Disposed

Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority

NGT13 Aug 2026IA No. 865/2025 in Appeal No. 626/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court disposed of an interlocutory application (I.A. No.351/2026) seeking to recall an order that permitted the hearing of a delay condonation application before a main appeal. The Court held that no separate order is needed as the delay condonation is being heard concurrently and will be disposed of first.

What did the court decide?

No order passed in I.A. No.351/2026 as delay condonation application is being heard and decided first before the main appeal.

Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. vs… — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | NGT (2026)

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(Pune Bench)

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Item No.11

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL WESTERN ZONE BENCH, PUNE

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[THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING (WITH HYBRID OPTION)]

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I.A. NO.865 OF 2025 (WZ) IN APPEAL NO.626 OF 2025 (WZ) IN

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I.A. 351 OF 2026 (WZ)

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Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.

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…..Applicant

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Versus

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Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority & Ors.

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….Respondents

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Date of hearing: 13.08.2026

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER HON’BLE DR. SUJIT KUMAR BAJPAYEE, EXPERT MEMBER

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Applicant : Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, Sr. Advocate a/w Mr. Karan Batura, Advocate for Applicant

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Respondents : Mr. Shubham Sinai Priolkar, Advocate for R-1

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Mr. Shivan Desai, Advocate a/w

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Mr. Shivshankar Swaminathan, Advocate for R-2 & R-3

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ORDER

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From the side of Respondent No.2- Dunhill Beach Resort and Respondent No.3- Vijay Komarpant has filed I.A. No.351/2026 praying therein to recall the order dated 02.07.2026 and 23.07.2026 passed in I.A. No.865/2025 (WZ), to the limited extent of directing to hear delay condonation application as well as in the main appeal on 13.08.2026. Further, it is prayed that the application for condonation of delay be heard and decided first before the main appeal is taken up for hearing on merits.

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We are of the view that it is a known practice in Courts that when a case filed with delay normally the delay condonation application is decided

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prior to hearing the main matter. So, in the case in hand also, we will follow the same procedure, it depends on time as to whether after disposing of delay condonation application enough time remains to hear the matter on mertis, therefore, no order is required to be passed in this application because we are already hearing the delay condonation application prior to hearing the matter on merits.

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We have already heard the argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2- Dunhill Beach Resort and Respondent No.3- Vijay Komarpant on the delay condonation.

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IN I.A. NO.865/2025

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This application is moved by the appellant seeking condonation of delay of 25 days in filing the present appeal against Impugned Order dated 25/29.09.2025.

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The submission is that the appellant collected the Impugned Order dated 25/29.09.2025 physically from the office of the Respondent No.1GCZMA on 30.09.2025 instead of waiting for the communication of the same to be done. In the case in hand 30 days period for filing the appeal expired on 30.10.2025, while this appeal has been filed on 24.11.2025, thus resulting in a miniscule and a minor delay of only twenty-five (25) days. This delay has occurred due to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances as the record was too bulky and voluminous forming part of the instant lis , Along with the substantial number of orders were passed by the Respondent No.1- GCZMA on the same date. The appellant required time to prepare and finalize the appeal documents in consultation with its legal counsel. In view this a few more days beyond the prescribed period of limitation were consumed in preparing and filing the instant appeal.

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From the side of Respondent No.3 - Vijay Komarpant has filed objection on 30.06.2026, wherein it is submitted that the appellant has filed about 24 legal proceedings before this Tribunal from the year 2022 and a similar number of legal proceedings before various Courts in Goa and other jurisdictions. The excuse that owing to “voluminous” nature of the records it could not file the present appeal within the prescribed period is not believable, which is generic and unsustainable in nature. The records would reveal that pages 207 to 804 of the memo of present appeal are common to most of the proceedings filed and/or instituted by the appellant before this Tribunal. Even in the earlier proceedings inter alia bearing Appeal No.136/2025, Appeal No.619/2025, the very same documents were relied upon by the appellant. The appellant is an Asset Reconstruction Company having its independent legal department apart from having deep ties with the law firm namely Dhir and Dhir having its office in New Delhi. The appellant has close foundational links with the said law firm, therefore, the foundational reason for delay i.e. conference, consultation and/or co-ordination between the legal departments and/or their layers appears to be a mere eye wash.

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The delay is further aggravated by the fact that the appellant has already instituted independent civil proceedings before the Ld. Civil Judge Senior Devision at Margao, Goa, bearing Special Civil Suit No.62/2024, which is pending adjudication. It is settled that institutional or corporate litigants, possessing substantial legal resources and professional assistance are expected to act with a higher degree of diligence. The appellant is unnecessarily dragging the answering respondent into the meritless and baseless litigation causing undue harassment.

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The conduct of the appellant is further substantiated by the fact that, on earlier occasions as well the appellant had challenged the

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permissions lawfully granted in favour of the answering respondent. However, the said challenges were dismissed by this Tribunal at the stage of consideration of the applications for condonation of delay itself.

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Despite the dismissal of the previous appeal leading to the permissions of the answering respondent attaining finality, the appellant has continued to drag the answering respondent into unnecessary and repetitive litigation casing undue harassment.

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The appellant is a corpus juris and not an environmentalist or person interested in protection of the environment. It is denied that the delay caused is due to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances. Rather the same is abuse of process of law.

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Hence, this application should be dismissed.

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From the side of Respondent No.1-GCZMA, learned counsel Mr. Shubham Sinai Priolkar has filed reply affidavit dated 18.03.2026, wherein it is submitted that Respondent No.3 has been granted approval for erection of temporary shacks and huts having a total built-up area of 55.13 square metres in the property bearing Survey No.102/1-A of Village Agonda, Canacona, Goa vide NOC dated 12.11 2018 and extension dated 26.07.2024 issued by the answering respondent. The prayer sought by the appellants effectively amounts to a challenge to the said NOC dated 12.11.2018 and extension dated 26.07.2024, which is not permissible.

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The decision of the Coastal Zone Management Authority granting approval under the CRZ Notification can only be made by invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal under Section 16 of the NGT Act, 2010, which lays down on 30 days period from the date of which the order was communicated to the aggrieved party. The present appeal is an

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attempt to indirectly challenge the said NOC seeking demolition of structures which were duly approved by the competent authority long back. Hence this application should be dismissed.

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We have heard the argument of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in Shivamma (Dead) By Lrs. Vs.

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Karnataka Housing Board and Others – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 ,

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wherein para 138 to 143, following is held:-

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138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly true that a justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding application under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section 5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning the delay.

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139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.

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140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the

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underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.

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141. Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.

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142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.

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143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity.”

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Having drawn attention to the above, it is urged by him that no merits is to be seen at the time of disposing of the delay condonation

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application and it is only to be seen that whether sufficient cause was there for delay explained by the appellant or not.

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While the respondents are trying to press upon the merits of the matter.

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From the side of Respondent No.3 has placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary – 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 , wherein para 7 and 7, following is held:-

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“ 5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram wherein, it was held as follows:

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" 13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

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"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which

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prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

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14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

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Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

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5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heirs, wherein, one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue,

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it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

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"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

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25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

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26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the

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proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

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XXX XXX XXX

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34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

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36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."

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Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same. and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold ……….

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7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day

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and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495: AIR 1981 SC 733).”

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Having relied upon the said judgment, it is urged by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 that it was incumbent upon the appellant to explain as to why he could not file appeal within 30 days and thereafter some period lapsed then he should have given explanation of such delay with cogent reason which has not been done in the present case.

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We find that in the application moved by the appellant seeking condonation of delay it is clearly stated that they had obtained the copy of order physically on 30.09.2025, while the order was passed on 25/29.09.2025 without waiting for the said order to be communicated to them promptly and thereafter they had to go through the bulky records forming part of the dispute and substantial number of orders were passed by the Respondent No.1- GCZMA, which needed to be gone through and in preparing this application for which time is consumed, which resulted in

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delay of 25 days. From this explanation we find that the applicant was not sleeping over the matter, rather they were alert and were busy in preparing the appeal promptly and thereafter they filed the same. Therefore, this delay could have occurred in the case in hand. The submissions that 24 other matters have already been filed by the applicant and the same set of documents have been used in each such case, this submission is illogical. We are not in agreement with the said argument and deem it appropriate to condone the said delay and allow this application/I.A.

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Put up this matter for further consideration on 08.09.2026.

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Justice Dinesh Kumar Singh, JM

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Dr. Sujit Kumar Bajpayee, EM

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August 13, 2026 I.A. NO.865 OF 2025 (WZ) IN APPEAL NO.626 OF 2025 (WZ) IN I.A. NO.351 OF 2026 (WZ) SAR

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Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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