification is matriculation and that the technical qualification is diploma is incorrect. The minimum qualification for the post cannot be deemed to be only matriculation but rather

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that only such of those matriculates, or 10+2 pass students, who are diploma holders would be eligible. The term “with” in this category has to be read as conjunctive .”

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21.3. It is apt to refer to The Post Graduate Institute Vrs. Dr. J.B. Dilawari, (1988) Supp SCC 355 = AIR 1988 SC 1348 wherein the following has been observed:

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“Specialisation is the order of the day. About half a century back, a general medical practitioner was in a position to attend to all human ailments in accordance with the then known methods of treatment. Today for the purpose of medical attention the human body has been divided into several parts and expertise with regard to these has so developed that specialisation has become the order of the day. Though the Court, it is stated, is the expert of experts, it is proper to take note of its limitations. Realization of this situation has led to a series of pronouncements where this Court has reiterated the position that matters involving expertise should be left to be handled by expert bodies.”

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21.4. The learned Single Judge, therefore, at paragraph 18 has come to the just and appropriate conclusion that “this Court is not competent to interfere with the qualification prescribed by the authority when the same has already been acted upon. Thereby, the relief sought in Clause (ia) [the amended prayer] cannot be granted to the petitioner”.

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21.5. To claim himself eligible for the post of Contract Teacher (Hindi) a candidate is required to possess the

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educational qualifications in terms of Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014. The respondent No.1 neither has satisfied the conditions in Category-I nor did he have qualifications enumerated in Category-II.

¶324

LACK OF REASON TO REJECT THE CANDIDATURE OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1:

¶325

22. Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate having not been able to satisfy that the respondent No.1 had the requisite qualification as envisaged in Resolution dated 27.10.2014, this Court finds it difficult to sustain the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the ground that reason for rejection of candidature— “not having requisite qualification”— is terse.

¶326

22.1. Perusal of “List of Rejected Candidates (Hindi Teacher)” enclosed to the writ petition/original application as Annexure-10, which was sought to be “quashed” by the respondent No.1 indicates that the reason for rejection of application has been shown as “NOT HAVING REQUISITE QUALIFICATION”. Whereas the respondent No.1 was aware of his own qualification with reference to the educational qualification required for the purpose of making application for Contract Teacher (Hindi) in terms of advertisement/Resolution dated 27.10.2014, even if detail reason is not ascribed, there cannot be any grievance of the respondent No.1 in this regard to

¶327

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impute against the authority that such decision gets vitiated for want of reason.

¶330

22.2. In this respect the following observation made in the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract & Leasing, Kota Vrs. M/s. Shukla & Brothers, (2010) 4 SCR 627 , may not be out of place to be referred to:

¶331

“In light of the judgments referred to and relied upon by the parties including the judgment of this Court, it is true that requirement of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning recorded by the Court for declining or granting relief to the petitioner. The purpose, as already noticed, is to make the litigant aware of the reasons for which the relief is declined as well as to help the higher Court in assessing the correctness of the view taken by the High Court while disposing off a matter.”

¶332

22.3. May it be fruitful to quote proposition with respect to recording of reason by public authority from National Highways Authority of India Vrs. Madhukar Kumar, (2021) 13 SCR 299 :

¶333

“If the law provides for a duty to record reasons in writing, undoubtedly, it must be followed and it would amount to the violation of the Statute, if it were not followed. Even if, there is no duty to record reasons or support an order with reasons, there cannot be any doubt that, for every decision, there would be and there must

¶334

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be, a reason. The Constitution does not contemplate any Public Authority, exercising power with caprice or without any rationale. But here again, in the absence of the duty to record reasons, the Court is not to be clothed with power to strike down administrative action for the mere reason that no reasons are to be found recorded. In certain situations, the reason for a particular decision, may be gleaned from the pleadings of the Authority, when the matter is tested in a Court. ”

¶337

22.4. In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences Vrs. Dr. K. Kalyana Raman, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 481 it has been held as follows: ―

¶338

7. We will first consider the second point. In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither nor judicial

¶339

adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. The selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India Vrs. Mohan Lal Capoor, (1973) 2 SCC 836 = (1974) 1 SCR 797. That decision

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proceeded on a statutory requirement. Regulation 5(5) which was considered in that case required the Selection Committee to record its reasons for superseding a senior member in the State Civil Service. The decision in Capoor case, (1973) 2 SCC 836 = (1974) 1 SCR 797 was rendered on September 26, 1973. In June 1977, Regulation 5(5) was amended deleting the requirement of recording reasons for the supersession of senior officers of the State Civil Services. The Capoor case, (1973) 2 SCC 836 = (1974) 1 SCR 797 cannot, therefore, be construed as an authority for the proposition that there should be reason formulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision. Indeed, even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement. This principle has been stated by this Court in R.S. Dass Vrs. Union of India, 1986 Supp. SCC 617, in which Capoor Case, (1973) 2 SCC 836 = (1974) 1 SCR 797 was also distinguished.

¶343

8. As to the first point we may state at the outset that giving of reasons for decision is different from, and in principle distinct from, the requirements of procedural fairness. The procedural fairness is the main requirement in the administrative action. The or ‘fairness’ ‘fair procedure’ in the administrative action ought to be observed. The Selection Committee cannot be an exception to this principle. It must take a decision reasonably without being guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. But there is nothing on

¶344

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record to suggest that the Selection Committee did anything to the contrary. The High Court however, observed, that Dr. Kalyana Raman did not receive a fair and reasonable consideration by the Selection Committee. The inference in this regard has been drawn by the High Court from the statement of objections dated February 18, 1980 filed on behalf of the Selection Committee. It appears that the Selection Committee took the stand that Dr. Kalyana Raman did not satisfy the minimum requirement of experience and was not eligible for selection. The High Court went on to state that it was somewhat extraordinary for the Selection Committee after calling him for the interview and selecting him for the post by placing him second, to have stated that he did not satisfy the minimum qualifications prescribed for eligibility. According to the High Court the stand taken by the Selection Committee raises serious doubts as to whether the deliberations of the Selection Committee were such as to inspire confidence and reassurance as to the related equality and justness of an effective consideration of this case. It is true that selection of the petitioner and the stand taken by the Selection Committee before the High Court that he was not eligible at all, are, indeed, antithetical and cannot co-exist. But the fact remains that the case of Dr. Kalyana Raman was considered and he was placed second in the panel of names. It is not shown that the selection was arbitrary or whimsical or the Selection Committee did not act fairly towards Dr Kalyana Raman. The fact that he was placed second in the panel, itself indicates that there was proper consideration of his case and he has been treated fairly. It should not be lost sight of that the Selection Committee consisted of experts in the subject for

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selection. They were men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality. The Court should be slow to interfere with their opinion.”

¶350

22.5. It is noticed that in the writ petition/original application the respondent No.1 has made endeavour to demonstrate that the qualification which he acquired from the University of Jammu is sufficient qualification as found mentioned in the Resolution. Enclosing a Letter F.No.49-21/2005/NCTE (N&S), dated 31.05.2007 as Annexure-15 to the reply to the counter filed before the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, the respondent No.1 submitted that clarification has been issued by the National Council for Teacher Education addressed to all Education Secretaries and all States Governments/ Union Territories that “persons who have obtained degrees from institutions recognised by the Government of J&K/UGC would be eligible for employment in Central Government and other States”. Therefore, it is quite clear that the reason ascribed to by the authority to reject the candidature of the respondent No.1 was that he had no requisite qualification. Such a fact being known to the respondent No.1, there requires no necessity for further elaboration.

¶351

22.6. Glaring error apparent on the face of the Judgment of the learned Single Judge is perceived. In construing the categories of educational qualification for the purpose of Contract Teacher (Hindi), though he has proceeded to

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¶354

observe that as prescription of educational qualification is policy decision of the State Government, and that there is no scope for declaring equivalence, he ought not to have held that the action of rejection of candidature could not be sustained.

¶355

22.7. The authority, while rejecting the candidature of the respondent No.1 along with many others, assigned reason that they did not have necessary educational qualification for the post of Contract Teacher (Hindi). It cannot be presumed to have been done in an erroneous or mechanical manner in the absence of any allegation of favouritism or bias. A presumption arises as regards the correctness of the decision of an authority. The party who makes the allegation of bias or favouritism is required to prove the same. Thus, in the absence of mala fides against the authority, the decision taken cannot be doubted. Reliance can be had on Union of India Vrs. Bikash Kuanar, (2006) 8 SCC 192; Sadananda Halo Vrs. Momtaz Ali Sheikh, (2008) 4 SCC 619; University of Mysore Vrs. C.D. Govinda Rao, (1964) 4 SCR 575 .

¶356

22.8. With the sound principles of application of the words “with”, “and” and “or”, as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in different contexts, this Court is inclined to interfere with the decision contained in the Judgment dated 17.08.2021 of the learned Single Judge in WPC (OAC) No.1629 of 2015.

¶357

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¶359

DECISIONS REFERRED TO AND RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT

¶360

NO.1:

¶361

23. Before considering applicability of the decisions cited at the bar and relied upon by the learned counsel during the course of hearing to the fact-situation of the present case attracting provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is felt expedient to refer to following dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India Vrs. Arulmozhi Iniarasu, AIR 2011 SC 2731 = (2011) 7 SCC 397 :

¶362

“Before examining the first limb of the question, formulated above, it would be instructive to note, as a preface, the well settled principle of law in the matter of applying precedents that the Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the fact situation of the case before it fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of Statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper because one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. [Ref.: Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vrs. N.R. Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai Vrs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 1 SCC 494 and Bhuwalka Steel Industries Limited Vrs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board, (2010) 2 SCC 273]”

¶363

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¶365

24. By way of written note, filed after conclusion of hearing, Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 has stated to have relied on the case of Bapi Sahu Vrs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No. 27414 of 2017, disposed of on 06.08.2018 by a Division Bench of this Court and contended that the petitioner therein, “who had obtained B.Ed. from Rastriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha, deemed University, Thirupati, Andhra Pradesh, and got equivalency from Utkal University was directed to be appointed” by this Court and consequently, the said petitioner was given appointment by implementing said direction of this Court.

¶366

24.1. Said case is distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the contention therein of the petitioner was that “the candidature of the petitioner was rejected by the Selection Committee as he was untrained, even though he has the trained qualification, i.e ., Sikhya Sastri Degree (B.Ed.), which was declared equivalent with B.Ed. Degree of Utkal University vide its Notification dated 15.12.2011 under Annexure-4. The Utkal University by the aforesaid notification has published a list of Universities, whose B.Ed./Special Education etc . and correspondence courses have been made equivalent with the corresponding B.Ed/Special Education/M.Ed Regular and Correspondence Courses of the Utkal University.” This Court having taken into consideration the Resolution dated 18.02.2008 (whereas in the instant

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case, the Resolution under consideration is of 27.10.2014), this Court took note of the fact that “Siksha Sastri Degree— Siksha Acharya Degree of Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha, Thirupati, Andhra Pradesh is equivalent, i.e., Sikhya Sastri has been declared as equivalent qualification with B.Ed. Degree of Utkal University” and held that “non-consideration of the candidature of the petitioner for the post of Hindi Teacher on the ground that Sikhya Sastri qualification has not been recognized to be a training qualification is not sustainable in the eye of law.”

¶370

24.2. However, in the present case, the University of Jammu has certified that the respondent No.1 has qualified B.Ed. examination, but there is no certification with respect to B.H.Ed., which is enumerated as one of the requisite educational qualifications specified under the Resolution dated 27.10.2014. Moreover, the Letter dated 15.12.2011 citing of equivalency recognizes “B.Ed. (Regular)” acquired from Jammu University (University of Jammu) as equivalent to B.Ed. of Utkal University. Nothing is available to show that the respondent No.1 has passed B.Ed. (Regular). Howsoever the matter may be, this Court finds distinctive feature that “Sikhya Shastri” which is made equivalent to “B.Ed.” Degree, cannot be treated at par with “B.Ed. (Regular)” for the purpose of Contractual Teacher (Hindi) vis-à-vis

¶371

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educational qualification specified in the Resolution dated 27.10.2014.

¶374

24.3. Thus, on account of factual distinction, the decision of this Court rendered in Bapi Sahu (supra) is misplaced by the counsel for the respondent No.1.

¶375

25. The next case which is cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 is the decision rendered by this Court in State of Odisha Vrs. Aparna Sinha, W.P.(C) No.10616 of 2020, disposed of on 07.09.2020 vide written note of submission dated 04.03.2024. It is submitted that said case was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.(C) No. 195 of 2021, which was dismissed with the following Order dated 20.01.2021:

¶376

“In the facts of the present case, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to be entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.”

¶377

25.1. The decision of this Court in Aparna Sinha (supra) cannot be of any assistance inasmuch as the said case proceeded to grant relief to the petitioner therein on the following ground:

¶378

“4. Though initially Mr. Mohapartra, leaned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioner did not have requisite qualification for being appointed as a contractual Hindi Teacher, but being confronted with the submissions made by Mr. G. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the opposite party No.1,

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he conceded that the opposite party No.1 had the requisite qualification for being appointed as contractual Hindi Teacher.”

¶382

25.2. In Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Vrs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola, (2019) 13 SCC 82, it has been propounded that,

¶383

“13. Even a concession on facts disputed by a respondent in its written statement cannot bind the respondent. Thus, in Swami Krishnanand Govindananad Vrs. Managing Director, Oswal Hosiery (Regd.), (2002) 3 SCC 39, this Court held:

¶384

‘2. *** It appears that when the case was posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the Court. That statement of the advocate was recorded by the Additional Rent Controller thus:

¶385

‘The respondent’s learned counsel has admitted the ground of eviction and also the fact that the applicant is a public charitable institution and for that purpose it required the premises.’ ***

¶386

3. *** Whether the appellant is an institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bona fide the premises for furtherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller. He can record his satisfaction only when he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant. For so holding there must be

¶387

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material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the Bar be treated as admission of the party? Having regard to the requirements of Section 18 of the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the aforementioned statement of the counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that statement from consideration, there was thus no material before the Additional Rent Controller to record his satisfaction within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 22 of the Act. It follows that the order of eviction was without jurisdiction.’

¶390

14. Equally, where a question is a mixed question of fact and law, a concession made by a lawyer or his authorised representative at the stage of arguments cannot preclude the party for whom such person appears from re-agitating the point in appeal. In C.M. Arumugam Vrs. S. Rajgopal’, (1976) 1 SCC 863, this Court held:

¶391

‘8. *** That question is a mixed question of law and fact and we do not think that a concession made by the first respondent on such a question at the stage of argument before the High Court, can preclude him from re-agitating it in the appeal before this Court, when it formed the subject-matter of an issue before

¶392

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the High Court and full and complete evidence in regard to such issue was led by both parties.’

¶395

15. It would be perverse to decide based only on a concession , without more, that a direct relationship exists between the employer and the workmen. Equally perverse is finding that the extended definition of ‘employer’ contained in the Act would automatically apply.”

¶396

25.3. In Union of India Vrs. Hira Lal, (1996) 10 SCC 574 it has been held that the concession made by the Government advocate on the question of law could not be said to be binding upon the Government.

¶397

25.4. In B.S. Bajwa Vrs. State of Punjab, (1998) 2 SCC 523 , a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had granted the relief on the basis of concession given by the learned Additional Advocate General without considering the effect of the same or of taking into account the inconsistency with its earlier finding. The Supreme Court held that the concession on the point, being one of law, could not bind the State and, therefore, it was open to the State to withdraw and it had been so done by filing a review petition in the High Court itself.

¶398

25.5. It has been succinctly stated in Union of India Vrs. Dharamendra Textile Processors, (2008) 14 SCR 13 as follows:

¶399

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¶401

“The decision in State of M.P. Vrs. Bharat Heavy Electricals, (1997) 7 SCC 1 cannot be of any assistance to the assessee because the same proceeded on the basis of concession. Even otherwise, it was not open to the Bench to read, into a statute which was specific and clear, something which is not specifically provided for in the statute.”

¶402

25.6. Having taken note of decisions rendered on concession, and being not oblivious of what has been laid down in Kunhayammed Vrs. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 = (2000) 6 SCC 359 , it can be said that the decision rendered in the case of Aparna Sinha (supra) relied on by Sri Sameer Kumar Das, learned Advocate to buttress his argument that special leave petition being dismissed against the Order dated 07.09.2020 of this Court passed in writ petition, the relief granted therein is required to be extended to the respondent No.1, cannot come to his aid.

¶403

26. It is further placed by way of written note of submission by the counsel for the respondent No.1 that in the case of Narayan Pandey Vrs. State of Odisha, WPC (OAC) No.165 of 2015, disposed of vide Order dated 07.07.2022, the learned Single Judge allowed claim of the petitioner therein for appointment as Contract Teacher (Hindi). Against the said Order, the Division Bench of this Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the State of Odisha. Consequently, the State

¶404

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Government having implemented the Order, given appointment to the petitioner therein.

¶407

26.1. Here again it is seen that such Order of the learned Single Judge has been passed on the concession of the counsel for both the sides and the writ appeal against such Order of the Single Judge got dismissed on technical ground.

¶408

26.2. The aforesaid case in Narayan Pandey (supra) cannot be of any assistance to the case of the respondent No.1.

¶409

DIRECTION OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE TO CONSIDER FOR ENGAGEMENT OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1:

¶410

27. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to direct that “the petitioner’s application should be considered for engagement as Contract Teacher in Hindi as per his choice exercised by him, as expeditiously as possible”.

¶411

27.1. Having examined the educational qualification of the respondent No.1, this Court came to find that neither he satisfied the eligibility criteria specified in Category-I nor could he demonstrate that his case fell within the ken of conditions stipulated in Category-II.

¶412

27.2. When the respondent No.1 does not have requisite educational qualification as stipulated in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014 of the School and Mass Education Department qua Hindi Teacher, in such view

¶413

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of the matter, aforesaid direction of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside.

¶416

CONCLUSION & DECISION:

¶417

28. The above discussion lands this Court to reach at a definite opinion that it is not within the domain of this Court exercising power of judicial review to declare whether the Bachelor of Education from University of Jammu is equivalent to “Hindi Sikshyan Parangat from Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra / B.H.Ed. (a course prescribed by NCTE) from an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University / B.Ed. in Hindi (a course prescribed by NCTE) from Dakhin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha Madras, an Institution recognized by NCTE and affiliated to a recognized University”. Prescribing essential educational qualification for a post, viz. , Contract Teacher (Hindi) is the domain of policy makers, which does not lie with the Court to interfere.

¶418

29. Since the respondent No.1 has been issued with the Provisional Certificate by the University of Jammu awarding “Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.)”, it does not lead to conceive of the fact that such certificate could be construed to be Certificate of B.H.Ed. Therefore, none of the requisite qualifications enumerated in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014, being shown to have been acquired/possessed by the respondent No.1, the

¶419

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¶421

Judgment of the learned Single Judge does warrant interference in this writ appeal.

¶422

30. The requirement in Clause 3(f) of the Resolution dated 27.10.2014 so far as “educational qualification” for Contract Teacher (Hindi) is concerned, it is of Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized University with Hindi as one of the elective subjects with minimum 50% marks in aggregate with either Rastrabhasa Ratna or Sastri or Snataka or an equivalent degree (equivalent to the aforesaid three qualifications) and Hindi Sikshyan Parangat/B.H.Ed/B.Ed. A reading of the whole of Clause-3 would indicate that the requirement of a Bachelor’s Degree with 50% marks in aggregate is the basic requirement and along with it, further qualifications are also necessary. The words ‘Rastrabhasa Ratna’ ‘Sastri’ and ‘Snataka’ as employed in different clauses have been prefixed with ‘with’. It is, thus, unambiguous that these are additional qualifications which a candidate must possess apart from the basic requirement of securing 50% marks in graduation. Similarly, the use of ‘or’ prefixing ‘with’ in these clauses obviously indicates that the said three qualifications are alternatives. The respondent No.1 failed to persuade this Court that the qualification he acquired from University of Jammu fell within ken of these three alternatives so that he would be entitled to claim for consideration for the post of Contract Teacher

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(Hindi) under Category-I, nor could he demonstrate that he had the qualifications as contemplated under Category-II. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent No.1 misdirected himself and sought to claim relief in the writ petition.

¶426

31. For the reasons stated above and the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court having perceived infirmity in the decision of the learned Single Judge vide Judgment dated 17.08.2021, this Court is inclined to show indulgence in this writ appeal.

¶427

32. Consequent upon aforesaid observation, finding infirmity in the Judgment dated 17.08.2021 rendered by the learned Single Judge in WPC (OAC) No.1629 of 2015 is set aside. In the result, this writ appeal stands allowed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

¶428

(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)

¶429

JUDGE

¶430

MR. CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH, CJ. I agree.

¶431

Signature Not Verified

¶432

(MR. CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH) CHIEF JUSTICE

¶433

Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, C UTT ACK Date: 20-May-2024 18:30:38 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 20^th May, 2024//Laxmikant

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State of Odisha v. Prasanta Kumar Nayak

Case brief

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State of Odisha v. Prasanta Kumar Nayak

Case brief

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