Dismissed

V.S.Devarajan v. State of Kerala

Kerala HC6 Dec 2018WP(C)/8282/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Retired employees challenged deduction of special advance amounts from their gratuity, arguing it violated the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Court held that enforcing the employees' prior undertaking to refund un-sanctioned advances is a valid set-off, not a prohibited forfeiture under the Act, and dismissed the petition.

What did the court decide?

The writ petition of the petitioners was dismissed with no order as to costs.

V.S.Devarajan Vs State of Kerala — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Kerala HC (2018)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

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THURSDAY ,THE 06TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2018 / 5TH AGRAHAYANA, 1940

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WP(C).No. 8282 of 2018

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PETITIONER/S:

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1 V.S.DEVARAJAN, AGED 61 YEARS, S/O.SREEDHARAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT VELAMKUDY HOUSE, CHERANALLOOR P.O., KARUVAPPADI-683544.

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2 P.K.CHANDRAN, AGED 61, S/O.KURUMBAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT PAINADATHU, MAYKAVU P.O., HARINAGAR, ANGAMALI.

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3 ISSAC PAUL, AGED 62, S/O.PAUL, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT AMBALLOORKARA HOUSE, MAYKADU P.O., ANGAMALI.

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4 K.R.MOHANAN, AGED 63, S/O.RAMAKRISHNAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT KOLLASSERY HOUSE, NEELISWARAM P.O.-683584.

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5 N.T.FRANCIS, AGED 64, S/O.THARIYATH, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT NJALIYATH HOUSE, MOOKANNUR-683577.

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6 K.A.INDRAN, AGED 64, S/O.ACHUTHAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT KOVATHU HOUSE, KIDANGOOR P.O., ANGAMALI. 7 A.K.NARAYANAN, AGED 61, S/O.KUTTAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT ARAKKAL HOUSE, THURAVOOR P.O., ANGAMALI. 8 K.P.ANTONY, AGED 62, S/O.PAULO, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT KUTHEKKADAN HOUSE, GEROGUNAPURAM-683574. 9 E.P.RAJAN, AGED 65, S/O.PAPPU, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT ILANJIKKAL HOUSE, THOTTAKAM, MANIKYAMANGALAM-683573. 10 V.K.ULLAS, AGED 62, S/O.KUMARAN, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT VALLARAKATHU HOUSE, SOUTH VAZHAKKULAM, ALUVA. 11 J.JNANADAS,AGED 66, S/O.JAMES, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT BEENA COTTAGE, KANAYITHOTTAM, ARIMANOOR, POOVAR-685525. 12 K.C.MATHEW, AGED 67, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT KOTTAKKAL HOUSE, ANGAMALI P.O.-687532.

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13 M.D.ANTU, AGED 59, S/O.DEVASSY, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT MENACHERRY, THAYATHOTTU P.O., KAVALAPARAMBU.

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14 K.V.PAULOSE, AGED 63, S/O.VAREED, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT KIRIYANTHAL HOUSE, ANGAMALI SOUTH P.O., CHAMPANOOR-683572.

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15 V.D.JOSE, AGED 66, S/O.DEVASSY, RETIRED AS PLANT WORKER, KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION, RESIDING AT VARAYADAN, KOTTAMAM, NEELISWARAM-683584.

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BY ADVS. SRI.MATHEW A KUZHALANADAN SMT.ANITHA MATHAI MUTHIRENTHY

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RESPONDENT/S:

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1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, INDUSTRIES (K) DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.

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2 KERALA STATE BAMBOO CORPORATION LIMITED REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, P.B.NO.20, ANGAMALY SOUTH, ERNAKULAM-683573.

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BY ADV. SMT.LATHA ANAND

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THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 06.12.2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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W.P.(C). No. 8282 of 2018

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JUDGMENT

Introduction:

A batch of employees receives “special advance” for many years from its employer, a State Government Corporation. For a few years, the employees receive it with the Government’s consent, and other years they receive that with the Government’s consent pending. Without the Government’s contribution, the Corporation cannot shoulder the burden, though. So the employees undertake to refund the special advances if the Government does not approve the disbursement. To get the approval, the Corporation tries and fails. In the meanwhile, the employees retire. So the Corporation deducts the special advances from their gratuity.

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After a few years, the employees challenge the deduction. They contend that the deduction is against the law and cite Section 4 (6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (“the Act”) in support. That provision provides for forfeiture, however. Then, does the Corporation’s enforcing an employee’s undertaking and deducting

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from his gratuity amount to forfeiture beyond that mentioned in Section 4(6) of the Act?

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Facts:

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All the fifteen petitioners worked as plant workers in the second respondent Corporation: Kerala State Bamboo Corporation Limited. On superannuation, they retired from service, in different years beginning from 2001.

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When the petitioners were in service, until 2006-07 they were given special advance—during Onam. The Government sanctioned the amounts and allotted the funds to the Corporation. From 2007-08 onwards, the Government did not sanction the advance, much less has it allotted the funds. But the Corporation continued to pay its employees the special advance. When the petitioners retired, as is evident from Exts.P1 to P15; the Corporation settled their terminal benefits, including the gratuity. But it deducted from the petitioners’ gratuity all the special advances it had paid to them earlier. Assailing that deduction, the petitioners have filed this writ petition.

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Discussion:

Petitioners’:

Smt. Anitha Mathai Muthirenthy, the petitioners' counsel, has contended that the petitioners never secured a benefit by misrepresenting. They only received from the Corporation what they had been entitled to. According to her, just because the Government did not sanction the amount, the special advance could not become illegal. In this context, she draws my attention to the Ext.P17 Government sanction for 2006-07.

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Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972, Smt Anitha Mathai also contends, enumerates the circumstances under which deductions can be made from the gratuity. In this context, she stresses that the Gratuity Act is a self-contained code and that no deductions can be effected from the gratuity beyond what has been statutorily stipulated.

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Smt. Mathai has also drawn my attention to the Ext.P18 judgment, dated 7^th March 2012. According to her, similarly placed retired employees from the Corporation were allowed to enjoy the

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benefit without deduction, even though those employees, too, had no Government sanction. To support her contention, Smt Mathai has relied on State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih¹ , Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. v. Surendra T. Amin² , Mathew v. Plantation Corporation of Kerala Ltd.³ Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors.⁴

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Respondents’:

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On the other hand, Sri Joseph Sebastian Parackal, appearing for the Corporations’ Standing Counsel, has submitted that despite the Corporation's best efforts, the Government did not sanction the special advance to its employees from 2007-08 onwards. According to him, the Corporation has always been under losses since its inception; it has been struggling to pay even the salaries. To pay the special advance, the Corporation, Sri Parackal submits, has no corpus. On the contrary, it is the Government that releases the grant.

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1 AIR 2015 SC 696

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2 2004 GLH (3) 752

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3 2000 (3) KLT 107

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4 2007 (1) SCC 663

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To elaborate, Sri Parackal also contends that from 200708 the Corporation, only as a matter of a goodwill gesture towards its employees, released the special advances in anticipation of the Government sanction and release of funds. Given its financial difficulties, the Corporation has acted, the Counsel stresses, with caution: it has taken undertakings from the employees that if the Government refused to sanction the special advance, they would repay the amounts.

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Sri Parackal has further drawn my attention to Section 4(6) and also Section 13 of the Act. According to him, Section 4(6) only refers to forfeiture. And adjusting the amounts on an undertaking does not amount to forfeiture; it could rather be treated as a set off. In the alternative, he has also drawn my attention to Rule 7(1), Rule 8(1), and Rule 10, to elaborate on the procedure for paying the gratuity. Sri Parackal stresses that Rule 10 is categoric: if an employee has a grievance about the quantum, he should

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approach the Controlling Authority within ninety days.

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Since 2009 to this year, according to Sri Parackal, over

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three hundred employees must have retired. Against them all, the Corporation, with a uniform policy, enforced their undertakings and deducted the amounts, as was done in the petitioners' case, too. But the petitioners alone approached this Court—and they have approached the Court belatedly, at that. To support his contentions, Sri Parackal has relied on High Court of Punjab & Haryana & Ors.

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v. Jagdev Singh⁵ , Chandi Prasad Uniyal and Otrs. v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors.⁶ , Wazir Chand v. Union of India & Ors.⁷ and Krishna Bahadur v. M.s, Purna Theatre & Ors.⁸ .

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Besides, Sri Parackal has also taken me to the lexical meaning of forfeiture by referring to an extract from Black's Law Dictionary.

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Heard Smt. Anitha Mathai Muthirenthy, the learned

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counsel for the petitioners, and Sri Joseph Sebastian Parackal, the

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5 2016 (14) SCC 267

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6 2012 (8) SCC 417

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7 2001 (6) SCC 596

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8 AIR 2004 SC 4282

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learned counsel for the Corporation, besides perusing the record.

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Discussion:

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The petitioners worked in the respondent Corporation and retired. When they were in service, till 2006-07 the petitioners received special advance with the Government’s approval and, later, until their retirement, without the Government’s approval. Of course, the petitioners call it “special advance”, given on a festive occasion; but the Corporation calls it “recoverable advance.” Let us stick to the petitioners’ expression: special advance. The Corporation paid that advance in anticipation of the Government’s approval. But on the Corporation’s insistence, the employees undertook to repay the advance if the Government refused to sanction it. Despite the Corporation’s repeated requests, the Government remained unmoved. So the Corporation enforced the petitioners’ undertaking; it deducted the amounts from their gratuity.

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The petitioners contend that gratuity is immune from any deductions, save those provided for in the Act. So it pays to examine

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the relevant provisions of the Act.

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Gratuity and the Respondent-Establishment:

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Lexically speaking, gratuity is a sum of money paid to an employee at the end of a period of employment, denoting graciousness or favour. Etymologically, it originates from Latin gratus ‘pleasing, thankful’.⁹ It is lump sum payment from an employer to an employee for the employee’s service, and it is paid when the employment ends. Literally, gratuity is a bounty or bonus or tip, given as a goodwill gesture, with no legal compulsion. But, in practice, it is otherwise. With the enactment of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the gratuity has become mandatory.

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Here the respondent Corporation is an establishment within the sweep of Section 1 (3) and the petitioners are its employees, as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act. When the petitioners superannuated from service, the Corporation paid them all their terminal benefits, including the gratuity. But it deducted some amount from the gratuity. And that deduction concerns the

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9Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd Edition revised)

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special advance the petitioners received earlier.

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Now the petitioners assert that nothing should be deducted

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from their gratuity. Yet the Corporation maintains that the petitioners themselves undertook to refund the advance if the Government did not approve the disbursement. That refund, the Corporation also maintains, ought to be from the petitioners’ terminal benefit, as they consented to earlier.

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Section 4 of the Act mandates that an employee gets the gratuity on his superannuation, retirement, or resignation if he has worked for five or more years. If an employee dies or disables himself because of an accident or disease, the minimum service criterion—five years—does not apply.

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The petitioners lay much emphasis on sub-section (6). This sub-section begins with an exclusionary expression: notwithstanding. Thus remaining immune from sub-section (1), it lays down that the gratuity of an terminated employee shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss he caused to the employer. The loss or damage can even be because of the

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employee’s “riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part” or moral turpitude during his employment. So they contend that as Section 4 (6) does not apply here; the deduction is unwarranted. Yet we may note one important feature of Section 4 (6): it deals with forfeiture per se —not every form of deduction. No doubt an employee’s gratuity cannot be forfeited either in full or in part for any reason beyond those mentioned in Section 4 (6) of the Act. Forfeiture is so obvious an expression—at least, in this context; it needs no elaboration.

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The question here, however, is whether all forms of deductions stand proscribed under Section 4 (6) or any other provision of the Act. The counsel on either side have cited copious precedents to support their respective contentions. We will examine their holding before we move further.

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In one case, because of the employer’s “unintentional mistake”, a few employees received monetary benefits beyond their due. The employer, then, wanted to recover those amounts from the

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employees. In that context, the Supreme Court in Rafiq Masih has held that the order of recovery is arbitrary and unjustified. After examining the precedential position, Rafiq Masih acknowledges the difficulty in visualising all situations of hardship that affect an employee on recovery of payments mistakenly made by the employer above their entitlement. Then, illustratively, it sets out a few circumstances under which recoveries by the employers would

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be impermissible in law:

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(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service).

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(ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

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(iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

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(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

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(v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.

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The distinguishing feature of Rafiq Masih is this: the recovery must concern the amounts the employer has mistakenly made. Here, I am afraid there is no element of mistake or inadvertence; both the employees and the employer are conscious of the payment and its consequences.

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In another case, an employee faced disciplinary proceedings on the grounds of moral turpitude. He was discharged from service and denied the gratuity benefit, too. On a complaint, the Controlling Authority restored the benefit. The management questioned this. Then, Gujarat High court in Surendra T. Amin has held that before terminating the employee’s service, the employer ought to have conducted a “full-fledged formal inquiry into the allegations of moral turpitude”. On facts, the Surendra T. Amin has held there was no inquiry and, so, the denial of the benefit could not be sustained.

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In Mathew , an employee, on inquiry, was found to have caused “huge loss” to his employer. The employer ordered for

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recovery of loss from the employee’s gratuity and adjusted it towards loss; it forfeited the gratuity to the extent of loss. Then, this Court has held that sub-sections (1) and (6) of Section 4 read together lead to only one conclusion: forfeiture to the extent of the damage or loss caused when the employee’s services have been “terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss or destruction of property belonging to the employer.” Then, on facts, Mathew holds that admittedly the appellant’s services were not terminated.

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Let us examine another case. The appellant was a chief general manager in a public sector undertaking—Bharat Coking Ltd. He faced disciplinary proceedings on the allegation of stock shortage. But pending the departmental proceeding, the appellant was allowed to retire. When he applied for gratuity, the management denied it under the regnant departmental rules. In fact, Rule 27 provides for “recovering from pay or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the company by negligence or breach of orders or trust”.

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Examining the interplay between the Rules and the Act, the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Gill has, first, observed that the Rules framed by the Coal India Limited are not statutory rules; they have been made by the holding company. Then, it has observed that the Act must prevail over the Rules:

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“Gratuity becomes payable as soon as the employee retires. The only condition therefore is rendition of five years continuous service. A statutory right accrued, thus, cannot be impaired by reason of a rule which does not have the force of a statute.”

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Here, I reckon, the case holding of Jaswant Singh Gill does not apply, either. The employees have suffered no deductions on account of any rules that could be declared invalid.

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Now, we will examine the decisions the employer has relied on. In Wazir Chand , the appellant, placed “under hard circumstances” continued to occupy the Government quarter even after superannuation. For his extended occupation of the official residence, the Government, under Rules, has charged penal rent from the retired Government servant. It also adjusted that amount from the appellant’s “Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity” (“DCRG”).

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In the above factual backdrop, the Supreme Court in Wazir Chand has held that the appellant having unauthorisedly occupied the Government quarter, he was liable to pay the penal rent under Rules. That accepted, there is no illegality in the Government’s adjusting the penal rent against the employee’s DCRG.

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In another case, the appellant was employed in a cinema house. Faced with the disciplinary proceedings, he was dismissed from service. The Industrial Tribunal reinstated the appellant with full back wages and compensation. After the appellant’s readmission, the employer, within one month, retrenched him, by paying ‘retrenchment compensation under protest’. The appellant allegedly agreed to receive the amount, as full and final settlement. The Tribunal, again, held the retrenchment as illegal, for the employer has violated Section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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As the employer insisted that the appellant had waived his rights, the Supreme Court in Krishna Bahadur has examined the

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concept of waiver: The principle of waiver is akin to that of estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that while estoppel is not a cause of action. It is a rule of evidence. Waiver, on the other hand, is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties, and a party fully knowing of its rights agrees not to assert a right for a consideration.

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Krishna Bahadur also observes that a right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions have been provided for by a statute “subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein.” Further relevant is the observation that whenever waiver is pleaded, it is for the party pleading it to show that “an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct.”

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Of course, on facts Krishna Bahadur has held that the employer never took the plea of waiver before the courts below, it must fail in its defence. And it failed.

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In another case, a judicial officer was promoted as

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Additional Civil Judge. His pay scale was fixed. Then, under the Revised Pay Rules, he undertook to let the Government recover “either by adjustment against future payments due or otherwise” any excess pay “which may be found to have been paid” to him. The judicial officer, under circumstances not relevant here, was compulsorily retired. And the Government did recover from him the excess pay.

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The judicial officer contended that the Government cannot recover the excess amount after his retirement. This plea met the High Court’s acceptance. On appeal, in Jagdev Singh , the Supreme Court has held that the respondent officer’s plea “will have no application to a situation such as the present where an undertaking was specifically furnished by the officer at the time when his pay was initially revised, accepting that any payment found to have been made in excess would be liable to be adjusted.”

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Jagdev Singh , then, tellingly observed that while choosing the benefit of the revised pay scale, the respondent was clearly on notice that a future re-fixation or revision may warrant an

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adjustment of the excess payment, if any, made. Jagdev Singh has also considered Rafiq Masih . It examined the second condition: “Recovery from retired employees, or employees due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery”. Then, it explained that the principle enunciated in proposition (ii) cannot apply to a situation such as in Jagdev Singh: “In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by the undertaking.”

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To my mind, this case squarely accords with Jagdev Singh both on facts and on legal principles, too. The petitioners received, on more than one occasion, a benefit not due to them: special advance. The employees' entitlement was subject to the Government’s sanction. So the Corporation provided for the contingency: an undertaking from the employees to refund if the Government did not sanction the advance. Then, the Corporation

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did all it could to get the sanction, but failed in its effort.

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So the Corporation enforced the employee’s undertaking.

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I reckon it does not offend Section 4 (6) of the Act, which relates to forfeiture. And enforcing a contract—not found to be void—cannot be termed a forfeiture. Nor have the petitioners waived a right having an element of public interest. That said, I must observe that gratuity has an element of public interest, as it provides for financial protection in the autumn of a retired employee’s life. Then, I must also observe that every deduction from gratuity does not offend the public-interest principle. In other words, the amount sought to be deducted and the circumstances under which it is sought to be deducted must also be considered before we determine the element of public interest. It is not a stand-alone principle; rather it is a protean principle.

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Here, the benefit does not belong to the employees, yet they received it. They received it with an awareness that they may have to pay it back, and they have consciously consented to it. Those amounts deducted, many employees accepted the deduction;

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but a few protested. That protest is through this writ petition. And most of these employees retired many years ago—beyond five years. True, others accepting the deduction and only a few questioning it hardly matter, for mass acceptance does not defeat one man’s insistence—insistence on his right, at that.

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In Ext.P18 judgment, a few retired employees filed three writ petitions complaining that the Corporation had so far not paid their retirement benefits. The Corporation, in defence, maintained that as the issue about special advance pay those employees received had still been pending with the Government, they could not conclude the issue. In that context, this Court has held that their terminal benefits should be paid within a time frame with 9% interest. The Court has conspicuously not spelt out on the special pay allowance. Thus, that issue has gone sub silentio . Therefore, Ext.P18, I am afraid, cannot be recorded as a precedent.

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Keeping aside the legal logomachy, we may as well examine what was the amount the petitioners received. It was “advance”. They called it special advance; the Corporation called it

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“recoverable advance”. Either way it was an advance. Perhaps,

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earlier the Government that held the purse-strings converted that advance into a benefit a la an incentive or an allowance. Later, it did not. So the Corporation wanted to recover the amounts. And that recovery was based on the petitioners’ undertaking.

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To sum up, Section 4 (6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, does not defeat the Corporation’s right to enforce the petitioners' undertaking, as it did. Nor could the petitioners establish that the Corporation’s action suffers from any legal infirmity. So the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and it is.

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No order on costs.

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Sd/-

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DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

JUDGE

das

APPENDIX

PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:

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EXHIBIT P1	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 1ST PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P2	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 2ND PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P3	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 3RD PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 4TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P5	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 5TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P6	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 6TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P7	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 7TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P8	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 8TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P9	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 9TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P10	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 10TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P11	SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 11TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.

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EXHIBIT	P12 SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 12TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT	P13 SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 13TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT	P14 SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 14TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT	P15 SERVICE DETAILS OF THE 15TH PETITIONER DATED NIL ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT	P16 LETTER TO 1ST RESPONDENT FROM 2ND RESPONDENT DATED 04-11-2015.
EXHIBIT	P17 LETTER TO 2ND RESPONDENT FROM 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 27-08-2008.
EXHIBIT	P18 JUDGMENT BY THE HON'BLE SINGLE BENCH OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA IN WP(C)NO.36969 OF 2010 DATED 07-03- 2012.

V.S.Devarajan v. State of Kerala

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

V.S.Devarajan v. State of Kerala

Case brief

What is this about?

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