“10. xxx xxx xxx. It was only with the passing
of the impugned order that the proceedings
started and the question of the appellants being
put up for trial arose for the first time. This
was undoubtedly a valuable right which the
appellants possessed and which was being denied
to them by the impugned order. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the appellants were not
at all prejudiced, or that any right of their's
was not involved by the impugned order. It is
difficult to hold that the impugned order
summoning the appellants straightaway was merely
an interlocutory order which could not be revised
by the High Court under sub-sections (1) and (2)
of Section 397 of the 1973 Code. The order of the
Judicial Magistrate summoning the appellants in
the circumstances of the present case,
particularly having regard to what had preceded,
was undoubtedly a matter of moment, and a
valuable right of the appellants had been taken
away by the Magistrate's passing an order prima
facie in a mechanical fashion without applying
his mind. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
order impugned was one which was a matter of
moment and which did involve a decision regarding
the rights of the appellants. If the appellants
were not summoned, then they could not have faced
the trial at all, but by compelling the
appellants to face a trial without proper
application of mind cannot be held to be an
interlocutory matter but one which decided a
