Dismissed

Dr. Venugopal P. R. v. Manager/Authorised Officer

Kerala HC4 Dec 2020WP(C)/28785/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioners, doctors treating Covid patients, filed a writ petition challenging a SARFAESI notice for loan recovery and seeking regularization of their account. The Court held that an efficacious alternative remedy exists under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Dismissing the plea for indulgence due to non-compliance with prior orders, the Court dismissed the petition.

What did the court decide?

The writ petition challenging the steps taken under the SARFAESI Act was dismissed as the petitioners have a more efficacious alternate remedy under Section 17 of the Act.

Dr. Venugopal P. R. Vs Manager/Authorised Officer — Banking and Recovery | Kerala HC (2020)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.M.BADAR

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FRIDAY, THE 04TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 13TH AGRAHAYANA, 1942

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019(W)

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PETITIONER/S:

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1 DR. VENUGOPAL P. R.,AGED 57 YEARS S/O. M. K. RAGAVAN NAMBIAR, RESIDING AT 'MITHILA', CHETTAMCOON, THALASSERRY, PIN CODE - 670101, KANNUR DISTRICT.

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2 DR. BINDU VENUGOPAL,AGED 47 YEARS W/O. DR. VENUGOPAL, RESIDING AT 'MITHILA', CHETTAMCOON, THALASSERRY, PIN CODE - 670101, KANNUR DISTRICT.

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BY ADVS. SHRI.SHERRY J. THOMAS SRI.E.K.AVINASH

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RESPONDENT/S:

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1 MANAGER/AUTHORISED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF INDIA, THALASSERRY TOWN BRANCH, THALASSERRY - 670101

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2 STATE BANK OF INDIA RASMECCC, KANNUR - 670003.

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R2 BY ADV. SRI.S.EASWARAN

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THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.12.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 2

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JUDGMENT

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Dated this the 4th day of December 2020

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The petitioners have filed this writ petition, seeking the

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following reliefs:-

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''i) Call for the entire records pertaining tot he Exhibit P1, Notices regarding the SARFAESI proceedings against the petitioners.

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ii) Issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, or direction, directing the respondent to quash Exhibit P1 notice as the same is illegal.

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iii) Issue a writ of mandamus to provide the payment details and avail installments to the petitioner after reducing the illegal interest rate. iv)Issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction, to the 1^st respectively to Regularise the loan account of the petitioners.''

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On a perusal of the petition, it is seen that initially this Court vide order dated 11.11.2019 had directed the petitioners to deposit some amount with a further direction to pay regular instalments as per the loan agreements. It is not in dispute that the order dated 11.11.2019 passed by this Court regarding the payment of regular instalments under the loan agreement is not complied by the petitioners. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent secured creditor submitted that even direction to pay amount of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs only) in pursuant to the order dated 11.11.2019 is not followed by the petitioners. It is thus clear that the interim order passed by this Court dated 11.11.2019 is not followed by the petitioners.

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Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits

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that in view of order dated 07.09.2020 passed by the Division

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 3

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Bench of this Court in W.P.(C). No.9400 of 2020, the petitioners are entitled for some time for repayment of loan. As against this, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent Bank submits that more than Rs.3.5 Crores are still outstanding and respondents have already initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the SARFAESI Act') .

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Perusal of the petition and more particularly, the prayer clause shows that the petitioners are challenging Ext.P1 notice, by which steps were taken by the secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, for recovery of secured debt. Ext.P1 is the notice issued by the advocate commissioner for taking possession of the property as per the provisions of the SARFAESI Act after recall of loan by issuing demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. By filing interim application, the petitioners are also challenging the similar notice issued for taking possession of schedule property on 03.12.2020.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners are doctors rendering service to the Covid patients and therefore, they need to be shown some indulgence.

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 4

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Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent bank, on instructions, submits that for showing indulgence, in view of noncompliance of the earlier orders passed by this Court by petitioners, the petitioners be directed to deposit at least an amount of Rs.75,00,000/- (Rupees seventy five lakhs only) prior to 31.12.2020. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners are not in a position to deposit that much amount.

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The question which falls for consideration is whether the writ petition as framed and filed challenging the steps taken by the secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act is maintainable before this

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Court, in view of availability of alternate and most efficacious remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

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In the matter of Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Another V. Mathew K.C [2018 (1) KLT 784] following are the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court which virtually prohibits this Court from entertainment of such writ petitions:-

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….... The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others vs. Chhabil Dass

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 5

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Agarwal, 2014 (1) SCC 603, as follows:

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“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”

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Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and others, (2001) 6 SCC 569, that :-

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“6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 6

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where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.”

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In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding :-

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“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasijudicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

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It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 7

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availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.”

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In Union Bank of India and another vs. Panchanan Subudhi, 2010 (15) SCC 552, further proceedings under Section 13(4) were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of Rs.10,00,000/- leading this Court to observe as follows :

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“7. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of onetime settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under Section 17 of the Act.”

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The same view was reiterated in Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011 (2) SCC 782 observing:

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“23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)”

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 8

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In Ikbal (supra), it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13 (4) of the ‘SARFAESI Act’ available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon (Supra), observing :

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“27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented.

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28…….In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge.”

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A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and another vs. Imperial Gift House and others, (2013) 14 SCC 622, observing:-

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“3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court.

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In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank.”

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It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially

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WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 9

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when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:-

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“46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v.

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Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.”

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We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, 1997 (6) SCC 450, observing :-

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“32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.”

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In this view of the matter, the petitioners have most efficacious and alternate remedy of approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal where they could have demonstrated their grievances, including the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C). No.9400 of 2020 in those proceedings.

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The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

A.M.BADAR, JUDGE

Sd/-

ajt

WP(C).No.28785 OF 2019 11

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APPENDIX

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PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:

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EXHIBIT P1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE ADVOCATE COMMISSIONER TO THE PETITIONERS.

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EXHIBIT P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SANCTION LETTER ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT. EXHIBIT P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 25/11/2020 ISSUED BY THE ADVOCATE COMMISSIONER EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE DATED 30/11/2020 ISSUED FROM HOSPITAL EXHIBIT P4A TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED FROM THE JOSGIRI HOSPITAL

Dr. Venugopal P. R. v. Manager/Authorised Officer

Case brief

What is this about?

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Dr. Venugopal P. R. v. Manager/Authorised Officer

Case brief

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