conscious and had told her that she did not want to speak anything about the incident. This aspect shows that the deceased was fully conscious, and her dying declaration could have very well been recorded, which was deliberately not done by the prosecution because they were sure that it would go against them. The above omission attracts the presumption under Section 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the presence of kerosene at the place of the incident or on the body of the deceased, which again leans in favour of the accused. Furthermore, it was only PW2 – the neighbour – who saw the deceased in an alleged ball of flames coming out of the house. The other witnesses have only seen the deceased in the hospital. The murky evidence, especially the finding of the court below that the accused is not guilty of the offence under Section 306, is sufficient to hold that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence, and the benefit of doubt ought to be given to him. He placed reliance on the decision in Neeraj vs. State of M.P.