The High Court dismissed a writ petition filed by SAIL Management challenging an Industrial Tribunal order that refused approval for a workmen's removal. The Court held the Tribunal was correct in refusing approval as Section 33(2)(b) does not permit directing lesser punishment.
Writ petition dismissed having no merit.
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O.J.C. No. 99 of 1999
07. 20.06.2016 The petitioner, namely Management of SAIL, Rourkela St
eel Plant (for short, the Management) has filed this writ petition assailing the order dated 1
9.06.1998 passed by the Learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela in I.D. Misc.
Case No.77/97 (24/95), wherein he rejected an application of the Management made under Sectio
n 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act) praying, inter alia, to a
pprove the action of the Management in removing opposite party No.1 (Workman) with effect from
14.07.1995.
2. During pendency of the ID Case No.25/90 before the Industrial Tribunal
, Rourkela (for short, the Tribunal), the Management initiated a Domestic Enquiry against the
Workman, who was working as Khalasi in Coke Ovens (Operation) Department of the Management, fo
r alleged misconduct by remaining absent from his duty without leave for 101 days in different
spells in between March, 1993 to September, 1993 and not reporting for duty. Thus, charges we
re framed under Order 28 (v) and 28 (xxii) read with Order 7(a) of the Certified Standing Orde
r of the Management.
3. Order 28 (v) relates to habitual late attendance and/or habitual absen
t from duty without sufficient cause. Order 7(a) provides that all workers shall be at the wor
k spot of the establishment at the time fixed and notified under the Standing Order No.5. Simi
larly, Order 28 (xxii) relates to breach of any Standing Order. The Workman did not respond to
the notice of the Management and did not file any explanation/show cause to the charges level
ed against him. As such, the Management constituted a one man enquiry committee to probe into
the charges. In course of enquiry, the workman was given opportunity of hearing. Accordingly,
basing upon the enquiry report, the workman was removed from his service with effect from 14.0
7.1995. In view of pendency of ID Case No.25/90 before the Tribunal, the Management sought for
approval of its action in removing the workman-opposite party No.1 from service.
4. Learned Tribunal considering the case of the parties held that the pri
nciples of natural justice was complied with during enquiry and the workman has failed to prov
e his innocence in the enquiry. Learned Tribunal also held that there is no violation of provi
sions contained in the Certified Standing Order while conducting Domestic Enquiry, the workman
having failed to report for duty at 8 AM on 23.07.1993, which he was required to meet, has vi
olated the Standing Order 7(a) and thereby committed misconduct under Order 28(xxii) also. Onc
e he (workman) is found guilty under Order 28 (xxii) of the Standing Order, he should not have
been held guilty under Order 28(v) of the said Certified Standing Order for remaining absent
from duty. Holding the workman guilty under Order 28(v) as well as under Order 28(xii) of the
Certified Standing Order simultaneously amounts to double jeopardy to the workman. Thus, he (l
earned Tribunal) held the finding of the Enquiry Officer to that effect to be perverse. Accord
ingly, he refused to approve the action of the Management under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that once the lea
rned Tribunal has held that the Enquiry Officer has complied with the principles of natural ju
stice in course of Domestic Enquiry and there is no violation of any provisions of the Certifi
ed Standing Order in conducting the Domestic Enquiry, the punishment imposed by the Management
ought to have been approved by the learned Tribunal. As such, the learned Tribunal has commit
ted error of law in not approving the action taken by the Management in removing the workman f
rom service.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of t
he impugned order under Annexure-1, it is manifest that the learned Tribunal has categorically
held that the Enquiry Officer has complied principles of natural justice during the enquiry.
The Enquiry Officer had no bias against the workman; there is no violation of principles of na
tural justice. There is no infringement of condition as provided under Circular No.654 dated 2
1.09.1992; the action of removal has been taken by the appointing authority; Order 30 of the C
ertified Standing Order has been followed in letter and spirit. However, learned Tribunal took
exception to the fact that the opposite party-workman could not have been held guilty under O
rder 28(v) as well as under Order 28(xxii) read with Order 7(a) of the Certified Standing Orde
r simultaneously. Once the workman has been held guilty under Order 28(v) for remaining absent
from duty without leave or without sufficient cause, he could not have been held guilty for l
ate attendance, i.e., for not reporting for duty at 8 AM on 23.07.1993 and on subsequent dates
as mentioned in the charge sheet.
7. Accordingly, learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that had the oppo
site party-workman been held guilty under Order 28(v) of the Certified Standing Order only, th
e Management might not have removed the opposite party-workman from service and would have imp
osed some lesser punishment. Section 33(2)(b) of the Act does not permit the Tribunal to direc
t the Management to award a lesser punishment. It only relates to approval and/or refusal of t
he action taken by the Management; thus, he refused to grant approval.
8. The finding of the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any material
irregularity or violation of any statutory provision. There is also no jurisdictional error i
n the impugned order. Law is well-settled that this Court in exercise of power under Article 2
27 of the Constitution should not substitute the finding arrived at by the Tribunal unless the
same is an outcome of error apparent on the face of record, perverse, jurisdictional error an
d violative of any statutory provision. The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal does not fal
l under any of the aforesaid category. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the order
impugned herein.
9. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.
ss .....................
K.R. Mohapatra, J.1
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the Industrial Tribunal correctly refused approval of removal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act due to double jeopardy under Certified Standing Orders.
Whether the High Court should interfere with the Tribunal's order refusing approval for removal of a workman.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
N/AReferred
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Management of SAIL, Rourkela Steel Plant
Workman
K.R. Mohapatra
As recorded by the court registry
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