A village administrative officer challenged his conviction for demanding and accepting a bribe to issue chitta. The court rejected objections concerning sanction and witness credibility, held demand and acceptance proved, and dismissed the appeal, confirming the conviction and directing service of the remaining sentence.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
BAIL SLIP
The appellant herein/Accused Viz. A.Selvaraj, S/O. Arunachalam, was directed to be released on bail as per orderof this court dated 05.08.2016 made in Crl MP. No.8227 of 2016 in Crl A No.605 of 2016.
IN THE HIGH COURT JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Pronounced on :.19.06.2018
State rep.by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Dharmapuri. .. Respondent/Complainant
Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374(2) of Criminal Procedure Code praying to set aside the judgment dated 18.07.2016 in Spl.C.C.No.7 of 2008 on the file of the Special Court cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dharmapuri.
For Respondent :Mr.K.Prabakaran, APP
This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is directed against the judgment dated 18/07/2016 passed in Spl.C.C.No.7 of 2008 on the file of the Special Courtcum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dharmapuri.
2.The accused is the appellant herein. Aggreived by the judgment of conviction holding him guilty of offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the present appeal is filed.
3.Prosecution case as projected through its witnesses: The defacto complainant Thiru.K.Shanmugam, S/o Kuppan (PW-
5.The defacto complainant Thiru.Shanmugam (PW-2) and the decoy witness Mr.Indrajith (PW-3) reached the Village Administrative Office, Kokkarapatti Village on 24/12/2002 at about 3.00 pm. The accused was not at his seat. They waited for the arrival of the accused. At about 5.00 p.m., the accused came to the office. On seeing PW-3 along with PW-2, the accused enquired with PW-2 about PW-3 and thereafter, asked whether PW-2 has brought the money. PW-2 answered in affirmative and gave the tainted money of Rs.500/- to the accused. The accused received it and kept it in his shirt pocket. PW-2 and PW-3 left the place and gave the pre-arranged signal to the trap team waiting outside. On receipt of the signal, the trap team led by PW-7, Thiru.Balan entered the office of the accused. Phenolphthalein test conducted both hands of accused proved positive. When he asked about the money received from PW-2, the accused took out Rs.500/- (five 100 rupees notes – M.O. 1 series) from his left side shirt pocket and produced it to PW-7. The numbers in the
currency produced by the accused were compared with the numbers noted in the entrustment mahazar and found tallied. The shirt ( M.O.7) of the accused was recovered after giving an alternate shirt purchased at nearby shop. The pocket portion was subjected to the phenolpthalien test and the resultant solution was collected separately. Mahazar Ex.P-4 was drawn for the recovery of Rs.500/- (M.O. 1 series), the samples solutions of the hands wash and shirt wash (M.Os. 4 to 6) and the shirt of the accused marked as M.O.7. The rough sketch Ex.P-5 drawn at the time of trap indicating the SOC.
The trial Court framed charges under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution has examined 11 witneses. 18 Exhibits and 7 Material Objects were marked. After affording opportunity to the accused to explain the evidence against him, found accused guilty of charges under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, sentenced the accused to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to undergo 3 months Simple Imprisonment for each of the offences. Trial Court ordered the substantive sentence to run concurrently and the period of sentence already undergone to be set off.
Counsels:
The judgment is impugned on the ground that, the trial Court failed to see the order according sanction to prosecute is a defective and suffers non-application of mind. In Ex.P-1, it is mentioned that the Sanctioning Authority [PW-1] before according sanction carefully examined the materials such as, the copy of the First Information Report, Statement of witnesses and
Thiru.A.Selvaraj (accused). The statement of the accused mentioned in the sanction order Ex.P-1 has not been seen the light of the day. It is mandatory under Rule 47 of the Vigilence Manual to afford opportunity to the officer caught in the trap to explain about the tainted money he received. The explanation so made has to be recorded and placed before the Sanctioning Authority for him to apply his mind independently before according sanction. In this case, Ex.P-1 was prepared by the prosecution and PW-1 has signed on the dotted lines of the sanction order without applying his mind and without perusing documents. In alternate, it must be, the prosecution had burged the explanation offered by the accused from the scrutiny of the Court knowing that it will prejudice the case of the prosecution. Either way the case of the prosecution ought to fall.
9.PW-2 admits that he lodged the complaint against the accused at the instigation of the Village Assistant Thiru.Gopal [PW-4] and the money used for trap was given to him by one Thiru.Vajiram. Whereas, the case of the prosecution is that, the defacto complainant brought with him the trap money, when he came to the Deputy Superintendent of Police office to give the complaint. This material contradiction makes the defacto complainant as an unreliable witness. Admittedly, he is an accused in ganja case and the other IPC offences. He was frequently troubling the accused to issue certificates to get bail. The accused protested and refused to give certificate. Disgrundled by that he has lodged a false complaint as if the accused refused to give Chitta.
5 and PW-10 is sufficient enough to expose the falsehood of the prosecution case.
2002, he was advised to get chitta is spoken by PW-2 and corroborated by PW-7 the Secretary to the Pariyapatti Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society. The fact that PW-2 owns land at Kokkarapatti and Erumiyampatti, is proved through Ex.P-10 sale deed and 'A' Registers of the respective villages which are marked as Exs.P-7 and P-8. The accused, who was the Village Administrative Officer of the village initially refused to issue chitta to the complainant on the ground that he did not possess patta exclusively in his name without Sub Division. To give chitta he demanded bribe of Rs.500/- on 13/12/2002 and 23/12/2002. PW-2 in his oral complaint as well as in his deposition had mentioned about the earlier demand of bribe by the accused. Omissions of certain details which are not insignificant and does not go to the root of the charge, will not render the evidence of PW-2 unreliable. It is to be taken note that the witness is a rustic villager being examined in chief after 7 years (18/09/2009) and cross examined one and half years thereafter (20/04/2011), recalled again after five years to cross examine.
The first attack on the impugned judgement is about the sanction order Ex.P-1 where the witness PW-1 refers about the statement of the accused, which is not before the Court. Whether there was any statement given by the accused at the time of trap at all is not clear. Though the Vigilence Manual Rule 47 say, in a trap proceedings the statement of the accused ought to be obtained. The said direction is only a procedural guidelines to the officer, who conduct the trap. It does not have a trappings of a legislation. It is only Directory in nature and not Mandatory. Failure of recording the statement or failure to
place the accused statement may cause doubt but not nugget the proceedings in entirety.
“21. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Investigating Officer has not recorded the 161 statement of the petitioner/A1, after the trap proceeding and the same is fatal. To substantiate his argument he relied upon the following decisions:
21.1. In the unreported decision of this Court made in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.189 of 2005, dated 25.04.2011, at paragraphs 34 and 35, it was held as follows:
“34. Though a Single Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 2004 Crl.L.J. Page 3754 after taking into consideration the earlier judgments of this Court reported in 2002 (1) Mad LW (Cri) 136 : (2001 Cri LJ 4139) G.A.Ethiraj v. State, has held that rules in Vigilance Manual are only administrative and nonobservance of the same cannot be termed as mandatory violation, which would affect the validity of the prosecution, this Court is of the considered opinion that certain procedure safeguards had also been given to the accused to explain the circumstances immediately after he was kept in the trap for the alleged bribe money, the relevant provision in the DVAC Manual namely Rule No.47 should have been complied with by the Appellant/Investigating Officers in a letter and spirit. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a decision reported in (2008) 3 page 484 after taking into consideration paragraphs 704 and 705 of Railway Vigilance Manual has held that if the safeguards are provided to avoid false implication of the Railway Employee, the procedures laid down therein, could not have been given a
complete go bye. The earlier decision reported in (2007) 1 SCC page 630, CBI Manual which is similar to that of DVAC Manual came up for consideration with regard to the preliminary enquiry and the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration Vineet Narain's case reported in (1998) 1 SCC page 226 wherein it has been held that it is imperative that the CBI adheres scrupulously the provisions in the Manual in relating to its investigative functions like raids, seizure and arrests and any deviation from the established procedure should be viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken against the official concerned and thus approving the procedures contemplated under CBI Manual for preliminary enquiry before registration of a regular case.
21.2. In the decision of this Court reported in CDJ 2011 MHC 6618, Thulasiram v. State through the Inspector of Police, it was held at paragraph 12 as follows:
“12. The learned counsel for the appellant places strong reliance upon a recent decision of this Court rendered by M.Sathyanarayanan.J. in Crl.Appeal (MD) No.189 of 2005 [State rep.by Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti- Corruption, Dindigul v. P.Paraman] on 25.04.2011 in which the learned Judge has referred and followed a decision of the Supreme Court as regards observing the settled procedures contained in the manual which is earmarked for the Departmental officials in the
matter of investigation in the trap cases. It is contended that as per Rule of 47 of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption Manual, immediate version of the accused after trap assumes great importance and non-recording of the statement of the accused immediately after trap, under Rule 47 of the DVAC Manual is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Rule 47 of the DVAC Manual reads as follows:
"47. Questioning of Accused Officer (1) Questioning of the Accused Officer and recovery of the bribe money should be after the phenolphthalein test. If the test proves positive, arrest of the Accused Officer may be made and recovery of notes effected on the basis of Accused Officer's statement, if any. In this event, the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act would be available to the prosecution. (2) Immediately after recovery and seizure of the bribe money or article, the Accused Officer must be further interrogated and his detailed statement separately recorded in the case diary under section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. If there is any need to examine him still further in the light of any fresh evidence that might come up later during the investigation of the case, the same can be done at a later stage and further statement of the Accused Officer recorded. [DVAC Circular Memo No.33979/VAC-4/76, dated 10th December, 1976]"
21.3. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent relied upon the decision reported in 2013 (1) CWC 136, Duraimurugan v. State, rep by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Vellore, wherein it was held that though the Investigating Agency did not comply with the procedure contemplated in the DVAC Manual, the accused cannot take advantage of non-
following of procedure contemplated under the Manual and it is for the concerned department to take action against concerned officer for alleged deviation. It is appropriate to incorporate paragraphs 38 and 39 of the said decision:
“38. A careful reading of the above cited decision would disclose that the accused cannot make any complaint with regard to the nonfollowing of the procedures contemplated under the Vigilance Manual and as per the decision rendered in Vineet Narain's case, cited supra, any deviation from the established procedure should be viewed seriously and severe disciplinary action taken against the officials concerned. 39. Assuming for the sake of argument that the respondent has failed to follow Rule 76 of the DVAC Manual in letter and spirit, it is for the concerned department to take action against the concerned official and it is not open to the writ petitioner/appellant to take advantage of the same. Moreover, the respondent in the counter-affidavit in the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.8931 of 2012 as well as the present writ petition in W.P.No.13788 of 2012 took a specific stand that they had followed the Vigilance Manual and accordingly, issued the Final Opportunity Notice as per Proforma 28 of the said Manual. In the light of the stand taken by the respondent in the counter-affidavit in the above said writ petitions, it cannot be said that the respondent/investigating officer has not followed the provisions of the DVAC Manual.”
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, - (a) In the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is
not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;
(b) In the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
(c) In the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-
(a) No finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission, irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned thereby;
(b) No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;
(c) No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Explanation: For the purposes of this Section, -
(a) Error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
(b) A sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.”
“Since the validity of Sanction depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent
mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority not to sanction was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution."
"...The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned."
had brought it to the notice of the Court during the trial. Even when opportunity to explain the evidence against him was afforded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has not placed any explanation before the trial Court, except filing written argument. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court judgment needs reversal in view of defect in sanction order is not sustainable both on law and facts.
The learned counsel for the appellant content that PW-2 had not specifically stated in his chief examination that the accused made his first demand of bribe of Rs.500/- on 13/12/2002. He erred in mentioning the date of trap as 12/02/2003 in the cross examination. This witness is wholely unreliable because he was a jail bird and he had animosity with the accused/appellant. These submissions are not points relevant to shake the root of the prosecution case. Neither these contradictions or facts taken in isolation or cummulatively are sufficient to dislodge the strong foundation of the prosecution case laid through the documentary and occular evidence.
“Before parting with the case we are constrained to reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and jurisprudentially abominable....”
in it.
presumption, the Hon'ble Supreme court in M. Narsinga Rao Versus State of Andhra Pradesh reported in CDJ 2000 SC 630 would say that:
“In Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana, 1974(4) SCC 560, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench, observed that the very fact of an Assistant Station Master being in possession of the marked currency notes against an allegation that he demanded and received that amount is "res ipsa loquitur." In this context the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court (R.S. Sarkaria and O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.) in Hazari Lal v. Delhi (Delhi Administration), 1980(2) SCC 390 can usefully be referred to. A police constable was convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on the allegation that he demanded and received Rs. 60/- from one Sriram who was examined as PW-3 in that case. In the trial court PW-3 resiled from his previous statement and was declared hostile by the prosecution. The official witnesses including PW-8 have spoken to the prosecution version. The court found that phenolphthalein smeared currency notes were recovered from the pocket of the police constable. A contention was raised in the said case that in absence of direct evidence to show that the police constable demanded or accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the Act of 1947 could be drawn merely on the strength of recovery of the marked currency notes from the said police constable. Dealing with the said contention Chinnappa Reddy, J. (who spoke for the two-Judge Bench) observed as follows : "It is not necessary that the passing of money should be proved by direct evidence. It may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. The events which followed in quick succession in the present case lead to the only inference that the money was obtained by the accused from PW3. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case. One
of the illustrations to Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that the court may presume that a person who is in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft, is either the Thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. So too, in the facts and circumstances of the present case the court may presume that the accused who took out the currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the wall had obtained them from PW3, who a few minutes earlier was shown to have been in possession of the notes. Once we arrive at the finding that the accused had obtained the money from PW3, the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately attracted. The presumption is of course rebuttable but in the present case there is no material to rebut the presumption. The accused was, therefore, rightly convicted by the Courts below."
“14.The indispensability of the proof of demand and illegal gratification in establishing a charge under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, has by now engaged the attention of this Court on umpteen occasions. In A. Subair vs. State of Kerala, this Court propounded that the prosecution in order to prove the charge under the above provisions has to establish by proper proof, the demand and acceptance of the illegal gratification and till that is accomplished, the accused should be considered to be innocent. Carrying this enunciation further, it was exposited in State of Kerala vs. C.P. Rao that mere recovery by itself of the amount said to have been paid by way of illegal gratification would not prove the charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained. 14. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra), this Court took note of its verdict in B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. underlining that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It was recounted as well that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. Not only the proof of demand thus was held to be an indispensable essentiality and an inflexible statutory mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it was held as well qua Section 20 of the Act, that any presumption thereunder would arise only on such proof of demand. This Court thus in P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) on a survey of its earlier decisions on the pre-requisites of Sections 7 and 13 and the proof thereof summed up its conclusions as hereunder: “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (emphasis supplied)”
“10. We are aware of the position in law, as laid down in cases involving the relevant provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, that mere recovery of the tainted amount is not a sine qua non for holding a person guilty under Sections 7, 11 and 13 of the Act. This Court has observed in Narendra Champaklal Trivedi Vs. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 80, that there has to be evidence adduced by the prosecution that bribe was demanded or paid voluntarily as bribe. The demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The prosecution is duty bound to establish that there was illegal offer of bribe and acceptance thereof and it has to be founded on facts. The same point of law has been reiterated by this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma, (2013) 14 SCC 153. In the present case the factum of the demand and acceptance has been proved by the recovery of the tainted amount and the factum of there being a demand has also been stated. The essential ingredient of demand and acceptance has been proved by the prosecution based on the factum of the case. It has been witnessed by the key eye witnesses and their testimonies have also been corroborated by other material witnesses. The offence under Section7 of P.C. Act has been confirmed by the unchallenged recovery of the tainted amount. Thus, it is our obligation to raise the presumption mandated by Section 20 of P.C. Act. It is for the accused respondent to rebut the presumption, by adducing direct or circumstantial evidence, that the money recovered was not a reward or motive as mentioned under Section 7 of the P.C. Act.”
Sd/-
Assistant Registrar(CS-VI)
//True Copy//
Sub Assistant Registrar
ari
To
1.The Special Court-cum-Chief Magistrate,
Dharmapuri
2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance & Anti Corruption,
Dharmapuri.
3. The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.
Copy to
The Section Officer,
Criminal Section, High Court, Madras.
Judgment made in
Crl.A.No.605 of 2016
mr(CO)
TR(26/06/2018)
3 issues framed by the court
Did non-recording of the accused's statement under Rule 47 or the sanction order's reference to that statement invalidate the prosecution?
Did discrepancies and objections to the prosecution witnesses undermine proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification?
Was the presumption under Section 20 attracted and left unrebutted?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
G.Mohanasundaram Vs State and othersRelied on¶40
G.Mohanasundaram Vs State and others reported in CDJ 2015 MHC 3278
Vineet NarainRelied on¶58
Vineet Narain's case
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan vs. State of GujaratRelied on¶74
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1997 SC 3400 · Who else cites this
Mohd. Iqubal Ahmed vs. State of A.PRelied on¶78
Mohd. Iqubal Ahmed vs. State of A.P, reported in AIR 1979 SC 677 · Who else cites this
Vinothkumar -vs- State of PunjabRelied on¶89
Vinothkumar -vs- State of Punjab reported in CDJ 2015 SC 115
M. Narsinga Rao Versus State of Andhra PradeshRelied on¶98
M. Narsinga Rao Versus State of Andhra Pradesh reported in CDJ 2000 SC 630
Mukhatiar Singh [since deceased] through his legal representative vs. State of PunjabApplied¶102
Mukhatiar Singh [since deceased] through his legal representative vs. State of Punjab reported in [2017 8 SCC 136] · Who else cites this
State of Andhra Pradesh v P.VenkateshwarluApplied¶107
State of Andhra Pradesh v P.Venkateshwarlu (2015 (3) MLJ (crl.) 225 (SC))
4 provisions across 2 enactments
A.Selvaraj
State rep.by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Dharmapuri.
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
