Dismissed¶102

Smt. P H Nagamani v. the Karnataka Slum Areas

Civil – Possession and title

Karnataka HC13 Feb 2026RFA/574/2011

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Karnataka HC, RFA 574/2011 (decided 13.02.2026, Magadum J): injunction simplicitor over vacant site; Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 excess-land vesting; Slum Board rehabilitation allotment; GPA/agreement-to-sale conveys no title; Suraj Lamp (2012) 1 SCC 656; nemo dat quod non habet; possession follows title for vacant land; parity/additional evidence in appeal rejected; Trial Court finding upheld; appeal dismissed.

What did the court decide?

A registered conveyance raises a presumption of due execution, but that presumption operates only if the vendor had subsisting right, title and interest in the property on the date of execution. ¶57

Smt. P H Nagamani Vs the Karnataka Slum Areas — Karnataka HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the Trial Court's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove lawful possession as on the date of filing the suit suffers from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court? +2 more

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Court's answer

A registered conveyance raises a presumption of due execution, but that presumption operates only if the vendor had subsisting right, title and interest in the property on the date of execution.

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Ratio / Principle

Once excess land is determined under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and proceedings attain finality, the land vests in the State Government absolutely and free from all encumbrances; the erstwhile owner is divested of all right, title and interest and retains no transferable or alienable interest.

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Key takeaways

Transactions based merely on GPA, agreement to sell or similar documents do not convey title; relying on Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, the Court holds such documents could not have conferred ownership on the Malleshwaram Tailoring Co-operative Society Ltd.ratio¶67
Since the Society itself had no valid title, the allotment, possession certificate and both sale deeds emanate from a source devoid of title; on the principle of nemo dat quod non habet, the plaintiff, despite her registered sale deed dated 29.11.2004, cannot claim ownership or lawful possession where the root of title was extinguished by statutory vesting.ratio¶72

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Civil — Possession and title — Vacant site forming part of 4 acres 8 guntas in Sy.No.17 declared excess vacant land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, vested in the State and handed over to the Slum Board under Govt. Order No.HUD108-MCS-1995 dt.31.05.1995 — Plaintiff's suit for injunction simplicitor dismissed below; appeal by unsuccessful plaintiff also dismissed. Registered sale deed (dt.29.11.2004) raises presumption of due execution only if vendor had subsisting title on execution date; erstwhile owner, divested by statutory vesting, retained no transferable or alienable interest. Society's title rested on GPA/agreement to sell, which convey no title (Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 — relied on); foundational defect permeates all downstream allotments and sales (nemo dat quod non habet). For vacant sites, possession ordinarily follows title; presumption favours the statutory authority. Parity-based protections granted to site holders in actual, settled possession cannot extend to open vacant land; additional evidence tendered in appeal held unnecessary. Trial Court finding sustained; appeal dismissed.

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NC: 2026:KHC:9441 RFA No. 574 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 13^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 574 OF 2011 (PAR/INJ)

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BETWEEN:

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. SMT. P.H. NAGAMANI AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, W/O SRI. A.S HANUMANTHA REDDY, R/A. NO. 2102, 13TH "B" MAIN, 19TH"D" CROSS, 3RD STAGE, YELAHANKA NEW TOWN, BANGALORE - 64.

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…APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. SUNIL S. RAO, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. T. SESHAGIRI RAO, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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Digitally signed by SHARADAVANI B Location: High Court of Karnataka

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THE KARNATAKA SLUM AREAS (IMPROVEMENT AND CLEARANCE BOARD) PLATFORM ROAD, SESHADRIPURAM, BANGALORE, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY - 04.

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…RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. B. RAMASWAMY IYENGAR, ADVOCATE AND MS. B.P. RADHA, ADVOCATE)

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THIS RFA IS FILED U/O-41, RULE-1, R/W, SEC.96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED03.01.2011 PASSED IN O.S.4900/2007 ON THE FILE OF THE XL ADDL. CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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NC: 2026:KHC:9441 RFA No. 574 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The captioned appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.4900/2007 whereby the plaintiff’s suit for injunction simplicitor against the defendant-Slum board is dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff’s site, which was part and parcel of 4 acres 8 guntas, was declared as excess land and then conveyed to the Slum board and that the plaintiff cannot assert possession over the site being part and parcel of the excess land.

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For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred

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to as per their rankings before the Trial Court.

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Facts leading to the case are as under:

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The plaintiff instituted the suit contending that she is

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in lawful possession of the suit schedule property by virtue

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HC-KAR

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of a registered sale deed dated 29.11.2004 executed in

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her favour by her vendor, Smt. Radha, wife of Shankar Narayan. It is specifically pleaded that the said vendor had been allotted the suit site by the Malleshwaram Tailoring Co-operative Society Ltd., and that a possession certificate dated 15.01.1984 was issued in her favour by the said Society. Placing reliance on the registered conveyance deed executed by her vendor and the possession certificate issued by the Co-operative Society, the plaintiff asserted that she stepped into the shoes of her vendor and has been in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Alleging interference at the hands of the defendant, the present suit in O.S.No.4900/2007 came to be instituted seeking protection of her possession.

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Upon service of summons, the defendant–Slum Board entered appearance and filed its written statement, stoutly denying the plaint averments. While disputing the plaintiff’s title and possession, the defendant specifically pleaded that an extent of 4 acres 8 guntas in Sy.No.17

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HC-KAR

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had been declared as excess vacant land and acquired under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, “the Act”), and that the same stood vested with the Government. It was further contended that, pursuant to Government Order No.HUD108-MCS-1995 dated 31.05.1995, the said land was handed over to the defendant–Slum Board for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers residing near the Football Stadium, Ashoknagar, Bengaluru. In that background, the defendant asserted that the erstwhile owner, having lost title over the land measuring 4 acres 8 guntas by virtue of statutory vesting, had no subsisting right, title or interest to enter into any arrangement with the said Society. Consequently, it was contended that the allotment letters issued by the Society and the subsequent alienations made by the alleged allottees did not confer any valid right or title, and the suit was therefore liable to be dismissed.

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On the basis of the rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed appropriate issues for consideration. In order to

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HC-KAR

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establish her case regarding title and lawful possession, the plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and another witness as P.W.2, and produced in all twenty-four documents marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.24. The defendant, in rebuttal, examined its official as D.W.1 and produced six documents marked as Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.6.

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Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court answered Issue No.1 in the negative, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish her lawful possession as on the date of institution of the suit. The Court, while considering the evidence adduced by the defendant–Slum Board, recorded a finding that the suit site forms part of the extent of 4 acres 8 guntas in Sy.No.17, which had been declared as excess vacant land and had vested with the Government under the Act. Consequently, it held that neither the erstwhile owner nor the Society had any subsisting right to deal with the property, and therefore the sale deed obtained by the

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plaintiff did not confer valid title. On that reasoning, the suit came to be dismissed.

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Assailing the judgment and decree, learned counsel for the plaintiff reiterates the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal and vehemently contends that in respect of similarly situated site holders, their possession has been protected both by the Court of first instance as well as by this Court, with directions to the Slum Board to take possession only by following due process of law. In support of this submission, the appellant has sought to produce, by way of additional evidence, copies of judgments and recovery proceedings pertaining to such similarly placed site owners. Placing reliance on the said material, it is argued that on the principle of parity and equal treatment, the plaintiff is also entitled to protection of her possessory rights.

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I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant–plaintiff. Despite service of notice, there is no

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HC-KAR

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representation on behalf of the respondent–Slum Board. In the light of the contentions urged and the material placed on record, the following points arise for consideration:

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(i) Whether the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff has failed to prove her lawful possession as on the date of filing of the suit suffers from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court?

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(ii) Whether the additional evidence sought to be produced in appeal is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the dispute between the parties?

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(iii) What order?

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Finding on point No.(i):-

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Though the learned counsel for the plaintiff made

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a strenuous attempt to persuade this Court that the registered sale deed dated 29.11.2004, obtained for valuable consideration, by itself establishes lawful

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possession, this Court is unable to accede to the said submission. A registered conveyance undoubtedly raises a presumption of due execution; however, such presumption operates only if the vendor had subsisting right, title and interest in the property on the date of execution. On a careful perusal of the rebuttal evidence adduced by the defendant–Slum Board, particularly Ex.D.1, it becomes evident that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 were duly initiated against the erstwhile owner. The records disclose that the landholder himself filed a statutory declaration admitting that an extent of 4 acres 8 guntas in Sy.No.17 constituted excess vacant land. Upon issuance of notices and after following the procedure contemplated under the Act, the competent authority declared the said extent as excess land.

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The consequence of such declaration is statutorily significant. Once excess land is determined under the Act and the proceedings attain finality, the land stands vested in the State Government free from all

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HC-KAR

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encumbrances. Such vesting is not contingent or inchoate;

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it is absolute and operates by force of statute. The erstwhile owner is divested of all right, title and interest in the declared extent, and thereafter retains no transferable or alienable interest. In the present case, the material on record demonstrates that subsequent to such vesting, the Government, by order dated 31.05.1995, handed over the said extent to the defendant–Slum Board for the purpose of rehabilitation of slum dwellers. The Slum Board, in exercise of its statutory powers, notified the area as a slum area and assumed control and management thereof. Thus, from the date of vesting and consequential handover, the authority and control over the land stood vested exclusively with the State and thereafter with the Slum Board in accordance with law.

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In the light of the above statutory scheme and the rebuttal evidence placed on record, the pivotal question is not the genuineness of the plaintiff’s sale deed, but whether the vendor, or more fundamentally the

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HC-KAR

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Malleshwaram Tailoring Co-operative Society Ltd., had acquired any valid title so as to lawfully allot sites and convey rights. Admittedly, the erstwhile owner had already lost title to 4 acres 8 guntas upon declaration of excess land. Therefore, he had no subsisting saleable interest which could be conveyed either by way of an agreement to sell, joint development agreement, or power of attorney.

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The Society’s claim of title is traced to a General Power of Attorney and an agreement to sell allegedly executed by the erstwhile owner. However, once the land had vested in the State by operation of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, any such arrangement would be legally inconsequential. Even otherwise, the law is no longer res integra that transactions based merely on GPA, agreement to sell or similar documents do not convey title. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana¹ has categorically held that a transfer of immovable property 1 (2012) 1 SCC 656

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can be effected only by a registered deed of conveyance, and that GPA sales or transfers based on agreement to sell do not create ownership rights nor amount to conveyance of title. Therefore, even assuming such documents were executed, they would not confer ownership upon the Society.

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If the Society itself had not acquired valid right, title or interest, it could not have lawfully allotted sites or issued possession certificates. The foundational defect in title permeates all subsequent transactions. Consequently, the allotment in favour of the plaintiff’s vendor, the issuance of possession certificate, the first sale deed, and the subsequent sale deed in favour of the plaintiff are all transactions emanating from a source devoid of title. It is trite that no person can convey a better title than what he possesses ( nemo dat quod non habet ). Therefore, the plaintiff, though armed with a registered sale deed, cannot claim either ownership or lawful possession when the very root of title stands extinguished by statutory vesting.

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HC-KAR

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In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has failed to establish either lawful title or actual, juridical possession over the suit site, which forms part of the 4 acres 8 guntas declared as excess land and vested in the State and thereafter handed over to the Slum Board. The finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue No.1 is based on proper appreciation of statutory provisions and evidence on record and does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the ‘ Negative' .

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Finding on point No.(ii):-

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The learned counsel for the appellant–plaintiff, placing reliance on the additional evidence sought to be produced, has contended that in respect of similarly situated site holders, the Courts have protected their possession and directed the Slum Board to take possession only in accordance with due process of law. On

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HC-KAR

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the strength of those judgments, it is urged that even assuming the plaintiff’s possession is not supported by valid title, she is nevertheless entitled to protection of her possessory rights and the defendant must be compelled to initiate appropriate proceedings for recovery of

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possession.

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This Court has carefully examined the said submission. However, on a perusal of the plaint averments and the nature of relief sought, it is evident that the present suit pertains to a vacant site. There is no pleading or evidence indicating that the plaintiff has put up any construction or is in settled, physical occupation in the sense of exclusive, visible enjoyment. The suit schedule property is an open and vacant parcel of land forming part of the larger extent declared as excess land and vested in the State.

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In cases involving vacant land, the legal position stands on a distinct footing. It is a settled principle that in

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respect of vacant sites, possession ordinarily follows title. Where the land is open and unoccupied, the person having lawful title is presumed to be in possession unless the contrary is established by cogent evidence of actual, settled possession. In the present case, as already held while answering Point No.(i), the plaintiff has failed to establish valid title, and the land stands vested in the State and thereafter handed over to the Slum Board. In such circumstances, the presumption of possession enures

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to the benefit of the statutory authority and not to a person claiming under a defective chain of title.

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The judgments relied upon by the plaintiff, wherein directions were issued to the Slum Board to take possession in a manner known to law, appear to relate to cases where the parties were in actual, settled possession, often accompanied by constructions or demonstrable occupation. The ratio of those decisions cannot be mechanically extended to the present case, where the property is admittedly a vacant site and the plaintiff has

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not established independent, settled possession divorced from her claim of title.

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Therefore, the question of the defendant being required to initiate separate proceedings for recovery of possession does not arise in the factual matrix of the present case. The additional evidence sought to be produced does not advance the core issue between the parties, namely, the plaintiff’s lawful title and possession over the vacant site forming part of the excess land vested in the State. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the additional evidence is neither necessary nor essential for effective and complete adjudication of the lis. Accordingly, Point No.(ii) is answered in the

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‘ Negative’ .

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Finding on point No.(iii):-

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