Dismissed

Solomon Thomas, v. the State of Kerala

Kerala HC23 Jan 2020WP(C)/18966/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Public interest writ petition seeking directions to prevent construction of a commercial building on land claimed to be government land and to dispose of the petitioner's representations. The land was shown by revenue records to be private land leased to the respondent church. The court held the petition did not satisfy the requirements for public interest litigation and dismissed it.

What the court decided

AI extract

Solomon Thomas, Vs the State of Kerala — Municipal and Town Planning | Kerala HC (2020)

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

¶2

PRESENT

¶3

THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR

¶4

¶5

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

¶6

THURSDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY 2020 / 3RD MAGHA, 1941

¶7

WP(C).No.18966 OF 2019(S)

¶8

PETITIONER:

¶9

SOLOMON THOMAS, AGED 51 YEARS, S/O. JEROM THOMAS, RARILLIKKAL HOUSE, KODAKKAL (P.O), 676 108, TIRUR, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.

¶10

BY ADVS. SRI.JAMSHEED HAFIZ SMT.T.S.SREEKUTTY

¶11

RESPONDENTS:

¶12

1 THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO REVENUE DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN-695 007.

¶13

2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, CIVIL STATION, KALPATTA, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN-673 121.

¶14

3 THE VILLAGE OFFICER, MEPPADY, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN-673 577.

¶15

4 MEPPADI GRAMA PANCHAYATH, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, MEPPADI, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN-673 577.

¶16

5 THE SECRETARY, MEPPADI GRAMA PANCHAYATH, MEPPADI, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN-673 577.

¶17

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶18

-:2:-

¶19

6 C.S.I HOLY IMMANUEL CHURCH, MEPPADY, WAYANAD DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICAR, C.S.I HOLY IMMANUEL CHURCH MEPPADY, PIN-673 577.

¶20

R1-3 BY SR.GP. SRI.ARAVINDAKUMAR BABU R4-5 BY SRI.MANOJ RAMASWAMY, SC, MEPPADI GRAMA PANCHAYAT

¶21

R6 BY ADV. SRI.S.SUJIN

¶22

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 23.01.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

¶23

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

-:3:-

“C.R.”

JUDGMENT

Dated this the 23^rd day of January, 2020

¶28

S.Manikumar, C.J.

¶29

Instant Public Interest Litigation has been filed seeking the following reliefs:

¶30

“a) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction, directing the respondent to dispose of the Exhibits-P1 to P3 representations filed by the petitioner, within such time as pleased by this Honourable court.

¶31

b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction, directing the respondents 1 to 5 to prevent carrying out further constructions in the property comprised of 29 Hectors situated in Re-survey No.7/2 of Kottapady village in Betheri Taluk and direct the 5^th respondent not to give any completion certificate or building number to the illegal construction of the commercial building in the above property.”

¶32

According to the petitioner, 29 Hectares of land situated in Re-

¶33

survey No.7/2 of Kottapady Village in Betheri Taluk is a Government Land

¶34

and as per the village records, the above property was leased out by Government to one Chembra Peek Company. It is submitted that C.S.I. Church is now carrying out construction of a commercial building in the

¶35

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶36

-:4:-

¶37

said land. According to the petitioner, though Exhibts-P1, P2 and P3 representations were filed before the District Collector, Wayanad (respondent No.2), Village Officer, Meppady (respondent No.3) and Secretary, Meppady Grama Panchayat (respondent No.5) respectively, nothing has been done till date.

¶38

Inviting the attention of this Court to the statement filed on behalf of the 2^nd respondent, Mr.T.K.Aravindakumar Babu, learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that land comprised in Re-survey No.7/2 is not a Government/Puramboke land, but a private land. According to him, the land tax in respect of the above land is remitted by the 5^th respondent and in the Basic Tax Register, which is produced along with the statement as Annexure R2(a), the land is recorded in the name of M.K.Jinachandran and Chembra Peek Company Church. He also submitted that the land possessed by 5^th respondent Church was obtained by a lease agreement from Chembra Peek Company during 1955 and 1956 respectively vide document No.1120/1995 and 121/1996 of SRO, Vythiri. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Statement read as under:

¶39

“3. It is submitted that land possessed by 5^th Respondent comprised in Block No.31, Re-survey No.7/2 having an extent of

¶40

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶41

-:5:-

¶42

2.9000 Hector is not Government or Puramboke land. The 5^th respondent church authority are remitting land tax for the above extent of land. It is further submitted that as per Revenue record Basic Tax Register of Kottapady Village, the land is record in Thandaper No.94 in the name of “M.K.Jinachandran & Chembra Peek Company Church”. Copy of the relevant page of B.T.R. of Kottapady Village is produced herewith and marked as Annexure R2(a) .

¶43

It is submitted that the land possessed by 5^th respondent Church was obtained by lease agreement from Chembra Peek Company during 1955 and 1956 respectively vide document No.1120/1995 and 121/1996 of SRO Vythiri. The above said land lease agreement is between private parties. The land was leased out before the implementation of Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. Hence the contention of the petitioner that land in question is Government land is false. Therefore the above Writ Petition may be dismissed as far as this respondent is concerned.”

¶44

The petitioner has simply sent Exhibits-P1, P2 and P3

¶45

representations to the respondents, without making any enquiry as to whether the land in question is a Government land or a private land.

¶46

The Rules framed by the High Court dealing with Public

¶47

Interest Litigation are Rules 146A and 146B of Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971. Said rules are extracted hereunder:

¶48

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶49

-:6:-

¶50

“ 146A. Affidavits in Public Interest Litigation,- A person filing a Public Interest Litigation, in addition to the requirements stipulated in the other rules of this chapter, shall precisely and specifically affirm in the affidavit to be sworn to by him the public cause he is seeking to espouse, that he has no personal or private interest in the matter, that there is no authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court or the High Court on the question raised and that the result of the litigation shall not lead to any undue gain to himself or to anyone associated with him.

¶51

146B: Costs in Public Interest Litigation,- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the court may direct the petitioner in a Public Interest Litigation to pay such amount as may be fixed by the Court as compensation or costs to all or any of the respondents, in the event of the litigation being found to be vexatious, frivolous or malafide.”

¶52

Now, let us consider few decisions on Public Interest Litigation.

¶53

“(i) In S.P.Anand v. H.D.Deve Gowda reported in (1996) 6 SCC 734, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 18, held as follows:

¶54

"It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public

¶55

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶56

-:7:-

¶57

cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the court that he does not rush to court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-baked information without proper research or by persons who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filling a series of petitions refusing to accept the Court's earlier decisions as concluding the point. We say this because when we drew the attention of the petitioner to earlier decisions of this Court, he brushed them aside, without so much as showing willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as having become stale and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration. Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this

¶58

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶59

-:8:-

¶60

Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expresssion, uniform civil code, etc., we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself."

¶61

(ii) In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others ,

¶62

reported in (2000) 10 SCC 664, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

¶63

“232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the Court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The Court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the Court's jurisdiction.

¶64

At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power, the Court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The Courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or nonuse of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The Courts must therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy

¶65

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶66

-:9:-

¶67

the Court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the Court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the Court itself is not above the law.

¶68

(iii) In Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India reported in (2002) 2 SCC 333, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that,

¶69

"Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. "litigation in the interest of the public....

¶70

Judicial interference by way of PIL is available if there is injury to public because of dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations on the part of the Government. Here it is not so and in the sphere of economic policy or reform the court

¶71

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶72

-:10:-

¶73

is not the appropriate forum. Every matter of public interest or curiosity cannot be the subject matter of PIL. Courts are not intended to and nor should they conduct the administration of the country. Courts will interfere only if there is a clear violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or non-compliance by the State with its constitutional or statutory duties. None of these contingencies arise in this present case."

¶74

(iv) In Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Another v. C.K.Rajan and others, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 546, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

¶75

“41. The courts exercising their power of judicial review found to their dismay that the poorest of the poor, the depraved (sic), the illiterate, the urban and rural unorganized labour sector, women, children, those handicapped by “ignorance, indigence and illiteracy” and other downtrodden persons have either no access to justice or had been denied justice. A new branch of proceedings known as “social action litigation” or “public interest litigation” was evolved with a view to render complete justice to the aforementioned classes of persons. It expanded its wings in course of time. The courts in pro bono publico granted relief to inmates of prisons, provided legal aid, directed speedy trials, maintenance of human dignity and covered several other areas. Representative actions, pro bono publico and test litigations were entertained in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass real issues on merits by

¶76

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶77

-:11:-

¶78

suspect reliance on peripheral procedural shortcomings. [See Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai (1976) 3 SCC 832)]

¶79

But with the passage of time, things started taking different shapes. The process was sometimes abused. Proceedings were initiated in the name of public interest litigation for ventilating private disputes. Some petitions were publicity-oriented.

¶80

The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may be suitably summarized as under:

¶81

(i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court.

¶82

The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfill its constitutional promises. (See S.P.Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87], People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 262], Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1638 : (1964) 1 SCR 561] and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] .)

¶83

(ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-à-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the

¶84

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶85

-:12:-

¶86

Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail [(1978) 4 SCC 104 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 542] and Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] .)

¶87

(iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial.

¶88

(v) In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. , reported in (2004) 3 SCC 349, the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering few decisions, on the aspect of public interest litigation, observed as follows:

¶89

"4. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta

¶90

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶91

-:13:-

¶92

and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305] and Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. See Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R.Srinivas v. R.M.Premchand [(1994) 6 SCC 620].

¶93

It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression 'public interest litigation'. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:

¶94

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶95

-:14:-

¶96

"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."

¶97

In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as follows :

¶98

"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."

¶99

In Janata Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 52 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows :

¶100

"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."

¶101

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶102

-:15:-

¶103

In paras 60, 61 and 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows:

¶104

"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."

¶105

In para 96 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows:

¶106

"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that Courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."

¶107

In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:

¶108

"109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the

¶109

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶110

-:16:-

¶111

poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".

¶112

It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but exp ress our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all

¶113

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶114

-:17:-

¶115

standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system.

¶116

Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting

¶117

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶118

-:18:-

¶119

bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.

¶120

The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:

¶121

"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."

¶122

The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two

¶123

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶124

-:19:-

¶125

conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.

¶126

Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharastra v. Prabhu [(1994) 2 SCC 481] and Andra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s.GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Another [AIR 1994 SC 2151]. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) v. K.Parasaran ,

¶127

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶128

-:20:-

¶129

[(1996) 7 JT 265]. Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.

¶130

As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and Ors., v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such

¶131

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶132

-:21:-

¶133

frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.

¶134

In State of H.P. v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and Ors . [(1985) 3 SCC 169], it has been said that public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection.

¶135

Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. , [(1987) 2 SCC 295, 331] said:

¶136

"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. (SCC p. 331, para 46)

¶137

¶138

Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and

¶139

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶140

-:22:-

¶141

the courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. (SCC p.334, para 59)

¶142

¶143

I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self- imposed restraint on public interest litigants." (SCC p.335, para 61)

¶144

Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India (1989 Supp (1) SCC 251), was in full agreement with the view expressed by Khalid, J. in Sachidanand Pandey's case (supra) and added that 'public interest litigation' is an instrument of the administration of justice to be used properly in proper cases. [See also separate judgment by Pathak, J. (as he then was) in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 161].

¶145

Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar [(1976) 1 SCC 671] expressed his view that the application of the busybody should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms: (SCC p. 683, para 37)

¶146

"It will be seen that in the context of locus standi

¶147

to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories : (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome

¶148

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶149

-:23:-

¶150

interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold."

¶151

Krishna Iyer, J. in Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568] in stronger terms stated: (SCC p.589, para 48)

¶152

"48. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him."

¶153

In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharash Samiti v. State of U.P., [(1990) 4 SCC 449], Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. observed: (SCC p.452, para 8)

¶154

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶155

-:24:-

¶156

"While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the superior court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights being considered by the court."

¶157

In Union Carbid Corporation v. Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 584, 610], Ranganath Mishra, C.J. in his separate judgment while concurring with the conclusions of the majority judgment has said thus: (SCC p.610, para 21)

¶158

"I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public activists should also be permitted to espouse the cause of the poor citizens but there must be a limit set to such activity and nothing perhaps should be done which would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the serviceability of the institution to the people at large. Those who are acquainted with jurisprudence and enjoy social privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation to the community of educating it properly and allowing the judicial process to continue unsoiled."

¶159

In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar , [(1991) 1

¶160

SCC 598] it was observed as follows:

¶161

"Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32,

¶162

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶163

-:25:-

¶164

are entertained it would amount to abuse of process of the court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 must approach this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is the duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation".

¶165

In the words of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) "the courts must be careful in entertaining public interest litigations" or in the words of Sarkaria, J. "the applications of the busybodies should be rejected at the threshold itself" and as Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out, "the doors of the courts should not be ajar for such vexatious litigants"."

¶166

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶167

-:26:-

¶168

(vi) In Dr.B.Singh vs. Union of India , reported in (2004) 3 SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

¶169

“Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, courts must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.”

¶170

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶171

-:27:-

¶172

(vii) On the aspect of a Public Interest Litigation purely based on newspaper report, In Vikas Vashishth v. Allahabad High Court reported in (2004) 13 SCC 485, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

¶173

"At the very outset, we put it to the petitioner that a bare perusal of the petition shows that it is based entirely on newspaper reports and asked him whether before filing the petition he has taken care to verify the facts personally. His answer is in the negative. In the writ petition all the 21 High Courts have been included as respondents and Union of India has also been impleaded as the 22^nd respondent. We asked the petitioner what has provoked him to implead all the High Courts as respondents and he states that it is his apprehension that similar incidents may occur in other High Courts though there is no factual foundation for such appreciation.

¶174

After affording the full opportunity of hearing, we are satisfied that what purports to have been filed as a public interest litigation is nothing more than a "publicity interest litigation". It is writ large that it has been filed without any effort at verifying the facts by the petitioner personally."

¶175

(viii) In R & M. Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group reported in (2005) 3 SCC 91, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 23 and 24, observed as follows:

¶176

"23. Next question is whether such Public Interest Litigation should at all be entertained & laches thereon. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not

¶177

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶178

-:28:-

¶179

for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends.

¶180

Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. Courts should be very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in a very rare cases where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the down trodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. This has become very handy to the developers and in matters of public contracts. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilize the service of the innocent people or organization in filing public interest litigation. The Courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding implication and giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in a very rare and few cases involving public interest of large number of people who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities."

¶181

(ix) In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2005) 5 SCC 136,

¶182

the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the scope of a petition styled as a public interest litigation, held as follows:

¶183

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶184

-:29:-

¶185

"5. The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as publicspirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.

¶186

¶187

As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in

¶188

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶189

-:30:-

¶190

essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.

¶191

Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and

¶192

Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message

¶193

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶194

-:31:-

¶195

goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.

¶196

......

¶197

It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners

¶198

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶199

-:32:-

¶200

having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.

¶201

Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be

¶202

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶203

-:33:-

¶204

abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs."

¶205

(x) In Rohit Pandey v. Union of India reported in (2005) 13 SCC 702, Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

¶206

"1. This petition purporting to be in public interest has been filed by a member of the legal fraternity seeking directions against the respondents to hand over the investigation of the case pertaining to recovery of light machine gun, which is said to have been stolen from the army according to reports published in two newspapers, to the Central Bureau of Investigation for fair investigation to ensure that the real culprits who are behind such theft of army arms and ammunition endangering the integrity and sovereignty of the country may be brought to book and action may be taken against them in accordance with law. The only basis for the petitioner coming to this Court are two newspaper reports dated 25-1-2004, and the other dated 12-22004. This petition was immediately filed on 16-2-2004 after the aforesaid second newspaper report appeared. On enquiry from the learned counsel, we have learnt that the petitioner is a young advocate having been in practice for a year or two. The

¶207

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶208

-:34:-

¶209

Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh, have been arrayed as party respondents. In the newspaper reports, there is no allegation either against the Union of India or against the Chief Minister.

¶210

We expect that when such a petition is filed in public interest and particularly by a member of the legal profession, it would be filed with all seriousness and after doing the necessary homework and enquiry. If the petitioner is so public-spirited at such a young age as is so professed, the least one would expect is that an enquiry would be made from the authorities concerned as to the nature of investigation which may be going on before filing a petition that the investigation be conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Admittedly, no such measures were taken by the petitioner. There is nothing in the petition as to what, in fact, prompted the petitioner to approach this Court within two-three days of the second publication dated 12-22004, in the newspaper Amar Ujala. Further, the State of Uttar Pradesh had filed its affidavit a year earlier i.e. on 7-10-2004, placing on record the steps taken against the accused persons, including the submission of the charge-sheet before the appropriate court. Despite one year having elapsed after the filing of the affidavit by the Special Secretary to the Home Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh, nothing seems to have been done by the petitioner. The petitioner has not even controverted what is stated in the affidavit. Ordinarily, we would have dismissed such a misconceived petition with exemplary

¶211

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶212

-:35:-

¶213

costs but considering that the petitioner is a young advocate, we feel that the ends of justice would be met and the necessary message conveyed if a token cost of rupees one thousand is imposed on the petitioner."

¶214

(xi) In DIVISIONAL MANAGER, ARAVALI GOLF CLUB AND ANOTHER (2008) 1 SCC 683, in paragraphs Nos.17, 19, 20 and 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-

¶215

“17. Before parting with this case, we would like to make some observations about the limits of the powers of the judiciary. We are compelled to make these observations because we are repeatedly coming across cases where judges are unjustifiably trying to perform executive or legislative functions. In our opinion this is clearly unconstitutional. In the name of judicial activism judges cannot cross their limits and try to take over functions which belong to another organ of the State.

¶216

Under our Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary all have their own broad spheres of operation. Ordinarily, it is not proper for any of these three organs of the State to encroach upon the domain of another, otherwise the delicate balance in the Constitution will be upset, and there will be a reaction.

¶217

Judges must know their limits and must not try to run the Government. They must have modesty and humility, and not behave like emperors. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution and each organ of the State – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary – must have respect

¶218

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶219

-:36:-

¶220

for the other and must not encroach into each other's domains.

¶221

In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (vide AIR para 113 : SCC para 94), this Court observed that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The same view has been taken in a large number of other decisions also, but it is unfortunate that many Courts are not following these decisions and are trying to perform legislative or executive functions. In our opinion adjudication must be done within the system of historically validated restraints and conscious minimisation of the Judges' preferences. The Court must not embarrass the administrative authorities and must realise that administrative authorities have expertise in the filed of administration while the Court does not. In the words of Neely VJ (Scc p.681, para 82).

¶222

“82.... I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a Judge ... I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, expect Judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of a public utility operation.” It is not the function of a Judge to act as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator.”

¶223

It is not the function of a Judge to act as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator.”

¶224

(xii) In Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 511, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju (as he then was), held as follows:

¶225

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶226

-:37:-

¶227

“40.The justification given for judicial activism is that the executive and legislature have failed in performing their functions. Even if this allegations is true, does it justify the judiciary in taking over the functions of the legislature or executive? In our opinion it does not: firstly, because that would be in violation of the high constitutional principle of separation of powers between the three organs of the State, and secondly, because the judiciary has neither the expertise nor the resources for this. If the legislature or executive are not functioning properly it is for the people to correct the defects by exercising their franchise properly in the next elections and voting for candidates who will fulfill their expectations, or by other lawful means e.g., peaceful demonstrations and agitations, but the remedy is surely not by the judiciary in taking over the functions of the other organs.”

¶228

"59. Unfortunately, the truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the result is that the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. As stated in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2005 SC 540, public interest litigation has nowadays largely become 'publicity interest litigation', 'private interest litigation', or 'politics interest litigation' or the latest trend

¶229

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶230

-:38:-

¶231

'paise income litigation'. Much of P.I.L. is really blackmail.

¶232

Thus, Public Interest Litigation which was initially created as a useful judicial tool to help the poor and weaker section of society who could not afford to come to courts, has, in course of time, largely developed into an uncontrollable Frankenstein and a nuisance which is threatening to choke the dockets of the superior courts obstructing the hearing of the genuine and regular cases which have been waiting to be taken up for years together."

¶233

In the same judgment, concurring with the view of his Brother Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K.Sema (as he then was), further added, as follows:

¶234

"69. Therefore, whether to entertain the petition in the form of Public Interest Litigation either represented by public-spirited person; or private interest litigation in the guise of public interest litigation; or publicity interest litigation; or political interest litigation is to be examined in the facts and circumstances recited in the petition itself. I am also of the view that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the legislature or executive which is detrimental to the public interest, judiciary must occupy the field to subserve public interest. Therefore, each case has to be examined on its own facts."

¶235

(xiii) In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India , reported in (2009) 7 SCC 561, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

¶236

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶237

-:39:-

¶238

“168. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy. Often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or change in economic policies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the court.

¶239

It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.

¶240

Normally, there is always a presumption that the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public

¶241

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶242

-:40:-

¶243

interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the court by proper and adequate material. The court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or against public interest because there are large number of considerations, which necessarily weigh with the Government in taking an action.”

¶244

(xiv) In State of Uttranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal , reported in (2010) 3 SCC 402, the Hon'ble Supreme court has held as follows:

¶245

“(1) The Courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.

¶246

(2) Instead of every individual Judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this Court immediately thereafter.

¶247

(3) The Courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL.

¶248

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶249

-:41:-

¶250

(4) The Courts should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.

¶251

(5) The Courts should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.

¶252

(6) The Courts should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.

¶253

(7) The Courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The Court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation.

¶254

(8) The Courts should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.”

¶255

(xv) In Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash Rahangdale reported in 2012 (2) SCC 425, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:

¶256

"57. In the light of the above, we shall first consider whether the High Court committed an error by entertaining the writ petition filed by Subhash Rahangdale as public interest litigation. This Court has, time and again, laid down guiding principles for entertaining petitions filed in public

¶257

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶258

-:42:-

¶259

interest. However, for the purpose of deciding the appellants' objection it is not necessary to advert to the plethora of precedents on the subject because in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402, a two-Judge Bench discussed the development of law relating to public interest litigation and reiterated that before entertaining such petitions, the Court must feel satisfied that the petitioner has genuinely come forward to espouse public cause and his litigious venture is not guided by any ulterior motive or is not a publicity gimmick.

¶260

In paragraphs 96 to 104, the Bench discussed Phase-III of the public interest litigation in the context of transparency and probity in governance, referred to the judgments in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226, Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 532, Rajiv Ranjan Singh "Lalan" (VIII) v. Union of India (2006) 6 SCC 613, M.C. Mehta v. Union of Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 407 and observed:

¶261

"These are some of the cases where the Supreme Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in governance of the State, there is transparency and no extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except the public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the courts can be

¶262

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶263

-:43:-

¶264

placed in the third phase of public interest litigation."

¶265

Reference also deserves to be made to the judgment of the three Judge Bench in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (1987) 1 SCC 227 in which a new dimension was given to the power of the Superior Courts to make investigation into the issues of public importance even though the petitioner may have moved the Court for vindication of a private interest. In that case the High Court had entertained a writ petition filed by Assistant Medical Officer of K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay questioning the assessment of answer sheets of the Post Graduate Medical Examinations held by the Bombay University in October 1985. He alleged malpractices in the evaluation of the answer sheets of the daughter of the appellant who, at the relevant time, was Chief Minister of the State. The learned Single Judge held that altering and tampering of the grade sheets was done by Dr. Rawal at the behest of the Chief Minister. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge with some modification.

¶266

While rejecting the objection raised on behalf of the appellant that the writ petition filed by the respondent cannot be treated as a petition filed in public interest, this Court observed:

¶267

"The allegations made in the petition disclose a lamentable state of affairs in one of the premier universities of India. The petitioner might have moved

¶268

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶269

-:44:-

¶270

in his private interest but enquiry into the conduct of the examiners of the Bombay University in one of the highest medical degrees was a matter of public interest. Such state of affairs having been brought to the notice of the Court, it was the duty of the Court to the public that the truth and the validity of the allegations made be inquired into. It was in furtherance of public interest that an enquiry into the state of affairs of public institution becomes necessary and private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation and such an enquiry cannot be avoided if it is necessary and essential for the administration of justice."

¶271

(emphasis supplied)

¶272

(xvi) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2013) 2 SCC 398, once again laid down the principles governing obligations of the litigants while approaching the Court and the consequences for abuse of process of law while filing the Public Interest Litigation.

¶273

(xvii) In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in a public interest litigation, the Court must ensure that there is an element of genuine public interest is involved.

¶274

(xviii) In State of Jaipur Shahar Hindu Vikas Samiti v. State of Rajasthan and Others , reported in (2014) 5 SCC 530, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

¶275

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶276

-:45:-

¶277

The scope of public interest litigation is very limited, particularly, in the matter of religious institutions. It is always better not to entertain this type of public interest litigations simply on the basis of affidavits of the parties. The public trusts and religious institutions are governed by particular legislation which provide for a proper mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating to the properties of the trust and the management thereof. It is not proper for the court to entertain such litigation and pass orders. It is also needless to mention that the forums cannot be misused by the rival groups in the guise of public interest litigation.

¶278

We feel that it is apt to quote the views expressed by this Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee [(2003) 7 SCC 546] wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 574-75 & 578, paras 60, 64 & 76)

¶279

“60. It is possible to contend that the Hindus in general and the devotees visiting the temple in particular are interested in proper management of the temple at the hands of the statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self-contained code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked to look into the grievances of the

¶280

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶281

-:46:-

¶282

aggrieved devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of its statutory duties.

¶283

¶284

The Court should be circumspect in entertaining such public interest litigation for another reason. There may be dispute amongst the devotees as to what practices in should be followed by the temple authorities. There may be dispute as regards the rites and rituals to be performed in the temple or omission thereof. Any decision in favour of one sector of the people may hurt the sentiments of the other. The courts normally, thus, at the first instance would not enter into such disputed arena, particularly, when by reason thereof the fundamental right of a group of devotees under Articles 25 and 26 may be infringed. Like any other wing of the State, the courts also while passing an order should ensure that the fundamental rights of a group of citizens under Articles 25 and 26 are not infringed. Such care and caution on the part of the High Court would be a welcome step.

¶285

¶286

When the administration of the temple is within its control and it exercises the said power in terms of a statute, the State, it is expected, normally would itself probe into the alleged irregularities. If the State through its machinery as provided for in one Act

¶287

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶288

-:47:-

¶289

can arrive at the requisite finding of fact for the purpose of remedying the defects, it may not find it necessary to take recourse to the remedies provided for in another statute. It is trite that recourse to a provision to another statute may be resorted to when the State finds that its powers under the Act governing the field are inadequate. The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular manner. Normally, the courts would ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time-frame and undoubtedly, as and when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review.”

¶290

The concept of public interest litigation is a phenomenon which is evolved to bring justice to the reach of people who are handicapped by ignorance, indigence, illiteracy and other downtrodden people. Through the public interest litigation, the cause of several people who are not able to approach the court is espoused. In the guise of public interest litigation, we are coming across several cases where it is exploited for the benefit of certain individuals. The courts have to be very cautious and careful while entertaining public interest litigation. The judiciary should

¶291

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶292

-:48:-

¶293

deal with the misuse of public interest litigation with iron hand. If the public interest litigation is permitted to be misused the very purpose for which it is conceived, namely, to come to the rescue of the poor and downtrodden will be defeated. The courts should discourage the unjustified litigants at the initial stage itself and the person who misuses the forum should be made accountable for it. In the realm of public interest litigation, the courts while protecting the larger public interest involved, should at the same time have to look at the effective way in which the relief can be granted to the people whose rights are adversely affected or are at stake. When their interest can be protected and the controversy or the dispute can be adjudicated by a mechanism created under a particular statute, the parties should be relegated to the appropriate forum instead of entertaining the writ petition filed as public interest litigation.”

¶294

(xix) In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India reported in (2018) 6 SCC 72, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 96 to 98, held as follows:

¶295

"96. Public interest litigation has developed as a powerful tool to espouse the cause of the marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, that was the foundation on which public interest jurisdiction was judicially recognised in situations such as those in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389]. Persons who were unable to seek

¶296

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶297

-:49:-

¶298

access to the judicial process by reason of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy are faced with a deprivation of fundamental human rights. Bonded labour and undertrials (among others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons who are unable to pursue their rights. Public interest litigation has been entertained by relaxing the rules of standing. The essential aspect of the procedure is that the person who moves the court has no personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from a general standing as a citizen before the court. This ensures the objectivity of those who pursue the grievance before the court. Environmental jurisprudence has developed around the rubric of public interest petitions. Environmental concerns affect the present generation and the future. Principles such as the polluter pays and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. Over time, public interest litigation has become a powerful instrument to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the accountability of and transparency within structures of governance. Public interest litigation is in that sense a valuable instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural due process.

¶299

Yet over time, it has been realised that this jurisdiction is capable of being and has been brazenly

¶300

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶301

-:50:-

¶302

misutilised by persons with a personal agenda. At one end of that spectrum are those cases where public interest petitions are motivated by a desire to seek publicity. At the other end of the spectrum are petitions which have been instituted at the behest of business or political rivals to settle scores behind the facade of a public interest litigation. The true face of the litigant behind the façade is seldom unravelled. These concerns are indeed reflected in the judgment of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal [State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 81 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 807]. Underlining these concerns, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 453, para 143)

¶303

“143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-monetary directions by the courts.”

¶304

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶305

-:51:-

¶306

The misuse of public interest litigation is a serious matter of concern for the judicial process. Both this Court and the High Courts are flooded with litigations and are burdened by arrears. Frivolous or motivated petitions, ostensibly invoking the public interest detract from the time and attention which courts must devote to genuine causes. This Court has a long list of pending cases where the personal liberty of citizens is involved. Those who await trial or the resolution of appeals against orders of conviction have a legitimate expectation of early justice. It is a travesty of justice for the resources of the legal system to be consumed by an avalanche of misdirected petitions purportedly filed in the public interest which, upon due scrutiny, are found to promote a personal, business or political agenda. This has spawned an industry of vested interests in litigation. There is a grave danger that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue, it would seriously denude the efficacy of the judicial system by detracting from the ability of the court to devote its time and resources to cases which legitimately require attention. Worse still, such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the judicial process. This has the propensity of endangering the credibility of other institutions and undermining public faith in democracy and the rule of law. This will happen when the agency of the court is utilised to settle extra-judicial scores. Business rivalries have to be resolved in a competitive

¶307

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶308

-:52:-

¶309

market for goods and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights and entitlements. Courts protect the rule of law. There is a danger that the judicial process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes beyond the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space."

¶310

7. Giving due consideration to the law of the land and the statutory

¶311

provisions, extracted supra, we are of the view that instant Public Interest Writ Petition does not satisfy the requirements as laid by the Hon'ble

¶312

Supreme Court.

¶313

For the foregoing reasons and decisions, this writ petition is dismissed.

¶314

Sd/-

¶315

S.Manikumar, Chief Justice

¶316

Sd/-

¶317

Shaji P.Chaly Judge

¶318

vpv

¶319

W.P.(C)No.18966 of 2019

¶320

-:53:-

¶321

APPENDIX

¶322

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:

¶323

EXHIBIT P1	A TRUE THE 2ND ENGLISH	COPY OF RESPOND TRANSLA	THE REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE ENT DATED 31.01.2019 AND ITS TION.
EXHIBIT P2	A TRUE THE 3RD ENGLISH	COPY OF RESPOND TRANSLA	THE REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE ENT DATED 31.01.2019 AND ITS TION.
EXHIBIT P3	A TRUE THE 4TH ENGLISH	COPY OF RESPOND TRANSLA	THE REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE ENT DATED 31.01.2019 AND ITS TION.
EXHIBIT P4	A TRUE RECEIPT 2ND RES	COPY OF OF THE PONDENT	THE A.D. CARD FOR THE REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE DATED 02.02.2019.
EXHIBIT P5	A TRUE RECEIPT 3RD RES	COPY OF OF THE PONDENT	THE A.D. CARD FOR THE REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE DATED 02.02.2019.
EXHIBIT P6	A TRUE RECEIPT 4TH RES	COPY OF OF THE PONDENT	THE A.D. CARD FOR THE REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE DATED 02.02.2019.

¶324

RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:

¶325

ANNEXURE R2(a) COPY OF RELEVANT PAGE OF B.T.R. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF ANNEXURE R2(a).

¶326

/TRUE COPY/

¶327

P.A. TO JUDGE

Solomon Thomas, v. the State of Kerala

Case brief

What is this about?

What the court decided

Solomon Thomas, v. the State of Kerala

Case brief

What is this about?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

S. Syamlal Vs S. Lathika

M.P.Rajan Vs C.D.Suresh

M.Satheesh Vs Shino David

P.J.Antony Vs Peter.D.F

P.J.Antony Vs the Addl. Thahasildar

Johny Thomas Vs the Authorised Officer, South Indian Bank