contended that some dates are relevant for resolving the controversy. The property was agreed to be purchased on 30.12.1993. We find that there are two agreements marked as Ext.A2 and B1. There is some discrepancy in the amount shown in these two agreements. However, the fact remains that the property was agreed to be purchased on 30.12.1993. Exts.A2 and A8 letters written by DW2, father of the contesting parties, bore dates as 3.1.94 and 15.2.1994 respectively. Ext.B2 is the original sale deed in the name of the appellant and the first respondent. It was executed on 30.6.1994. So, the events transpired between 30.12.1993, as evidenced by Exts.A2, B1 and Ext.B2, and 30.6.1994 show that the property was intended to be purchased in the name of both the parties. Appellant's contentions that the first respondent had only agreed to advance money for purchasing the plaint schedule property in her name, that she never intended to acquire any right, title or possession over the property and that she agreed to assign her share over the property to the appellant are not established by materials before us. Further, they are self contradictory. It goes without saying that if plaintiff was expected to execute a release deed in favour
