Dismissed

Omanakuttan @ KEERIKKADAN,C.2422,C.P,KNR v. State of Kerala

Kerala HC21 Oct 2009CRL.A/1965/2005

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Kerala High Court dismissed a criminal appeal challenging a conviction for murder and robbery. The High Court held that the prosecution successfully established guilt through circumstantial evidence, which was complete and unexplainable by any other hypothesis. The Court rejected the plea of private defence as the version provided by the appellant was highly improbable given the forensic evidence of strangulation. It also held that the appellant was not denied a fair trial despite the initial appointment of counsel, as he refused further legal aid.

What did the court decide?

The criminal appeal was dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment passed by the trial court.

Omanakuttan @ KEERIKKADAN,C.2422,C.P,KNR Vs… — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Kerala HC (2009)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT :

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN

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WEDNESDAY, THE 21ST OCTOBER 2009 / 29TH ASWINA 1931

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CRL.A.No. 1965 of 2005(B)

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------------------------SC.1/2004 of II ADDL.SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM

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APPELLANT(S):

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OMANAKUTTAN @ KEERIKKADAN, S/O. RAGHAVAN, C.NO.2422, CENTRAL PRISON, KANNUR.

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BY ADV. ADV.K.M.JAMALUDHEEN(STATE BRIEF)

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RESPONDENT(S):

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STATE OF KERALA, REPREESNTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM. (CRIME NO.249/98, HILL PALACE-P.S)

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PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. NOBLE MATHEW.

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THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24/09/2009, THE COURT ON 21/10/2009 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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K. BALAKRISHNAN NAIR & P. BHAVADASAN, JJ.

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- - - - Crl. Appeal No. 1965 of 2005

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- - - - Dated this the 21st day of October, 2009.

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JUDGMENT

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Bhavadasan, J,

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The accused in this case was prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 392 and 302 Indian Penal

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Code. He was found guilty on both counts. Accordingly he was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC with a default clause. He was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 392 IPC, that too with a default clause. It is also directed that if the fine amount is realised, a sum of Rs.20,000/- shall be paid as compensation to the mother of the

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deceased or to the legal heirs as the case may be. Set off as per law was allowed.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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The incident which gave rise to this case is alleged to

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have taken place in the intervening night of 9.11.1998 and 10.11.1998. The body of the deceased, namely, Shine was found in the lean to the marriage hall of Puthiyakavu Devi Temple. Shine was working as a sales representative. On 9.11.1998 Shine was on his way to his house. The next day when P.W.1 had gone to the temple, he came to know the death of his nephew, namely, Shine and found his body in the lean to the marriage hall. He laid Ext.P1 First Information Statement before Hill Palace Police Station. Thripunithura. That was recorded by P.W.19, the Station House Officer of the Hill Palace Police Station. On the basis of Ext.P1 first information statement, Crime No.249 of 1998 was registered as per Ext.P1(a) First Information Report. P.W.20 took over investigation on 10.11.1998. He went to the scene of occurrence and conducted inquest over the body of the deceased person and Ext.P2 report was prepared by him. He then sent the body for autopsy. P.W.18, Forensic Surgeon conducted autopsy ad

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 3

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prepared Ext.P11 certificate. P.W.20 seized M.Os. 1 to 9, which were found on the body of the deceased. He secured the assistance of a Scientific Expert and had samples collected from the place. He also recovered materials, which were found at the scene of occurrence as per Ext.P4 mahazar. During his investigation, it was revealed that it was a case of murder and hence he filed a report before the court incorporating Section 302 IPC. Ext.P13 is the relevant report. It was revealed during investigation that the accused and the deceased were seen together on 9.11.1998 late in the night. Since the investigating officer was convinced that the accused had a role in the incident, the accused was arrested. Based on Exts.P5(a) and P6(a) confession statements said to have been given by the accused, M.O.11 bath towel and the cloths worn by the accused at the relevant time were seized. P.W.20 had the accused examined by Doctor and had also collected his blood sample and hair sample. He had the materials seized by him sent for chemical examination. In the meanwhile, he had the Village

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 4

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Officer prepare the site plan. Later he had Section 392 IPC also incorporated. He took the statements of witnesses and on receipt of Exts.P9 and P10 chemical examination reports, he completed investigation and laid charge before court.

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Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam took cognizance of the offence. On appearance of the accused before the said court, all legal formalities were complied with. The learned Magistrate found that the offences are exclusively triable by a court of Sessions and accordingly committed the case to Sessions Court, Ernakulam under Section 209 Criminal Procedure Code. On receipt of the records, the said court made over the case

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to IInd Additional Sessions Court, Ernakulam for trial and disposal.

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The said court, on receipt of records issued summons to the accused and he entered appearance. It was found that the accused was unable to engage a counsel to defend him and therefore the court appointed Adv.Sreelal Warriar to defend the

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 5

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accused. On 14.10.2004 after hearing both sides charge was framed for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 392 IPC. It was read over to him. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. It is seen from the records that thereafter the accused filed a petition stating that he had no confidence in his counsel and that he wishes to conduct the case on his own. It is also seen that the court cautioned him about the risk involved and also offered him appointment of another counsel to defend him. The accused refused to avail the service of a counsel and insisted that he conducts the case on his own.

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Prosecution had therefore P.Ws. 1 to 20 examined

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Exts.P1 to P20 marked. M.Os. 1 to 22(b) were identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out against him and maintained that he is innocent. He revealed that the deceased and he were classmates and that while they were studying

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 6

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in the 9^th standard, he had beaten the deceased. Soon thereafter they parted and they met after a long time, ie., on the date of the incident. He claims that Shine offered to buy food and on the way they bought a bottle of liquor. On the way they purchased several food items. He would say that on request he gave his address at Trivandrum to the deceased. Since it was too late in the night, Shine told him that they could not go to his house and suggested that they could go to the lean to the auditorium of the temple. They did so. They had drinks and thereafter they had their food. The deceased says that then he went to sleep. While he was sleeping, according to him, the deceased tried to have unnatural sex with him. When he tried to get up, the deceased pressed him down. It is also alleged by the accused that the deceased tried to suffocate him in his attempt to have oral sex and in a desperate attempt he bit the deceased. He would also say that he was badly beaten by the deceased. He would then say that Shine tried to strangulate him and he managed to kick Shine on his face. Shine,

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 7

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the deceased fell on the ground and remained motionless. The accused claimed, after that soon he left the place and does not know what happened thereafter.

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Presumably finding that the accused cannot be acquitted under Section 232 Cr.P.C., he was asked to enter on his defence. The accused had D.Ws. 1 to 4 examined. The trial court on a consideration of the materials found that the prosecution had

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succeeded in establishing the case against the accused and accordingly he was convicted and sentenced as already mentioned. The said conviction and sentence are assailed in this appeal.

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The question that arises for consideration is whether any interference is called for with the conviction and sentence passed by the court below.

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Since the appellant was unable to engage a counsel of his own, Adv. Sri. K.M. Jamaludeen was appointed as State Brief to defend the appellant.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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At the outset, it may be observed that the case is

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built on circumstantial evidence. The main items of evidence are

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the testimony of those witnesses who had seen the accused in the company of the deceased shortly before the alleged time of the death of Shine and also the Forensic Science evidence adduced by the prosecution.

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In a case based on circumstantial evidence, it is

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well settled that unless all the circumstances are proved, and they unerringly point to the guilt of the accused, the accused cannot be found guilty. There is a plethora of decisions on this aspect. It

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has been held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be satisfy the following tests:

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(1) The circumstances from which an inference of

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guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

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(2) Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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accused;

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(3) The circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and no one else; and

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(4) The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

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It is unnecessary to refer all the decisions on the point except the decisions reported in Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2009 SC 963) and Krishna Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (AIR 2009 SC 2279). In the decision in Baldev Singh's case, after referring a number of decisions on the point, it was held as follows:

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“A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not 'may be' established.

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(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

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(g) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

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These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh and Anr. (2003(1) SCC 261) and Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P. (Criminal Appeal No.185/2005 disposed on on 7.7.2008)”

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In the decision reported in Krishna Ghosh's case, it

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was held as follows:

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“A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sards v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC 1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not 'may be' established.

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(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

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(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

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(g) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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Learned counsel appearing for the appellant

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pointed out that the court below had failed to appreciate the evidence in the proper perspective and according to the learned counsel there is absolutely no evidence to show that the accused

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 13

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had committed the offences. Merely because the accused was seen sometime during the previous night of the day of the incident with the deceased, it does not lead to the conclusion that he was the culprit. Learned counsel highlighted that the prosecution has not been able to establish the motive for the act committed by the accused. So also it is contended that the motive alleged is not proved.

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It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that before the trial court the accused did not have the advantage of engaging a counsel to defend him and that caused considerable prejudice to the accused. Learned counsel emphasised that the court below should have ensured that the accused was properly defended and in case it was found that he was unable to engage his own counsel, the court should have taken steps to engage a counsel for him. It is also contended that the court below has failed to consider the plea of private defence which arises from the evidence adduced in the case. In short,

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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according to learned counsel, there is absolutely no evidence at all to show that it was the accused, who had committed the objectionable act.

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Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the court below has considered the evidence in detail and has come to the conclusion that the circumstances brought out in evidence clearly point to the guilt of the accused. Learned Public Prosecutor drew attention of this court to the statement in the judgment, which clearly showed that legal aid was made available to the accused, but he refused to accept the same. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that in fact a senior counsel was engaged to defend him and after the charge was read over to the accused, he stated that he had no faith in his counsel and he did not want the assistance of any counsel at all. He insisted that he conducts the case on his own.

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Learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that even assuming that the motive is not established, that by itself is

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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not a ground to reject the prosecution case. There are other items of evidence, which unerringly point to the guilt of the accused. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the plea of self defence is baseless. There is nothing to indicate that the deceased was the aggressor and that the accused had acted in self defence. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that no grounds are made out to interfere with the judgment of the court below.

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The body of the deceased was found in the lean to the auditorium of the Puthiyakavu temple. It cannot be disputed that the death of Shine was homicidal. The evidence of P.W.18, Forensic Surgeon taken along with Ext.P11 postmortem certificate show that the death was caused due to strangulation. In fact there is no serious dispute regarding this aspect in this case.

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The next and the most important question that arises for consideration is, has the prosecution succeeded in establishing that it was the accused, who was responsible for the act which resulted in the death of late Shine. As already

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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mentioned, the case is built on circumstantial evidence.

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The evidence of P.W.1 is not of much significance

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except for the fact that he is the author of Ext.P1 first information statement. He had no direct knowledge about the incident.

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Going by the forensic evidence and the testimony of P.W.18, it would appear that the death occurred after mid night of 9.11.1998 and in the early morning of 10.11.1998.

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P.W.3 has deposed that he knows Shine very well

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and he is a resident nearby. He had occasion to meet Shine at about 10.15 p.m. at Puthiyakavu Junction on the previous day. P.W.3 claims that he was waiting for his friend, who was to arrive by about that time. This witness would say that when he had met Shine, the accused was with Shine and Shine had introduced him to PW.3.

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P.W.4 is another witness, who claims to have seen

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the accused and the deceased together by about 11 p.m. on the eventful day. He conducts a tea shop at Puthiyakavu Junction. He

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 17

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would depose that both the accused and Shine came to his shop and had food from there. Shine gave him Rs.100/- and since P.W.4 did not have change, Shine told him that he would collect the balance on the next day. P.W.5 is yet another witness, who claims to have seen the deceased and the accused at about 10.30 p.m. on 9.11.1998. He too runs a tea shop near Puthiyakavu Junction. He would depose that the deceased and the accused came to his shop and purchased fish fry and omelet. P.W.6 Udyan, who is also related to Shine would say that on 9.11.1998 he was standing in the bus stop talking to his friends. He was attempting to raise funds for the treatment of his father. He happened to see the accused and the deceased alighting from a bus at Puthiyakavu Junction. He also claims that the deceased is very familiar to him and the accused was a classmate of Shine. When P.W.6 asked Shine to come to his house, Shine replied that he will come to his house after consuming the liquor that he had with him.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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P.W.7 would depose that late Shine and the accused

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had come to the bar and they had purchased half bottle Old Cask Rum. They had a peg at the bar itself and then left the place.

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It needs to be noticed that these witnesses were not cross-examined at all. The claim of these witnesses that they had occasion to see the accused and the deceased together at the time mentioned by each one of them is not challenged at all. There is also nothing to show that these witnesses had any reason to falsely implicate the accused. It is therefore quite evident from the available evidence that the deceased and the accused were together on the previous night, or in other words they were last seen together.

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In the decision reported in State of Goa v. Pandurang Mohite (AIR 2009 SC 1066), the Apex Court, after following the decisions reported in Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P. (AIR 2008 SC 2819) and in State of Goa v. Sanjay

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 19

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Thakran ((2007) 2 SCC (Cri.) 162), it was held as follows:

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“So far as the last seen aspect is concerned, it is necessary to take note of two decisions of this court. In State of U.P. v. Satish (2005(3) SCC 114) it was noted as follows:

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“22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses P.Ws.3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of P.W.2.”

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In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (2006(10) SCC 172) it was noted as follows:

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“27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration.”

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It is therefore clear that once the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the accused and the deceased were seen together and the time gap between that and the death are short, the accused has to explain as to how the incident had occurred.

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The prosecution placed considerable reliance on the chemical analysis report namely Exts.P9 and P10. The allegation is that M.O.11 bath towel was used by the accused to strangulate late Shine. The evidence of P.W.12 discloses that during the relevant period the accused was working as a coolie at a construction site near his tailoring shop at Puthiyakavu. P.W.12 has stated that the accused had approached him and asked him whether he could give him a bath towel. He claims that he had

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 21

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purchased one bath towel, ie., M.O.11 and handed it over to the accused. P.W.3, the contractor had stated that he had engaged the accused for work for a day. He also stated that he had seen M.O.11 bath towel with the accused. While P.W.13 was not crossexamined at all, the cross examination of P.W.12 did not bring out anything in favour of the defence.

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One may notice here that M.O.11 towel was recovered based on Ext.P5(a) confession statement said to have been given by the accused and the towel was seized as per Ext.P5 mahazar. P.W.5 was the witness to the seizure. The accused did not challenge the confessional statement said to have been given by him nor the recovery based on that statement. He had not crossexamined the witness, namely, P.W.11, P.W.5 and P.W.20 on this aspect. It is significant to notice that as per forensic report the fibre of the towel, namely M.O.11, matched with the fibre found on the cellophane tape sample taken from the neck of the deceased.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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Yet another circumstance relied on by the

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prosecution is recovery of M.Os.12, 13 and 14. They are the clothes said to have been worn by the accused and his chappals. They were recovered as per Ext.P6 mahazar and the relevant portion which led to the recovery is shown as Ext.P6(a). As already noticed Exts.P9 and P10 are the Forensic Lab Reports. M.Os.12 and 13 on chemical examination found contained blood stains belonging to 'A' group. The blood group of the accused, going by the available records, is 'B' group. No explanation whatsoever is offered by the accused with respect to these items of evidence. It has to be noticed that those portions of the confession statement which led to the recovery of materials are admissible as evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The relevant statements and consequential recovery satisfy all the requirements of that provision.

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In fact there is no serious dispute regarding most of the facts. On a reading of the statement of the accused at the time

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 23

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of questioning under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it can be seen that he admits that they were together and also that they were present at the place where the body of Shine was found. However, the accused gave a different version of the incident.

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One must notice certain facts. They are (i) The incident took place in the dead of night, (ii) It could not be said that the place where the incident took place is an open place, (iii) There is absolutely no evidence to show that except the accused and the deceased any one else was present. It therefore follows that when the accused and the deceased were last seen together, also considering the place where the incident had taken place and the time at which it had taken place, the accused had to give an explanation as to how injuries were caused to the deceased. It is for him to show as to what had happened at the place of incident.

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Even though the accused had examined D.Ws.1 to

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4, it served no purpose. One fails to understand as to why they were examined at all.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 24

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Before going further into the other aspects of the case, one fact needs to be mentioned. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the court below had not provided a counsel on State Brief to defend him even though he was unable to engage his own counsel. That according to the learned counsel for the appellant had caused considerable prejudice and the matter needs to be remanded for fresh consideration. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pardesh ((1986) 2 SCC 401) and Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((1991) 1 SCC 286).

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In the decision reported in Suk Das's Case (Supra) it is seen on going through the decision that that was a case where no legal aid was provided to the accused since he did not apply. The Apex Court held that the right of an accused to be defended by a counsel does not depend on his application for the same and

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the court ought to have provided a counsel on State Brief. In the decision reported in Kishore Chand's Case (supra) it is seen that the accused was being prosecuted for serious and grave crimes. He was provided with a State counsel. It so happened that the counsel appointed to defend the accused was a very junior counsel. On going through the records, the Apex Court held that since the crime involved was a heinous and grave one, it was not proper to have appointed a junior counsel to defend him.

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The facts of the above two decisions have no application to the present case. In the case on hand, in paragraph 3 of the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge has observed that on the request of the accused, Adv. Sri.Sreelal Warriyar was initially appointed to defend him by the District Legal Services Authority and after framing of charge when it was read over to the accused. The accused then seems to have filed a petition expressing no confidence on the counsel appointed for him. Thereafter he indicated that he wishes conduct the defence on his own. It is

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 26

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seen from the judgment that the learned Sessions Judge apprised the accused that he could have the service of another counsel. The accused declined to avail the services of a counsel and wanted to defend himself. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that he did not have the aid of a counsel for his defence.

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Before going into the private defence set up in the case the issue regarding motive may be considered. Prosecution allegation is that the accused wanted to commit robbery and in the process had caused the death of the deceased.

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It must be said that the evidence is very thin in this regard. Going by the evidence on record, it is seen that the accused had met the deceased after a long time. There is nothing to indicate that at the time of the meeting, the accused was aware that the deceased carried money with him. It also needs to be noticed that if robbery was the sole motive, the body of the deceased would not have been found naked. True, the accused had deprived the deceased of a sum of Rs.300/-. It may be possible to say that

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 27

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seeing the extravagant manner in which the deceased was spending money in his company, might have indicated to the accused that the deceased was carrying money with him. But the evidence in this regard is not very convincing.

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One may even assume that the accused was in need of money for a litigation as alleged by the prosecution. But that by itself is insufficient. The definite stand of the accused is that he and the deceased met on the date of the incident after a long time. There is absolutely no evidence from the side of the prosecution to show that the deceased and the accused were meeting regularly and the accused was aware that the deceased was carrying money with him.

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Normally in a case based on circumstantial evidence motive may play a significant role. But the absence of proof of motive or the failure of the prosecution to prove the same

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by itself is not a ground to reject the prosecution case.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 28

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In the decision reported in Alavi v. State of Kerala (2008(1) K.L.T. SC 42), it was held as follows:

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“In every crime committed, there will be a motive for the crime. But, it is a difficult task for the prosecution to prove motive with precision. When there is direct evidence, proof of motive may become irrelevant. Here, since the alleged occurrence witnesses turned hostile, proof of motive is very important. Even in circumstantial evidence, failure of proving motive alone is not fatal, if there were all sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”

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In the light of the above decision, it could not be said that want of convincing proof regarding motive should prove fatal.

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One may note that the accused takes the aid of private defence to justify his acts. Specific reliance s placed on Section 100 Clause 4, which reads as follows:

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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“ 100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death .- The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:-

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Fourthly.- An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

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............... .................”

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The defence version is that after consuming liquor

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the accused had gone to sleep. While he was asleep, according to

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the accused, the deceased forced him to have unnatural sex and he resisted. In the scuffle that followed, he had kicked on the face of the deceased and the deceased fell down and he became motionless.

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Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

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It is not necessary that the plea of private defence should be specifically set up. If as a matter of fact it is possible to infer the act of the accused, as a result of private defence from the evidence on record, the benefit should go to the accused. In other words, the accused may rely on the prosecution evidence itself or adduce independent evidence on his behalf to substantiate the plea of private defence. It must be remembered that the burden of proof on the accused is not as onerous as that of the prosecution. While the prosecution has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probability.

¶175

In the decision reported in Rizan v. State of Chhatisgarh (AIR 2003 SC 976) regarding the plea of private defence, it was observed as follows:

¶176

“Then comes plea relating to alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the

¶177

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 31

¶178

exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in selfdefence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it. If the same is available to be considered from the material on record. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets of the plea of self defence, and in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self defence. The Court

¶179

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 32

¶180

shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. A accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and others v. Delhi Administration. AIR 1968 SC 902;

¶181

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶182

¶183

State of Gujarat v. Bai Fathima. AIR 1975 SC 1478; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan, AR 1977 SC 2226 and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections 100 and 101 define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 391), runs as follows:

¶184

“It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing defence evidence.”

¶185

The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough

¶186

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶187

¶188

for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea.”

¶189

In the decision reported in Santokh Singh v. State

¶190

of Punjab (AIR 2009 SC 1923), after referring to the decision reported in Madan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2008 SC 3083), it was held as follows:

¶191

“A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 IPC deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i)of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence

¶192

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶193

¶194

against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 IPC lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 IPC give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 IPC is controlled by Section 99 IPC. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Sections 100 and 101 IPC define the limit and extent of right of private defence.

¶195

Sections 102 and 105 IPC deal with commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of body and property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat to

¶196

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 36

¶197

commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until that there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence.”

¶198

Before going into the above aspects, one fact needs to be noticed. As already noticed, the incident had taken place in the dead of night and in a concealed place. Under such circumstance, it may not be possible for the prosecution to establish all the facts. The prosecution cannot be asked to do the impossible. In this regard, it will not be out of place to refer to the decision reported in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006(4) K.L.T. 638(SC)), wherein it was observed as follows:

¶199

¶200

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶201

“If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind S.106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that is upon him. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the

¶202

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶203

¶204

initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of S.106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.

¶205

The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution

¶206

¶207

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶208

to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position.”

¶209

¶210

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶211

Coming back to the facts of the case, even the prosecution allegation is that there was an attempt by the accused to have unnatural sex, even though the accused would say that it was the deceased who was the aggressor in this regard.

¶212

Since the incident took place in a concealed place and in the dead of night and since the deceased and the accused were last seen together, the burden is on the accused under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act to show as to what had transpired at the place of incident. It is admitted that the accused and the deceased were together in the night and they had consumed alcohol. The accused would say that the deceased tried to have unnatural sex with him and he had kicked the deceased on his face. The accused further says that receiving the kick the deceased fell down and became motionless and he left the place.

¶213

It has to be observed that the version given by the accused is highly improbable and unacceptable. The postmortem certificate and the Doctor who conducted autopsy, P.W. 18 would

¶214

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005. 41

¶215

support the case that death was due to strangulation. If on receiving the kick the deceased had fallen and became motionless, there was no need to strangulate him. Nothing prevented the accused from leaving the place. He could have easily escaped. To believe that after the accused had left the place, some other person had sneaked in and strangulated the deceased is too far fetched. Apart from the high improbability, there is also no necessity to anybody else to do that. It is significant to note that the injuries found on the face of the deceased were corresponding to the kick given by the accused. It is true that the Forensic Surgeon says that injury No.1 could be attributed to death, but that was not the sole cause of death.

¶216

It must also be remembered that the injuries on the face, which may be the result of kick on the face, are antemortem injuries. The strangulation must have been the last act. By no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the accused had acted in private defence and he is entitled to the benefit of Section 100

¶217

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶218

¶219

Clause 4. The evidence available on record would clearly show that the explanation offered by the accused is totally unacceptable. His explanation regarding the incident is not true.

¶220

Before parting with the case, one may also notice the forensic evidence in this case. The Forensic report says that the blood group of the deceased was A and that of the accused was B as could be seen from Exts.P9 and P10. The towel (.......................) (M.O.11) and shirt and dhoti worn by the accused at the relevant time, ie., M.Os. 12 and 13 contained blood stains belonging to A group. One may remember here that the prosecution allegation is that M.O.11 was used by the accused to strangulate the deceased. It is also significant to notice that the blood samples collected from the body of the victim as well as from the floor at the place of incident matched with the blood group of the accused.

¶221

The court below had clearly held that the recovery based on confessional statement admittedly fall under Section 27 of the Act and other circumstantial evidence are sufficient to find

¶222

Crl.Appeal.1965/2005.

¶223

¶224

that the accused had committed the objectionable act. On a reevaluation and re-appreciation of the evidence, we find no ground to take a different view. The court below was perfectly justified in holding the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him.

¶225

The result is that this appeal is without merit and it is liable to be dismissed. We do so confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the court below.

¶226

K. Balakrishnan Nair, Judge

¶227

P. Bhavadasan, Judge

¶228

sb.

Omanakuttan @ KEERIKKADAN,C.2422,C.P,KNR v. State of Kerala

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Omanakuttan @ KEERIKKADAN,C.2422,C.P,KNR v. State of Kerala

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