Dismissed

Satya Narayan Jena v. Panchanan Jena

Orissa HC15 Nov 2023CRLLP/106/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Orissa High Court dismissed a Criminal Reference (leave to appeal) challenging an acquittal. It held that evidence proved the petitioner filled the amount and date on a blank cheque received from the respondent, negating the prosecution's claim. The Court found the petitioner's submissions regarding the non-production of documentary evidence to be misconceived and dismissed the appeal, allowin

What did the court decide?

The application for leave to appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. is dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondent is upheld.

Satya Narayan Jena Vs Panchanan Jena — Cheque Dishonour | Orissa HC (2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

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CRLLP No.106 of 2014

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An Application U/s.378 of Cr.P.C.

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Satya Narayan Jena …..… Petitioner
-Versus-
Panchanan Jena & another …..… Opposite parties
For Petitioner : Mr. P.C. Das on behalf of Mr.P.C.
Jena, Advocate
For Opp.Parties : Mr. Debasish Nayak, Addl. Govt.
Advocate for O.P. No.2
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P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO
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Date of Hearing & Judgment:15.11.2023
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M.S.SAHOO, J. The petition has been filed U/s.378(4) of Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal, against the judgment of acquittal dated 08.11.2013, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Balasore in Criminal Appeal No.13/16 of 2010/2013 acquitting the opposite party no.1 of the offence U/s.138 of N.I. Act and U/s.386(b)(i) of Cr.P.C., by setting aside the judgment and order of conviction dtd.10.02.2010 passed by the learned SDJM, Nilgiri in 1CC Case No.135 of 2006

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Page 1 of 15

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2. The matter was heard at length for admission on 10.11.2023. Again it was adjourned for further hearing to 15.11.2023 and is taken up.

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3. The petitioner/complainant could not prove the writings on the cheque like: the amount payable and the date were filled-up by the opposite party.

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Rather, it was proved by the P.W.1 that the contents of the cheque like the amount Rs. 24,992/- and the date were filled-up by the complainant-petitioner himself after obtaining a blank cheque from the opposite party.

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4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that despite the above mentioned evidence, the learned court of the 1^st instance i.e. learned SDJM, Nilgiri should have held the opposite party guilty for the offence U/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

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5. On being specifically asked, when the matter was being heard on 10.11.2023 whether the offence can be said to have been completed when the P.W.1 himself admits that he filled-up the amount and date in the blank cheque signed by the opposite party and presented to the Bank for honouring the same, learned counsel for the petitioner had taken time to examine the matter further and address arguments.

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6. Today, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates his submissions that though it is proved that P.W.1 has filled-up the details in cheque like the date 04.06.2006, name of the payee i.e. the society and the amount Rs.24,992/- in words and figures in handwriting of the

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P.W.1 that was proved before the learned court of the 1^st instance.

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7. It is further noticed that there is clear finding of facts by the learned court both by the learned court at the 1^st instance and the appellate court that on 04.06.2006, the appellant had liability to the extent as alleged. The loan ledger relating to the appellant was not proved though a photocopy of the said ledger was filed and being a photocopy not being proved was not admitted by the learned court which is just and proper.

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8. The further finding of the fact that the resolution book of the society of which the P.W.1 has himself the custodian was not brought on record as evidence which could have indicated that the appellant has liability to pay the amount indicated in the cheque.

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9. In Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 776 (at page 179 of SCC), the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 CrPC and the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held:-

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14.1. In Babu [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 196-99)

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“12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 3 of 15

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aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837] , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar [Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 518] , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. [Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 432] , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. [Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893] , Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 377] , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 363] , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 645] , Arulveluv. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 176] and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1496] )

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 4 of 15

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13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42 : (1933-34) 61 IA 398 :

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AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] , the Privy Council observed as under: (SCC Online PC: IA p. 404)

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‘… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.’

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14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [Tulsiram Kanu v. State, 1951 SCC 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1] , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235] , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479] , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)

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15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432,

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para 42)

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 5 of 15

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‘(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as,
“substantial and compelling reasons”, “good
and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted _conclusions”, _
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to
its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 6 of 15

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16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60] , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

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17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1069], the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)

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‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.’

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18. In State of U.P. v. Banne [State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include:(SCC p. 286, para 28)

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‘(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

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(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

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(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

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(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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unjust and unreasonable based on erroneouslaw and facts on the record of the case;

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(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

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(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.’

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A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State [Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] .

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19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”

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14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , SCC p. 199)

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“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cumAssessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501] , Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”

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(emphasis supplied)

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It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

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14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 9 of 15

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Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 447-49) “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’

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31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 10 of 15

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approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)

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‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether he judgment of the appellate court is free

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’

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31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an

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order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

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31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10)

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‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

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It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

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If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this

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(Underlined to Supply Emphasis)

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Page 13 of 15

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connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122] ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’

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31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be besetwith fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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10. In considered opinion of this Court, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that nonproduction of the resolution book, loan ledger is not fatal to the prosecution case of the complainant case is misconceived and is liable to be rejected.

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11. By applying the principles laid down in Anwar Ali ( Supra ) and in view of the evidence of the petitionercomplainant (P.W.1), the judgment passed by the learned SDJM, Nilgiri in I.C.C. No.135 of 2006 dated 10.02.2010 convicting the opposite party of the offence U/s.138 of NI Act U/s.386(b)(i) Cr.P.C. cannot be sustained. Similarly the appellate court setting aside the judgment of conviction and acquitting the Opp. Party by judgment and

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order dated 08.11.2013 in Criminal Appeal No.13/16 of 2010/2013 also cannot be interfered with.

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The CRLLP petition stands dismissed.

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…………………… M.S.Sahoo, J.

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Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 15^th November, 2023/RRJena