Allowed

B.C.Abdul Khader v. M.P.Moideenkutty

Kerala HC14 Jan 2016MACA/2121/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed motor accident claims appeals, setting aside the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal's award which incorrectly used a multiplier method. The Court held that compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act must follow the structured formula in the Second Schedule, not the multiplier-multiplicand method, and clarified the method for calculating loss of dependency.

What did the court decide?

The appellant-titled to get a compensation of `5,29,000/- (in one case) and `4,12,500/- (in the other) under the Second Schedule, with the liability on the insurer to deposit the balance amount with i

B.C.Abdul Khader Vs M.P.Moideenkutty — Motor Accident Claims | Kerala HC (2016)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT:

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR

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THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH

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THURSDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF JANUARY 2016/24TH POUSHA, 1937

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MACA.No. 2121 of 2011 ( )

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AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 583/2005 of M.A.C.T., THALASSERY DATED 29-11-2010

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APPELLANT(S):PETITIONERS 2 & 3 & SUPPLEMENTAL PETITIONER

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B.C.ABDUL KHADER, AGED 58 YEARS, LAKSHAM VEEDU, ATHAZHAKKUNNU, P.O.KOTTALI, KANNUR.

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RABIYA K., AGED 51 YEARS, W/O.ADBUL KHADER, KORAMBETH HOUSE, ATHAZHAKKUNNU, P.O.KOTTALI, KANNUR.

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SAJITHA K., AGED 26 YEARS, KORAMBETH HOUSE, ATHAZHAKKUNNU, P.O.KOTTALI, KANNUR.

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SAFOORA K., AGED 22 YEARS, D/O.ABDUL KHADER, KORAMBETH HOUSE, ATHAZHAKKUNNU, P.O.KOTTALI, KANNUR.

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SHAFEENA K., AGED 22 YEARS, D/O.ABDUL KHADER, KORAMBETH HOUSE, ATHAZHAKKUNNU, P.O.KOTTALI, KANNUR.

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BY ADV. SRI.P.U.SHAILAJAN

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RESPONDENT(S):RESPONDENTS

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1. M.P.MOIDEENKUTTY

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AGED 35 YEARS, S/O.IBRAHIMKUTTY, MOOSANKUNNIL PUTHIYA PURAYIL, KURUMATHOOR AMSOM, P.O.MUNDERI, PIN-670591. [DELETED]

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2.C.PRADEEPAN,

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S/O.KRISHNAN, POONHATHU HOUSE, KALLOORIKKADAVU, P.O.AROLI, KANNUR, PIN-670566.[DELETED]

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M/S.UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. KANNUR-670001.

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*[RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 ARE DELETED FROM THE PARTY ARRAY AS PER ORDER DATED 18.09.2015 IN IA 3292/15.]

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R3 BY ADV. SRI. JOHN JOSEPH VETTIKAD R3 BY ADV. SRI.P.JAYASANKAR

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THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14-01-2016 ALONG WITH MACA. 2122/2011, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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C.T. RAVIKUMAR &

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MARY JOSEPH, JJ.

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M.A.C.A.Nos.2121 & 2122 OF 2011

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Dated this the 14^th day of January, 2016

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JUDGMENT

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Ravikumar, J.

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These appeals arise respectively from O.P(MV).Nos. 583/2005 and 582/2005, which were disposed of by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thalassery as per the common award dated 29.11.2010. The aforesaid claim petitions were filed claiming compensation respectively for the death of one K.Hamshad and K.Siddique by their respective legal heirs. Siddique was riding the motor cycle bearing Reg.No.KL-13/K 3121 on 19.9.2004 and deceased Hamshad was the pillion rider on it. They are relatives. When they reached near Valapattanam High Way in KannurPappinissery Road, the offending vehicle bearing Reg.No.KL-13/H 9656 driven by the first respondent in a rash and negligent manner came from the opposite direction and knocked down their motor cycle. Both Siddique and Hamshad sustained injuries in the accident

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MACA.Nos.2121 & 2122/2011 2

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and enroute to A.K.G.Hospital, Kannur, they succumbed to the are injuries. The parents and siblings of the deceased Hamshad

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the appellants in MACA No.2121/2011/the petitioners in O.P(MV). No.583/2005. O.P(MV) No.582/2005 (wrongly shown in the opening part of the common award as O.P.(MV).No.484/2005) was filed by the father, grandmother and sister of the deceased Siddique. During the pendency of the said claim petition, the father of deceased Siddique/the first petitioner died and consequently, the fourth petitioner/the third appellant in MACA.No.2122/2012 was impleaded. Both the claim petitions were filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short 'M.V.Act' only). The Tribunal, after considering the petitions, allowed them and awarded compensation to the respective petitioners/appellants. In O.P(MV) No.583/2005, an award was passed for 2,68,500/ with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realisation and also with cost of 3,000/-. In O.P(MV) No.582/2005, an award was passed for 1,24,500/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum with cost of 2,000/-. It is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation that these appeals have been filed

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MACA.Nos.2121 & 2122/2011 3

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seeking enhancement of compensation raising various grounds. Since these appeals are arising from the common award, they were jointly heard and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

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2.We have heard Sri.P.U.Shailajan, the learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals and the learned counsel for the common respondent-the United India Insurance Co.Ltd. In the former appeal, respondents 1 and 2 were deleted from the party array and in the latter appeal, notice to them was dispensed with.

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3.For a proper disposal of these appeals, it is only appropriate to refer to the factual aspects succinctly. Though certain common questions of law involve in both the cases, some additional points also pose for consideration in the latter appeal. Hence, we deal with the latter case first and also answer the common questions there.

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M.A.C.A .No.2122 of 2011

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4.This appeal is directed against the judgment and award in O.P.(MV).No.582/2005 on the files of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thalassery. The appellants herein are the father, grandmother and siblings of the deceased Siddique. It is pursuant to

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the death of the first petitioner in the claim petition viz., the original petitioner that the third appellant/supplemental fourth petitioner was impleaded in the claim petition. The claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the M.V. Act. At the same time, it is relevant to note that in the claim petition itself, it was claimed that the monthly salary of the deceased Siddique was 4,000/- and that, he was working as a Salesman. The Tribunal, taking into account the said fact and finding that the annual income in such circumstances would come to 48,000/- in excess of the ceiling limit of 40,000/-, the maximum permissible in order to maintain a claim under Section 163A, found that going by the said factual averments, the claim petition is not maintainable. At the same time, the Tribunal did not dismiss the claim petition, but proceeded with its consideration by suo motu scaling down the monthly income. The Tribunal held “ _Therefore, in the interest of justice, I fix_ 3000/- as the monthly income of the deceased, so that ceiling limit will be below 40,000/-. ” Thereafter, the Tribunal determined the compensation, obviously, following the multiplier-multiplicand method. The Tribunal adopted the multiplier as '5' taking into account the age of the first appellant

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viz., grandmother of the deceased. A perusal of the impugned award would reveal that the Tribunal fixed the compensation payable under the head loss of dependency by following the formula 3000x12x5x1/3. Evidently, in addition to the compensation payable under the said head, amount payable towards loss of estate and funeral expenses in terms of the structured formula under the second schedule appended to the M.V.Act was also given. Computing in that way, the compensation payable was arrived at by the Tribunal as 1,24,500/-. The contention of the appellants is that the Tribunal went wrong in identifying the multiplier reckoning the age of the grandmother. In fact, there was no necessity to consider the multiplier and the compensation ought to have fixed as per the second schedule, it is contended. It is further contended that in terms of the second schedule, considering the age of the deceased, an amount of 4,32,000/- ought to have been granted towards loss of dependency. Instead of 1,24,500/-, a total compensation of 4,36,500/- ought to have been granted, it is further contended. Per contra, the learned counsel for the third respondent-Insurance Company though contended that the award passed by the Tribunal in

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O.P.(MV) No.582/2005 calls for no appellate interference, endorsed the contention of the appellants that the multiplier-multiplicand method ought not to have been followed for arriving at the quantum of compensation.

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5.Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is only appropriate to refer to certain aspects relevant for the purpose of disposal of these appeals. Though the provision under section 163A of the M.V.Act is a social security legislation, the second schedule to the M.V.Act would undoubtedly reveal that in order to maintain an application under section 163A, the annual income of the deceased/injured claimant should not exceed 40,000/-. In the decision in **Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd.** [ **2004 (2) KLT 395]** , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that those who got annual income only up to 40,000/- alone could seek the benefit under section 163A. See also the decision in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Lathika [2011(3) KLT 412] .

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It is obvious that even without an application from the claimants, the Tribunal suo motu scaled down the monthly income ignoring the declared monthly income of the deceased solely for the

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purpose of bringing the application within the purview of section 163A of the M.V.Act. Evidently, the first question to be decided is whether the Tribunal was justified in adopting such a method to pass the impugned award. Even after suo motu bringing down the monthly salary of the deceased for the purpose of bringing the application within the purview of section 163A M.V.Act, the Tribunal went on to consider the compensation payable by following the muliplicand-multiplier method instead of following the structured formula under the second schedule. Therefore, another question also crops up for consideration viz., whether in an application under section 163A, for the purpose of computing compensation, the multiplicand-multiplier method could be followed? We will firstly consider the said question. In fact, the said issue is no more res integra. The position relating the same has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Gurumallamma and another [2009 (16) SCC 43] . The Hon'ble Apex Court considered the question as to how compensation has to be determined in an application under section 163 A, M.V Act. It was held thus:-

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“As the Second Schedule provides for a structured formula, the question of determination of payment of compensation by application of judicial mind which is otherwise necessary for a proceeding arising out of a claim petition filed under Section 166 would not arise. The Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 163-A of the Act is required to determine the amount of compensation as specified in the Second Schedule. It is not required to apply the multiplier except in a case of injuries and disabilities.”

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(underline supplied)

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In the decision in Kadeeja v. K.S.R.T.C reported in 2013(4) KLT

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683, a Division Bench of this Court held that for a claim under section 163A, M.V.Act, dependency has no relevancy unlike in the case of a proceeding under section 166, M.V.Act. It is further held that once it is proved by the claimants that they are the legal heirs of the deceased then, in a claim under section 163A, they are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. Further it was held that in a claim under section 163A for death, the Tribunal need

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not go into the question of selecting the multiplier and that in order to maintain such an application under section 163A, the upper limit

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of the annual income is `40,000/-. Thus, it is evident that in the

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light of the decision in Gurumallamma' s case (supra), for determining the compensation payable in an application under section 163A, what is to be looked into is only the structured formula under the second schedule and the application of the multiplier is not at all required. In other words, the multipliermultiplicand is not the method to be followed in the matter of computing compensation in a claim under section 163A, for death. In the case on hand, the Tribunal arrived at the compensation payable under the head loss of dependency by following the formula the monthly income x 12 x multiplier x 1/3. There cannot be any doubt that application of the said formula for the purpose of computing the compensation for death in a proceeding under section 163A is absolutely impermissible in the light of the decision in Kadeeja 's case and Gurumallamma' s and it has to be determined only by looking into the structured formula under the second schedule. In fact dependency got no relevance and it is not at all a factor to be looked into. Award of compensation under section 163A is virtually, on a predetermined formula for payment of compensation. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation to

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hold that the method followed by the Tribunal in arriving at the compensation payable to the appellants for the death of Siddique in O.P.(MV) No.582 of 2005 is bad in law and it cannot be sustained in law and liable to be interfered with. Though we are not oblivious of the maxim ignorantia legis neminem excusat means ignorance of the law excuses no one; we are of the view that we should be kept reminded of the fact that the provisions under the M.V Act for compensation for death, permanent disablement or injuries is nothing but a social welfare legislation. In such circumstances, if a claimant is entitled to compensation his right to get compensation cannot be defeated looking into the technicalities. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in N.K.V.Bros.(P) Ltd. v. M.K.Ammal (1980 ACJ 435) wherein it was held that the claims Tribunal must take care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and persons liable do not escape the liability because of some doubt here and there and further that the Tribunal must not succumb to niceties, technicality and whatever mystic it might be. No doubt, it will bind on this Court as well. But the salutory maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the

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Court will hurt no person) has to be looked into. In the light of the decision in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal [(1964) 2 SCR 145] and Ramji v. Ramadevi [AIR 1991 SC 211], there can be no doubt with respect to the duty of the courts in such circumstances. No act of court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of courts to see that if a person is harmed by a mistake of the court, he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. In the decision in Rajam v. Ramaswamy [1988 ACJ 1067], it was held that the failure of a person seeking remedy in a court of law to mention the provision of law relied on by him for piloting his prayer by way of a petition or suit should not be rejected on technical grounds. The same should be the position according to us, when a provision was misquoted.

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7.The question then to be considered is whether the claim petition submitted by the appellants for compensation for the death of Siddique ought to have been dismissed on the reason that the annual income of the deceased was given by the claimants as more than `40,000/- in the application filed under section 163A. Contextually, the decision by a Division Bench of this Court in

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United India Insurance Company v. Akbar Shihab reported in 2012(2) KLT 242 assumes relevance besides the aforesaid

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decisions. In paragraph 13 of the said decision, it was held thus:-

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“We do notice that Deepal's case is silent regarding the point of time at which the option has to be exercised by the claimants to go for a proceeding either under S.163A or under S.166 of the Act. We are of the firm view that such an option has to be exercised by the claimant before the commencement of trial, so that no prejudice would be caused to the opposite party.”

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But at the same time, it was further held that provisions under sections 163A and 166 of the M.V Act are mutually exclusive and independent of each other and they envisage two different situations and therefore, the conversion of a claim petition filed under section 166 of the M.V Act to one under section 163A suo motu by the Tribunal is incompetent. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the basic pleadings sine qua non for making an application under section 166 would not normally be there when an application under section 163A is converted or treated as a claim petition under section 166, M.V Act. It is in the said circumstances that the decision in Akbar Shihab 's case (supra) of this Court regarding

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option to convert the claim petition under section 163A as a claim under section 166 assumes relevance. Going by the decision, it has to be done before the commencement of the trial. But then, if in a case where the averment regarding negligence which is sine qua non to maintain an application under section 166 is there in an application originally filed under section 163A and if it is found not maintainable solely for the reason that the annual income of the deceased/the injured claimant exceeded the permissible upper income limit of `40,000/-, we are of the view that taking into account the fact that the provision for granting compensation under M.V Act which is a social welfare legislation, the application could not be rejected and in fact, it has to be proceeded with treating it as a petition under section 166, M.V Act. Needless to say that in such circumstances, all contentions which are legally permissible to the opposite side should be made available to the respondents.

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8.In the case on hand, evidently, going by the claim petition, the annual income of the deceased was in excess of `40,000/- and therefore, owing to that fact the application could not have been maintained under section 163A. It is a fact that the owner, driver

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and the insurer of the offending vehicle are made parties to the petition. As noticed hereinbefore, the claimants have specifically averred in the claim petition that the accident in question occurred solely due to the negligence on the part of the first respondent, the driver of the offending vehicle. It is to be noted that the deceased was the rider of the motor cycle involved in the accident. True that the third respondent-insurer had taken up a contention that the accident occurred owing to the negligence of the rider of the motor cycle. Evidently, in this case, after analysing the evidence on record, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred solely due to the negligence from the part of the driver of the bus, the offending vehicle. Ext.A1 is the copy of the FIR in Crime No.600 of 2004 of Valapattanam Police Station registered against the first respondent, the driver of the bus. Thus, it is evident that based on the rival pleadings and the evidence available, the Tribunal found that the accident was solely due to the negligence on the part of the first respondent, the driver of the offending vehicle. Despite such a finding, none of the respondents filed any appeal against the impugned award. Liability was fastened only on the insurance

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company. As noticed hereinbefore, the common respondent admitted the insurance of the offending vehicle. Even in a claim petition under section 163A, the claimant has to state the following details:-

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(1) age of the victim; (2) the fact of accident by use of motor vehicle; (3) it is fatal or whether the injury is permanent or partial disability; (4) income of the victim; (5) the name of the owner of the vehicle and the name of the insurer.

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All such details are furnished in this case. In such circumstances and taking into account the fact that the accident occurred in 2004, we are of the view that it will not be in the interest of justice if we remit the matter for fresh consideration treating the claim petition as filed under section 166 at this distance of time. Since after analysing the evidence on record, a positive finding regarding negligence has been arrived at by the Tribunal and such other details required for considering the compensation payable under section 166 of the M.V.Act, we are of the view that the question of just

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compensation to which the appellants are entitled can be decided in this appeal itself.

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MACA.Nos.2121 & 2122/2011

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9.While considering the question what should be the just compensation in a case of death much importance has to be given for identifying the multiplicand and the multiplier. The question how the multiplier should be taken is no more res integra and now, it has been settled that it should be taken with reference to the age of the deceased. The decision in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [2010(2) KLT 802] was virtually affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma [(2015) 6 SCC 347] after referring to an earlier decision in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 54] . In this case, the Tribunal wrongly identified the multiplier with reference to the age of the first petitioner, the father of the deceased on the day of the accident instead of taking it with reference to the age of the deceased. The deceased Siddhique was aged 24 years on the day of the accident. In support of the same, evidently, the appellants have produced Ext.A5 which is the S.S.L.C book of Siddhique. Hence, it terms of the decision in Sarla Verma 's case, the multiplier to be applied is '18'.

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10.In this case, only for the purpose of bringing the claim petition within the ceiling limit of 40,000/- under section 163A, the Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased as 3,000/-. In the claim petition, the monthly income of the deceased was stated as 4,000/-. But, no evidence to support the averment regarding the occupation and income was legally brought on record. Nothing is on record even to suggest that the deceased was a disabled person prior to the accident. He was only aged 24 years on the day of the accident. In such circumstances, taking note of the age of the deceased and year of the accident, we are of the view that the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **_Ramachandrappa v. Manager Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. [2011 (13) SCC 236]_** , has to be taken as the guiding factor. In that case, in the case of a coolie, in respect of an accident occurred in the year 2004, the Hon'ble Apex Court took the monthly income notionally as 4,500/-. The accident in this case also occurred in the year 2004. In such circumstances, the notional income of the deceased Siddique has to be taken as `4,500/- for calculation

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purpose. Accordingly, it is so fixed. The appellant was a bachelor. In the light of the decision in Sarla Verma 's case (supra), 50% of the income has to be deducted towards personal expenses of the deceased. Taking into account all such factors, the appellants are entitled to get 4,86,000/-(4500x12x18x1/2) as compensation under the head loss of dependency. Towards transportation expenses, taking into account the fact that though Siddique breath his last on the way to the hospital before declaration of his death the body was taken to the hospital and thereafter the body was taken back to his residence, we are inclined to grant an amount of 2,000/-. It is awarded under the said head. There can be little doubt that the dresses worn by the deceased must have been damaged. Hence, under the head of damage to clothing, an amount of 1,000/- is awarded. The death of Siddique had occurred on the way to the hospital. Hence, under the head of pain and sufferings, an amount of 5,000/- is granted. Under the head of loss of love and affection, an amount of 25,000/- is granted, considering the fact that the appellants/petitioners are the grandmother and siblings of the deceased. Towards loss of estate an amount of 10,000/- is granted.

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Based on the discussions as above, the appeal is allowed and the

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appellants are entitled to get compensation as hereunder:-

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*Head of claim*	*Amount awarded in* *Rupees*
(a) Loss of dependency (4500x12x18x1/2)	4,86,000/-
(b)Transportation expenses	2,000/-
(c)Damage to clothing	1,000/-
(d)Pain & sufferings	5,000/-
(e)Loss of love and affection	25,000/-
(f)Loss of estate	10,000/-
*Total*	*5,29,000/-*(Rupees Five lakhs twenty nine thousand only

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11.In the said circumstances, the appellants are entitled to get an award for an amount of 5,29,000/-. But, the learned counsel for the third respondent-insurance company submitted that the amount payable under the impugned award viz., 1,24,500/- along with interest was already deposited. In case the amount covered by the impugned award was already deposited, the insurance company shall deposit the balance amount payable in view of this judgment and the cost awarded by the Tribunal. The amount now, remaining to be

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paid shall be deposited within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment along with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of compensation till realisation. The apportionment of the amount of compensation among the appellants shall be in the same manner as mentioned in the impugned award. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their respective costs.

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M.A.C.A.No.2121/2011

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12.This appeal is preferred against the judgment and award in O.P.(MV)No.583/2005 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thalassery. Legal heirs of one K.Hamshad, who lost his life in a motor vehicle accident on 19.09.2004 are the appellants herein. The appellants/claimants are the parents and siblings of K.Hamshad. The deceased was a pillion rider on a motor cycle bearing Reg.No.KL 13/H 9656 driven by one Siddique who is his relative. Immediately after the accident, Hamshad was taken to hospital and enroute to A.K.G. Hospital, Kannur, he succumbed to the injuries. The appellants filed claim petition under section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act for a total compensation of `4,36,500/-. It

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is stated in the claim petition that the deceased was earning an amount of 3,000/- from tailoring work and on the day of his death, he was aged 25 years. The Tribunal quantified 2,64,000/- as the compensation payable under the head of loss of dependency following the multiplier-multiplicand method and the multiplier was taken with reference to the average age of the appellants, who are appellants 1 and 2. In addition to the amount thus calculated, 2,000/- and 2,500/- were granted respectively under the heads 'funeral expenses' and 'loss of estate'. Accordingly, an award was passed for a total compensation of 2,68,500/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of petition till realisation and cost of 3,000/-.

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13.As noticed hereinbefore, the claim petition was filed by the appellants under section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. We have already found and held that in a proceeding under section 163A of the Act, going by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gurumallamma 's case (supra), there is no requirement to look into the multiplier and in fact, compensation payable has to be determined by looking into the structured formula under the second

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schedule to M.V. Act, taking into account the age group and the annual income. At the same time, a mere perusal of the impugned award would reveal that instead of determining the compensation in the said manner, the Tribunal followed the multiplier-multiplicand method for the purpose of computing the compensation payable under the head 'loss of dependency' and then, in addition to it granted 2,000/- and 2,500/- under the heads 'funeral expenses' and 'loss of estate'. In the light of the decision in Gurumallamma 's case (supra), the manner of determination of compensation has to be held as bad in law. That apart, we have also found in the light of Kadeeja 's case (supra) that dependency has no relevancy in a proceeding under section 163A of the M.V.Act and what is to be determined following the structured formula, in this case, is the compensation payable for death with reference to the age group and annual income. In the said circumstances, compensation has to be re-assessed following the structured formula under the second schedule. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in fact, at the time of death of Hamshad, he had crossed the age of 25 years. To prove the age, the appellants had produced Ext.A8 which is

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the S.S.L.C. Book of deceased Hamshad. No dispute has been raised with respect to the monthly income taken by the Tribunal viz., 3,000/-. Taking into account the said relevant factors viz., his annual income as 36,000/- and the age group as above 25 years but not exceeding 30 years under the structured formula under the second schedule, the compensation for death is 6,12,000/-. But then, 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the same has to be deducted in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. Hence, the amount of compensation thereunder would be 4,08,000/-. Going by the second schedule in addition to the same, the appellants are also entitled to get 2,000/under the head funeral expenses and 2,500/- under the head loss of estate. By determining the amount of compensation payable taking into account the aforesaid aspects, the appellants are entitled to get an award for an amount of `4,12,500/-.

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In the result, this appeal is allowed. The learned counsel for the insurance company submitted that the amount payable under the impugned award viz., `2,68,500/- along with interest was already deposited. If that be so, the respondent shall deposit the balance

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amount in terms of this judgment with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of petition till realisation, along with the cost awarded

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by the Tribunal, within three months from the date of receipt of a

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copy of this judgment. The amount shall be apportioned between the appellants in the manner apportionment has been directed by the Tribunal.

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There will be no order as to costs.

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