Sri Rajashekar Vs Karnataka Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited

¶1

1 -

¶2

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶3

HC-KAR

¶4

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 2^ND DAY OF APRIL, 2026

¶5

BEFORE

¶6

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 531 OF 2021 (S-RES)

¶7

BETWEEN:

¶8

SRI RAJASHEKAR S/O LATE H. M. VENKATARAMANA SHETTY AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, WAS WORKING AS JUNIOR ASSISTANT KARNATAKA FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED RESIDING AT NO.799, 9^TH CROSS, RAJKUMAR ROAD, NEW ERAGANAHALLI MYSORE – 573 028

¶9

…PETITIONER

¶10

(BY SRI. SATISH K., ADVOCATE)

¶11

AND:

¶12

Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka

¶13

KARNATAKA FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR NO.16/1, MILLERS TANK BED AREA, BENGALURU – 560 052

¶14

THE GENERAL MANAGER, KARNATAKA FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED, NO.16/1, MILLERS TANK BED AREA, BENGALURU – 560 052

¶15

…RESPONDENTS

¶16

(BY SRI. R. B. SADASIVAPPA, & SRI. NANDISH GOWDA, ADVOCATES)

¶17

THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF PENALTY DTD 21.12.2020 BEARING NO.KaAaaNaaSaNiNi/KaaShi/17/2016-17/2020-21/2320 ISSUED BY

¶18

2 -

¶19

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶20

HC-KAR

¶21

THE R-1 VIDE ANNX-N AND GRANT ALL CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS.

¶22

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

¶23

ORAL ORDER

¶24

In this petition, petitioner seeks for the following reliefs:-

¶25

“a) Call for records from the Respondents;

¶26

b) Issue Writ or Order quashing the impugned Order of penalty dated 21/12/2020 bearing No. KaAaaNaaSaNiNi/KaaShi/17/2016-17/2020-21/2320 issued by the 1^st Respondent (Annexure – N) and grant all consequential benefits, in the interest of justice and equity.

¶27

c) Pass any such Order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit, including the costs of the Writ Petition, in the interest of justice and equity.”

¶28

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

¶29

counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record.

¶30

A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the

¶31

respondent No.2- General Manager of the Karnataka Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., appointed an enquiry officer to

¶32

3 - NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶33

HC-KAR

¶34

enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner and charge memo was issued by him to the petitioner in this regard. After enquiry, the enquiry officer having submitted a report dated 24.02.2020 holding that the charges are proved, the respondent No.2 issued show cause notice dated 09.06.2020 calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why penalty/punishment should not be imposed upon the petitioner who submitted a reply dated 04.09.2020 to the said second show cause notice. In pursuance of the same, the respondent No.1 - Managing Director of the Corporation proceeded to pass the impugned order at Annexure-N dated 21.12.2020 imposing the major penalty/punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service, which is assailed in the present petition.

¶35

In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the memorandum of petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the petitioner would invite my attention to the second show cause notice dated 09.06.2020 in order to contend that the same having been issued by the respondent No.2General Manager, it was impermissible for the respondent No.1 - Managing Director to pass the impugned dismissal order imposing

¶36

4 - NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶37

HC-KAR

¶38

a major penalty/punishment of dismissal, which is impermissible in law inasmuch as it was only respondent No.2 - General Manager, who had issued the show cause notice, who was entitled competent to pass the impugned order. Alternatively, it was submitted that as per the delegation of powers to the officers of the respondent No.1- Corporation effective from 01.04.2000, it is only the Managing Director who was entitled to pass the impugned order of dismissal, which is a major punishment and consequently, the show cause notice was also ought to have been issued by the respondent No.1 - Managing Director and not by respondent No.2, who was not entitled to issue the show cause notice and consequently, the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 without issuing a show cause notice and without following principles of natural justice deserves to be quashed.

¶39

In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors., Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation - AIR 1959 SC 308.

¶40

5 -

¶41

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶42

HC-KAR

¶43

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits

¶44

that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

¶45

Before adverting to the rival contentions, the

¶46

delegation of powers insofar as disciplinary proceedings and imposition of punishment etc., to the petitioner is as under:

¶47

DISCIPLINARY:

¶48

*SL.* *NO.*	*DESCRIPTION OF* *POWER*	*MANAGING* *DIRECTOR*	*GENERAL* *MANAGE* R	*FM / SR.* *DGM / IAO* */ DGM /* *CAO /CS*	*DISTRICT* *MANAGER*
1	To institute inquires against erring employees of the Corporation and to take disciplinary action in pursuance thereof.	Below GM	Up to AM and equivalent posts	Sr. DGMs: up to OM and equivalent post working under them. Other Officers up to Sr. Asst. or Equivalent post working _under them _	Up to Sr. Asst. except internal audit staff (IAO is disciplinary authority)
2	To Keep the employees under suspension and to sanction subsistence allowance	Below GM	Up to AM and equivalent posts	Sr. DGMs: up to OM and equivalent post working under them. Other Officers up to Sr. Asst. or Equivalent post working _under them _	Up to Sr. Asst. except internal audit staff (IAO is disciplinary authority)

¶49

6 -

¶50

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶51

HC-KAR

¶52

3	To impose penalties as per CCA Rules 1951 a) Rule no. 8(I) to 8(iv)(a) (minor punishments)	Up to DM; In case of officers appointed by the Board or posted by Govt., with prior approval of the Board / Govt., as the case may be	Up to AM and equivalent posts	Sr. DGMs: up to OM and equivalent post working under them. Other officers up to Sr. Asst. or Equivalent post working under them	Up to Sr. Asst. except internal audit staff (IAO is disciplinary authority)
	b) Rule no.8(v) to 8(viii) punishments	Up to DM; In case of officers appointed by the Board or posted by Govt., with prior approval of the Board / Govt., as the case may be	Nil	Nil	Nil
4	To, exercise powers of: a) Disciplinary authority	Below GM	Upto AM	Sr. DGMs: up to OM and equivalent post, Other Officers: up to Sr. Asst., working under them	Up to Sr. Asst., except internal audit staff (IAO is disciplinary authority)
	b) Appellate authority	For AM and equivalent cadres for minor punishments	OM and equivalent cadre for minor punishmen ts and in respect of staff to whome officers in	Sr. DGMs: up to Sr. Asst., cadre for minor punishment s in respect of staff working in district _officers. _	Nil

¶53

7 -

¶54

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶55

HC-KAR

¶56

		column 5 are disciplinary Authority	Other officers: Nil
c) Reviewing authority	OM and equivalent cadre for minor punishments	Up to Sr. Asst., and equivalent cadres for minor punishmen ts	Nil	Nil

¶57

NOTE:-

¶58

1. As Managing Director will be awarding major punishments 8(v) to 8(viii) as per CCA Rules; Board will be Appellate/Reviewing Authority.

¶59

2. Board is the Appellate Authority for officers in the cadre of DM and above.

¶60

3. The Board is the Reviewing Authority in respect of AM.

¶61

4. Powers delegated above shall be exercised by the concerned officers as per their allocation of work.

¶62

5. All powers concerning administration and disciplinary matters in column No.5 shall be exercised by Sr. DGM/DGM incharge of Administration at Head Office.

¶63

6. The above powers delegated shall be in supersession of earlier orders issued hitherto.”

¶64

As can be seen from the delegation of powers of the

¶65

respondent No.1 - Corporation, in particular, Sl.No.3B (supra), insofar as major punishments are concerned, it is only the Managing Director, who was competent and was

¶66

8 -

¶67

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶68

HC-KAR

¶69

empowered/authorized to impose a major punishment/penalty of removal as per 5 to 8 of the CCA Rules, 1951. In the instant case, as stated supra, having regard to the fact that the major penalty could have been imposed by only the Managing Director of the respondent No.1- Corporation, it was impermissible in law for the respondent No.2 - General Manager to have issued a Show Cause Notice preceding the order of imposition of major penalty/dismissal, which deserves to be quashed on this ground alone.

¶70

9. In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao’s case supra, the

¶71

Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:

¶72

“29. The mode of performing quasi-judicial acts by Administrative Tribunals has been the subject of judicial decisions in England as well as in India. The House of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge13 in the context of the Housing, town Planning Etc., Act, 1909, made the following observations at p. 132:

¶73

“My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same.”

¶74

9 -

¶75

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶76

HC-KAR

¶77

In New Prakash Transport Co., Ltd. v. New Swarna Transport Co., Ltd.14 this Court reviewed the case law on the subject and came to the conclusion that the rules of natural justice vary with varying constitutions of statutory bodies, and the rules prescribed by the legislature under which they have to act, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. This Court reaffirmed the principle in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division (supra)10.

¶78

30. With this background we shall proceed to consider the validity of the three alleged deviations of the State Government from the fundamental judicial procedure. In the present case, the officer who received the objections of the parties and heard them personally or through their representatives, was the Secretary of the Transport Department. Under the ‘Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions’ made by the Governor under Article Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. One of the parties to the dispute before the State Government was the Transport Department functioning as a statutory authority under the Act. The head of that department received the objections, heard the parties, recorded the entire proceedings and presumably discussed the matter with the Chief Minister before the latter approved the scheme. Though the formal orders were made by the Chief Minister, in effect and substance, the enquiry was conducted and personal hearing was given by one of the

¶79

10 -

¶80

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶81

HC-KAR

¶82

parties to the dispute itself. It is one of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure that the person or persons who are entrusted with the duty of hearing a case judicially should be those who have no personal bias in the matter. In Ranger v. Great Western By. Co.15 Lord Cranworth L.C., says:

¶83

“A Judge ought to be, and is supposed to be, indifferent between the parties. He has, or is supposed to have, no bias inducing him to lean to the one side rather than to the other. In ordinary cases it is just ground of exception to a Judge that he is not indifferent, and the fact that he is himself a party, or interested as a party, affords the strongest proof that he cannot be indifferent.”

¶84

In Rex v. Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy16 Lord Hewart C.J., observed:

¶85

“It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when that gentleman retired in the usual way with the justices, taking with him the notes of the evidence in case the justices might desire to consult him, the justices came to a conclusion without consulting him, and that he scrupulously abstained from referring to the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism which he might not properly have made or offered; the question is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspects as to be unfit to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done, but upon what might appear to be done.”

¶86

This was followed in Rex v. Essex Justices Ex parte Perkins17. In Franklin's Case (supra)12, though on a

¶87

11 -

¶88

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶89

HC-KAR

¶90

construction of the provisions of that Act under consideration in that case it was held that the Minister was not acting judicially in discharging his duties, his Lordship accepted the aforesaid principle and expressed his view on the doctrine of ‘bias’ thus, at p. 103:

¶91

“My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word ‘bias’ should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute.”

¶92

The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural justice that in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or other in the dispute. It is also a matter or fundamental importance that a person interested in one party or the other should not, even formally, take part in the proceedings though in fact he does not influence the mind of the person, who finally decides the case. This is on the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The hearing given by the Secretary, Transport Department, certainly offends the said principle of natural justice and the proceeding and the hearing given, in violation of that principle, are bad.

¶93

31. The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State

¶94

12 -

¶95

NC: 2026:KHC:18167 WP No. 531 of 2021

¶96

HC-KAR

¶97

Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure.

¶98

As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, so long as the Show Cause Notice dated 09.06.2020 was issued by the respondent No.2 - General Manager, it was incumbent upon him alone to proceed further and without there being any Show Cause Notice issued by respondent No.1 - Managing Director, it was impermissible in law for him to pass the impugned order, which is not only contrary to the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, but also violative of principles of natural justice and consequently, the impugned order deserves to be quashed on this ground also.

¶99