“4. It is true that the allowing of the amendment prayed for would entail a trial of an issue regarding that item. But, it is well settled that an admission by itself cannot confer title to property. An admission of a preexisting title where none in fact existed, is not sufficient to create title on Moyi Haji in this case. This position is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Neelakantan v. Velayudhan (AIR 1958 SC 832) and the decision of this Court in Sarojini v. Santha Trading Co. (1969 KLT 412). It is also clear from Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai (AIR 1966 SC 605 at 612) that admission cannot convey title. I refer to this aspect because, the main contention of Sri. P. Sukumaran Nair, Senior counsel appearing for defendant No. 2 is that defendants 16 to 26 are not entitled to withdraw their admission that the title to property is that of the estate of Moyi Haji and is available for partition and to introduce in its place, a plea that the title is that of their predecessor Mammu Haji, the son of Moyi Haji. If the position of law is that such an admission by itself cannot confer any title on Moyi Haji, why could not defendants 16 to 26 be permitted to set up the plea that the title is really with Mammu Haji, their predecessor, by way of an amendment of the written statement, even if it be, by withdrawing the earlier admission? In my view, they can be permitted since their prior admission by itself cannot be confer any title on Moyi Haji, if in fact none existed in him.
