A father sought alteration of his son's marriage registration following an asserted divorce by talaq. The court held that the Rules permit applications by the spouses, not through a power of attorney or authorisation, and dismissed the writ appeal.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020/30TH MAGHA, 1941
WA.No.294 OF 2020
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 33608/2019(A) OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 23.1.2020
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
ABDUL SAMAD V.T., AGED 55 YEARS, S/O SAID ALAVI, VADAKKETHODUVIL HOUSE, PANJARAMOOLA,NIRAMARUTHOOR.P.O, TIRUR-676109.
BY ADV. SMT.DEEPA NARAYANAN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 VALANCHERY MUNICIPALITY, VALANCHERY.P.O,MALAPPURAM, PIN-676552,REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.
2 HEALTH INSPECTOR GRADE-1 AND REGISTRAR OF BIRTH,DEATH AND COMMON MARRIAGE, VALANCHERY MUNICIPALITY,VALANCHERY.P.O, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-676 552.
3 KHAIRUNNISA.P.O, D/O BASHEER.P,PALARA HOUSE, KIZHAKKEKARA,VALANCHERY, MALAPPURAM-670 552.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 19.02.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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“CR”
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 19th day of February, 2020
S. Manikumar, CJ
Challenging the judgment made in W.P(C). No.33608 of 2019 dated 23.1.2020, instant appeal is filed.
Appellant's son Mr. Niyas married 3rd respondent (Khairunnisa. P) and marriage was registered as per Kerala Registration of Marriage Rules on 16.6.2014. Niyas and the third respondent, for various reasons decided to separate and mutually agreed for pronouncing Talaq. They entered into an agreement on 23.5.2018, accepting Talaq. 3rd respondent is now married another person. As Niyas he is working abroad, appellant preferred Ext.P3 application dated 29.10.2019 before the concerned authorities for changing 3rd respondent's name as Niyas's wife, from visa, passport etc. Registrar of Birth, Death and Common Marriage, Valanchery Municipality (2nd respondent) has rejected the said application vide Ext.P4 notice stating that no court decree granting divorce has been submitted by the applicant and the parties to the marriage has not made any application for recording divorce. Hence writ petition was filed.
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thus:
“In pursuance to the notice issued by this Court, the learned Counsel for the Municipality expressed doubt over the maintainability on this writ petition on the premise that, the request for alteration or cancellation of entry in the files of the Registrar has been submitted by the father of the husband, Abdul Samad. By virtue of Section 13 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, parties referred to therein are husband and wife in the case of alteration of entries in the files of the Registrar. Section 13 read thus:
“Correction and cancellation of entries:(1) If the Local Registrar is satisfied either suo motu or on an application by the parties, that any entry in the Register of Marriages (Common is erroneous in form or substance or has been fraudeulently or improperly made, he shall subject to conditions in sub-rule (2) make suitable corrections including cancellation of registration, noting the evidence for such corrections in the margin of the Register of Marriages (Common), without any alteration of the original entry and shall sign the marginal entry with the date of correction or cancellation and shall forward the particulars of the corrections to the Registrar General concerned. (2) All corrections in material particulars like name, age date etc. and cancellation shall be done only with the sanction of the Registrar General concerned.
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Provided that no such correction or cancellation shall be made without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned.
(3) On getting sanction under sub-rule (2) the Local Registrar shall effect the correction or cancellation, as the case may be, in the Register of Marriages (Common)
(4) An amount of rupees one hundred shall be charged as fee for making corrections in the Register of Marriages (Common) other than clerical mistakes.”
(5) In every case in which an entry is corrected or cancelled under this Rule, intimation thereof shall be sent to the parties to the marriage and the Local Registrar shall make a report giving necessary details to the Registrar General concerned.”
On going through the above provisions, I am also of the view that reference are to the parties and not to any third persons. Learned Counsel for the petitioner at this juncture submitted that the parties belonged to Muslim Community and the marriage has already been dissolved, and the only requirement is alteration of entries in the file of the Registrar. I am of the view that the afore-mentioned request cannot be considered, as the party should be either the husband or the 3rd respondent, wife. The reason that the husband is abroad will not preclude the 3rd respondent in making an application for alteration of entries in the files of the Registrar.
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The writ petition, with the aforesaid observation, is disposed of.”
a) The judgment of the learned Single Judge is, without correctly noticing Exhibit P3 application and Exhibit P4 notice. The interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge to Kerala Registration Rules is not correct, comprehending the real purpose of the rule.
b) In Pradeep kodiveedu Cletus and Another v. Local Registrar of Marriages (Common), Kollam and Others, 2018 (10 KHC 280, this Hon'ble court held that Local Registrar can ensure that application for registration of marriage is preferred with the knowledge of parties, through video conferencing, thus enabling Local Registrar to obtain personal appearance through video conferencing. It was also held that provision of law can be interpreted by courts in fashion not causing any inconvenience to the parties. The court ought to have appreciated the fact that appellant's son is abroad and that is at the time for renewal of his visa which still carries the name of the respondent No.3 as spouse and in order for its renewal it was imminent to record necessary entries cancelling the marriage certificate.
c) Ext.P2 agreement was entered into by the appellant on behalf of his son and respondent which was duly
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agreed to by both the parties recognizing divorce by Talaq and setting all claims.
d) Marriage according to Mohammedan Law is a civil contract and one of the modes of dissolving the contract of marriage is by mutual consent of the husband and wife without the intervention of a court.
e) Respondent No.2 ought to have heard the appellant and respondent No.3 before issuing Ext.P4 notice. The respondent No.2 has also failed to consider Ext.P2 agreement which was entered into by Niyas and 3rd respondent in mutual consent.
“BEFORE THE SECRETARY, VALANCHERY MUNICIPALITY
Application submitted for Niyas, aged 30 years, S/o
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Vadakke Thoduvil Abdul Samad, residing at Niramaruthur amsom desom, Pancharamoola, Tirur Taluk by father of Niyas, Abdul Samad, S/o Saidalavi-Vadakke Thoduvil.
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to the marriage of my son recorded in the register kept on the Municipality. It is legal to do the same.
Therefore it is requested to record dissolution of marriage of my son Niyas and Khairunnisa, D/o. Palara Basheer, aged 26 years residing at Kattipparuthi amsom, Desom, P.O. Valanchery, Tirur Taluk, on 4.5.2018 by pronouncing Talaq in the register of Marriage of the Municipality. Kindly give me a copy of the same on behalf of my son.
In the above matter notice be sent to Khairunnisa if
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required and pass an order after hearing both the parties.
I enclose herewith copy of certificate of marriage of my son Niyas and Khairunnisa, agreement entered into on dissolution of marriage by pronouncing Talaq and a copy of Hon'ble Kerala High Court judgment in 2019 (4) KHC 39.”
“Valanchery Municipality Office Valanchery P.O., Pin:676 552, Malappuram District Phone No.0494 -2644325 Email:valanchery [email protected].
Notice
No.H1/12809/19
Date: 02.11.2019
Ref: Your letter No.H2 12809/19 dated 29.10.2019
It is informed that as no court records decreeing divorce has been submitted and the parties to the marriage have not applied, your above referred application cannot be considered.
Sd/-
To Abdul Samad V.T Vadakkethoduvil House Pancharamoola, Niramaruthur P.O., Tirur-676 109.”
the Registrar of Birth, Death and Common Marriage, Valanchery
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Municipality, Malappuram District is extracted :
“ Niyas Vadakkethoduvil #45720 Victoria Ave Chilliwack, BC V2P 2T5 Phone Number: (604) 997-4114 Passport #:L7067833
Regarding : Cancellation of Registration of Marriage To
Registrar of Birth, Death & Common Marriage, Valanchery Municipality, Valanchery P.O., PIN-676 552, Malappuram District
Respected sir,
I, Niyas Vadakethoduvil, am working as an Aircraft Pilot Trainee in Canada. The marriage between Khairunnisa and myself was held on 5.6.2014. Due to hassles between us we decided to dissolve marriage mutually. The marriage was dissolved by me pronouncing Talaq to her. Acknowledging the same and settling maintenance, Khairunnisa and my father (on my behalf) entered into an agreement dated 23.5.2018. Pursuant to this, my father submitted an application to your office for cancelling the necessary entries in the Register of Marriage on 29.10.2019 (Inward No.12808-19). However the same has been rejected by your office for the reason that it was not submitted by both parties to the marriage.
I had authorised my father, Abdul Samad
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(Vadakethoduvil House) to make such an application to your office as I am unable to come down to India personally due to my work in Canada. It is essential for a certificate effecting such changes as it needs to be presented before the concerned authorities to make necessary changes in my Visa, Passport etc. Therefore, kindly reconsider the application submitted by my father for effecting necessary cancellation in the Marriage Register as it has been made on my behalf, upon my authorization. Kindly do the needful.
Yours respectfully Sd/Niyas Vadakkethoduvil”
on the decision of a learned Single Judge in Jithin Varghese Prakash v. Registrar of Marriage, Piravam Municipality (2019(4) KHC 39) , attention of this Court was invited to a contra decision in Rajesh Rajan v. Chief Registrar General of Marriages (Common), Thiruvananthapuram and two others, (W.P(C). No.5911 of 2015) dated 8.6.2015, confirmed by a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.A. No.1549 of 2015 dated 3.8.2015.
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Registrar of Marriages (Common), Thrissur to cancel the entries relating to the parties to the marriage. The application was filed under Rule 13(1) of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008. The competent authority refused to entertain the same, which was challenged in W.P(C).No.5911 of 2015 with the following reliefs:
to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Chief Registrar General of Marriages (Common), Thiruvananthapuram and the Registrar of Marriages (Common), Thrissur (respondents 1 and 2) to exercise the jurisdiction under Rule 13 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008, after receiving Ext.P4 application.
And also
to direct the second respondent to cancel the entry in the Register of Marriages (Common) in the matter of Ext.P3 certificate exercising his power and authority under Rule 13 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008.
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registration, either suo motu or on application. The jurisdiction under Rule 13 can be exercised if an entry is erroneous in form or substance or has been fraudulently or improperly made. The jurisdiction to be exercised under sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 is subject to conditions in sub-rule (2), which provides that all corrections in material particulars like name, age, date etc. and the cancellation shall be done only with the sanction of the Registrar General concerned. No such correction or cancellation shall be made without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. When the parties make an application jointly stating that their marriage was solemnized and when they produce proof of the same, the Local Registrar is duty bound to register the marriage. The power of correction is regarding any mistake in the marriage certificate. The mistakes may be either those committed by the Local Registrar while making the entries in the certificate; or the mistakes may be those mistakes which the parties committed while submitting the memorandum for registration. Cancellation of the entries can be made only if the Local Registrar is satisfied that an entry in the Register of Marriages (Common) is erroneous in form or substance or has been fraudulently or improperly made. There is no case for the petitioner that he had any
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intention to commit any fraud. Registration of a marriage to secure visa would be made only on the volition of the parties to the alleged marriage. They cannot get those entries cancelled once they changed their mind. The authority under the Rules exercises a very serious function of registering marriages. A marriage certificate is a permanent record. The authorities under the Rules are expected to keep the records as permanent records. The entries made in the memorandum and which were later carried out in the Marriage Register cannot be altered except on the ground of errors or on the ground that the entries were fraudulently or improperly made. The parties who submitted the memorandum in Form No.I with a declaration that the details shown therein are true to the best of their knowledge and belief cannot turn round and say that the said declaration was made for a particular purpose and, therefore, the entries are liable to be corrected and the registration is liable to be cancelled. The entries in the Marriage Register and the marriage certificate are not liable to be corrected at the whims and fancies of the parties to the marriage. The corrections are to be carried out only in the manner provided under Rule 13 of the Rules. Wide powers are given to the Local Registrar for correction of entries and for cancellation of entries
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and registration. There may be instances were an entry relating to marriage was fraudulently made and the victim thereof is entitled to approach the Registrar for cancellation of the entries or registration. In the case of such fraudulent acts, one of the parties to the marriage may be a victim of fraud. But the parties to the marriage cannot approach the Local Registrar and say that for a particular purpose they made a false entry and since that purpose could not be achieved, they want to resile from the declaration. That is not the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Local Registrar under Rule 13. That is not the liberty provided to the parties to the marriage to apply before the Local Registrar for correction and cancellation of the entries.
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memorandum for registration is erroneous and therefore the entry is to be corrected or the registration is liable to be cancelled. A party to a marriage cannot relegate the right to apply under Rule 13 to a power of attorney holder.
For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
2.Writ petitioner and third respondent obtained a certification under the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008, “the Rules”, for short, to the effect that they are married couple. Later on, the writ petitioner turned round to say that there was no marriage, and registration of such a nature was obtained after the parties had agreed to enter into marriage, however that, the marriage did not materialise as the parties had fallen apart. On this premise, they invoked Rule 13 of the Rules and moved the competent authority under the Rules seeking that the registration may be cancelled. The registering authority did not approve such request. This brought the writ petitioner to this Court. Dilating on different aspects of the Rules and also similar provisions, the learned single Judge, in our view, quite rightly, came to the conclusion that the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to seek any relief as has been sought for by
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him, particularly when conduct of the parties would clearly show that the certification was obtained by the writ petitioner and the third respondent jointly and; at the instance of one party, the registration cannot be cancelled.
3.We have looked into the substance of the contentions. This is a case where writ jurisdiction should keep its hands off as rightly noted by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment, since other remedies may be available in appropriate jurisdictions.
5.With this, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned single Judge does not merit interference by entertaining this intra-court appeal. This appeal, therefore, fails.
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marriage and two other persons who witnessed the marriage. In the case of a marriage solemnized as per religious rites, a copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the religious authority concerned or a declaration from a Gazetted Officer/Member of Parliament/Member of Legislative Assembly/ Member of Local Self Government Institution in Form No.II may be considered as a document in proof of the marriage.
“ 13. Correction and cancellation of entries .-- (1) If the Local Registrar is satisfied either suo motu or on application by the parties, that any entry in the Register of Marriages (Common) is erroneous in form or substance or has been fraudulently or improperly made, he shall subject to conditions in sub-rule (2), make suitable corrections including cancellation of registration, noting the evidence for such corrections in the margin of the Register of Marriages (Common), without any alteration of the original entry and shall sign the marginal entry with the date of correction or cancellation and shall forward the particulars of the corrections to the Registrar General concerned.
(2) All corrections in material particulars like name, age, date, etc., and cancellation shall be done only with the sanction of the Registrar General concerned:
Provided that no such correction or cancellation shall be made without affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned.
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(3) On getting sanction under sub-rule (2), the Local Registrar shall effect the correction or cancellation, as the case may be, in the Register of Marriages (Common).
(4) An amount of rupees one hundred shall be charged as fee for making corrections in the Register of Marriages (Common) other than clerical mistakes.
(5) In every case in which an entry is corrected or cancelled under this Rule, intimation thereof shall be sent to the parties to the marriage and the Local Registrar shall make a report giving necessary details to the Registrar General concerned.”
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(i) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & F 85], wherein, he said thus, “If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.
(ii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, “Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice.
(iii) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51, the Hon'ble Mr.S.R.Das, held as follows:
“The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction.”
(iv) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “It is settled
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rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.”
(v) In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State , reported in AIR 1953 SC 394, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.”
(vi) What is the spirit of law, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R.Das in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749, said that, “The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act.”
(vii) In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D.Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,
“It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined.”
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(viii) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“It must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.
It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct.”
(ix) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained the unambiguous, as “unambiguous in context”.
(x) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in
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its entirety.
(xi) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr.Vijay Anand Maharaj reported in AIR 1963 SC 946, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on "Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge "to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy," and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p.68 of his book:
"The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words."
Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute's scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature.
The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the
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Legislature.”
(xii) In Namamal v. Radhey Shyam reported in AIR 1970 Rajasthan 26, the Court held as follows:
“It was observed by Pollock C. B. in Waugh v. Mid-dleton, 1853-8 Ex 352 (356):-- "It must, however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it
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would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes thus:--
"The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked, comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature. The paramount object, in construing penal as well us other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning, or the more extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating the intention. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent, or, to use Sir Edward Cole's words, to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”
(xiii) In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Joiner reported in (1975) 3 All. ER 1050, it has been held that normally a statutory provision consists of a general description of some factual situation and the legal consequences ensuing from it. Whether the general description is wide or narrow, it will have some limits. The question before a court of law in dealing with a
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statute is whether the factual situation proved before it falls within the general description given in the statute. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an “ambiguity” in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, “ambiguity” and “ambiguous” are widely used in judgments.
(xiv) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 = AIR 1975 SC 1106, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,
"A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, “ut res magis valiat quam pereat”, lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air."
(xv) In C.I.T., Madras v. T.Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd. , reported in (1976) 1 SCC 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice.
(xvi) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. , and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance.
(xvii) In LT.-Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India reported in (1983) 3 SCC 140, at Paragraph 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
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held as follows:
“8. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. ..........If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the Act.”
(xviii) In Philips India Ltd. , v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (3) SCC 103, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Paragraph 15, held as follows:
“(15) No cannon of statutory construction is more firmly, established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All.ER 497]) and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274]). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: 'it is the most natural and genuine
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exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers' (Quoted with approval in Punjab Breverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 3 SCR 370 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165]).”
(xix) In Narendra H.Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it was held that, it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance is to examine its language and then ask what is the natural meaning uninfluenced by the considerations derived from previous state of law and then assume that it was property intended to leave unaltered. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact.
(xx) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context.
(xxi) It is a well settled law of interpretation that “when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. Reference can be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981.”
(xxii) In M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 = AIR 1993 SC 2288, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,
“where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there
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is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand.”
(xxiii) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom....
(xxiv) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held that,
“The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be
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deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.”
(xxv) In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,-
“The interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy
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involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.”
In Nathi Devi's case, it was further held that,
“It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors.”
(xxvi) In Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn., 2008), the learned author while referring to judgments of different Courts states (at page 134) that procedural laws regulating proceedings in court are to be construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible and to avoid injustice from a mistake of court. He further states (at pages 135 and 136) that: "Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. "The argument ab inconvenienti", said LORD MOULTON, "is one which requires to be used with great caution".
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(xxvii) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
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or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so. (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
“It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.”
(xxviii) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. , reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or
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construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.”
(xxix) In A.N.Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC 2677, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,
“It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.”
(xxx) In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56, the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said.
(xxxi) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“One of the basic principles of Interpretation of
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Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.”
(xxxii) In Visitor Amu v. K.S.Misra reported in (2007) 8 SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.”
(xxxiii) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.,
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reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows:
“52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.”
(xxxiv) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation
that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear.”
(xxxv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar , reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2009) 3 SCC 553]
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precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision.”
(xxxvi) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well-recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise--Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907]
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(xxxvii) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. [2010 CIJ 273 SC (1)], it was held that,
"6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness,
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ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be."
(xxxviii) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. , reported in (2011) 9 SCC 354, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with a provision under Section 17(3-A) of the Act, held that,
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(xxxix) In Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida reported in (2011) 6 SCC 58, at paragraph 25, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“22. It is a settled proposition of law that whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be affected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of "quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur at omne per quod devenitur ad illud", which means" "whenever a thing is prohibited, it is prohibited whether done directly or indirectly". (See: Swantraj & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 517; Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry v. ACER India Ltd., (2004) 8 SCC 173; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors., v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd., & Ors., JT (2010) 11 SC 273).
At Paragraph 26 in Noida Entrepreneurs Association's case (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, further held that,
“23. In Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh & Anr. AIR 1979 SC 381, this Court has observed that an authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by "shift or contrivance." While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fox v. Bishop of Chester, (1824) 2 B &C 635, wherein it was observed as under:-
"To carry out effectually the object of a statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined."
19. If the contentions of the petitioner are to be accepted, then
this court would be adding words to the rules, which is not permissible.
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On the said aspect, let us consider few decisions as to whether, Courts can add or delete or substitute any word to a section or rule, as the case
may be.
(i) In CIT v. Badhraja and Compan y reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that,“An object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature.”
(ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
“13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.”
(iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court
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held that,-
“So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.”
(iv) In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, -
“It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules.”
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Corporation and Others reported in (2003) 2 SCC 455 & AIR 2003 SC 2103, wherein it was argued that the Court cannot supply the omissions by the Legislature. While interpreting a provision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it and it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it if it is deemed necessary. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that by the principle of causus omissus, Court cannot add words to a Statute.
binding on us. Reference can be made to a few decisions:
“The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Judicial Comity is an integral part of judicial discipline and to maintain judicial discipline, corner stone of the judicial integrity requires that judgments of Coordinate Benches must be respected.
(i) In Lily Thomas vs. Union of India , reported in 2000 (6) SCC 244, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reiterated the principle that rulings of Larger Bench should be followed and those of Coordinate Bench of equal strength not to be different from and most be followed.
(ii) In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has criticised the decisions of Coordinate Benches, which have not followed the earlier judgments by another Coordinate Bench. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, reported in
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(2008) 10 SCC 1 , wherein at paragraph Nos.90 and 91, held thus:-
"90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed.
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(iii) Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger Bench. (See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in 2003 (7) SCC 01, SCC at paras 6 and 7; followed in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, reported in 2002 (7) SCC 01, SCC at para 2.) But no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1686 and K.K. Narula, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1368 , both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority.”
In the light of the decisions and discussions we find no error in the impugned judgment, warranting interference. In the result, writ appeal is dismissed.
Sd/S. Manikumar, Chief Justice
Sd/Shaji P. Chaly, Judge
sou.
1 issue framed by the court
Can a spouse's father, acting under authorisation, apply under Rule 13 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008 for cancellation of marriage registration?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Jithin Varghese Prakash v. Registrar of Marriage, Piravam MunicipalityDistinguished¶131
(2019(4) KHC 39)
Rajesh Rajan v. Chief Registrar General of Marriages (Common), Thiruvananthapuram and two othersFollowed¶100
(W.P(C). No.5911 of 2015) dated 8.6.2015
W.A. No.1549 of 2015 dated 3.8.2015Followed¶100
Sussex Peerage caseRelied on¶149
[(1844) 11 Cl & F 85]
Ram Rattan v. Parma NandRelied on¶151
AIR 1946 PC 51 · Who else cites this
Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi SadhukhanRelied on¶163
AIR 1957 SC 907 · Who else cites this
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr.Vijay Anand MaharajRelied on¶172
AIR 1963 SC 946 · Who else cites this
Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. , and othersRelied on¶193
1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274 · Who else cites this
Nelson Motis v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶206
AIR 1992 SC 1981 · Who else cites this
M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise and othersRelied on¶207
1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 = AIR 1993 SC 2288 · Who else cites this
Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram AgarwalRelied on¶212
(2003) 2 SCC 577 · Who else cites this
Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi GuptaRelied on¶220
AIR 2005 SC 648 · Who else cites this
State of Jharkhand v. Govind SinghRelied on¶230
(2005) 10 SCC 437 · Who else cites this
Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.Relied on¶240
(2006) 2 SCC 670 · Who else cites this
Phool Patti v. Ram SinghRelied on¶260
(2009) 13 SCC 22 · Who else cites this
Satheedevi v. PrasannaRelied on¶269
(2010) 5 SCC 622 · Who else cites this
Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors.Relied on¶274
[2010 CIJ 273 SC (1)]
Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. NoidaRelied on¶284
(2011) 6 SCC 58 · Who else cites this
CIT v. Badhraja and Compan yRelied on¶295
1994 Supp (1) SCC 280 · Who else cites this
Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu RamuluRelied on¶296
(2001) 7 SCC 71 · Who else cites this
Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar IddyaRelied on¶298
AIR 2003 Kant. 187 · Who else cites this
Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service CommissionRelied on¶303
(2007) 3 SCC 720 · Who else cites this
Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation and OthersRelied on¶308
(2003) 2 SCC 455 & AIR 2003 SC 2103 · Who else cites this
Lily Thomas vs. Union of IndiaRelied on¶313
2000 (6) SCC 244 · Who else cites this
Official Liquidator v. DayanandRelied on¶317
(2008) 10 SCC 1 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 1 enactments
ABDUL SAMAD V.T.
VALANCHERY MUNICIPALITY
HEALTH INSPECTOR GRADE-1 AND REGISTRAR OF BIRTH,DEATH AND COMMON MARRIAGE, VALANCHERY MUNICIPALITY
KHAIRUNNISA.P.O
S. Manikumar
Shaji P. Chaly
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
