Allowed

Hajira v. Anto

Kerala HC19 Mar 2018RFA/259/2010

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property had been decreed. Allowing the defendants' appeal, the High Court held that time was the essence of the contract, that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform, and that part performance under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act had not been properly pleaded. The decree was set aside and the advance order

What did the court decide?

Decree and judgment of the lower court set aside; the plaintiffs granted recovery of Rs.3,50,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of suit till realisation from the defendants jointly and s

Hajira Vs Anto — Specific Performance | Kerala HC (2018)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT:

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE &

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.SOMARAJAN

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MONDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF MARCH 2018 / 28TH PHALGUNA, 1939

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RFA.No. 259 of 2010

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AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN OS NO.621/2007 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL SUB COURT, THRISSUR DATED 23.12.2009.

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APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS:

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1 HAJIRA, AGED 70 YEARS, D/O.RAYANMARAKKAR VEETTIL CHEKKU AND W/O.KOLAMBIL PADINJAKKARA KUNJUMUHAMMED, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE, THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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2 YAHYA ASHRAF, AGED 57 YEARS,BUSINESS, S/O.MR.KUNJIMUHAMMED,ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE, THALAPPILLY TALUK,REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY.HOLDER, (NO.51/1986 OF WADAKKANCHERY SUB REGISTRY), MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED,PENSIONER, S/O.KOLAMBIL, PADINJAKKARA KAMMATH, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE, THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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3 ABDUL RAHAMAN, AGED 54 YEARS, COMPANY EMPLOYEE, S/O.MR.KUNJIMUHAMMED,REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER, (DATED.06/11/1993 SIGNED BEFORE CONSULATE GENERAL, OF INDIA DUBAI),MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED,S/O.KOLAMBIL, PADINJAKKARA

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KAMMATH, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE, THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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4 SHAHEERA, AGED 49 YEARS,D/O.MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED AND W/O.KINARAMAKKAL ABDUL RAHIMAN,REP. BY HER,

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POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER(N0.145/84 OF WADAKKANCHERY SRO),, MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED,S/O.KOLAMBIL PADINJAKKARA, KAMMATH, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE,THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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5 ABDUL SHUKKOOR, AGED 47 YEARS,COMPANY EMPLOYEE S/O.KUNJUMUHAMMED,REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER, (NO.3/2003 OF WADAKKANCHERRY SRO), MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED,S/O.KOLAMBIL PADINJAKKARA KAMMATH, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE,THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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6 BUSHARA, AGED 45 YEARS,D/O.KUNJUMUHAMMED, REP. BY HER POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER (NO.3060/91 REGD. BEFORE THE EMBASSY OF INDIA DATED 12/08/91), MR.KUNJUMUHAMMED,S/O.KOLAMBIL PADINJAKKARA, KAMMATH, ENKAKKAD DESOM & VILLAGE,THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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BY ADVS.SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.) SRI.C.A.MAJEED SRI.K.H.ASIF

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R.F.A.NO.259 OF 2010

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RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFFS:

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ANTO, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O.NEDUMBARAYIL POULOSE, RESIDING AT PULLAKANDATH, MADAKKATHARA VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK.

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THANKACHAN, AGED 45 YEARS, S/O.OROTHKUDI POULOSE, RESIDING AT PULLAKANDATH, MADAKKATHARA VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK.

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LAIJU VARGHESE, AGED 38 YEARS, BEAUTICIAN, D/O.KURISINGAL OUSEPH,, MOOKKANNUR VILLAGE, ALUVA TALUK NOW RESIDING AT KOTHAKULAM, VENGALAKUNNU, KATTILA POOVAM, THRISSUR DISTRICT.

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MEERA, AGED 53 YEARS, W/O.DARIAM VEETTIL JOSEPH @ BABURAJ, ENKAKKAD VILLAGE DESOM, THALAPPILLY TALUK.

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R1-4 BY ADV. SRI.K.G.BALASUBRAMANIAN

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THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14.02.2018, THE COURT ON 19.03.2018 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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“C.R.”

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A.M.Shaffique & P. Somarajan, JJ.

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----------------------------------------------------

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R.F.A. No.259 of 2010

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---------------------------------------------------Dated this the 19^th day of March, 2018

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JUDGMENT

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P. Somarajan, J.

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Appeal against the decree and judgment dated 23.12.2009 in O.S.No.621 of 2007 of the Principal Sub Court, Thrissur by the defendants. A suit for specific performance of contract for sale was decreed in terms of plaint granting specific performance in respect of 3 acres 3 cents and 920 sq. links of property scheduled in the plaint. The agreement for sale dated 13.12.2006 was entered into by the plaintiffs and defendants for a sale consideration at the rate of 14,000/- per cent, totalling an amount of 42,54,880/-. The time agreed for performance of the contract was six months. It was also agreed that time is the essence of the contract. Out of the sale consideration, an amount of `3,50,000/- was given in advance. Though the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and in spite of issuance of Ext.A2(a) notice dated 23.5.2007 calling upon the defendants to come and

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execute the sale deed on 6.6.2007 at 11 am., there was no positive response from the defendants. In answer to Ext.A2 notice, the defendants sent Ext.A3 reply notice dated 25.5.2007, expressing that they are ready and willing to perform their part of contract and that it is the plaintiffs who failed to perform their part of contract. The defendants had also expressed their willingness to execute the document at 11 a.m. on 6.6.2007. There on the plaintiffs purchased stamp paper for `4,25,500/- and got prepared two deeds of sale, one in the name of plaintiffs and the other in the name of one Aboobacker, and intimated the same to the defendants. But the defendants did not come forward to execute the sale deed on 6.6.2007. However, the power of attorney holder of the defendants came to the Sub Registrar's Office by afternoon on the same day, but he was not ready to execute the deed as agreed. Then again the defendants issued Ext.A4 notice to the plaintiffs on 7.6.2007 by rescinding the contract for sale due to non performance of the agreement by the plaintiffs and hence the suit.

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The defendants except the 4^th defendant contested

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the suit denying and disputing the allegations mainly on the ground that the plaint schedule property is not identified. Defendants were ready and willing to perform their part of contract and to execute the deed of agreement and waited at the Sub Registrar's Office from 11.am. to 5 p.m., on 6.6.2007. But the plaintiffs did not turn up. Hence the contract was repudiated by the defendants by issuing Ext.A4 notice dated 7.6.2007. The plaintiffs were not having sufficient funds to purchase the property as per the agreement. They were not ready and willing to perform their part of contract at any point of time. The property is not exclusively owned by the defendants and it is known to the plaintiffs even at the time of execution of the sale deed. The property is a co-ownership property owned by the defendants along with another co-owner Laila, who is not a party to the agreement. The defendants were always ready and willing to perform their part of contract. It is due to the default on the part of the plaintiffs the agreement for sale could not be performed. The agreement for sale as such is not

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capable of performance as one of the co-owners was not a party to the contract and hence cannot be enforced in its entirety. There is no pleading in the plaint by the plaintiffs that they are ready to perform their part of contract to get the contract for sale performed in part excluding the share owned by Laila and hence pressed for dismissal of the suit.

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The lower court, on consideration of the pleadings and evidence and after hearing the parties, decreed the suit in terms of the plaint allowing specific performance of the contract under the impugned decree and judgment. The following questions came up for consideration:

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1. Whether Ext.A1 contract for sale is capable of performance and what would be the effect of non-joinder of one of the co-owners of the property to the contract?

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1. Whether time is the essence of Ext.A1 contract for sale?

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1. Is it permissible for any of the parties to the contract to repudiate/rescind the contract before the expiry of the agreed period and what would be the effect of such

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rescission, if time is essence of the contract? Is there any difference in the legal position when time is not the essence of the contract?

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1. Is it necessary to plead and prove the readiness and willingness to get a part of contract performed when the other part became not enforceable and what would be the legal position when time is essence of the contract?

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1. Is there any difference in the treatment given to performance of a part of a contract under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act when time is essence of the contract in relation to admission of compensation in money?

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1. Whether the lower court was justified in granting a decree of specific performance of contract for sale in part?

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There is no dispute with respect to the execution of

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Ext.A1 contract for sale, the period agreed therein, the consideration fixed by the parties and the amount received in

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advance out of the sale consideration. The agreement is dated 13.12.2006. Since the period of contract was six months, it would expire on 13.6.2007. According to the defendants, they had repudiated the contract for sale by issuing Ext.A4 notice with effect from 7.6.2007. There is a specific provision in the contract for sale making time as the essence of the contract. The agreement was executed on 13.12.2006 and the period agreed was six months. The total extent of property comes to 3 acres 3 cents and 920 sq. links. The rate of consideration was agreed at 14,000/- per cent. An amount of 3,50,000/was given in advance. The suit was filed on 20.6.2007, just few days after the expiry of the agreed period of contract. The first notice issued by the plaintiffs was on 23.5.2007 (Ext.A2), raising the allegation that the defendants did not turn up to execute the sale deed in spite of the request made by the plaintiffs and no document of title was forwarded so as to show valid title over the property. A request/demand was also raised by the plaintiffs calling upon the defendants to come and execute the sale deed before the concerned Sub Registrar's

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Office at 11 a.m. on 6.6.2007. There is a further direction in the said notice to produce and entrust all the prior title deeds of the property in advance on or before 3.6.2007 to the plaintiffs. To which Ext.A3 reply notice was issued refuting the allegation levelled against the defendants and also asserting that all the title deeds were already entrusted and handed over to the plaintiffs and expressed their willingness to execute the deed of conveyance. Along with Ext.A3 reply, a photocopy of the original title deed was also annexed so as to show valid title of the property with the defendants. The further contention raised by the defendants is that though they were present in the Sub Registry Office along with Laila for executing the sale deed, none of the plaintiffs turned up. Thereon, the defendants issued another notice (Ext.A4) on 7.6.2007 stating that they were present in the Sub Registry Office to execute the sale deed on 6.6.2007, as demanded in Ext.A2 notice. But, the plaintiffs did not turn up and hence the contract for sale was unilaterally rescinded/repudiated with effect from 7.6.2007, i.e., before the expiry of the agreed period of contract.

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One of the main grounds raised by the defendants is

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that the contract was entered with respect to a property jointly owned by several persons and all of the co-owners are not joined as party to the suit. Admittedly, Laila, another co-owner of the property is not a signatory to Ext.A1 contract for sale. The property covered by Ext.A1 is a common ownership property of the defendants with one Laila. So, there cannot be any specific performance of the contract in respect of fractional interest over the said property stands in the name of Laila as she is not a party to the contract. But, the contract was entered in respect of the entire title and interest over the property inclusive of the right, title and interest held by the abovesaid Laila, though she is not a party to the contract. But the defendants had agreed to procure the consent of Laila and her signature in the deed of conveyance when executed. This would show that the plaintiffs were very well aware of the fractional interest belonged to Laila over the property even at the time of execution of the contract for sale. The pleading raised in the plaint specifying the readiness and willingness of

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the plaintiffs should be understood so as to find out whether it is unconditional. There cannot be any readiness or willingness if it is subject to any condition. But the pleading raised in the plaint is to the effect that they are willing to perform their part of contract in accordance with Ext.A1 contract for sale which includes the right, title and interest of a third person who is neither a party to the suit nor a signatory to the contract. In other words, the readiness and willingness pleaded by the plaintiffs is subject to the terms and conditions contained in Ext.A1 contract for sale wherein the defendants had agreed to procure the consent of Laila and her signature at the time of execution of the sale deed. The fact that she is not a party to the contract and not bound by the contract was within the knowledge of the plaintiffs even at the time of execution of the contract for sale. Needless to say that no decree for specific performance of contract can be allowed as against the abovesaid co-owner Laila who is not a party to the suit and not a party or signatory to the contract and not claiming under any of the person who is a party to the contract. In that situation, it

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was argued that the pleading raised in the plaint expressing the readiness and willingness should be specific to the effect that they are willing to perform their part of contract in respect of the shares or right, title and interest held by the defendants over the property. In other words, the readiness and willingness expressed and pleaded in the plaint to purchase the entire property of 3 acres 3 cents and 920 sq. links, covered by Ext.A1 contract, is a conditional one that the defendants should procure the presence of Laila and her signature for the purpose of executing the document as per Ext.A1 contract. The relief sought in the suit is to get the sale deed executed in respect of the entire property in accordance with Ext.A1 contract for sale and value of the said relief assessed at `42,54,880/-, i.e. the total sale consideration agreed for an extent of 3 acres 3 cents and 920 sq. links, i.e. inclusive of the fractional right, title and interest of Laila over the property. There is absolutely no prayer in the suit for specific performance of part of contract excluding the right, title and interest of Laila over the property.

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Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act would come into play when part of the contract alone is found to be enforceable. It says that except as otherwise provided in that Section, the Court shall not direct for specific performance of part of a contract. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act is extracted below for reference:

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“ 12. Specific performance of part of contract. -- (1) Except as otherwise hereinafter provided in this section the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract.

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(2) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must be left unperformed by only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct the specific performance of so much of the contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency.

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(3) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed either--

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(a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in

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money; or

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(b) does not admit of compensation in

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money,

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he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, if the other party –

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(i) in a case falling under clause (a), pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and a case falling under clause (b), pays or had paid the consideration for the whole of the contract without any abatement; and

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(ii) in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendants.

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(4) When a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from

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another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the court may direct specific performance of the former part.

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Explanation.-- for the purposes of this section, a party to a contract shall be deemed to be unable to perform the whole of his part of it if a portion of its subject matter existing at the date of the contract has ceased to exist at the time of its performance.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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7. Section 12 deals with three situations in granting

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specific performance of part of a contract and constitute a complete code for specific performance of part of a contract. (1) When part of the contract left unperformed is only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, sub-section (2) of Section 12 would come into play, enabling specific performance of so much of contract as can be performed and to award compensation in money for the deficiency, for which a suit can be brought up by either of the party. (2) But when part of the contract left unperformed forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of

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compensation in money or not, sub-section (3) of Section 12 would come into play and the Court may direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can perform at the suit of the other party, (i) when the contract admits compensation in money and pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed; (ii) when the contract does not admit of compensation in money pays or had paid the consideration for the whole of the contract without any abatement and in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract and all rights to compensation either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendants. (3) When the contract itself has two separate and independent parts standing on separate and independent footings and it would be lawful to perform one of the parts of the said contract apart from the other which is not capable of performance. A mere reading of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act would show

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that award of compensation would arise only in cases falling under sub-section (2) of Section 12. In so far as cases which would fall under sub-section (3) of Section 12 are concerned, whether compensation in money admits or not for performance of part of contract, the person who seeks performance should relinquish all rights to compensation either for the deficiency or for the loss or damages sustained by him through the default of the defendants. Two different treatments were given to the cases which would fall under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, it appears that there cannot be any logic for denying the benefit to compensate for the default or the loss occasioned in cases which would fall under sub-section (3) from that of those which would fall under sub-section (2) of S.12 except the principle not to promote enforcement of part of a contract when considerable portion became not capable of performance. The principle of equity was not followed while differentiating sub-sections (2) and (3) based on the quantum of contract available for performance by giving different treatment. The principle is to not to promote specific

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performance of part of a contract unless the portion left out unperformed is considerably small in proportion. The ninth report of the Law Commission which was the basis of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in paragraph 27 at page No.11 made the following observation, on the changes made to the present sub-section (3) when compared to its predecessors, Section 15 of the 1877 Act:

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“Section 15 (of the 1877 Act) contemplates two types of cases, viz., (1) where the part, which must be left unperformed, forms a considerable portion of the whole but admits of compensation in money, and (ii) where it does not admit of compensation. In our opinion, the principle embodied in the section, as it stands, is inequitable insofar as the former case is concerned; for where monetary assessment of the part unperformed is possible, there is no reason why the plaintiff should not get a proportionate abatement of the consideration when he is to relinquish all claim to further performance or any further compensation for the breach. In the latter case, on the other hand, no question of abatement arises because apportionment of the consideration is not possible.”

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The question whether the requirement under Section

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16(c) of the said Act has to be complied in reference to the mandate under Section 12 of the Act when seeking performance of part of a contract requires consideration especially when there is a requirement to relinquish all claims due to non-performance of part of a contract and all rights to compensation either for deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by the default of the other party apart from the liability to pay the entire amount without any abatement. It really curtails and restricts the well recognized right of compensation under the provisions of the Contract Act and under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. It is an exception to the general rule that the party who commits breach or default or failure should compensate the other for the loss occasioned or damages sustained. The expression “without any abatement” incorporated in Section 12(3)(i) governing the cases falling under clause (b) mandates the payment of the consideration for the whole contract without any abatement is yet another exemption to the general principle that the party

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who committed default should compensate the other for the loss/damages occasioned. The recommendation and observation made by the ninth Law Commission regarding the amendment required to Section 15 of the former Act, 1877 that “there is no reason why the plaintiff should not get the proportionate abatement of consideration when he is to relinquish all claim to further performance or any further compensation for the breach” would be relevant at this juncture. It is in the abovesaid background the question whether it is necessary to plead the relinquishment as mandated under Section 12(3)(ii) of the Specific Relief Act so as to satisfy the requirement under Section 16(c) of the Act has to be considered. In so far as the relinquishment under Section 12(3), in order to have a claim of performance of part of a contract, no limitation is provided any where in the Act. There is no limitation provided in sub-section (3) of Section 12 for filing an application under this provision. Such an application can be filed at any stage of the proceedings and can be filed even before the Supreme Court. The delay by

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itself will not stand in the way of the plaintiffs from claiming the relief unless the defendants establish prejudice. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Surinder Singh v. Kapoor Singh (Dead) Through LRs. and others ((2005) 5 SCC 142) settled the law that the delay by itself do not stand in the way of plaintiffs from claiming relief unless the defendants establish prejudice. The claim under Section 12(3) and consequential relinquishment of claim can be made at any stage of litigation. Delay by itself should not be a factor to disentitle unless it causes prejudice to the defendants. Going by the legal positions settled by the Apex Court it can be seen that in so far as application of Section 12(3) is concerned, the relinquishment as mandated under sub-section (3) will not form part of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. It is also settled in Surinder Singh's case (supra) that the plea of Section 12(3) need not be specifically pleaded in the suit and can be raised even at the appellate stage. The relevant portion of paragraphs 8 and 13 are extracted below for reference:

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“Section 12(3) of the Act is a beneficial provision so far as the purchasers are concerned. In the instant case, in view of the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court, the decree for specific performance of contract in respect of the entire suit land could not have been granted as the appellant herein was not authorised by his sister to enter into the agreement for sale. The agreement for sale was entered into in respect of the entire suit land and having regard to the fact that the sister of the appellant did not authorise him to enter into the said agreement, Section 12(3) would be attracted. Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh (1990) 3 SCC 517) should not be held to lay down a law to the effect that even in a case where a part of the contract is held to be invalid, Section 12 will have no application. ….... The relinquishment of claim as contemplated under Section 12(3)(ii) of the Act as regards performance of the remaining part of the contract and all rights to compensation need not specifically be pleaded. Subsection (3) of Section 12 does not lay down any limitation for filing such an application. Such an application can be filed at any stage of the proceedings and in that view of the matter an application even before the Supreme Court would be maintainable. Delay by itself may not stand in the way of the plaintiffs from

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claiming the relief unless the defendants establishes prejudice.”

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Going by the abovesaid legal position settled it is clear that no law of limitation is available in filing an application under S.12(3) of the Act for partial enforcement of a contract for sale or to amend the plaint either in the first appellate or second appellate stage incorporating a claim under S.12(3) of the Act. It may be noted that none of these decisions exempts the party from raising a pleading as mandated under Section 12(3) of the Act either by filing an application or amending the plaint. The question mooted in the abovesaid decisions is whether it is permissible to raise the pleading under S.12(3) on a subsequent stage of the suit or in the first appellate stage or in the second appellate stage. But, going by the requirement under S.12(3), the relinquishment of claim for damages or loss occasioned or for the deficiency would form part of readiness and willingness as mandated under S.16(c) when a claim was raised for performance of a part of a contract under S.12(3) of the Specific Relief Act. What is settled by the Apex Court is

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that no limitation is available in claiming the said benefit under S.12(3) either in the trial stage or in the first appellate stage or in the second appellate stage. It can be claimed even before the Supreme Court, for which necessarily there should be an application under S.12(3) of the Act or an amendment to the plaint raising a claim under S.12(3) of the Act. The expression “readiness and willingness” when part of a contract sought to be enforced under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act would intake the ingredients which constitute a performance of contract in part especially when the person seeking the claim under sub-section (3) should relinquish any claim for damages, loss occasioned or for the deficiency due to non-performance of part of the contract left out and also he should pay the entire sale consideration without any abatement due to non-performance of part of a contract left out.

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In the instant case, what is sought for is the specific performance of the entire contract for sale for a total sale consideration of `42,54,880/- inclusive of the fractional interest

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of one Laila, a co-owner of the property who is not a party to the suit and not a party to the contract for sale. Even going by the legal position settled by the Apex Court in the abovesaid decisions, there should be an application under S.12(3) of the Act or there should be an amendment to the plaint to that effect. The expression “the Court may, at the suit of either party” as incorporated under sub-section (2) stands for a suit of either of a party - the seller or the purchaser. But, subsection (3) is a benefit solely given to the purchaser and not to the seller and hence demands specific pleading regarding the requirement to perform the contract in part relinquishing all claims for compensation on account of deficiency, loss or damage due to non-performance of the other part coupled with the liability to pay the whole sale consideration agreed without any abatement. Since sub-section (2) is available to both the parties, the purchaser or the seller, the rigor of pleading as required under sub-section (3) of Section 12 claiming a benefit cannot be extended. Further, the wording used “the Court may, at the suit of either party, direct specific performance” of so

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much of the contract as can be performed stands for the jurisdiction vested with the Court in giving direction when a small portion to the whole in value of the contract is found to be not capable of performance and admits compensation in money. Section 12(2) would come into play only when the contract admits of compensation in money and the portion of contract to be left out unperformed is only a small proportion to the whole in value of the contract. If there is no admission of compensation in money in the contract, Section 12(2) has no application.

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It is true that going by Ext.A1 contract for sale the

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fractional interest belonged to Laila is small in proportion to the whole in value of the contract but does not admit compensation in money and as such the parties are not governed by Section 12(2) of the Specific Relief Act but by Section 12(3) of the Act, for which there should be specific pleading, either by way of amendment or by way of an application, expressing relinquishment of claims and willingness to pay the entire

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consideration agreed without any abatement as mandated under Section 12(3) of the Act and in the absence of such pleading/application, no decree can be granted under Section 12(3) of the Act, firstly on the ground that there is no express relinquishment of the claim for damages or loss sustained; secondly on the reason that there is no express willingness to pay the entire consideration without any abatement as mandated under Section 12(3) of the Act, and thirdly it is to the party who seeks enforcement of a contract in part to express the relinquishment of claim and willingness to pay the entire consideration without any abatement as mandated under Section 12(3) of the Act, and the Court cannot, in the absence of pleading, unilaterally impose such condition on the plaintiffs while granting performance in part. In the case of part performance of contract, once an election is made not to relinquish all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract, it is no longer open to him on a finding that he could not get specific performance of whole, to claim part performance at a later date.

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The Apex Court in Surjit Kaur v. Naurata Singh (2000) 7 SCC 379) had considered the application of doctrine of election in specific performance of part of a contract. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said judgment are extracted below for reference:

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“14. It must be clarified that this Court is not saying that merely because in correspondence or orally a party has insisted on performance of the whole contract he cannot thereafter elect to accept performance in part. A mere assertion that contract must be performed in full or even a filing of a suit for specific performance of the whole contract without averring that the plaintiff is willing to accept performance in part may not amount to electing not to accept performance in part. It is only in cases where a party has categorically refused to accept performance in part i.e. he has unambiguously elected not to accept part-performance that he will be precluded from subsequently turning around and electing to accept performance in part. Whether a party has categorically elected or not will depend on the facts of each case.

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15. It is also settled law that specific performance cannot be granted to a party who has not

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been ready and willing at all stages to perform the contract. Of course, the 1^st respondent was ready and willing to perform the contract in its entirety. To that extent there would be readiness and willingness on the part of the 1^st respondent. But in cases where a contract is not capable of being performed in whole then the readiness and willingness, at all stages, is the readiness and willingness to accept part-performance. If a contract is not capable of being performed in whole and a party clearly indicates that he is not willing to accept part-performance, then there is no readiness and willingness, at all stages, to accept partperformance. In that case there can be no specific performance of a part of the contract at a later stage. None of the authorities cited by Mr.Gupta lay down anything contrary. In all those cases the party had been insisting on part-performance and/or the time for election had not arrived. In none of those cases an election not to accept part-performance had been made. It is under those circumstances that the courts held that the party could elect to accept partperformance at any stage of the litigation. In those cases it could not be said that there was no readiness and willingness to accept part-performance.”

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It is also settled in that decision that “provisions of Section 12(3) are mandatory and party seeking part-performance must unambiguously relinquish all claims to performance of remaining part of the contract and must pay the full consideration”. Following the abovesaid decision, another Bench of the Apex Court ( Shanker Singh v. Narinder Singh and others (2014) 16 SCC 662) reiterated the legal position that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property, there must be certainty with respect to the property to be sold. Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 permits a party to an agreement to relinquish a part of the agreement which is not enforceable. However, it should be possible to identify and demarcate that part of the agreement concerned which is not to be enforced. The relinquishment has to be unambiguous. The party seeking part-performance must unambiguously relinquish all claims to performance of remaining part of the contract.

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It should be possible to identify and demarcate that

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part of the agreement concerned which is not to be enforced and the relinquishment should be unambiguous ( Shanker Singh v. Narinder Singh and others (2014) 16 SCC 662 ). These requirements would fortify the necessity for pleading either by amendment or by an application either in the trial stage or at a later stage.

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The application in I.A.No.327 of 2018 was filed before this Court for amendment of the plaint by incorporating the relinquishment of claim for compensation on account of the non-performance of contract for sale as against Laila. Though the pleadings sought to be incorporated are not so specific with respect to relinquishment of any loss occasioned or damages sustained or the deficiency due to non-performance of part of contract left out, their intention to relinquish all claims in order to bring the matter under Section 12(3) of the Act is well evident and hence, the amendment is permissible and would be a substantial compliance of requirement under Section 12(3) of the Act.

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Admittedly the repudiation of contract alleged by the

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defendants is before the expiry of the period of contract. In the contract there is no provision for rescission unilaterally by any of the parties before the expiry of the period of contract. If that be so, the parties are governed by the provisions contained in the Specific Relief Act and the Contract Act in the matter of rescission of contract. The legal position is different regarding the right to rescind a contract by one of the parties in the absence of a provision in the contract and it really depends on the question whether time is essence of the contract. The repudiation/rescission of a contract by one of the parties before the expiry of the agreed period of performance is permissible only when there is anticipatory breach of contract in which time is essence of the contract. It would be capable of giving an option to the promisee to treat either the contract or that much part of the contract void. The principle embodied under the first part of S.55 of the Contract Act enables the promisee to exercise an option to treat the entire contract or so much part of contract which was not performed

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by the promisor void when time is essence of the contract. The question of rescission/repudiation of contract would come into play only when the contract or any portion thereof is either void or become void. S.55 of the Contract Act and S.27 of the Specific Relief Act deal with different situations. S.27 of the Specific Relief Act deals with the power of Court to adjudge any rescission of contract when sued for that purpose by any interested person. It is permissible only on two grounds i.e. under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of S.27 of the Specific Relief Act, namely, (a) where the contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiffs, (b) where the contract is unlawful for the causes not apparent on its face and the defendants are more to blame than the plaintiffs. In other words, the contract became terminable by operation of law only when the contract is voidable or unlawful or by agreement of parties terminable by one party. Sub-section (2) of S.27 deals with the situations in which the Court can refuse to rescind the contract. The basic requirement under S.27 is the voidability of the contract or an unlawful contract for causes apparent on

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the face by which the defendants are to be blamed more than the plaintiffs or by its agreed terms for termination. This would show that S.27 would come into play only on satisfying any of these three requirements and it can be made available or pressed into service only in a suit filed by a person to rescind the contract for which an adjudication by the Court is necessary. The grounds which are available for an adjudication under S.27 of the Specific Relief Act germinates from the operation of law making the contract voidable or unlawful or terminable by the agreement of parties. This is the cardinal difference of S.27 of the Specific Relief Act from that of the first part of S.55 of the Contract Act by which the failure of promisor to do such an act within a specified time agreed makes the contract voidable at the option of the promisee provided that time should be the essence of the contract. In other words, the first part of S.55 has only a limited application to a contract in which time is essence of the contract. All other contracts are dealt with under second part of S.55 by which the failure to do any act within the time specified would not and does not give

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any option to the promisee and the contract does not become voidable by such failure. But the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. The third limb of Sec.55 deals with a situation wherein time was extended by mutual consent. As discussed earlier, S.27 of the Specific Relief Act can be invoked only in a suit instituted for rescinding the contract by the plaintiffs. But S.55 of the Contract Act can be made applicable in any suit based on the contract. A conjoint reading of S.55 of the Contract Act and Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act would make the legal position crystal clear that rescission/repudiation of a contract without having a suit for that purpose could be possible only under the first limb of S.55 of the Contract Act, for which the requirement is that time should be the essence of the contract and there is failure to perform any act by the promisor within the specified time agreed. Thereon the promisee would get an option to repudiate the entire contract or so much of the contract which has not been performed treating the entire contract or so

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much of the contract void. Thereafter the parties would be governed by Ss.64 and 65 of the Contract Act which mandates that “when a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained, in which he is the promisor. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he had received any benefit thereunder from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received.” Sec.65 of the Contract Act mandates that such party shall make compensation to the other party who had received any advantage under such agreement. A conjoint reading of first limb of S.55 and Ss.64 and 65 of the Contract Act would settle the legal position that in the case of repudiation/rescission of a contract in which time is essence of the contract, the promisee who rescind/repudiate the contract being the same void, is not entitled to any compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure except under Ss.64 and 65 of the Contract Act which is limited to restoring the other party with the benefit he had received

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under the contract and to return advantage, if any, he had obtained by such agreement. In other words, the compensation which is permissible under Ss.64 and 65 is confined only to return of the benefit which he had received from the other party and to return any advantage obtained under such agreement. If we go by the strict interpretation to first limb of S.55 and Ss.64 and 65 of the Contract Act, it is clear that unless the parties have agreed otherwise they cannot claim compensation on account of any “loss occasioned” due to repudiation/ rescission of the contract. But when time is not the essence of the contract, there is no application of either S.64 or S.65 of the Contract Act, but the parties are governed by second limb of S.55 of the Contract Act which permits compensation from the promisor for any “loss occasioned” to the promisee by any such failure.

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Being the legal position as stated above, a unilateral act of rescission/repudiation of a contract by the defendant, or any party to the contract is permissible, other than in a suit

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instituted for rescission of contract, when the contract became voidable at the option of promisee provided that time should be the essence of contract, then parties are governed by the first limb of Section 55 of the Contract Act in the absence of any contrary agreement. In the instant case, there is no agreement/ provision enabling any one of the parties to have a unilateral termination before the expiry of the period of contract. Necessarily, the parties are governed by first limb of S.55 of the Contract Act if time is essence of the contract and by second or third limb of S.55 if time is not the essence of the contract, except in a suit for rescission of contract under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act.

¶177

On coming into the question whether time is essence of the contract involved in the instant case, generally, in a contract for sale of immovable property time is not the essence of contract unless the nature of the property and surrounding circumstances make it so, but if it is for re-conveyance, time is the essence of the contract. What is important is the intention

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of the parties, which can be gathered both from the nature of the contract and from the attending circumstances. In commercial and mercantile contracts, generally time is essence of the contract. The principle behind it is equity and good conscience and nothing else. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai and others v. Palaniswami Nadar (AIR 1967 SC 868) had explained the legal impact of S.55 of the Contract Act. The relevant portion in paragraph 4 of the said judgment is extracted below for reference:

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“.... It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in language which is unmistakable: it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be

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granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence....”

¶185

The Apex Court had extracted the observation of the judicial committee of Privy Council in Jamshed Kodaram Irani

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v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai (ILR 40 Bom 289 : AIR 1915 PC 83)

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thus:

¶188

“Under that law equity, which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it

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should take place within a reasonable time. Their Lordships are of opinion that this is the doctrine which the Section of the Indian Statute adopts and embodies in reference to sales of land. It may be stated concisely in the language used by Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas, (1867) 3 Ch A 61:

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'The construction is, and must be, in equity the same as in a Court of law. A Court of equity will indeed relieve against, and enforce, specific performance, notwithstanding a failure to keep the dates assigned by the contract, either for completion, or for the steps towards completion, if it can do justice between the parties, and if (as Lord Justice Turner said in Roberts v. Berry, (1853) 3 De G.M. and G 284) there is nothing in the 'express stipulations between the parties, the nature of the property, or the surrounding circumstances', which would make it inequitable to interfere with and modify the legal right. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract. Of the three grounds ... mentioned by Lord Justice Turner 'express stipulations' requires no comment. The 'nature of the property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. The 'surrounding circumstances' must depend on the facts of each particular case.'”

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It was held in Saradamani Kandappan v.

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Rajalakshmi (AIR 2011 SC 3234) that the question whether time is of the essence of the contract does not depend upon express stipulation to that effect made by the parties, but it depends upon the intention of the parties. The intention can be gathered either from the express terms of the contract or impliedly from the intention of the parties as expressed by the terms of the contract. It was also held in Mcdermott International Inc v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. ((2006) 11 SCC 3234) that the question whether or not time was of the essence of the contract would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties, to be gathered from terms of contract. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where the contract contained provisions for extension of time and payment of damages in case of delay, in execution of the contract, the parties did not intend that time was to be of the essence.

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In so far as contract for sale of immovable property is concerned, two prominent factors now evolved due to the substantial increase of population, especially in India, causing rising of value of immovable property day by day. There is a change in the whole scenario value of immovable property by the escalation of its price day by day. This would be a factor to be taken into consideration at the present situation in order to test the intention of parties in fixing a particular period for performance of the contract for sale of immovable property. The principle of equity and good conscience demands elimination of any unfair advantage or hardship to any of the parties to the contract by way of escalation of value of immovable property and due to inflation in rate.

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A five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (1993) 1 SCC 519 : (1993 AIR SCW 1371) had elaborately considered whether there can be any general proposition of law/presumption as to whether time is essence of the contract based on the subject matter of the

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contract - immovable property - and it was held that “as a general proposition of law, in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are evident (i) from the express terms of the contract; (ii) from the nature of the property; and (iii) from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.”

¶204

Following the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Chand Rani's case (supra), a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.S.Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan (AIR 1997 SC 1751) had taken note of current realities in the matter of specific performance of agreement for sale of immovable properties. The relevant portions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment are extracted below for reference:

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“ It cannot be said that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing.

¶208

The rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties - evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown - requires to be relaxed, if the modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time, the Court do so. In the instant case may be the parties knew of the circumstance regarding rising prices but they have also specified six months as the period within which the transaction should be completed. The said time-limit may not amount to making time the essence of the contract but it must yet have some meaning. Not for nothing could such time-limit would have been prescribed. Can it be stated as a rule of law or rule of prudence that where time is not made the essence of the contract, all stipulations of

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time provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or that they are as good as non-existent? All this only means that while exercising its discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit(s) for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time-limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract (relating to immovable properties).”

¶212

The question to be considered is whether these two factors (escalation of value of immovable property and rate of inflation) would give any unfair advantage or hardship to any of the parties if the contract was not performed within the time specified. Necessarily, the time would stand as essence of the contract unless a contrary intention is well evident from the contract itself by making a provision for compensation in case of delayed performance or for extension of period of contract. A mere existence of a forfeiture clause without more is not indicative of time being the essence of contract. In the instant case, the contract was entered for selling the property for a

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total sum of 42,54,880/- and only an amount of 3,50,000/was paid as advance out of the sale consideration and the period of contract agreed was six months. The specific case of the defendants is that such an agreement was entered into for the purpose of purchasing another property and they could not purchase that property due to the default on the part of the plaintiffs. As discussed in earlier paragraphs, while considering the escalation of price of immovable property and the rate of inflation with the attending circumstances, it can only be concluded that time was the essence of the contract.

¶216

It is true that the plaintiffs have issued Ext.A2 demand notice before the expiry of the period of contract demanding the defendants to entrust the prior title deed on or before 3.6.2007 and to execute the deed of conveyance on 6.6.2007 at 11 a.m. at the concerned Sub Registry Office. The defendants were present on 6.6.2007 along with one Laila, another co-owner who is not a party to the contract, but the plaintiffs were absent. Along with Ext.A3 reply notice, a

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photocopy of the settlement deed was also annexed. In the witness box the plaintiffs had admitted that they had satisfied with the valid title of the defendants over the property. It was argued by the learned counsel for the defendants that except the issuance of Ext.A2 notice, there is nothing to show that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to get the sale deed executed in their favour by performing their part of contract, by making payment of the balance sale consideration. It was also submitted that issuance of Ext.A2 notice is only an eye wash so as to appear that they were ready and willing to perform their part of contract by making payment of the balance sale consideration. The documents relied on by them, Exts.A9 to A12, would be self explanatory with respect to the falsity of the claim. The plaintiffs produced those documents so as to show that they were having sufficient funds to purchase the said property by making payment of the balance sale consideration, which would approximately comes to `39 lakhs. The lower court, on consideration of Exts.A9 to A12, found that the plaintiffs were having sufficient funds to pay the balance sale

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consideration. According to the defendants, the lower court has committed a very serious mistake in arriving at such a conclusion. Ext.A9 is a passbook stands in the name of M.P.Anto (plaintiff No.1). The various entries in the said document would show that as on 8.1.2007, there was only a balance amount of 8,805/-, out of which an amount of 8,000/- was withdrawn on 1.3.2007 reducing the balance to 805/-. An amount of 90,000/- was deposited on 14.6.2007. Another 90,000/- was deposited on 16.6.2007 and the entire amount of 1,80,000/- was withdrawn on 20.6.2007 reducing the balance to 805/-. Ext.A10(a) and (b) are the passbooks of the accounts of Thankachan (plaintiff No.2). There was only a balance of 8,658/- as on 19.12.2006. Out of which an amount of 8,000/- was withdrawn on 10.4.2007 making the balance as 658/-. An amount of 99,000/- was deposited on 14.6.2007, out of which an amount of 15,000/- was withdrawn on 15.6.2007, 20,000/- was withdrawn on 7.8.2007, 7,000/- on 19.9.2007 and `25,000/- on 22.9.2007. An amount of

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23,000/- was deposited on 28.9.2007 and 55,000/- was withdrawn on 2.11.2007. The balance amount was only 740/on that day. Ext.A10(b) is another passbook of Thankachan and on 1.3.2006 an amount 35,000/- alone was available in that account and by 25.7.2007 the entire amounts were taken back in piecemeal, making the balance 'nil'. It is thereafter, on 11.8.2006, an amount of Rupees one lakh was deposited and on the next day, i.e. on 12.8.2006, the same was withdrawn making the balance 'nil'. Ext.A11 is the account book of Laiju Varghese (plaintiff No.3). The balance amount outstanding in the said account will not exceed 50,000/- from 28.7.2005 till 29.11.2007 except a deposit of 4,50,000/- on 14.6.2007 and its withdrawal of 1,25,000/- on 20.6.2007 and 3 lakhs on 22.6.2007. The balance amount was only 26,055/-, out of which 600/- was withdrawn on 28.7.2007 and 21,000/- was withdrawn on 6.9.2007,making the balance to 4,455/-. Ext.A12 is the passbook of Meera (plaintiff No.4) wherein also the balance amount available as on 26.11.2004 was only 871/-. It was reduced to 686/- due to non-operation till

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10.3.2007. It is thereafter on 12.4.2007 an amount of 3,50,000/- was deposited. On the second day, i.e.16.4.2007, an amount of 2 lakhs was withdrawn. The balance amount was also withdrawn within two months. This would sufficiently show that none of the plaintiffs was having any amount near to the balance sale consideration. The total amount outstanding in all their accounts will not satisfy even one-tenth of the balance sale consideration. A striking aspect which came to our notice is that all the amounts which were deposited exceeding `50,000/- were withdrawn immediately on the next day or within two or three days in piecemeal. This would show that the plaintiffs were not having sufficient funds with them so as to satisfy the balance sale consideration payable. It is not at all necessary that the plaintiffs should have money in cash and their ability to collect the balance amount would suffix, but, for which, no satisfactory evidence was adduced. A close scrutiny of their respective accounts, evident from Ext.A9 to A12, would show that they do not have the power or capacity to collect such a huge amount.

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The preparation of sale deed in two sets, one in favour of the plaintiffs and the other in the name of a stranger, in the abovesaid factual background could only be treated as a device created at the risk of a small amount (the stamp paper was returned to the authority for refund after deducting its commission) to appear that they were ready and willing to perform their part of contract and that they are having sufficient funds to satisfy the balance sale consideration payable. From the circumstances it is clear that it is a device played by the plaintiffs so as to appear that they are willing and ready to perform their part of contract without having sufficient funds so as to satisfy the balance sale consideration.

¶232

A Division Bench of this Court in Antony K.O. and another v. M.K.Krishnankutty Menoki and others (2017 (1) KHC 479: 2017(1) KLJ 357: ILR 2017 (1) Ker. 444: AIR 2017 NOC 202) (of which one of us was a party) had settled the law under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act thus:

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“The question at what time the Court has to exercise its discretion is also well evident from a mere reading of S.20 of the Specific Relief Act, which would arise only after finding that it is lawful to grant the relief sought for in favour of the plaintiffs. In all other provisions of law wherein discretion could be exercised stands for exercising discretion in a positive way for granting some relief to the parties and not for refusing any relief. But, the discretionary power incorporated and embodied under S.20 stands on a different footing in which the Court has to exercise discretion not for granting the relief, but for refusing the same. It has got its own character and peculiarity, apart from other provisions contained in other laws for the time being in force. So, the real impact of S.20 should be and must be understood under the background of those aspects. It is a mandate upon the Court to address the question of exercise of discretion before granting or refusing a decree for specific performance and it has to be exercised only after finding that it is lawful to grant a relief of specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs. A decree which was granted without addressing and without exercising the discretion under S.20 of the said Act is bad in law. The Court

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is duty bound to address the question of exercise of discretion under S.20 of the Specific Relief Act while granting or refusing to grant a decree of specific performance. The said discretion has to be exercised only after finding that it is lawful to grant the relief prayed for in suit in favour of the plaintiffs.”

¶239

Being an equitable relief, both parties are under the obligation to comply with the terms and conditions agreed upon and are bound by it. Any breach or failure to perform any of the obligations arising out of the terms and conditions of the agreement would be fatal and hence, the decree for specific performance granted by the lower court cannot be sustained. The lower court ought to have directed return of the advance amount already received as there is an alternative prayer in the suit in accordance with the mandate under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act. In the said circumstances, the application for amendment in I.A.No.327 of 2018 will not give any assistance to the case advanced by the plaintiffs and is of no use, hence dismissed.

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In the result, the appeal allowed. Decree and judgment of the lower court allowing specific performance of the contract for sale as against the defendants is hereby set aside and granted a decree to the plaintiffs for recovery of an amount of `3,50,000/- with interest at 12% per annum from the date of suit till the date of realization from the defendants, jointly and severally, and charged upon the plaint schedule properties with proportionate cost of the suit. The application in I.A.No.327 of 2018 is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs of appeal.

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Sd/A.M. Shaffique

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Judge

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Sd/P.Somarajan Judge

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ahz/

Hajira v. Anto

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Hajira v. Anto

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State of Kerala Vs Perinadu Murali

Krishnan S/O. Alakan, C.NO.846, Central Prison, Viyyur Vs State of Kerala

Chandra Lal, C.NO.4432, Central Prison, Poojappura.P.O., Trivandrum. Vs State of Kerala, Represented by D.G.P., High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam.

M/S.Bayshore Sea Wood Project Vs Sheela V.S