regard to the submissions made and taking note of the facts and circumstances presented, I find no notice to the respondent is necessary, and hence it is dispensed with. I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Challenge raised that the order passed on the application moved by the respondent/plaintiff on the trial side is a petition for execution of the decree, and so much so, it is barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act, has no merit at all. In view of the provisions of Sections 35 and 28 of the Specific Relief Act, decree for specific performance of a contract for sale is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the court does not become frunctus officio after passing such decree. Sub Section (3) of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is a clear pointer that reliefs by delivery or possession or separate possession of property should be consequential to the passing of a decree for specific performance of a contract to transfer an immovable property. When a sale deed had been executed by the court consequent to the decree passed in the suit for specific performance, delivery of the property through court, is only
