Dismissed

M/S.Raymond Pharmaceuticals v. Union of India

Madras HC2 Dec 2022WP/28593/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Company-name rectification was challenged on limitation grounds and because interim trademark relief had been refused. The court held the application timely on the next working day after a Sunday and treated rectification as independent of infringement proceedings. It upheld the direction to change the company's name and dismissed the writ petition.

What the court decided

AI extract

M/S.Raymond Pharmaceuticals Vs Union of India — Intellectual Property | Madras HC (2022)

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W.P.No.28593 of 2012

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

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DATED: 02.12.2022

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CORAM:

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.SATHISH KUMAR

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W.P.No. 28593 of 2012 and M.P.Nos. 1 & 2 of 2012

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M/s.Raymond Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 4/19, 2nd Street, Dr.Radhakrishnan Nagar, Thiruvanmiyur, Chennai - 600 041, Represented by its Director, Mrs.Sunitha Khanna

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.. Petitioner

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Vs.

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Union of India, Represented by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Nirman Bhavan, New Delhi - 110 011.

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The Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Southern Region, Haddows Road, Shastri Bhawan, Chennai - 600 006.

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M/s.Raymond Limited, Regd.Office Plot No.156/H No.2, Village Zadgaon, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra - 451 612 and H.O. New Hind House Narottam, Morarji Marg, Ballard Estate, Mumbai - 400 001.

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.. Respondents

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Prayer : Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records connected with the impugned order dated 17.07.2022 in REF.No.4/22/M-8/2010, passed by the 2nd respondent herein and quash the same as not sustainable in law.

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For Petitioner : Mr.N.Viswanathan

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For Respondents 1 & 2 : No appearance For Respondent 3 : Mr.T.K.Bhaskar

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O R D E R

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This writ petition has been filed challenging the order of the second respondent dated 17.07.2012, passed under Section 22 of the Companies Act, 1956 directing the petitioner to change the name of its registered company within a period of three months from the date of the said order.

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2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the writ petition is as follows:

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(i) The petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act,

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1956 as early as on 31.03.1983, in Karnataka and later shifted the registered office to Chennai, Tamilnadu in the year 1988.

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(ii) The petitioner company is primarily engaged in manufacturing and

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trading of pharmaceutical products/drugs under various trade names and also

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acting as contract manufacturer of drugs and formulations for the last 29 years having its manufacturing unit located at B-21, SIDCO Pharmaceutical Complex Athur Tiporrur near Chennai in the state of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner company has been marketing its goods under a brand name/trade name duly registered with the appropriate authority under the Trade Marks Act. The trade mark registration has been obtained by the company for its product since 2003.

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(iii) The petitioner company was named as Raymond Pharmaceutical Private Limited, on the understanding that it is a common Christian name and as per the Reader's Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary the word meant "mighty protection". Initially the representative of the petitioner company addressed a communication dated 23.07.82 to the Registrar of Company, Karnataka suggesting three words to be prefixed namely "Raymond" "Osmond" and "Esmond" all being Christian name having an identical meaning namely "Mighty name" or "God's protection". They received a reply dated 19.08.82 from the said authority informing the petitioner that there does not appear to be any objection to the registration of the company by the name

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"Raymond", and accordingly the petitioner company filed necessary application under the Companies Act, and got it registered on 21.03.1983 with the name "Raymond Pharmaceutical Private Limited".

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(iv) The petitioner ever since was carrying on its business uninterruptedly till they received a notice dated 03.10.2005 from the 3rd respondent and that too after 23 years of its existence. Many of their products being periodically advertised in various periodicals and journals. The use of the word "Raymond" by the petitioner company as pan of its corporate name trading style without the express authority/knowledge on its letterheads, invoices, receipts other stationeries, various medical preparations, advertisements at a merchant and/or manufacturer of such products, thereby creating an impression that these products are somehow connected or owned or licensed by the 3rd respondent herein and that in or about September 2005 it has also been brought to the knowledge of the said company that the Registrar of Trade Mark had published in the Trade Mark Journal No:1327 Suppl (4), dated 24.01.2005 and to desist from using the word "Raymond" by the petitioner company.

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(v ) Perusal of the said notice clearly revealed that the 3rd respondent had on its own had knowledge of the fact of the petitioner company using the name "Raymond" as its corporate name through the product manufactured and traded by it as well as the advertisement published by it in the periodicals/journals but also was informed of the publication of an advertisement made in the journal published in January 2005 by the Trade Mark authorities of the fact of the petitioner filing an application seeking the registration of a trade mark, which it claimed was brought to its knowledge in September 2005.

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(vi) The 3rd respondent herein consequent to the reply sent by the petitioner aforementioned filed original suit dated 26.12.2005 before the Bombay High Court in O.S.No.436/2006 against the petitioner company seeking a perpetual order of injunction from any manner manufacturing, marketing, selling, offering for sale, supplying, advertising or using in any manner or otherwise dealing with in relation to the word/mark "Raymond" or any other mark identical with or deceptively similar to the registered trade mark and copyright held by it. The petitioner was not sure of the date of acquiring the said knowledge and that there is every possibility of its getting

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the said knowledge even on a date prior to 12.09.2005.

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(vii) The Bombay High Court in the above suit passed orders on 15.02.2007 dismissing the said notice of motion holding the same to be devoid of any merits. The 3rd respondent filed an appeal against the said order, which also came to be dismissed. Thereafter the 3rd respondent moved a petition for special leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which also after hearing the counsels for the 3rd respondent herein refused to interfere with the judgment of the Bombay High Court.

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(viii) The 3rd respondent after being unsuccessful in its attempt to resist the petitioner company from using the word "Raymond" before the Bombay High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, belatedly filed an application on 13.09.2010 under Sections 20 & 22 of the Companies Act before the 2 respondent herein seeking rectification of the name of the petitioner company so as to remove the word "Raymond" there from.

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(ix) In the said application, the 3rd respondent after adverting to the

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various facts narrated above claimed for the first time that it came in

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knowledge of the fact that the Petitioner company was using the word

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"Raymond" in its corporate through an email dated 12.09.2005 and claimed to be received on 13.09.2005 and accordingly contended that it has fulfilled the conditions of limitation imposed under Section 22 of the Companies Act by filing application on the last date.

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(x) The petitioner sent its reply on 06.01.2011 to the 2nd respondent opposing the application moved by the 3rd respondent. The 2nd respondent without considering any of the factual and legal submissions made by the petitioner and without even verifying the correctness of the claim made by the 3rd respondent, passed the impugned order dated 17.07.2012 directing the petitioner to change its name within three months from the date of the order as per the procedure laid down under the Companies Act. The impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent has put the petitioner company to a disadvantageous potion since it was deprived of the good will earned for over 30 years in the pharmaceutical industry apart from causing severe and irreparable loss to it. Hence, challenging the same the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

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3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that

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the order of the second respondent is not maintainable in the eye of law. The

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3rd respondent has in fact filed a suit for infringement before the Bombay High Court and sought an injunction on the ground of infringement of Trade Mark "Raymond". A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has also held that the use of the mark "Raymond" by the petitioner herein was not detrimental to the 3rd respondent's rights in the name/mark "Raymond" and thus the 3rd respondent's contentions have been totally ignored. Aggrieved over the same, the 3rd respondent filed an appeal and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has dismissed the said appeal and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge. Thereafter a Special Leave Petition has been preferred by the 3rd respondent before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the same was also dismissed.

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4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted

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that in the same subject matter reiterating similar facts an application has been filed under the Companies Act for rectification, which has been considered by the second respondent. The second respondent has not recorded any finding that the name of the petitioner company is identical or too merely resembles

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the trademark owned by the 3rd respondent, however passed the impugned order dated 17.07.2012, against the petitioner. As the petitioner company is only a private limited company and do not attract any investment from the general public, to hold that the name "Raymond" as a prefix to the petitioner's company name result in misleading the general public.

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5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the second respondent ought to have held that the provisions contained in Section 22 of the Companies Act, cannot be extended beyond the right available to them in terms of Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act viz., the right on the goods and services for which the trade mark has been registered in their name.

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6. It is further contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that proviso contained in Section 22(1) read with Sub Section ii(b) of the Companies Act only provided a maximum of 12 months of a company's first registration or from the date of commencement of the Act whichever is later, the period of 5 years provided under the proviso cannot be interpreted so as to direct any company to change its name even after 29 years of its

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existence holding the same name, as it would otherwise lead to any person claiming knowledge within short span of time to extinguish the vested right available to such companies.

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7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the proviso to Section 22 of the Companies Act having only spoken about the date of notice of the registration of the company and not knowledge of the existence of the company and therefore the alleged knowledge through the purported email dated 12.09.2005 should not have been considered by the authorities. At any event, it is his contention that the application ought to have been filed within 5 years from the date of such knowledge, whereas, the application has been filed beyond the period of limitation and therefore the said application is not maintainable. Hence, according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the impugned order dated 17.07.2012, of the second respondent has to be set aside. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the following judgments:

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(i) Congruent Info-tech Pvt Ltd., Vs. The Regional Director, Southern Region, Ministry of Company Affairs in W.P.No.40035 of 2005 dated 16.10.2019.

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(ii) Maharashtra Housing Development Authority Vs. Shapoorji

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Pallonji and Company Private Limited reported in (2018) 3 SCC 13 .

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8. Whereas, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent submitted that civil proceedings is pending between the parties in respect of the trademark relating to goods and services, whereas Sections 22 and 20 of the Companies Act and Section 29 of the Trademarks Act operate under different spear. Therefore, mere pendency of the civil suit will not be a bar to exercise the power conferred under the Statute namely the Companies Act. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent would submit that the application has been filed to rectify the same within a period of five years. Since the last date of limitation being a Sunday, the application has been filed on the following working day i.e. on Monday, which has been properly considered by the 2nd respondent. Therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent, the contention of the writ petitioner that the application is barred by limitation has no legs to stand. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent relied on the following judgments:

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(i) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Anshuman Shukla reported in

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(2008) 7 SCC 487 .

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(ii) Surya Elevator and Escalators India Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Union of India

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reported in (2013) 177 Comp Cas 230 (Karn) .

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(iii) Montari Overseas Ltd. Vs. Montari Industries Ltd . reported in I LR 1997 Delhi 64 .

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(iv) K.G.Khosla Compressors Ltd., Vs. Khosla Extraktions Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 Delhi 181 .

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(v) CGMP Pharmaplan Pvt. Ltd., Regional Director reported in MANU/DE/2116/2010 .

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(vi) Mondelez Foods Private Limited Vs. The Regional Director reported in (2017) 204 Comp Cas 169 .

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9. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and also perused the entire materials available on record carefully.

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10. Challenge has been made to the impugned order dated 17.07.2012 passed by the second respondent, under Section 22 of the Companies Act directing the petitioner viz. "Raymond Pharmaceuticals Private Limited" registered in the State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai to change its name within a

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period of three months from the date of the said order.

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11. The 3rd respondent has filed an application claiming that the writ petitioner has registered his company in the name "Raymond Pharmaceuticals Private Limited" in the State of Tamil Nadu much after the registration of the trademark of the 3rd respondent. The third respondent was original incorporated in the year 1925 under the Companies Act, 1913 in the name "The Raymond Woollen Mills Limited" having its registered office at 'Plot No.156/H.No.2, Village Zadgaon, Ratnagiri - 415 612, Maharashtra. It appears that subsequently the 3rd respondent changed its name as "Raymond Limited" with effect from 31.03.1995. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent is the registered proprietor of the mark "Raymond" in Indian and abroad. In India it has registered the mark "Raymond" under various Clauses including 3, 19, 23, 24, 25, 35 and 40. To substantiate these aspects, necessary documents have been filed in the typed set of papers and these facts are also not disputed.

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12. The writ petitioner appears to have registered the company in the name "Raymond Pharmaceuticals Private Limited" on 31.03.1983 much after the company of the 3rd respondent has been registered in the year 1925 and

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the 3rd respondent has also acquired the trademark name in India and also abroad under various clauses. It is the case of the 3rd respondent that they came to know about the registration of a company in the name of the 3rd respondent viz., "Raymond" on 12.09.2005 by the petitioner and thereafter immediately within the period of 5 years, the 3rd respondent has filed an application under Section 22 of the Companies Act for rectification.

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13. The contention of the writ petitioner before the 2nd respondent is that an interim order has been passed in favour of the petitioner in a Civil Suit filed by the 3rd respondent and the same has reached finality. Now the 3rd respondent cannot seek for rectification and further his civil suit is pending and under such circumstance the application filed by the 3rd respondent ought not to have been decided by the 2nd respondent.

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14. Section 20 of the Companies Act, 1956 deals with companies not to

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be registered with undesirable names. Section 20 reads as follows:

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"Section 20. COMPANIES NOT TO BE -- REGISTERED WITH UNDESIRABLE NAMES,

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(1) No company shall be registered by a name which, in the opinion of the Central Government, is undesirable.

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(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, a name which is identical with, or too nearly resembles,-

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(i) The name by which a company in existence has been previously registered, or

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(ii) a registered trade mark, or a trade mark which is subject of an application for registration, of any other person under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, may be deemed to be undesirable by the Central Government within the meaning of sub-section (1).

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(3) The Central Government may, before deeming a name as undesirable under clause (ii) of sub-section (2), consult the Registrar of Trade Marks. "

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15. A perusal of the above Section makes it clear that the name by which a company is in existence has been previously registered or a registered trade mark, or a trade mark which is subject of an application for registration, of any other person under the Trade Marks Act, such company may be deemed to be undesirable by the Central Government within the meaning of sub-section (1).

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16. Section 22 of the Companies Act deals with Rectification of name

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of company, the said section reads as follows:

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"Section 22. RECTIFICATION OF NAME OF

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-- COMPANY,

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(1) If, through inadvertence or otherwise, a company on its first registration or on its registration by a new name, is registered by a name which-

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(i) in the opinion of the Central Government, is identical with, or too nearly resembles, the name by which a company in existence has been previously registered, whether under this Act or any previous companies law, the first-mentioned company, or

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(ii) on an application by a registered proprietor of a trade mark, is in the opinion of the Central Government identical with, or too nearly resembles, a registered trade mark of such proprietor under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, such company,

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(a) may, by ordinary resolution and with the previous approval of the Central Government signified in writing, change its name or new name ; and

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(b) shall, if the Central Government so directs within twelve months of its first registration or registration by its new name, as the case may be, or within twelve months of the commencement of this

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Act, whichever is later, by ordinary resolution and with the previous approval of the Central Government signified in writing, change its name or new name within a period of three months from the date of the direction or such longer period as the Central Government may think fit to allow.

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Provided that no application under clause (ii) made by a registered proprietor of a trade mark after five years of coming to notice of registration of the company shall be considered by the Central Government.

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(2) If a company makes default in complying with any direction given under clause (b) of subsection (1), the company, and every officer who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues."

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17. A perusal of the above Section makes it clear that an application by a registered proprietor of a trademark can be made for rectification on the ground that the registered proprietor's trademark is identical with or too nearly resembles with the registered trademark of such registered company. The proviso to the said Section makes it clear that after the knowledge of existence

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of any company, any application for rectification ought to have been made within a period of five years from the date of notice of registration of the company.

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18. It is the specific case of the 3rd respondent that they acquired the knowledge of the writ petitioner's company only on 12.09.2005 and thereafter, they filed an application within a period of five years. As, 12.09.2005 being a Sunday, they filed the application on 13.09.2005, being the very next working day. Therefore, it is the contention of the 3rd respondent that the application filed by them is within time.

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19. It is relevant to note that the 2nd respondent has conducted enquiry and also by following due procedure adjudicated the matter. Therefore, it had all the trappings of the Court while conducting proceedings and Limitation Act will certainly be applicable. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Anshuman Shukla reported in (2008) 7 SCC 487 has held that Administrative Bodies and Tribunal if in fact having the characteristics, functions and powers of a Court and therefore for all intents and purposes they are Courts.

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20. It is not disputed that the application has been submitted to the second respondent on 13.09.2005 and it is also not disputed that the limitation period clearly ends on 12.09.2005. It is also not disputed that 12.09.2005 is a Sunday. As 12.09.2005 being a Sunday, the 3rd respondent naturally submitted the application on the next working day and therefore the application has been filed within the period of five years. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the limitation has expired and the application of the 3rd respondent ought not to have been entertained beyond the period of limitation i.e., after five years cannot be countenanced.

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21. The next submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the civil court is seized of the matter in respect of trademark and infringement suit, the interim order sought for by the 3rd respondent has not been granted by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, which has been ultimately confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

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22. Section 29 of the Trademarks Act deals with registered trademarks

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relating to goods and services in respect of which trademarks is registered. When there is infringement, the registered proprietor may sue for infringement. Whereas Section 22 of the Companies Act deals with rectification of name of the company. The two Acts act in different field. Whereas the Trademarks Act deals with infringement relating to goods and services, whereas Section 22 of the Companies Act deals with rectification of the name of the company which are identical with or too nearly resembles the registered trademark of any proprietor under the Trademarks Act.

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23. Therefore, merely because an interim order was not in favour of the third respondent in the civil suit, that will not have any relevance to decide the application filed under Section 22 of the Companies Act since both Section 29 of the Trademarks Act and Section 22 of the Companies Act operate in different field and independent of each other.

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24. In this regard, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Surya Elevators and Escalators India Private Limited Vs. Union of India

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reported in (2013) 177 Comp Cas 230 (Karn) has held that mere pendency of a civil suit has no relevance to decide an application under Section 22 of the

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Companies Act and the contention that pendency of civil proceedings under Section 22 of the Companies Act ought not to have been entertained was also rejected.

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25. The Delhi High Court in Montari Overseas Ltd., Vs. Montari Industries Ltd., reported in ILR 1997 Delhi 64 has held that the remedy under Section 22 of the Companies Act and other common law will operate in different fields.

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26. The Delhi High Court in K.G.Khosla Compressors Ltd., Vs. Khosla Extrakting Ltd reported in AIR 1986 Delhi 181 has held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is independent of and separate from that of the Central Government under Section 20 of the Companies Act.

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27. The Delhi High Court in CGMP Pharmaplan Pvt. Ltd., Vs.

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Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs reported in MANU/DE/2116/2010 has held in paragraph 17 as follows:

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"17. The decision in Montari Overseas Limited makes it clear that a civil court exercising its powers in terms of the CPC and determining in a

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passing-off action if one name is confusingly deceptive or similar to another name, is exercising a jurisdiction independent of the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 in respect of the registering of a company"s name. The latter is a power vested in the central government in terms of Sections 20 and 22 of the Act. While it is true that the Respondent No. 1 cannot approach the case as it would in a trade mark dispute, it is nevertheless required to come to the conclusion whether the name of which the registration is sought or has been granted too nearly resembles the name of another company. Mr. Chandra is right in his contention that the powers of the central government under Section 22 of the Act are wider inasmuch as there is no need to examine whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion. It is enough to examine if the name registered too nearly resembles another registered name. The Respondent No.2 has been able to show that both names too nearly resemble each other."

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28. The Delhi High Court in Mondelez Foods Private Limited Vs. The

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Regional Director (North), Ministry of Corporate Affairs reported in 2017

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SCC Online Del 9219 in paragraph 12 has held as follows:

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"12. Section 22 of the Act is not happily

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worded. Whereas Section 22(1)(i) of the Act, does not indicate that the Central Government is precluded from directing change of name in case the same is found to be undesirable; Section 22(1)(ii)(b) of the Act indicates that the company with an undesirable name is obliged to change its name only on receipt of such directions within a period of twelve months from the date of registration. Further, the introduction of proviso to Section 22(1) must also be given some meaning; plainly, if the owner of a registered trade mark is not precluded from making a complaint within a period of five years of becoming aware of a company with a deceptively similar name, the power of the RD to examine and address such complaint should be read in the statutory provision. However, it is not necessary to examine the same in view of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 which are now in force. In terms of Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Central Government is empowered to issue directions to a company to change its name, if it is similar to the name of a company registered prior in point of time......"

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29. The interim order dated 15.02.2007 has been passed by the Bombay

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High Court in Civil Suit No.437 of 2006 mainly on the ground that the

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petitioner herein used the trademark name "Raymond" not in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the 3rd respondent's trade mark is registered since the petitioner did not use it on any of the 3rd respondent's products. Hence, the use is not in such a manner as is likely to be taken as being used as a trademark. The above order has been passed taking note of the fact the nature of good and services rendered by the contesting parties. Therefore, merely because injunction was rejected in favour of the 3rd respondent, it cannot be said that he has no remedy under the Companies Act. As the Companies Act operate in a different field, what is required to be seen in the Companies Act is whether the trademark is identical with or too nearly resembles a registered trademark. Therefore, mere assumption of identical name or name resembles a registered trademark is suffice to take action under Section 22 of the Companies Act and it is in no way dealt with goods or services.

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30. Therefore, this Court is of the view that when an application has been filed within the period of five years and the name "Raymond" resembled with the name of the third respondent, the order passed by the second respondent cannot be faulted.

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31. It is yet another contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that since the application has now been filed on the Online portal, the same ought to have been filed on 12.09.2005 itself. It is relevant to note that it is not a mere submission just like e-tender, it is an application to be submitted before the authority within the relevant period of time. Even the application are filed on-line, it cannot be taken as filing since the entire office of the 2nd respondent was not functioning during Sunday, therefore it cannot be said that Limitation Act will not be applicable. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time in legal proceedings. Therefore, the last day being a holiday (Sunday), the filling of an application on the very next working day was in order and within the period of five years. The Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Maharashtra Housing Development Authority Vs. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company reported in (2018) 3 SCC 13 relates to the filing of e-tender. On the date of submission of the e-tender, there was enough time and on that context the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that e-tender ought to have been filed within time and the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

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32.

32. Further, Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes it clear that the period prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the date when the Court re-opens. Therefore in the given case the relevant date expired on Sunday and on the very next working day the application has been filed by the 3rd respondent and the same has been entertained by the 2nd respondent. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the limitation period has expired has no legs to stand.

¶194

33. Considering the entire order passed by the second respondent, this Court do not find any illegality or irregularity in the same. The second respondent has rightly invoked the powers under Section 22 of the Companies Act and the 3rd respondent company being incorporated in the year 1925 and it has registered the trademark under various Clauses including 3, 19, 23, 24, 25, 35 and 40. Whereas, the petitioner's company has been registered in the year 1983 much after the registration of the 3rd respondent company in the year 1925.

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W.P.No.28593 of 2012

34.

34. Such view the matter, the impugned order dated 17.07.2012, passed by the second respondent directing the petitioner Company to change its name does not require any interference and accordingly this writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.

02.12.2022

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