appearing for the appellants made a valiant effort to convince this Court to show that Ex.A.1 only represented a loan transaction. But the challenge he faces is insurmountable, since the first defendant did not even choose to depose before the Court. So far as the title to the property is concerned, it cannot be denied that on the date of Ex.A.1, first defendant indeed is the owner of the suit properties. This apart in a suit for specific performance, want of title of the defendants cannot be a ground of defence, though in appropriate cases, it can be considered to ascertain whether an effective decree could be given. But those are circumstances where the Court probe the title more to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. So far as the present case is concerned, possibility of any such complication does not arise. Turning to the second question point raised, there is hardly any material to show that any Criminal Court has even attached the property. Even if there is an attachment over the property, it is for the plaintiff to sort it out. To state it differently, if the attachment is raised, the plaintiff stands to benefit. But, it does not ipso facto implies that a decree for specific performance should be denied merely because there is an attachment. However the executability of any such decree will depend upon the ultimate outcome which the order of attachment may lead to. There the plaintiff takes a chance.
