Dismissed

Binu v. Travancore Devaswom Board

Kerala HC17 Feb 2023WP(C)/4307/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioners challenged a ban imposed by a local temple managing committee (Karayogam) barring them from temple activities. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on maintainability, holding that the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact regarding civil rights in writ proceedings and must refer such matters to civil courts.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed on the ground of maintainability as the Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of facts in writ proceedings.

Binu Vs Travancore Devaswom Board — Writ and Judicial Review | Kerala HC (2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR

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FRIDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2023 / 28TH MAGHA, 1944
W.P.(C)NO.4307OF 2023

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PETITIONERS:

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1 BINU AGED 36 YEARS, S/OVISWANATHAN, RESIDING AT MANAKAKDAMPALLIL, EREZHA SOUTH P.O., CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA

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DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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2 THUSHAR,

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AGED 31 YEARS, S/O KOCHUKUTTAN, RESIDING AT
PUSHPATHADATHIL HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA
DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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3 AKHIL SIVAN, AGED 27 YEARS, S/O SIVAN, RESIDING AT PANOOR HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O., CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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4 ABHILASH,
AGED 39 YEARS, S/O GOPALAKRISHNAN, RESIDING AT
PANARAYIL HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA

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DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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5 ABHILASH,

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AGED 35 YEARS, S/O ASHOKAN, RESIDING AT
OMANASSERIL HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA
DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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6 ARAVINDAKSHAN AGED 42 YEARS, S/O GOPALAKRISHNAN, RESIDING AT

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

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PANARAYIL HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA

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DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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7 PRINCE,

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AGED 46 YEARS, S/O NARAYANANKUTTY, RESIDING AT
PUTHMANGALATH HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA

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DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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8 SUBHASH,
AGED 47 YEARS, S/O BALAKRISHNA PILLAI, RESIDING
AT MALAMEL HOUSE, EREZHA SOUTH P.O.,
CHETTIKULANGARA, MAVELIKKARA, ALAPPUZHA

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DISTRICT, PIN – 690106.

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BY ADVS.GODWIN JOSEPH
HARIGOVIND S.NAIR

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RESPONDENTS:

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1 TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DEVASWOM BOARD HEADQUARTERS, NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695003.

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2 THE DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, DEVASWOM BOARD HEADQUARTERS, NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN – 695003.

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3 THE DEVASWOM ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, MAVELIKKARA GROUP, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, MAVELIKKARA, PIN – 690103.

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4 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, CHETTIKULANGARA DEVASWOM, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, MAVELIKKARA, PIN – 690101.

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5 SREE DEVI VILASAM HINDU MATHA CONVENTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY (TEMPLE ADVISORY COMMITTEE), CHETTIKULANGARA TEMPLE,

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

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CHETTTIKULANGARA, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN –
690106.

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6 EREZHA THEKKU HAINDAVA KARAYOGAM
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, REG. NO.
A3138/06, KUTHIRAMALIKA, EREZHA THEKKU P.O.,
CHETTIKULAGARA, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, PIN –
690106.

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R1 TO R4 BY SRI G.BIJU, STANDING COUNSEL,
TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD

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OTHER PRESENT:

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SRI S.RAJMOHAN, SR.GOVERNMENT PLEADER

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THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 17.02.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

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JUDGMENT

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Anil K. Narendran, J.

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The petitioners, who are residing at Erezha Thekku in Chettikulangara, within the limits of the 6^th respondent Erezha Thekku Haindava Karayogam, have filed this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a declaration that the inaction of respondents 1 to 4, i.e., the Travancore Devaswom Board and its officials, in taking action against the 6^th respondent Karayogam for prohibiting the petitioners from taking part in the religious activities of Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple is highly illegal and unjust and that, the proceedings of the 6^th respondent Karayogam, as evidenced by Ext.P5, banning the petitioners from taking part in religious rituals of Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple and other activities of the said Karayogam, without reasonable cause and in violation of the principles of natural justice, is illegal and unsustainable. The petitioners have also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 2 to 4 to issue necessary directions to the 5^th respondent Sree Devi Vilasam Hindu Matha Convention and the 6^th respondent Karayogam to stop all proceedings in Ext.P5, as against the petitioners.

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Going by the averments in the Writ Petition, the petitioners are feeling aggrieved by the decision taken by the 6^th respondent Karayogam in its general body meeting held on 24.04.2022, whereby the petitioners are restrained from participating in the activities of the Karayogam, for a period of five years. The document marked as Ext.P5 is the relevant extract of the notice of the general body meeting of the Karayogam, which was held on 08.01.2023, to consider the report and income and expenditure accounts of the Karayogam for the year 2022. The decisions taken on 24.04.2022 in the general body of the Karayogam forms part of Ext.P5.

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Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and also the learned Standing Counsel for the Travancore Devaswom Board for respondents 1 to 4.

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The relevant extract of the decision taken in the general body of the 6^th respondent Karayogam held on 24.04.2022, insofar as it relates to the petitioners, is reproduced hereunder;

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" ചെ്ടികുള്ങ ര ഭഗവതിയുചെ ഉ്഼ വ ആഘ ോഷ്ങ ൾ്ക് പരിസമോപ്തികുറി്കു്ന പരമപ്പധോന ഉ്഼ വമോയ അശ്വതി അെിയ്ᩌ ിര ദിന്ᩈ ിൽ ഈഘരഴ ചത്ക് കരയിൽ നി്നുും അഘയോധയ എ്ന സും െനയുചെ ഘനതൃതവ്ᩈ ിൽ ,

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കൺവൻഷൻ അശ്വതി ചക്ടു കോഴ്ചയിൽ വില്ക് ചവ്ച ി്ടു്ᩦ ഫ്ഘളോ്ട് ഡി.ചെ പോ്ടു മോയി ഘവ്മ നോ്ട് മു്കു മുതൽ ര വചര ഗതോഗത ചെ്ടികുള്ങ ഘേപ്തും പൂർ്ᩆ മോയുും തെ്ᩰും ഉ്ᩂ ോ്ക ി മദയപി്ച് മഘദോ്മ്ᩈ രോയി വഴിയോപ്ത്ക ോചര അസഭയും പറ്ഞ് ഘേപ്ത പരിസര്ᩈ് എ്ᩈ ി ഭ്വ െന്ങ ളുമോയി സും ർഷും ഉ്ᩂ ോ്കു കയുും അതിനുഘശ്ഷും മോരകോയുധ്ങ ളുമോയി പവിപ്തമോയ ഘപോളവിള്കു നിർ്മ ോണും നെ്നു ചകോ്ᩂ ിരിച്ക വിള്ക ിൻ െുവ്ടിൽ എ്ᩈ ി ഘപോളവിള്ക ിന്ചറ നിർ്മ ോ ണ്ᩈ ിൽ ഏർചെ്ടിരു്ന കരഘയോഗും ഭോരവോഹികഘളയുും തിരുവോഭരണഘപെകും എെു്കു്ന തിനോയി പ്വതചമെു്ᩈ് കോെു ചക്ടിയിരു്ന വചര പ്കൂരമോയി മർ്ദി്കു കയുും ചെയ്തു . കരഘയോഗവുും കൺവൻഷനുും ഈ വിഷയ്ᩈ ിൽ ഘപോലീസിൽ ഘകസ് ചകോെു്കു കയുും ചെയ്തി്ടു്ᩂ് . ഘേപ്തപരിസര്ᩈ് വലിയ സും ർഷമു്ᩂ ോ്ക ി ചകോ്ചു കു്ട ികളുും സ്പ്തീകളുും കൂെുതലോയി പചെെു്കു്ന അശ്വതി മഘഹോ്഼ വദിവസും ഈ മദയപസും ും നെ്ᩈ ിയ സും ർഷും മ്റ്കര്ക ോരുചെ ഇെയിലുും ഭ്വ െന്ങ ൾ ്ക ചെ ിെയിലുും മോതൃകോപരമോയി പ്പവർ്ᩈ ി്ചു വരു്ന ന്മു കരഘയോഗ്ᩈ ിന് വലിയ മോനഹോനി ഉ്ᩂ ോ്ക ി യിരി്കു കയോണ്. ഈ പരിത്ᩝ ിതിയിൽ കരഘയോഗും അെിയ്ᩌ ിര ചപോതുഘയോഗും വിളി്ച് വിഷയും െർ്ച ചെ്യു കയുും ഈ സും ർഷ്ᩈ ിന് ഘനതൃതവും നൽകിയവർച്ക തിചര ഐകകഘഠേന മോതൃകോ പരമോയ ശ്ിേണനെപെികൾ കകചകോ്ᩦു കയുും ചെയ്തു . സും ർഷ്ᩈ ിന് ഘനതൃതവും നൽകിയ ബിനു മണ്ക ോെൻപ്ᩦ ിൽ , തുഷോർ പുഷ ് െും , അഖിൽ ശ്ിവൻ , പോണൂർ , അഭിലോഷ് പനോറയിൽ , അഭിലോഷ് ഓമനഘേരിൽ , അരവി്ᩎ ോേൻ പനോറയിൽ , പ്പിൻസ് പുതുമുംഗല്ᩈ് എ്ന ിവചര 5 വർഷഘ്ᩈ്ക് കരഘയോഗപ്പവർ്ᩈ ന്ങ ളി

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

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ഘല്ക് വില്കു്ന തിനുും കരഘയോഗും അുംഗമ്ᩤ ോ്ᩈ സുഭോഷ് മലഘമലിഘനയുും 5 വർഷഘ്ᩈ്ക് വില്ക് ഏർചെെു്ᩈ ി ച്ക ോ്ᩂ് ചപോതുഘയോഗ തീരുമോനും ഉ്ᩂ ോയി .”

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On the question of maintainability of this writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioners would place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Andi Mukta

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Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarana Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691] , Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan [(2005) 6 SCC 657] and also the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in S. Sasi

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v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others [judgment

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dated 21.01.2020 in W.P.(C) No.5467 of 2019].

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In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarana Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust [(1989)

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2 SCC 691] , the Apex Court held that, if the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can be issued. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. Once these are absent and the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied merely on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute.

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7. In Binny Ltd. v. V.Sadasivan [(2005) 6 SCC 657]

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the Apex Court held that a writ of mandamus can also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. However, such a private body must be discharging a public function and the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. The scope of writ of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on

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such a body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, nevertheless, there

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must be a public law element in such action.

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8. In S. Sasi v. Travancore Devaswom Board and

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others [judgment dated 21.01.2020 in W.P.(C) No.5467 of 2019] a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a writ petition in which two members of the Executive Committee of Kaithathekke Haindava Karayogam, the 5^th respondent therein approached this Court seeking a writ of mandamus

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commanding the said Karayogam to consider their complaint, which was marked as Ext.P2, and to conduct fresh election to its Executive Committee; a writ of mandamus commanding the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chengannoor, the 4^th respondent therein, to interfere in the dispute that is existing in Kaithathekke Haindava Karayogam considering the law and order situation that may arise in Kettukazhcha Ulsavom at Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple; a writ of mandamus commanding the Travancore Devaswom Board and Chettikulangara Grama Panchayat not to transfer the annual grant to the elected members of the Executive Committee of Kaithathekke Haindava Karayogam, who were arrayed as respondents 8 to 15 therein and restrain them from making public collection from the devotees in the name of the said Karayogam. In that writ petition, this Court passed an interim order dated 05.03.2019, appointing a learned counsel of this Court as Special Officer to conduct election to the Executive Committee of Kaithathekke Haindava Karayogam. The dispute raised in that writ petition was mainly in respect of the election conducted on 13.01.2019 to the Executive Committee of the Karayogam. When the question of maintainability of the writ

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petition was raised at the time of final hearing, the Division Bench took a view that, in the absence of a challenge made against the order dated 05.03.2019, that issue has attained finality and therefore the party respondents cannot raise the question of maintainability at a later stage.

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During the course of arguments, on a query made by this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the entitlement of the petitioners for the reliefs sought for in this writ petition depends upon the decision that has to be taken by this Court on the legality or otherwise of the decision taken by the 6^th respondent Karayogam in its general body held on 24.04.2022, as evidenced by Ext.P5, whereby the petitioners are restrained from participating in the activities of the Karayogam, for a period of five years. The learned counsel would contend that the said decision taken on 24.04.2022, in the general body of the 6^th respondent Karayogam, is per se arbitrary and illegal. Without any reasonable cause, the petitioners are restrained from participating in the activities of the Karayogam.

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The learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board would point out that the 5^th respondent Sree

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Devi Vilasam Hindu Matha Convention is not yet formed and recognised as the Temple Advisory Committee of Chettikulangara Bhagavathi Temple. Moreover, the Board cannot resolve the dispute between the petitioners and the 6^th respondent Karayogam. Such a dispute cannot also be resolved in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since it involves adjudication of disputed question of facts.

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In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC

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100 6] a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the special remedy provided in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions.

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12. I n P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda

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Theertha Padar [(2006) 4 SCC 501] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the 1^st respondent therein claimed himself to be a Sanyasi in the tradition of ‘Sree Chattambi Swamy Thiruvadikal’ and Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan of Parama Bhattara Gurukula Seva Sangham, known as ‘Vadayampadi Asharamam’. He filed a suit in the Munsiff's Court, Kolencherry as O.S.No.71 of 2000 for a declaration that he was

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entitled to continue in the said capacity and he was not allowed to discharge his duties attached to the said office in terms of the purported order dated 20.01.1996 of Kailasanatha Theertha

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Padar. The said suit was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the said suit was filed which was also dismissed. In relation to the affairs of the trust a suit as O.S.No.30 of 2002 is pending in the Munsiff's Court, Kolencherry. The said suit has been filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair, founder member of Vadayampadi Asharamam questioning the aforementioned purported resolution dated 07.01.2001. Brahmasree Kailasanatha Theertha Padar filed an interlocutory application for getting himself impleaded as a party, alleging that as per the bye laws, he had admittedly been serving in the said capacity since 1996

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and, thus, in law continues to be the Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan. The said applicant as also the 1^st respondent before the Apex Court are parties in O.S.No.30 of 2002. Though O.S.No.71 of 2000 filed by the 1^st respondent was dismissed, he filed W.P.(C)No.16047 of 2004 before this Court praying for police protection. A Division Bench of this Court went into the question as to whether the 1^st respondent herein was entitled

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to hold the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan for the purpose of issuing an appropriate direction as regards grant of police protection. This Court opined that the State and the

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police officials have got a legal obligation to give protection to the life and properties of the appellant upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellant approached the Apex Court.

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In P.R. Murlidharan [(2006) 4 SCC 501] the

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Apex Court noticed that the construction of the trust and the rights and obligations thereunder were in question. The 1^st respondent filed a suit in that behalf, which was dismissed. In terms of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 another suit would not be maintainable at his instance. Another suit, i.e., O.S.No.30 of 2002 filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair is pending in the Munsiff's Court. The High Court, despite noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court, and determined the contentious issues which were required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be entitled to police protection, having regard to the threat perception, but it is

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another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed questions of fact which were beyond the scope and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact. The 1^st respondent who sought to claim a status was required to establish the same in a court of law in an appropriate proceeding. He for one reason or the other, failed to do so. The provisions of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure stare on his face. He, therefore, could not have filed a writ petition for getting the selfsame issues determined in his favour, which he could not do even by filing a suit. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the writ court is wide while granting relief to a citizen of India so as to protect his life and liberty as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution, but while doing so it could not collaterally go into that question, determination whereof would undoubtedly be beyond its domain. What was necessary for determination of the question arising in the writ petition was not the interpretation of the

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documents alone, but it required adduction of oral evidence as well. Such evidence was necessary for the purpose of explaining the true nature of the deed of trust, as also the practice followed by this trust. In any event, the impleading applicant in O.S.No.30 of 2002 has raised a contention that he alone was ordained to hold the said office as per the bye laws of the trust. The qualification of the 1^st respondent to hold the office was also in question. In this view of the matter, the Apex Court held that such disputed questions could not have been gone into by the High Court in a writ proceeding. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the civil court is wide and plenary. In a case of this nature, a writ proceeding cannot be a substitute for a civil suit. For the said reasons, the Apex Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. However, the appeal was allowed with the observation that, in the event the 1^st respondent feels that he as a person should receive protection to his life, he may make an appropriate representation to the Superintendent of Police, who after causing an inquiry made in this behalf may pass an appropriate order as is permissible in law.

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In P.R. Murlidharan [(2006) 4 SCC 501] , P.K.

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Balasubramaniam J in his concurring judgment observed that, a writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus

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directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms

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of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But,

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it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains

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to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only

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be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to

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grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. On the facts of the case on hand, the learned Judge noticed that, various disputed questions arose based on a deed of trust and the facts pleaded by the writ petitioner and controverted by the other side. The High Court should have normally directed the writ petitioner to have his rights adjudicated upon, in an appropriate suit in a civil court. The fact that a writ petitioner may be barred from approaching the civil court, in view of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or some other provisions, is no ground for the High Court to take upon itself, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the duty to adjudicate on

¶117

the civil rights of parties for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to the police authorities for the protection of the alleged rights of the writ petitioner. A writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to the person of a writ petitioner can be issued, when the court is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities have failed to perform their duties and it is different

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from granting relief for the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property or his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose that disputed questions are involved. As rightly pointed out in the judgment, the High Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. The High Court should not have undertaken such an exercise on the basis that the right of the writ petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution is sought to be affected by the actions of the contesting respondents and their supporters and that can be prevented by the issue of the writ of mandamus prayed for. A writ for ‘police protection’ so called, has only a limited scope, as, when the court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil court or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance of the decree or order.

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In the instant case, the entitlement of the petitioners

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for the reliefs sought for in this writ petition depends upon a

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

¶125

decision on the legality or otherwise of the decision taken by the 6^th respondent Karayogam in its general body held on 24.04.2022, whereby they are restrained from participating in the activities of the Karayogam for a period of five years, since adjudication of disputed question of facts cannot be undertaken in exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for resolution of their disputes within the 6^th respondent Karayogam.

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In such circumstances, this Writ Petition filed on 05.02.2023 is dismissed on the ground of maintainability, leaving open the legal and factual contentions raised by the petitioners.

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Sd/-

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ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

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Sd/-

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P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE

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dkr

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W.P.(C) No.4307 of 2023

¶134

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 4307/2023

¶135

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

¶136

EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE BYE-LAW OF THE 5TH
RESPONDENT CONVENTION (TEMPLE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE).
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE BYE-LAW OF THE 6TH
RESPONDENT KARAYOGAM.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR DATED 04.04.2022
IN CRIME NO. 237/2022 OF MAVELIKKARA
POLICE STATION.

¶137

EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR DATED 05.04.2022
IN CRIME NO. 243/2022 OF THE MAVELIKKARA
POLICE STATION

¶138

EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF
THE BROCHURE DATED 01.01.2023 OF THE 6TH
RESPONDENT CONTAINING ANNUAL REPORT FOR
THE YEAR 2022

¶139

EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
30.01.2023 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS
TO THE RESPONDENT NO. 2.
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
30.01.2023 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS
TO THE RESPONDENT NO. 3.
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
30.01.2023 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS
TO THE RESPONDENT NO. 4.
EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
30.01.2023 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS
TO THE RESPONDENT NO. 5.

Binu v. Travancore Devaswom Board

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Binu v. Travancore Devaswom Board

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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